

연대와 성찰 : 사회포럼 2002

연대와 전진 : 사회포럼 2003

연대와 ? : 사회포럼 2004

한

국사회포럼은 매년 사회운동의 활동가들과 진보적인 연구자들이 한자리에 어울려 사회운동 전반의 질적 발전을 위해 중요한 논점들에 대해 토론하고 장기적인 운동발전의 과제를 전망해가는 뜻깊은 자리입니다. 더불어 한국사회의 진보적 발전에 이바지하기 위한 공동실천을 모색하는 자리이기도 합니다.

한

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
사

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한반도 평화포럼

정전 50년, 한반도를  
동아시아 평화의 중심으로



인권정보자료실  
SAel.3

정전 50년 한반도를 동아시아 평화의 중심으로

한반도 평화포럼

SAel.3

한국사회포럼

■ 일시 : 2003년 7월 26일(토) / 오전 9:30 - 오후 6:40 ■ 장소 : 연세대학교 법과대학  
■ 주최 : 정전 50년 평화대회 조직위원회 ■ 주관 : 한국사회포럼 ■ 후원 : 한겨레 통일문화재단

# 정전 50년, 한반도를 동아시아 평화의 중심으로



■ 일시 : 2003년 7월 26일(토) / 오전 9:30 - 오후 6:40 ■ 장소 : 연세대학교 법과대학

■ 주최 : 정전 50년 평화대회 조직위원회 ■ 주관 : 한국사회포럼 ■ 후원 : 한겨레 통일문화재단

# 한반도 평화포럼 프로그램

**개회식**  
9:30-10:00

민중의례		
경과보고	송주명	한국사회포럼 사무국장, 한신대
개회사	조희연	정전50년대회 조직위 상임운영위원장, 성공회대
인사말	단병호	민주노총 위원장
	박상중	참여연대 공동대표
기조연설	리영희	한양대 명예교수

## 제1세션

10:00-12:30 정전체제의 문제와 '북핵수기' : 한반도 위기의 진보적 해결책과 평화체제

사회	황상익	전국교수노동조합 위원장, 서울대
발제	브루스 커밍스	시카고대 교수
	이토나리히코	일본주오대학, 아소시에 21
	김민웅	재미언론인
토론	손호철	민교협 공동의장, 서강대
	김승국	통일연대
	이중희	노동자의 힘
	박석운	민중연대
	김제남	녹색연합

## 제2세션

1:30-3:20 한반도 위기, 평화운동은 이를 어떻게 돌파해 갈 것인가?

주제1 : 이라크 전쟁 이후 반전 반세계화 운동

사회	김어진	아시아사회연대
발제	최일봉	다함께
	고민택	노동자의 힘
	김승호	사이버노동대학
플로어토론		

주제2 : 한반도 평화운동과 통일운동  
 사회 신정완 학술단체협의회, 성공회대  
 발제 정대연 민중연대  
 양관수 희망네트워크 공동의장  
 플로어토론

주제3 : 남한 평화운동과 동아시아 평화연대  
 사회 정옥식 평화네트워크  
 발제 정경란 평화여성회  
 키타가와 히로카즈 일한민중연대  
 플로어토론

## 제3세션

3:30-6:00 한반도 위기와 남한 및 동아시아 평화운동의 과제

사회	김상근	한신대
발제	강정구	동국대, 통일연대
	박순성	동국대, 참여연대
토론	이장희	평화통일시민연대
	이희수	민주노총 대협실장
	박진섭	환경운동연합
	장상환	민주노동당, 경상대
	박이순	사회진보연대

## 평화선언 채택

6:10-6:40

사회	조희연	정전50년대회 조직위 상임운영위원장, 성공회대
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## 파괴된 평화체제 : 대한 미 외교의 반세기간의 실패상

Bruce Cumings University of Chicago

미국의 대한정책은 장기간의 실패를 거듭해 왔다. 한반도는 천년동안 통일되어 있었으며나 미군이 진주한 직후 곧이어 분단되었다. 김일성이 북한 최초의 정부인 임시인민위원회의 위원장으로 취임했을 때 미국은 그의 취임을 승인하기를 거부했으며, 그의 정권을 지금껏 인정해오지 않았다. 뒤이은 동족상잔의 전쟁으로 수백만의 사람들이 학살되었지만 한국을 이전상황(분단상황)으로 되돌린 채 이 분단 상황을 고착화 시켰다. 사실상 미국은 진지한 외교적 사안으로 북한과의 평화협정이나 평화조약에 서명함으로써 전쟁을 끝내려는 그 어떠한 조치도 취하지 않았다. 유력한 미국인들에 의하면, 현재 보다 파괴적인 전쟁의 가능성이 보다 분명해지고 있다.

한국의 역사적 경험에 비추어 짐작해보면 현재 미국의 이라크점령으로 인하여 이라크는 (아마도 두 부분이 아니라 세 부분으로) 분단될 것이다. 5년 후에는 내전이 발생하여 수백만의 인명이 희생될 것이나 그로 인해 해결되는 문제는 없을 것이다. 2060년대에 이르러서도 악한 적과 (그가 누구이든) 대치하면서 거의 4만 명의 미군들이 주둔하고 있을 것이며 또 다른 전쟁의 가능성에 항상 직면하고 있을 것이다. 현재 미군의 이라크점령으로 인해 미국은 매월 40억불의 경비를 지불하고 있으며, 또한 미국은 한국에 대한 안보공약을 지키기 위해 매년 280억불에서 400억불을 지출하고 있다.

요컨대 딘 러스크가 미공군이 나카사키를 말살한 다음날 자정에 지도를 들여다

■ 이 글은 7월 25일 학술단체협의회가 주최한 한국전쟁 정전 50년 국제평화 학술심포지움 『정전체제를 넘어, 평화체제로』 에 저자가 발표한 글을 한국어로 요약한 것이며, 원문과 요약본은 저자의 동의를 얻어 실었습니다.

보며 그때까지 아무도 주목하지 않았던 38선에 경계선을 그은 이후 미국은 북한과의 위협하고 영속적이며 궁극적으로는 무익한 대치상황에 고착되어 있다.

우리 시대에 들어 지난10년 이상 미국과 북한은 고양이와 쥐 사이와 같은 위험도 높은 외교를 벌여왔다. 북한측은 자신들이 개발하고 있는 핵 프로그램과 미사일을 비장의 카드로 이용해왔으며 역대 미국대통령들은 이에 대처하는데 있어 실수를 거듭하고 있다. 이 글에서 필자는 지난 5년간의 중대사건들을 검토하여 어떻게 우리가 2003년에 들어 이렇게 심각한 위험상황에 도달하게 되었는지 분석해보고자 한다. 또한 미국과 북한사이의 문제에 대한 근본적 해결책을 모색해보고자 한다.

The Peace Regime in Tatters:

Fifty Years of Failure in American Diplomacy Toward Korea

Bruce Cumings

University of Chicago

prepared for the

International Conference in Memory of the 50th anniversary of the Cease-fire of the  
Korean War

Seoul, July 25, 2003

Co-sponsored by the Munhwa Daily and the Korean Progressive Academy Council

**Please note:** this paper is copyrighted and is not for quotation or reproduction in any form without the expressed permission of the author. Parts of it are forthcoming in November 2003 in Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (The New Press).

On September 8, 1945 U.S. combat troops first occupied Korea. Three months later the commander of the Occupation, Gen. John Reed Hodge, declared war on the communist party and the Peoples Republic (the ones in the southern zone), in February 1946 he refused to have any dealings with Kim Il Sung, and in the next month (March 1946) he issued his first warning to Washington of an impending North Korean invasion. Now fifty eight years have passed, and if North Korea seems stuck in a time warp, likewise the U.S. has not been able to extricate itself from its original commitment to set up a government in the South and defend it against communism. As the 50th anniversary of the end of the war neared, *The New York Times* editorialized that the U.S. must find some mix of diplomacy and coercion that would keep the DPRK from becoming a nuclear power: There is no time to lose, the editors wrote, because the alternative to an engaged diplomacy would be a catastrophic war, including the possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on Japan. No Time to Lose on North Korea, lead editorial, *New York Times* (July 18, 2003). One of the closest American observers of Korea policy, former Defense Secretary William Perry, warned that the U. S. and North Korea are drifting toward war, perhaps as early as this year. I think we are losing control of the situation, Perry said, claiming that The nuclear program now underway in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities. Thomas E. Ricks and Glenn Kessler, U.S., N. Korea Drifting Toward War, Perry Warns, *Washington Post*, (July 15, 2003), p. A14.

By what sins of commission and omission have we arrived at such a disastrous state of affairs? How can it be that a commitment taken up at the end of World War II poses such a mortal threat to the U.S. and Japan today? From a strategic standpoint, one can only conclude that the American effort in Korea has been a long-running failure: Korea was unified when American troops landed, and had been for a millennium, but soon it was divided; when Kim Il Sung became the chairman of the Interim Peoples Committee, the first government in the North, the U.S. refused to recognize his position, and has never recognized the regime he embodied; soon a fratricidal war killed millions of people but returned Korea only to the *status quo ante*, and it has never ended indeed, the U.S. has never, as a matter of serious diplomacy, even tried to end it by concluding a peace treaty or agreement with the North. Today a new, even more devastating war is a distinct possibility, according to influential Americans.

If our contemporary occupation of Iraq follows Korea's pattern, the country will be divided (probably into three parts, not two), five years later a civil war will erupt and millions will die but nothing will be solved; and in the 2060s, nearly 40,000 American troops will still be there, holding the line against the evil enemy (whoever he might be), with a new war possible at any moment. That occupation is now costing the U.S. \$4 billion per month, but Americans pay between \$28 and \$40 billion to sustain our security commitments in Korea every year, year in and year out. In short, the United States had been locked in a dangerous, unending, but ultimately futile and failed embrace with North Korea ever since Dean Rusk consulted a map around midnight on the day after the U.S. Air Force obliterated Nagasaki with an atomic bomb, and etched a border no one had ever noticed before at the 38th parallel.

In our time, more than a decade of dangerous cat-and-mouse diplomacy has now passed between the U.S. and North Korea, with Pyongyang playing the hole card of its nuclear program and its missiles, and successive American presidents stumbling about to react and respond. In this paper I want to revisit the critical events of the past five years, so that we can understand how we arrived at a point of such dire danger in 2003. At the same time I want to point toward a fundamental solution of the problems between the U.S. and the DPRK. The solution begins with a simple *realpolitik* conclusion, but this conclusion seems to be one of the hardest aspects of this situation to understand: in the new century, unlike the previous one, the North *does not* want the U.S. out of Korea, in spite of endless regime propaganda, but wants the U.S. to stay involved, to deal with a new and threatening strategic environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union (which abruptly abandoned the North in 1991 Edward Neilan, "Soviets Demand Look at Reactors in North Korea," *The Washington Times* (April 16, 1991), p. A1. Soviet-DPRK trade was cut in half from 1988 to 1992, and shipments of oil dropped by three-quarters in one year alone (from 440,000 tons in 1990 to 100,000 tons in 1991).

), to help the country through its current difficult transition, and to keep the South from swallowing it. This is the key strategic element that makes possible a victory for diplomacy, rather than a reprehensible and ultimately criminal march toward war. Sooner or later an American president will come to understand this, the crisis will end, embassies will be exchanged, and Americans will begin to enjoy touring this beautiful Hermit Kingdom, and meeting its unknown but warm, proud and dignified people.

### The Nuclear Crisis First Act and Sequel

In June 1994 the US and North Korea nearly stumbled into the second Korean War, after months of increasing tension that very much resemble the situation today. On NBC's *Meet the Press* on April 3, 1994 (check if that was a Sunday), William Perry (then the Defense Secretary) said, "we do not want war and will not provoke a war over this or any other issue in Korea; but if US sanctions provoke the North Koreans into unleashing a war ... that is a risk that we're taking." Quoted in *The Chicago Tribune*, April 4, 1994. In a memorandum to the UN dated April 10, 1996, the DPRK stated that "a second Korean War would have broken out had the United Nations chosen to repeat its past by unilaterally imposing 'sanctions' against the DPRK." Press Release, April 10, 1996, DPRK Mission to the UN, New York. Perry's formulation was not just careful and precise: he and Ashton Carter, Jr. had been studying for some time whether a preemptive strike could be carried out against Yongbyon without starting the next Korean War. They concluded that it couldn't. But that did not stop either side from risking a war that nobody wanted, three months later.

By mid-June the Clinton administration had devised a plan laying out the first steps the US should take to prepare for war, which included the addition of 10,000 American troops in Korea, dispatching Apache attack helicopters, and moving in more Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

Susan Rosegrant, in collaboration with Michael D. Watkins, "Carrots, Sticks, and Question Marks: Negotiating the North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1995.

Furthermore, to make sure Clinton understood both the human and the monetary costs of a war, the Joint Chiefs had summoned all the regional commanders and four star generals in the service to Washington in late May [1994] to discuss Korea and brief the President. According to U.S. commander in Korea Gen. Gary Luck's estimates, he would need as many as 80,000 to 100,000 body bags in the field for the American soldiers who would die in a new Korean war, and Korean troop casualties could reach the hundreds of thousands. Moreover, if the North struck Seoul as expected, the number of civilian casualties would be staggering. The cost of such a war, Luck predicted, would be at least \$500 million and could top \$1 trillion, far higher than the almost \$60 billion spent on Desert Storm, a sum largely borne by US allies.

*Ibid.*, pp. 34-35. Although this study discounts Pentagon desires to remove Yŏngbyŏn entirely with a "surgical strike" (pp. 15, 32-4), State Department negotiators with North Korea told me they were constantly confronted with Pentagon and CIA officers who would say, "Why negotiate with these people? We can handle the Yŏngbyŏn problem overnight." Another informant told me that General Colin Powell played a critical role in pointing out the costs of a new Korean War to Clinton. See also Oberdorfer's harrowing account of how close Washington and P'yongyang were to going to war, in *The Two Koreas*, pp. 305-36.

One way of expressing what happened in May and June 1994 is that Clinton and his advisors looked down the barrel of the other side's guns and blinked. Another way is to say that Pyongyang did the same thing. It did not want war, either. But it did want to rub American noses in the realities of the Korean conflict, so they would pay attention and settle the crisis through diplomacy (i.e., diplomacy in the sense that both sides give up something, not that one side imposes its will on the other). Former President Jimmy Carter had been invited to visit Pyongyang some years before. Alarmed by what he had learned about the depth of the crisis from briefings by Clinton administration officials, he decided to fly off to Pyongyang in mid-June 1994 and meet with Kim Il Sung (the first such meeting between Kim and a current or former US President). By a sleight-of-hand that depended on Cable News Network's simultaneous transmission (direct TV mediation that short-circuited the ongoing diplomacy), Carter broke the logjam.

The October Framework Agreement promised Pyongyang that in return for freezing its graphite reactors and returning to full inspections under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a consortium of nations (including the US, Japan, South Korea and others) would supply light-water reactors to help solve the North's energy problems; the consortium also agreed to supply long-term loans and credits to enable Pyongyang to purchase the new reactors, valued at about \$4 billion. In the meantime the US would supply heating oil to tide over the DPRK's energy problems, and would begin a step-by-step upgrading of diplomatic relations. The agreement called for full normalization of relations, and most importantly, an American pledge not to threaten or target North Korea with nuclear weapons.

Since the provisions of the Framework Agreement are often misconstrued by critics, let's extract the language:

Article II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
- 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the others capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
- 3) As progress is made on issue of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level ..

III. 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.

The full text of the 1994 agreement is in Rosegrant and Watkins (1995), Exhibit ii.

The framework agreement was predicated on mutual mistrust, and therefore both sides had to verify compliance at each step toward completion of the agreement, which was supposed to come in 2003 (or later), since constructing the reactors and bringing them on line would take years. Once the reactor construction was completed the North Koreans would dismantle their mothballed reactors, and (before the LWRs began operation) they would be finally required open up their famous waste site to IAEA inspection--and that would at last prove whether they ever reprocessed enough plutonium for an atomic bomb.

The Light-Water Reactors cost the U.S. next to nothing. Building the reactors will probably run over \$5 billion if they are ever completed; we paid in about \$30 million a year, with Congress balking all the way, while the South Koreans and Japanese footed most of the bill. By contrast, the estimated direct and indirect cost of maintaining 37,000 American troops in the South and myriad military bases, runs from \$17 billion to \$42 billion annually, depending on how the costs are calculated.

Sigal, Leon V., *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 9; Harrison, Selig S., *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 184.

In other words the October Framework Agreement was a good one: it kept the



entire Yongbyon facility frozen, not just the 8000 fuel rods that the North withdrew in May 1994; it lasted for eight years, until December 2002, with seals on the reactors and UN inspectors on the scene; and it provided the basis for subsequent diplomacy and engagement that came close to neutralizing the North Korean threat. Above all, it was a key element making possible President Kim Dae Jungs dramatic new policies toward the North.

#### A Critical Year: 1998

In 1998, on a warm, beautiful winter day that would not come again to Korea for many Februaries, long-time dissident Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated. He was the first president to reflect a genuine political transition from the elites who had ruled the ROK since 1948. In his inaugural address he unveiled his sunshine policy, pledging to actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea, and declaring his support for Pyongyongs attempts to better relations with Washington and Tokyo in complete contrast with his predecessors, who chafed mightily at any hint of such rapprochement. He soon underlined his pledges by approving large shipments of food aid to the North, lifting limits on business deals between the North and southern firms, and calling for an end to the American economic embargo against the North (during a visit to Washington in June 1998). Kim explicitly rejected unification by absorption along German lines (which was the *de facto* policy of his predecessors), and in effect committed Seoul to a prolonged period of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation, with reunification put off for twenty or thirty more years, until the next generation.

Both governments now committed themselves to a staged, slow process of reaching a confederated reunification. The North first tabled its confederal plan in 1960, and Kim Dae Jungs scheme called for a prolonged period of confederation, the first stage of which would involve close, cooperative relations while maintaining two different systems, states, militaries and foreign policies. The two sides would manage relations between each other through various inter-Korean organizations, pending the second stage when, after a fairly long period of preparation, formal unification would occur under a federal system of one people, one nation, one political system, but two autonomous regional governments. (In his inaugural address Kim had cited a practical need to respect the pride of the North Koreans and the necessity to govern the North Korean region separately for a considerable time, under a regional autonomous government). The federal government would run Koreas diplomacy, defense and its

major domestic policies. The third stage would be real unification under a central government. All of this would be done with the consent of the people through a democratic process.

After a year of testing Kim Dae Jung, by mid-1999 it was apparent that Pyongyang viewed his sunshine policy as a major change in South Koreas position. Its attitude toward Washington also began changing. Long determined to get the U.S. out of Korea, North Korean leaders now began to make clear to various interlocutors that if the U.S. were to become an honest broker on the peninsula, American troops might stay on the peninsula, to deal with changed international power relations (especially a strong Japan and a strong China), and to help Pyongyang through its current economic difficulties. Selig Harrison interviewed a North Korean general who told him that whereas the North may call publicly for the withdrawal of American troops, in reality the troops should stay to help deal with a strong Japan, among other things. See Harrison, Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea, Foreign Policy, number 106 (Spring 1997).

Secretary of Defense William Cohen seemed almost to echo such views in July 1998, when he declared that American troops would stay in Korea even after it was unified.

The Republican opposition in the U.S., however, viewed something else as the critical fact of 1998: the DPRKs missile program, which soon came to be the primary justification for a National Missile Defense program. In late August, 1998, a hailstorm of alarmist press reports stated that the North had sent a long-range missile arcing through the stratosphere over Japan, leading to virtual panic in Tokyo as if the missile had barely cleared the treetops. In August 1998, however, North Koreas press had spoken for weeks of little else but preparations for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the regime on September 9, which would finally bring Kim Jong Il to full power after the long mourning period for his father. Ten days before that anniversary, Pyongyang announced that it had launched a three-stage rocket that had put a satellite in orbit its photo in DPRK-aligned newspapers in Japan looked just like the small satellite China had first put into orbit in 1970, whirring around the globe beeping out The East is Red albeit beeping out the Song of Kim Il Sung, of course. The international media, however, treated this as a direct threat to Japan, and denied that it was a satellite throw. It took weeks for the U.S. intelligence groups to do retrospective analysis of radar tapes, the only way to monitor this missile once it was launched; finally they concluded that it was indeed a fireworks display probably

meant to commemorate the 50th anniversary, but that the satellite had failed to reach orbit. In all the hoopla, it was conveniently forgotten that the North had not tested a missile from May 1993 to August 1998.

North Korean missiles are good, indeed they are the best available on the world market for countries not allied to the U.S. The Scud-C had a range of about 500 kilometers, but in May 1993 they tested an enhanced Scud capable of 1000 to 1300 kilometer range with a one ton payload. It used a cluster of four Scud engines wrapped around the missile body. David Wright and Timur Kadyshev, *An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile*, *Science and Global Security* 4 (1994), pp. 129-60.

In this, its only test, it flew down range 300 miles (or 500 kilometers) and banged the target right on the nosethus making clear that the North could hit Japan. The North Koreans squeezed everything possible out of this technology to give the Scud such range, but to go beyond it they developed the Taepodong-1, a long range ballistic missile capable of 1500-2000 kilometers. Like the early American rocket tests in the late 1940s, this is essentially one missile stacked on top of another Scud-C on top of a Nodong, with a small 3rd-stage booster for the satellite.

The Taepodong-2 has a different base rocket, resembling the Chinese DF-3 or CSS-2, with much greater thrust, capable of throwing a warhead 3500 to 6000 kilometers thus theoretically bringing into range the northwest coast of the U.S. (Alaska is about 5000 kilometers from North Korea, but the closest point in the contiguous 48 states is about 8,000). However it has never been tested, and independent experts believe the North has no rocket like the DF-3, or the much more powerful engines needed to power it. The only evidence that this rocket exists is a North Korean model, a mock-up that they allowed to be photographed in 1994. David C. Wright,

*Will North Korea Negotiate Away its Missiles?*, privately-circulated paper, 1998.

It may be a rocket under development, but much more likely, its another card pulled out of their deck, turned over briefly, and then put back in the deck.

Kim Jong IIs long-range missile quickly became Donald Rumsfelds poster child for Missile Defense. Rumsfeld had chaired a Task Force on missile defense, which issued its report in the summer of 1998, shortly before the missile was tested. In fact, however, this missile needs a shot of Mr. Rumsfelds Viagra. It has insufficient lift capacity to carry a nuclear warhead because the North lacks the technology either to lighten missile throw-weight (by using aluminum alloys), or to manufacture a

sufficiently small nuclear warhead (which would require high-speed X-ray cameras that the North does not have). Even if lighter chemical or biological warheads were installed, it is unclear that its first stage has the thrust to lift that payload fast enough and far enough to reach any part of the US. Nor does North Korea appear to have heat-resistant technologies that would keep the warhead from burning up upon re-entry into the atmosphere; Selig Harrison, *The Missiles of North Korea: How Real a Threat?*, *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (Fall 2000), pp. 1324.

it would turn into a charcoal briquette, which happens to be what Colin Powell wanted to turn North Korea into should it launch a missile at the U.S. or so he said in 1995. The missile launching site is rudimentary, with no barracks for a crew; the missiles have to be trucked in, warmed up, and then fired off. In a crisis the U.S. would take them out before they got to the launch pad.

In retrospect, 1998 was also the year that the North began seriously to question Washingtons real policies toward it: Selig Harrison has argued that the North lost patience with American unwillingness to fulfill its commitments under the Framework Agreement. The foreign minister told him in May 1998, *We are losing patience. Our generals and atomic industry leaders insist we must resume our nuclear program. If you do not act in good faith, there will be consequences. Good faith, to the foreign minister means showing us that you are serious about normalization.* Harrison (2002), p. 227.

Critical to the Clinton Administrations failure to implement the Framework Agreement was the Gingrich Revolution that swung the House of Representatives firmly into the Republican column in November 1994. Republicans railed on in criticism of the nuclear deal for months and years, beginning with a *Wall Street Journal* editorial saying that Clinton will be remembered for pouring money into the Kim regime just as it should have been allowed to crash; why help out this

Orwellian state at its moment of maximum vulnerability? Editorial, *New Deal for Pyongyang*, *The Wall Street Journal* (October 21, 1994), p. A14.

Somehow the editors usual economic rationality deserted them; North Korea gives up its huge investment in the Yongbyon complex, up front, in return for reactors to be finished a decade later. In August 2002 construction crews finally get around to pouring concrete for the buildings that will house the LWRs, with delivery of the reactor cores estimated to begin in 2005 Howard French, *Work Starts on North Koreas U.S.-Backed Nuclear Plant*, *The New York Times* (August 8, 2002), p. A9.

). So who poured their money down a rathole?

Furthermore, American nuclear threats never stopped. Documents recently obtained by Hans M. Kristensen of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* show that in June 1998 the Pentagon staged simulated long-range nuclear attack drills on North Korea out of the Seymour Johnson Air base in North Carolina. F-15E fighter-bombers of the 4th Fighter Wing dropped dummy BDU-38 nuclear bombs on concrete emplacements arrayed like the hundreds that protect Korean underground facilities. Such stand-off nuclear attacks replaced previous plans to utilize nukes in the South. Kristensen emphasized that this new strategy, of targeting hardened underground facilities, was to be used as early in a crisis as possible. Hans M. Kristensen, Preemptive Posturing, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September/October 2002, Volume 58, No. 5, pp. 54-59.

As if the North Koreans might not get the point, in October 1998 Marine Lt. General Raymond P. Ayres spoke publicly (on a not-for-attribution basis) about plans for rolling back the DPRK, installing a South Korean occupation regime, and possibly beginning the whole thing preemptively if they had unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing to attack. He said that the entire resources of the U.S. Marines would be into the battle; they would abolish North Korea as a state and reorganize it under South Korean control. Well kill em all. Richard Halloran, a veteran correspondent, was in this audience and reported Ayres statements on the Internet on Nov. 14, 1998; when I asked him to identify the source by name, he declined; however Selig Harrison identified the source as Gen. Ayres. Harrison (2002), pp. 119-20.

The North responded with a farrago of unusually bellicose statements. A retired American general who commanded the US-ROK first Corps in Korea, Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, said that if preemptive strikes were part of the American war plan, it would be very dangerous and would represent a fundamental departure from the past. No commander wants to wait for the other side to strike first if he can see it coming. But there is a very delicate calculation on both sides and its very important to give North Korea assurance that we will not be the first to attack. Quoted in Harrison (2002), p. 122.

The 1998 *Defense White Paper* issued by the Pentagon, however, once again suggested that a new war wouldnt be so easy: 640,000 American soldiers from all

branches of the military would be needed to defeat North Korea. Richard Halloran, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 3, 1998; Halloran quoted the second statement in his Nov. 14, 1998 story put out on the Global Beat internet site. Lee Sung-yul, U.S. Prepared to Send 640,000 Troops if North Korea Invades South, *Korea Herald* (September 28, 1998).

In the fall of 1998 the State Department (usually at odds with Pentagon hardliners back then, just as it is now) had begun a months-long review of American policy toward Korea, led by Amb. William Perry and Wendy Sherman. In May 1999 this group traveled to Pyongyang to meet with First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju and officials close to Kim Jong Il. He and his entourage were afforded every courtesy, and the North seemed to have been quite satisfied with the visit. Talks Between Kang Sok Ju and William Perry, KCNA, May 28, 1999.

In June, however, a bad clash over crabbing grounds in the West sea left 20 North Koreans dead. But in another augur of Pyongyongs mood, they took these deaths lying down and after an investigation, Kim Jong Il issued a highly unusual apology.

Dr. Perry finally issued a public version of his report (and this policy review) in October 1999, the essence of which was a policy of engagement predicated on the co-existence of two Koreas for another considerable period of time, a progressive lifting of the 50-year-old American embargo against the North, establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides, and a substantial aid package for the North. The North, for its part, agreed to continue to observe the 1994 agreement, to put a moratorium on missile testing, and to continue talks with the U.S. about ending its missile program, including sales of missiles to the Middle East. Thus the engagement policy was revived, and Washington and Seoul could move in tandem on their policies toward the DPRK. All this was predicated on the recognition that North Korea was not going away, would not collapse, and therefore had to be dealt with as it is, not as we would like it to be, in the words of Amb. Perry. This helped to set the stage for the June 2000 summit, when Kim Jong Il welcomed Kim Dae Jung to Pyongyang.

Kim Dae Jung had said many times that North Korea did not oppose a continuing U.S. troop presence in Korea if Washington were to pursue engagement with Pyongyang rather than confrontation (U.S. troops would continue to be useful in

policing the border, i.e. the DMZ, in assuring that the Souths superior armed forces dont swallow the North, and in keeping Japan and China at bay); at the June summit Kim Jong Il confirmed this view, telling Kim Dae Jung directly that he did not necessarily oppose the continuing stationing of U.S. troops in Korea. In this sense, Kim Dae Jungs policies constituted the first serious attempt in half a century years to achieve North-South reconciliation *within* the Northeast Asian security structure that has existed since the settlement of World War II. He won the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his far-reaching efforts at peace and reconciliation.

#### A Fateful Election

The June summit, and the State Departments major review of policy, prepared the ground for a deal on North Koreas missiles that was deeply in the Korean, American and global interest even if this deal seems almost to have been forgotten by the worlds media. North Korea was willing to forgo construction, deployment and international sales of all missiles with a range of more than 300 miles. If President Clinton had been willing to do Kim Jong Il the favor of a summit in Pyongyang, American negotiators were convinced that Kim would also have agreed to enter the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which would limit all North Korean missiles to an upper range of 180 miles (and thus remove a threat felt deeply in nearby Japan). In return the U.S. would have provided \$1 billion in food aid to the regime, for several years. See Michael R. Gordons investigative report, *How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea*, *New York Times* (March 6, 2001), pp. A1, A8. I also confirmed the details of his report during a meeting Amb. Perry at Stanford University in March 2001. In other words getting North Korea into the MTCR would cost \$1 billion annually and a summit meeting between the American President and Kim Jong Il; National Missile Defense said by spokesmen of the Bush administration to be directed particularly at North Korea had already cost \$60 billion by that time.

Kims missiles are commodities for sale, indeed they are the biggest earners of foreign exchange for the regime, and Bill Clinton rightly wanted to buy them out (again, on the principle that you cant get something for nothing). In a fateful month, November 2000, everything was poised for a Clinton visit to Pyongyang. Clinton wanted to go to Pyongyang, and his negotiators had their bags packed for weeks in November but as Sandy Berger later put it, it wasnt a good idea for the President to leave the country when they didnt know whether there could be a major constitutional crisis.

#### Gordon, *How Politics Sank Accord.*

After the Supreme Court stepped in to give the 2000 presidential election to George W. Bush, there was a touch-and-go moment when it looked like Clinton might still go: I met Kim Dae Jung along with some other scholars in Seoul on December 22, 2000, and he said he was waiting to hear from the White House if Clinton was on his way, that day or the next. Then I flew back to the U.S., in time to read morning headlines saying he had decided against the trip. Later on it became clear that the Bush transition team didnt like the deal; even if Clinton had signed off on it, they would have undone it, according to former officials in the Clinton administration.

The new administration was quickly at loggerheads over whether there had been any real progress in Korea in the late 1990s, or not. A day before President Kim Dae Jung showed up as the first foreign leader to meet with Bush in the White House in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters that he would pick up where the Clinton administration left off in working toward a deal that would shut down North Koreas missiles. Soon he had to backtrack, caught up short by the Presidents own hard line taken in his Oval Office meeting with Kim meeting that was a diplomatic disaster by any standard. Kim Dae Jung, fresh from winning the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize, was expecting to welcome the North Korean leader to Seoul in April or May of 2001, with this meeting being the follow-on to the previous summit. He returned home with his advisors publicly calling the meeting embarrassing and privately cursing President Bush. An unnamed advisor said it was embarrassing in *The Korea Herald*, March 13, 2001; I spoke with a Korean member of the National Assembly at a conference on Korea on March 13, who talked about Kims advisors cursing Bush for his ham-handed tactics. Powell backed and filled and rightwing Republicans lambasted him for appeasement, while President Kims upcoming summit and his sunshine policy were suddenly plunged into deep trouble, with Pyongyang abruptly canceling a Cabinet-level meeting with Southern negotiators.

Months after Kim Dae Jungs visit, President Bush appeared to reverse himself when the administration announced that it would hold be willing to talk with the North Koreans, after all. This period was punctuated by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, and Pyongyangs unprecedented official condolences published within 24 hours of those terrible events. Newspapers reported that a policy paper from former Ambassador to Korea Donald Gregg to former President Bush reached the oval office and turned the new president around on talks with the North. It was clear during the Clinton administration that engagement with North Korea had backing from

both Democrats and Republicans, and Republican Gregg was one of the vocal backers. It isn't clear, though, that Kim Dae Jung's assiduous courting of Republicans of both the middle and the right over many years (for example, several conservatives in the Heritage Foundation) helped him much in the last year two years of his term in office, particularly in regard to furthering reconciliation with North Korea. Bush administration and Republican Party affinities run in the direction of the old ruling group, the party of Generals Park, Chun and Roh, which had hoped to make a comeback in the 2002 presidential elections. The backtracking on Korea since Bush assumed office is also an unfortunate example of the degree to which Washington still dominates the diplomacy of the Korean peninsula.

Under the 1994 Framework Agreement, the U.S. promised to give the DPRK formal assurances that it would not threaten it with nuclear weapons, but such assurances were never provided. This failure did not seem to be an insurmountable stumbling block to continued implementation of the agreement, however, and in October 2000 when Clinton met with Gen. Cho Myong-nok in the Oval Office, the joint communiqué stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other. Both sides also again committed themselves to begin normalizing relations by opening liaison offices in both capitals, and to lift restrictions on trade and investment. Former Clinton administration officials say the North dragged its feet in opening a liaison office in Washington. Nothing prevented the U.S. from opening one in Pyongyang, however, but it didn't. In January 1995 the North lifted its trade and investment barriers, but the U.S. did nothing about the embargo it slapped on the North during the Korean War until June 2000, when some minor barriers were relaxed.

The embargo first began as a limited one in 1949, then the North came under the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1950, and in the 1970s and 80s other bills were tacked on: the Trade Act of 1974, the Export Administration Act, the Arms Control Export Act, the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits World Bank or IMF loans, and finally the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, barring various transactions with any country on the State Department's list of terrorist countries.

While Bush's advisors continued to argue over whether to confront or to engage Pyongyang, Kim Dae Jung's leading advisor on the North, Lim Dong Won, traveled to the North in April 2002 to convey President Kim's judgment that the global strategy of the United States has fundamentally changed, and that after the

September 11th attacks, the United States is prepared to resort to military means of counter-proliferation and that Chairman Kim must fully, and clearly, understand that North Korea itself is also included in the possible targets for such military efforts by the United States. (This was an early warning of the pre-emptive doctrine officially announced the following September.) The North responded with energetic diplomatic activity for the next several months, renewing high-level talks with the South, making a number of agreements on re-linking railways and establishing new free export zones in the North, culminating in Kim Jong Il's August meeting with President Putin and the unprecedented visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to Pyongyang in September 2002, with both sides appearing to think that a final normalization of relations was in the offing.

Koizumi's summit with Kim Jong Il was opposed by the Bush administration. A few days before it was announced, Undersecretary John Bolton (a protégé of Senator Jesse Helms) was in Seoul denouncing the North as armed to the teeth and thoroughly evil; in early September Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly traveled to Tokyo and tabled evidence that the North had a new nuclear program, this time to enrich uranium. Koizumi went ahead anyway, an act of independence unprecedented in U.S.-Japan relations going back to 1945. To avoid the appearance of a breach with Tokyo, however, U.S. diplomats publicly pretended that Washington agreed with the summit.

#### Nuclear Crisis: The Sequel

In October 2002 a second nuclear crisis erupted, which was a virtual rerun of events that transpired a decade ago played on fast-forward. The North Koreans pulled out their play book and began running a very predictable sequel, except they sped it up. What took them more than a year to do in 1993-94, they mostly accomplished in December 2002: The DPRK again kicked the IAEA inspectors out, took the seals off and reopened their 30 megawatt reactor and soon began loading new fuel rods. They again castigated the IAEA for being a tool of Washington, announced their withdrawal from the NPT, and said that any Security Council sanctions would be interpreted as a declaration of war.

The DPRK Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, said this in his news conference at the UN on January 10, 2003. In the spring of 2003 they frequently threatened to

reprocess the 8000 fuel rods that they recovered from the IAEA, just as they did in May 1994, but as of this writing, no one seems clear on whether the rods were still encased in concrete casks, whether their reprocessing plant was up and running (some Bush officials said no, some said yes, and experts in Seoul and Washington said no

Kang Jung-min, A South Korean nuclear analyst, said Its a sheer lie. There is no sign whatsoever that North Korea has restarted its reprocessing facility. Quoted in Sang-Hun Choe, Experts Doubt North Korean Nuclear Claim, Associated Press (Seoul, April 25, 2003). American experts had yet to detect the telltale krypton gas that reprocessing would give off. *New York Times* (July 1, 2003), p. A1.). Again the North played an elaborate game of braggadocio and bluff about whether they had nuclear weapons or not.

As if a Nietzschean ghost indulging the eternal recurrence of the same were running the show, the Bush administration revived the stuttering, confused and confounded policies of the early Clinton administration. This rerun began when Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly of the State Department went to Pyongyang in October 2002 and tabled evidence of renewed nuclear activity, this time involving enriched uranium. According to him the North Koreans at first denied it and then admitted it, not without a certain belligerent satisfaction. Sometime in 1998, Bush administration leaks had it, the North Koreans made a deal with Americas long-time ally in Islamabad: their missiles for Pakistans uranium enrichment technology. Sometime in the summer of 2002, the same sources said, evidence that the North was manufacturing enriched uranium came to light.

I draw on *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal* articles on this issue, October 18-22, 2002.

Shortly after Kellys return to Washington, a high American official told reporters that the 1994 Framework Agreement that froze the Norths Yongbyon reactor was null and void, a self-fulfilling prophecy since Bushs advisors had declared it a dead letter soon after coming to power. (There is nothing in the agreement prohibiting uranium enrichment, Bush spokesmen to the contrary, but the North certainly violated the spirit of the agreement.)

The North Koreans later denied that they said anything about building a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons; rather they suggested that Kelly had misunderstood (or even fabricated) what First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Ju had told him, which they rendered as follows: the DPRK made itself very

clear to the special envoy . . . that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon [sic] but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the U.S. DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, carried by KCNA, October 25, 2002. See also Byung Chul Koh, Is North Korea Changing? , Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyongnam University (March 5, 2003).

Independent American experts say that the Norths enrichment program is based on gas centrifuge technology, most likely using aluminum rotor tubes, an old design. Uranium in gaseous form is passed through the centrifuges many times and spun at high speed to separate fissionable U238 atoms from common uranium (U235); slowly the heavier atoms of U238 begin to collect along the outer wall through centrifugal force. The North would need to operate about 5000 centrifuges connected together in cascades to make about 15 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, roughly enough for one fission implosion-type nuclear weapon. If on the other hand the North has its hands on enough maraging steel, a lighter and stronger material than aluminum, it would have to build about 1200 centrifuges to get the same result. (Pakistan has used both methods.) David Albright, Finding Our Way Anew to a Denuclearized Korean Peninsula, Working Paper, Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy (Washington: Center for International Policy, and Chicago: Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago), November 19, 2002, pp. 2-3. See also the diagram on extracting U238 via centrifuges from *Scientific American*, pictured in *The New York Times* (January 15, 1992), p. A7.

Most experts think it would take them four or five years to begin turning out weapons-grade fuel from the centrifuges, but the Bush administration has said repeatedly that it may well be only a matter of months. Uranium enrichment can be done almost anywhere, above or underground; it doesnt require large amounts of electricity, and the task can be divided among centrifuges located in different places. Thus the program may serve as an even better hole card than Yongbyon, retaining ambiguity while not forcing the North to test a weapon, and thus reveal whether its hole card is an ace or a deuce; furthermore this kind of reprocessing cannot be destroyed by a surgical strike.

Since then, the sequel quickly emerged on the American side, amounting to an accumulation of pratfalls: Washington wont negotiate with the North Koreans, which would reward nuclear blackmail. Wait a minute, we better talk to them or theyll

just become a nuclear power but we can't reward them. Hold on! The DPRK is getting out of line again: we better take the problem to the UN Security Council. Whoa, no we can't, because China won't go along. OK, our new policy is tailored containment (which literally lasted about a day; Condoleezza Rice announced it in December 2002, and Colin Powell quickly repudiated it). No, said deputy secretary Dick Armitage, we have to talk directly to them. Armitage's remarks made President Bush off-the-wall angry, however, so it was again back to the drawing board: the result is that while North Korea is accelerating its nuclear programs, there is virtually no conversation under way. Were at the point, said one official involved in the internal debate, where nothing is happening. Among many well-informed news articles on these internal splits and their effects in causing frequent reversals of policy, see David Sanger, U.S. Sees Quick Start of North Korea Nuclear Site, *New York Times* (March 1, 2003), p. A1; and James Dao, Criticism of Bush's Policy on Korea Sharpens, *New York Times* (March 6, 2003), p. A16. Bush's pique at Armitage is reported in Sanger's article.

The internal splits in the Bush administration on what to do about North Korea were likened by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Joseph Biden to the San Andreas fault. Biden quoted in *USA Today* (April 25-26, 2003).

Obsessive concentration on the problem at hand in Pyongyang is met by inattention and confusion in Washington, and North Korea keeps winning. As Leon Sigal put it to me, You don't want to get into a pissing match when the other guy has a full bladder. But Washington has done just that for more than a decade.

George W. Bush repeated over and over that the U.S. had no intention of invading the DPRK, while close readers pointed out that this does not mean he won't attack the North. Hardliners in the Pentagon revive Clinton's plans for a surgical strike against Yongbyon, and they all lamented Kim Jong Il's multiple interruptions of their march toward war against Iraq. But the extended dilation of the Iraq problem occasioned by Bush's decision in September 2002 to put the problem of Iraq's

weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the UN Security Council and the IAEA, was clearly the occasion for North Korea to fast-forward the current crisis. Bush had serial plans for the axis of evil: first Saddam Hussein, then North Korea, and then Iran. Kim Jong Il was, understandably, a man in a hurry.

Only in April 2003 did we learn that the North's talking points for the October 2003 meetings included a trade-off of its nuclear programs and its missile exports in return for American aid and recognition of the DPRK the November 1993 package

deal again, with missiles thrown in for good measure. Doug Struck cited these talking points in his article in the *Washington Post* on April 20, 2003.

In the aftermath of the October meeting the Bush administration announced another new policy: the only thing worth talking to Pyongyang about was how it was going to dismantle its nuclear programs, and the only acceptable forum for such discussions was a multilateral one. In April 2003, however, the administration reversed itself yet again and agreed to meet in Beijing for what were, in effect, open-ended bilateral talks. Once again the North reported that it had tabled a bold proposal to settle all outstanding problems with the U.S., but Kelly had ignored it. Paul Eckert and Brian Rhoads, Talks End After North Korea Claims to Have Nuclear Bomb, Reuters (April 25, 2003); BBC News, North Korea Blames US in Nuclear Row, (April 25, 2003); Joseph Kahn, China Seeks to Put a Positive Spin on Talks with North Korea, *New York Times* (April 25, 2003). Days later Powell was forced to admit that the North had indeed offered to scrap their nukes and missiles if the U.S. would normalize relations and provide basic security guarantees.

South Korean newspapers suggested that the North had offered to verifiably scrap or suspend its nuclear programs, in exchange U.S. steps to recognize the DPRK and promise not to invade or attack it. S. Korea Seeking Unity with the U.S. on N.K. Nukes, *Korea Herald* (April 28, 2003). But Kelly again grabbed all the headlines by telling reporters that one of the North Koreans, in a verbal aside, had told him that the North did, indeed, have a couple of bombs; furthermore they might sell their fissile material on the world market, depending on Bush's strategy toward them.

Since 1991 the North cleverly kept their nuclear hole card concealed, but in Beijing they were artful: the negotiator spoke of having two unwieldy nuclear devices, which they did not know how to dismantle. (This is Bush's first demand: dismantle!) And they were recklessly bluffing; they know as well as anyone that sale of a bomb or fissile material to other countries or to terrorists would sooner or later be traced back to Pyongyang, and if that fissile material had been used to attack Americans, the DPRK would be destroyed. What appears to have happened in Beijing is that the North again turned a hole card over, and Mr. Kelly fell for it immediately relaying the news to the world media, but without a plan for what to do about it. Meanwhile former Clinton administration officials say that back in 1993 North Korea related the same story about having a bomb, again in an unstructured verbal aside during negotiations, and they chose to ignore it. The Bush administration, to the contrary,

leaks everything it hears.

A State Department official told me this on April 25, 2003, and the North Koreans also have said that in 1993 they told the Clinton people the same thing they said to Kelly in Beijing.

If the U.S. were to do what the North Koreans want, that would only return things to the unfulfilled promises Bill Clinton made as part of the Framework Agreement of October 1994, in which the U.S. pledged to normalize relations with the North and to refrain from threatening it. And it would return to the missile deal that Clinton successfully negotiated, just before leaving office, which Bush turned his back on. But Bush can't do any of this: diplomacy with the North is anathema, because the Republican right won't allow it--and because the same group which brought us an illegal war with Iraq wants to overthrow Kim Jong Il, too. According to Seymour Hersh, the best investigative reporter in Washington since 9/11, a participant in White House strategy meetings said of Kim Jong Il, "They want that guy's head on a platter. Don't be distracted by all this talk about negotiations. There will be negotiations, but they have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq. He's their version of Hitler."

*The New Yorker* (October 8, 2002).

This sequel has the same solution as the original: get North Korea's nuclear program mothballed and its medium and long-range missiles decommissioned by buying them out, at the price of American recognition of the DPRK, written promises not to target the North with nuclear weapons, and indirect compensation in the form of aid and investment (i.e., the purchase-price *quid pro quo*, instead of something for nothing). Indeed, William Perry was the point man for getting both jobs done in 1998-2000 as Clinton's roving ambassador, moving toward mutual diplomatic recognition and a full buy-out of Kim Jong Il's missiles, *in spite of* intelligence evidence that in 1998 North Korea had begun to import aluminum centrifuge tubes and other technology relevant to a separate nuclear program to enrich uranium.

#### Preventive War

George W. Bush cannot yet star in the new sequel, however, because of a host of ostensible foreign policy commitments laid down since the day of his inauguration. In a display of partisan foreign policy decision-making unlike any previous episode, Bush determined first of all to be the anti-Clinton: Clinton wanted the Kyoto Treaty? Bush didn't. Clinton loved multilateral meetings and pressing the

flesh with allied leaders? Bush would go unilateral, and consult only with those allies who agreed with him (mainly Britains Tony Blair). Clinton froze the DPRK's reactors and was on the verge of buying out their missiles as well? That was mere appeasement of a reprehensible rogue state.

More deeply, Bush's advisors moved toward a general reversal of previous American strategy: instead of deterrence, we would have what political scientist Thomas C. Schelling called *compellence*—marshaling America's overwhelming and unchallenged military might to shape relations with allies and constrain adversaries. Instead of non-proliferation, the overwhelming influence in Clinton's policies toward near-nuclear and rogue nations, we would have *counter*-proliferation: using the threat or reality of American military force to stop WMD development dead in its tracks.

Until recently the Cold War doctrine of containment was still in place, however, formally against countries like the DPRK and Iraq or Iran, informally against Chinese expansion or Russian resurgence, and (as always since 1945) through hidden constraints on allies like Japan and Germany provided by keeping a myriad of U.S. military bases on their soil. Along came Osama Bin Laden and friends, a force that could not be deterred or contained, and a new strategy of preemptive attack came into place, and was formally announced in September 2002. In the midst of this evolution of strategy, President Bush fatally conflated a group of nations that could easily be contained and deterred, namely Iraq, Iran and North Korea, with the diabolical and uncontrollable Al Qaeda: thus emerged the axis of evil. These evil-doers were not suicidal and had return addresses, but no matter: they might give or sell their weapons to terrorists.

George Bush, a naïf in world affairs, brought into office with him a highly experienced crew of Republican foreign policy hands: Donald Rumsfeld often seems to be the main spokesman for the administration's strategies, Dick Cheney has unprecedented weight in foreign policy for a Vice-President, and Colin Powell seeks to conduct diplomacy in an administration that does not believe in it. As often as not these three big egos would prefer not to consult with each other, either, let alone with foreign leaders. The result has been a set of independent kingdoms presided over by a weak and inattentive President, extraordinary divisions and battles over policy, and the most incoherent foreign policy in memory. But Bush has added insult to injury with continuous if utterly gratuitous outbursts against Kim Jong Il.

Nobel Peace Prize winner Kim Dae Jung came half-way around the world in March 2001 to meet Bush and be informed that the North Korean leader could not be



trusted to keep any agreements (as if the 1994 deal had been based on trust rather than verification); the following October Bush traveled to Shanghai to meet various Asian leaders (including Kim Dae Jung again) and denounced Kim Jong Il as a pygmy; and then in a discussion with Bob Woodward, Bush blurted out "I loathe Kim Jong Il!", shouting and waving his finger in the air. In a less-noticed part of this outburst, Bush declared his preference for toppling the North Korean regime.

Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 340. In typically convoluted syntax, Bush referred to what would happen if we try to if this guy were to topple. Some people thought the financial burdens of such an outcome would be too onerous, but not the President: "I just don't buy that. Either you believe in freedom, and want to and worry about the human condition, or you don't. One gets the sense from these impromptu *ad hominem* eruptions that Bush's resentments might have something to do with the widespread perception that both leaders would not be where they are without Daddy's provenance."

#### The Greater Danger

After three years of an American foreign policy that often resembles amateur night at a half-way house in its ill-thought demarches, incessant internal clashes, and frequent reversals, it was inevitable that one of the axis countries threatened with preemptive attack would preempt the center stage and call Bush's bluff. Kim Jong Il has done that, but North Korea presents a far more difficult crisis for the Bush administration than Iraq did, not to mention another sharp diversion from what one would assume to be America's primary quarry: Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Through its recent provocations Pyongyang has dropped the fat into a fire fanned by an administration that listens to no one, but that lacks the wherewithal to fight major wars on more than one front. Indeed, at this writing the U.S. has only one fresh combat division that is not already deployed somewhere in the world, the 101st Airborne. North Korea knows this, and therefore has pushed its advantage while Bush was fixated on Saddam Hussein. Furthermore Bush completely dropped the ball on Bill Clinton's last-minute attempt to buy out North Korea's medium- and long-range missiles, while keeping its nuclear facilities frozen; how could a devastating new war possibly be justified when that option was left to slide into oblivion? Nonetheless we again heard from William Perry and Ashton Carter, in a January 2003 editorial: that we must again make clear our determination to remove the nuclear threat even if it risks war.

William Perry and Ashton Carter, Op-Ed article, *New York Times* (January 19, 2003).

Even more damning, insiders say that the outgoing Clinton team fully briefed the Bush newcomers on the intelligence about the DPRK's imports of nuclear enrichment technology from Pakistan, but that the Bush people did nothing about it until July 2002, when they picked up evidence that the North might be beginning to build an enrichment facility.

I was told this on a not-for-attribution basis by two former Clinton administration officials at a conference in Washington in January 2002. Many knowledgeable experts, including former Clinton administration officials, believe that North Korea clearly cheated on its commitments by importing these technologies, but these same former officials also believe that whatever the North planned to do with them could have been shut down in the context of completing the missile deal and normalizing US-DPRK relations. By ignoring this evidence for eighteen months, however, and then using it to confront the North Koreans in October 2002, the Bush people turned a soluble problem into a major crisis, leaving little room to back away on either side.

The acute danger, though, really derives from a combination of typical and predictable North Korean cheating and provocation, longstanding U.S. war plans to use nuclear weapons in the earliest stages of a new Korean War, and Bush's new preemptive doctrine. Bush's doctrine conflates existing plans for nuclear preemption in a crisis initiated by North Korea, which have been standard operating procedure for the U.S. military in Korea for decades, with the apparent determination to attack states like North Korea simply because they have or would like to have nuclear weapons like those that the U.S. still amasses by the thousands. As if to make this crystal clear, someone in the White House leaked presidential decision directive 17 in September 2002, which listed North Korea as a target for preemption.

In September 2002 the National Security Council released a new Bush Doctrine moving beyond the Cold War staples of containment and deterrence, toward preemptive attacks against adversaries that might possess weapons of mass destruction. This came out of Condoleezza Rice's office, and as she later explained to reporters, preemption is anticipatory self-defense, that is, the right of the United States to attack a country that *it thinks* could attack it first [emphasis added].

Sanger, *New York Times*, 9/28/02, p. A-17. In the document itself we read that other nations should [not] use preemption as a pretext for aggression. When actually

implemented against Iraq, it turned out to be a strategy of preventive war, with goals of decapitation (witness the first day of the war), regime change, liberation, and rollback.

See the excellent discussion in David Sanger, *A Decision Made, and Its Consequences*, *New York Times* (March 17, 2003).

Running through this new doctrine is a messianic idealism proposing to rid the world of evil. We have come full circle a half-century later, as if nothing was learned, back to Graham Greenes *Quiet American* impregnably armored by his good intentions and his ignorance. Graham Greene, *The Quiet American* (New York: Modern Library, 1955), p. 213.

In the Korean theater, however, a new war could erupt over something like the recent June crab wars that have occurred frequently as North and South Korean fishermen compete for lucrative catches in the Yellow Sea, and a vicious cycle of preemption and counter-preemption could immediately plunge the Northeast Asian region into general war. Adding to the danger is a new threat to the existing deterrent structure on the peninsula: according to a retired U.S. Army general with much experience in Korea, A former American general who ran Army intelligence in Korea, told me this on a not-for-attribution basis, at a conference in Chicago on December 5, 2002. American advances in precision-guided munitions now make it feasible to take out the 10,000 artillery tubes that the North has imbedded in mountains north of Seoul, which were heretofore impregnable, and constituted the Norths basic guarantee against an attack from the South. To the extent that this is true, in the absence of credible security guarantees any general sitting in Pyongyang would now move to a more reliable deterrent.

#### The Greater Evil

All this is truly tragic, given the enormous progress toward reconciliation between North and South Korea, propelled mightily by Kim Dae Jungs leadership since he took office in early 1998. In December 2002 the South Korean people elected Kims protégé, Roh Moo Hyun, a lawyer with a sterling record of courageous defense of labor leaders and human rights activists during the darkest days of the military dictatorship in the 1980s. A burgeoning movement among younger Koreans against the seemingly endless American military presence in the South, conducted in successive, truly massive and dignified candlelight processions along the grand boulevard in front

of the American Embassy in Seoul, united citizens who were educated on the raucous college campuses of the 1980s while American diplomacy backed the dictatorship and its bloody suppression of the Kwangju uprising in 1980, with the Roh administration and a set of advisors well aware of Americas shared responsibility for the current crisis.

President Rohs inauguration in February 2003 was a much less festive affair than Kim Dae Jungs five years before. A somber mood prevailed because of the growing crisis with the North and the rift between Seoul and Washington. The next day I met with President Roh along with twelve other Americans for what was supposed to be a brief congratulatory get-together. Instead three prominent Americans gathered across the table from Roh and began to lecture him on what was wrong with just about everything he had said about his position vis-à-vis the North. One of them, a former ambassador to Japan, hulked menacingly over the table, his face red and seemingly angered, telling Roh that Americans would never understand his statement that he would guarantee the security and survival of the North, since the American people found that regime detestable. President Roh responded gently by saying that in solving international problems it was not necessarily the best procedure to begin by name-calling and casting all blame on ones adversary, and abruptly brought the meeting to a close. Thus Bush finds himself having to manage two very difficult relationships on the Korean peninsula, amid the mammoth task of occupying and stabilizing Iraq, and the failed search for Osama Bin Laden (and Saddam Hussein, for that matter). Just as it did a decade ago a supine American media fell in line with this administrations caricature of the crisis in Korea, instead of doing serious investigative reporting. The cover story of the January 13, 2003 issue of *Newsweek* carried a photo of Kim Jong Il, North Koreas Dr. Evil.

But where is the greater evil? The essential principle of the non-proliferation regime is that countries without nuclear weapons cannot be threatened by those that possess them. In order to obtain the requisite votes from non-nuclear states to get the NPT through the United Nations in 1968, the US, UK and USSR committed themselves to aid any "victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used" (see UN Security Council Resolution number 255, March 7, 1968).

Quoted in Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg*, p. 214. In 1996 the International Court of Justice at the Hague stated that the use or threat of nuclear weapons should be outlawed as "the ultimate evil." It could not come to a decision, however, whether the use of nuclear weapons for self-defense was justified: The Court cannot conclude

definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.

New York Times, July 9, 1996. By this standard, North Korea is more justified in developing nuclear weapons than the US is in threatening a non-nuclear North Korea with annihilation.

Once again the DPRK believes that its very survival is at stake.

This was the main thrust of Amb. Pak Gil Yons news conference on January 10, 2003. Hopefully they are wrong, but in the current volatile conditions of world affairs, one can't expect them to take chances on a matter of such gravity. The only way to unravel this emergent calamity, short of war, is a quick return to the *status quo ante* 2001, to the compelling and still feasible *denouement* to the original crisis fashioned by Kim Dae Jung, Bill Clinton and Kim Jong Il because no one will benefit from this sequel, except hardliners in both capitals who believe that true security lies only in the deployment and brandishing of nuclear weapons.

North Korea often says it prizes national sovereignty like life itself; this has been the *leitmotiv* of the regime since it was founded in the aftermath of decades of brutal Japanese colonialism, and all the more so after we tried to liberate it in 1950 at an appalling human cost, only to get into a war with China and ultimately fail. Bush, however, has run roughshod over essential principles of international relations and world peace: in place of respect for others sovereignty, he puts assassination, decapitation, and regime change. Our last foray into North Korea helped to bring about an armed-to-the-teeth garrison state, and fifty years later it is still with us. If North Korea does finally get the bomb, there's very little we can do about it. So let's just call it Bush's bomb, since it is the American president that is the new problem (North Korea presents merely a heretofore insoluble 58-year-old problem).

### Beyond Good and Evil

From his recent discussions in Washington, Seoul and Beijing, William Perry has concluded that George W. Bush is the basic reason why the U.S. will not enter into genuine talks with Pyongyang: My theory is the reason we don't have a policy on this, and we aren't negotiating, is the president himself, Perry said. I think he has come to the conclusion that Kim Jong Il is evil and loathsome and it is immoral to negotiate with him.

Thomas E. Ricks and Glenn Kessler, U.S., N. Korea Drifting Toward War, Perry Warns, *Washington Post*, (July 15, 2003), p. A14

In a recent book, Susan Nieman distinguishes between the Enlightenment conception of evil, focused on natural disasters (like drought and floods) that led people to question how God could create a world full of innocent suffering, to the modern, post-Auschwitz idea that evil is absolute wrongdoing that leaves no room for account or expiation. Nieman rightly argues that the September 11th attacks embodied a form of evil so old-fashioned that its reappearance is part of our shock; it combined a modern nihilism with Old Testament fire and brimstone, and left us with a sense of conceptual helplessness. But true evil is not the opposite of good, as President Bush seems to believe; rather it aims at destroying moral distinctions themselves.

Susan Nieman, *Evil in Modern Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 3-4, 281-88.

In this sense Saddam Hussein's Iraq represented not something evil, so much as a banal example of a nasty police state, a replica of any number of regimes in the past century. The other two charter members of the axis of evil, Iran and North Korea, however, are founded on principles that they quite sincerely believe distinguish them morally and ethically from American imperialism. The North Korean case is compounded, though, by what Koreans think about evil.

The West divides, chopping things and people up. The East creates relationships modeled on the family. So writes sociologist Fred Alford, in a fascinating account of Korean conceptions of evil. C. Fred Alford, *Think No Evil: Korean Values in the Age of Globalization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 1. Evil comes from the creation of dualisms and oppositions: a Buddhist told him, You Americans destroyed the Indians because of dualism. You are always fighting and finding an enemy. South Korea has plenty of Christians, but on this particular Old Testament question,

they sounded like Buddhists, too. Koreans do not construct on Other their fear is rather becoming other to oneself, a stranger to ones proper self. You do that not by straying from your true self, through what we would call alienation; you do it by cutting your family ties. The highest value in Korea is *chong*: belonging and affection. Alford says it is for Koreans what honor and shame are for the Japanese. Belonging and affection begin in the family, with a strict father and a loving mother (*ombu chamo*). Without this core element, a Korean told him, there can be no discipline in society. The Korean family system produces respect for authority combined with tenderness. A society like this has no place for evil; in fact Koreans dont have a conception of evil: Evil couldnt exist because Koreans have created a universe in which there is no place for it.

Alford (1999), p. 89. Dr. Alford is talking about South Korea, not the North, but he helps us to understand the core principles of that vexing family-state. After sixty years, isnt it high time for Americans to find out if Koreans dont have a lot to teach us?

After all, Koreans arent going away either the southern or the northern variety. As a North Korean spokesman put it at the height of the nuclear crisis, We have so far lived on our own without any relations with the United States, we can live on our own in the future, too. We have become constitutionally adapted to such life.

Press Release, DPRK Mission to the UN (February 1 1994), no. 4. In an indication that some learning might actually be seeping into the American media, Eason Jordan, the president of CNN International, who had made nine visits to Pyongyang, told a Harvard audience this in 1999: When you hear about starvation in North Korea, a lot of very level-headed people think, There is no way a country like that can survive. Well, I can guarantee you this: Im here to tell you with absolute certainty those guys will tough it out for centuries just the way they are. Neither the United States nor any other country is going to be able to force a collapse of that government.

Quoted in Harrison (2002), p. 3.

Thats exactly what I think, when I reflect back on where the North Korean problem began: in the wilds of Manchuria in the 1930s, when Kim Il Sung and his allies fought bitterly against the blood enemy of the Korean nation, led at the time by Tōjō Hideki. In the mid-1930s Tōjō was the head of the Central

Control Committee of Police Affairs for Manchukuo and concurrent Provost Marshall of the Kwantung Army. He was, of course, in command when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and subsequently was sentenced to death for his war crimes by the American occupation under Gen. Douglas MacArthur. After 1948 these guerrillas occupied the commanding heights of the regime for the next fifty years; it is another indication of American failure that U.S. officials have never understood this, have never understood the basic nature of the North Korean regime and all too many lives have been lost because of this failure to know your enemy. Instead of focusing on Kim and his son as the North always does, though, lets remember two lesser known individuals: Chu To-il, who lost three brothers to the Manchurian battlefield and his mother to starvation, and Yi O-song, whose father and two sisters starved to death. Yet both continued their bitter struggle against General Tōjō and his ilk fascists who truly would stop at nothing, and who define the worldly face of evil and they survived. Today the sons and daughters of people like Chu and Yi constitute the core leadership of the North: somehow I think they will be able to survive George W. Bush, too. They arent going to go away, as Ambassador Perry said, so we must deal with them as they are, rather than as we might like the to be.

The path to the goal of peace on the Korean peninsula is through containment without isolation, the American policy that led to Richard Nixons breakthrough with China in 1971-72. The U.S. and the ROK maintain their defense treaty commitments while engaging the North and guaranteeing its security, slowly bringing it out of its isolation. If President Bush cannot bring himself to follow such a policy, than he should remember what happened to a previous president: in the late summer of 1950 Harry Truman transformed a victory for the containment doctrine into a campaign to roll back North Korea, and soon he was at war with China. His Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote that the first Korean War, the one to restore the 38th parallel in the summer of 1950, was Trumans finest moment. The second war, to liberate the North, led to the worst American defeat since the Battle of Bull Run (during our own civil war), and demolished the Truman administration, in Achesons words. The same will happen to George W. Bush, if he plunges ahead to confront the North against the judgment of virtually all those individuals, scholars and policy-makers, who have expert knowledge of the DPRK.

## 국제화시대의 전쟁과 평화 :

## 한국전 휴전 50주년 기념일을 맞이하여 제시하는 7가지 논점

이토 나리히코 일본주오대학, 아소시에21

먼저 이렇게 중요하고 역사적인 학회에서 제가 기초연설을 할 수 있게 해주신 것을 영광스럽게 생각하며 주최측에 심심한 사의를 표하고자 합니다. 정전 후 이미 50년이 지났지만 저는 아직도 한국전이 끝나지 않았다고 생각합니다. 그러므로 오늘날 완전히 다른 상황에 직면하여 우리는 어떻게 한국전을 종식시킬 수 있는지 논의해야 합니다. 이는 한국전을 완전히 종식시키는 것이야말로 인류를 전쟁 그 자체에서 해방시키는 것을 의미하기 때문입니다.

## 1. 우리는 어떠한 상황에 직면해 있는가?

미군과 영국군은 2003년 3월 20일 이라크에 대한 공격을 시작하였습니다. 이것이 얼마나 부당한지는 미국 및 영국정부가 2002년 9월 이후 6개월동안 가능한 모든 수단을 동원하여 노력했음에도 불구하고 이라크공격을 승인하는 유엔안보이사회의 결의를 얻지 못했다는 데서 분명히 나타나고 있습니다.

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우리는 부시행정부가 이라크에 대한 공격을 2001년 9월 11일 직후, 아니면 그 이

전 럽스펠드, 체이니, 월포비츠, 볼튼, 아미티지 등의 소위 신보수주의 인사들이 1997년에 새로운 미국의 세기를 위한 계획 (PNAC)를 결성한 이후부터 계획하였다는 사실에 주목할 필요가 있습니다.

## 2. 2001년 9월 11일 이후 세계가 어떻게 변화하였는가?

9/11이후 테러행위보다 더 심한 이나 새로운 전쟁, 복수 등 부시대통령의 표현은 세상이 변화했다는 의미로 해석되면서 전세계에서 인용되었습니다. 그러나 세계가 진정으로 변한 것일까요? 이 질문에 답하기 위해 우리는 두 가지 점을 고려해야 할 것입니다.

첫째, 부시행정부가 세상이 변화하였다고 말할 때 이들은 미헌법, 국제법, 유엔헌장등을 무시할 좋은 구실을 이에서 찾고 있는 것으로 보입니다. 국내적으로 부시는 미국내에서 아랍계 미국인들에 대한 인권침해사례들의 증가를 막기 위해 아무런 노력도 하지 않았습니다.

동시에 우리는 2차대전 이후 미국의 국제정책의 연속성에 주목해야 합니다. 즉 세계가 평화를 향해 나아갈 때 미정부는 새로운 위기를 외치며 군사적 긴장상태를 조성하였습니다. 누가 그러한 위기 상황을 만들었을까요? 우리의 경험에 비추어 볼 때 이는 소위 군산 복합체로 불리는 군대 및 군수산업이라고 할 수 있겠습니다.

1999년 클린턴의 민주당 행정부는 유엔헌장 및 북태평양방위조약(NATO)의 지위를 무시하고 유고슬라비아를 폭격하였습니다. 클린턴 행정부와 부시행정부의 차이는 무엇일까요?

클린턴행정부가 유엔헌장을 제한적으로 무시한데 반해 부시행정부는 다른 국가들의 주권을 무시함으로써 유엔헌장과 국제법을 공개적으로 파괴하였는데, 이는 또한 웨스트팔리아 조약체계의 파괴를 의미합니다.

1998년 10월 24일에 저는 30년전쟁에의 개입국들이 1648년에 웨스트팔리아조약에 조인한 장소였던 오스나브루크대학에서 평화에 대한 초청강연을 할 기회를 가졌습니다.

이 조약은 각 나라들의 주권을 인정하였습니다. 당시 사람들은 세계에 새로운 평화의 질서가 수립되리라고 믿었습니다. 그러나 우리가 알고 있는 바와 같이 이

조약으로도 인류는 전쟁을 극복할 수 없었습니다. 부시는 한편으로는 이 조약의 약점을 이용하였고 다른 한편으로는 이 조약의 원칙을 무시하고 고대 로마나 중세의 합스부르크 왕조처럼 아프가니스탄과 이라크를 침략하였습니다.

3. 이제 우리는 이러한 상황에 처해 있습니다. 그러므로 우리는 이제 우리가 어떻게 한국전을 이해해야 하는지를 다시 생각해보아야 합니다. 저는 한국전을 다음과 같은 세 가지 요소에 기초하여 이해합니다.

- (1) 한국전의 기원으로서의 일본의 식민지배
- (2) 한국전의 원래 성격은 어떠한가? 내란에서 국제전으로.
- (3) 한국전은 일본에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는가?

(1) 저는 한국전이 근본적으로 일본의 제국주의지배에서 기인하였다고 봅니다. 물론 한반도는 2차대전말 미국의 정책으로 인해 분단되었습니다. 그러나 일본이 한국을 지배하지 않았다면 한국은 아마 2차대전에 결코 말려들지 않았을 것으로 생각합니다.

그러므로 일본인으로서 저는 몇 가지 역사적 사실을 지적함으로써 한민족에게 사과하고자 합니다.

(2) 두 번째 요지로 저는 한국전의 원래 성격이 1936년부터 시작된 스페인전쟁처럼 내란이었음을 지적하고 싶습니다. 한국을 중국처럼 내란을 통해 통일하고자 했던 그 당시의 지도자들은 그 결과가 결국 어떻게 될 지 결코 상상할 수 없었다고 생각합니다. 우리는 이러한 과거의 경험을 통해 군사력을 이용한 국가통일이 민족의 삶과 영혼에 크나큰 손상을 줄 수 있다는 교훈을 얻을 수 있으며 이에 기초하여 정치적 과제를 해결할 수 있을 것으로 봅니다.

(3) 한국전은 한민족 전체에게 커다란 재난을 초래하였습니다. 반면 2차대전에 대한 책임이 있는 패전국들인 일본과 독일은 한국전으로 인하여 경제적으로 재건될 수 있었습니다. 특히 일본은 한국전 당시 미군을 위한 군수기지가 되어 미군의 군사작전을 지원함으로써 크나큰 이익을 얻었습니다. 이러한 특별수요는 1952년 6월부터 1953년 5월까지를 정점으로 하였으며 그 총액은 미화 4백 90만불(캘리포

니아주 예산의 20%에 해당)에 달하였습니다. 이 특별수요에서 오는 소득은 수출총액의 63.7%에 달하였습니다.

한국전은 패전국 일본의 경제복구를 도왔을 뿐 아니라 또한 일본의 민주화과정을 중단시키는 결과를 가져왔습니다. 전범들은 교도소나 교화소에서 풀려났고, 그들은 전쟁 이전의 중요한 공직으로 복귀하였습니다. 일본헌법이 재무장을 금지함에도 불구하고 일본은 사실상 재무장되었습니다.

일본 천황 및 다른 전범들은 미국의 파트너가 되어 그들의 범죄로부터 사면되었습니다. 호타 요시 (Hotta Yoshie)나 다케다 다이준 (Takeda Taijun) 등 일부 전후 일본작가들은 그러한 상황을 기회주의적이며 일본민족들의 사기를 떨어뜨리는 것이라고 날카롭게 비판하였습니다.

4. 한국에 대한 일본의 근본정책은 무엇인가? 한반도의 분단과 북한의 고립을 통한 신식민지배.

한국전 이후 1955년의 하토야마 (Hatoyama) 내각과 1956년의 이시바시 탄잔 (Ishibashi Tanzan) 내각 동안 일본내의 정치적 과정에 독립성과 도덕성을 확립하려는 노력이 잠시 있었습니다.

만약 이것이 실현되었다면 아시아의 상황은 달라졌을 것 입니다. 아마 월남전이 없었을지도 모릅니다. 이시바시 내각 이후 악명높은 식민주의자이며 전범인 키시 노부스케(Kishi Nobusuke)가 한국전을 계기로 수가모(Sugamo) 형무소에서 석방되었고 미정부가 CIA를 통해 제공한 거액의 정치자금으로 권력을 잡게 되었습니다.

키시와 그 동생 사토 에이사쿠(Sato Eisaku)가 일본을 지배하면서 대한 정책 기조는 한국의 분단과 북한의 고립을 통한 신식민적인 지배로 결정되었습니다. 박정희 장군은 1961년에 군사쿠데타를 감행하여 남한정부를 장악하였습니다. 미국이 키시와 사토정권을 지원함으로써 일본을 지배한 것처럼 사토정권은 미국의 도움을 받아 박정희 군사정권을 지원하였습니다.

5. 왜 일본인들이 납치되었는가? 납치사건의 배경.

여기서 1970년대에 발생한 북한에 의한 젊은 일본인들의 납치사건에 대해 한 가지 언급하고자 합니다. 이 납치사건을 논하기 위해 우리는 1592년에서 1598년까지 히데요시 장군의 한국 침략을 되돌아 볼 필요가 있습니다. 그는 노동력 확보를 위해 약 7만명의 조선인들을 일본으로 납치하였습니다. 당시 일본의 청소년들이 전장으로 보내짐에 따라 일본정부는 1941년부터 한국의 청소년들을 노동력으로 이용하고자 일본으로 강제로 데려가려고 계획하였습니다. 한국의 처녀들은 강제로 성노예로 이용되었습니다. 납치되는 경우도 있었습니다.

1973년 8월 8일 김 대중씨는 동경의 한 호텔에서 당시 한국의 중앙정보부에 의해 납치되었습니다. 김 대중씨를 암살하려고 했던 것에는 의문의 여지가 없습니다. 그러나 일본정부는 한국정부와 결탁하여 이 사건의 진상을 감추었습니다.

2002년 9월 17일 일본과 북한이 함께 서명한 공동성명은 다음과 같이 선언하고 있습니다: 일본인들의 생명과 안전에 관한 현안에 관하여 북한은 양국간의 비정상적인 관계하에 발생한 그러한 유감스러운 문제가 다시는 반복되지 않아야 한다고 확인하였습니다.

김 정일이 이렇게 납치사건들에 대해 해명하고 사과함에 따라 이 사건들은 의혹에서 사실이 되었습니다. 이에 대한 해결책을 모색하기 위해서는 이 공동성명이 약속하는대로 이 문제를 진지하게 직면하여야 합니다. 저는 김 정일이 이미 납치사실을 인정하고 사과함으로써 이를 위한 그의 진지한 의도를 표현하였다고 봅니다. 양국간의 비정상적인 관계하에서 범해진 이 사건의 해결이란 히데요시의 침략으로부터 일본인 납치사건에 이르기까지 연속되어온 불행한 사건들의 청산을 의미하는 것이라 봅니다. 그러나 저는 일본정부가 이러한 의미를 이해하지 못하지 않을까 우려합니다.

## 6. 한국전을 어떻게 종식시킬 수 있는가?

미국과 북한은 2000년 10월 12일의 공동성명에서 1953년의 정전협정을 안정된 평화 안보체제로 전환할 것을 선언하였습니다. 그러나 그 이후 취임한 부시 대통령은 그간 최종 실천단계 직전까지 양국이 발전시켜 온 관계를 마치 어린아이가 블록으로 지은 성을 파괴하듯이 파괴하였습니다. 그리하여 양국간의 관계는 또 다시 냉전시대의 관계로 퇴행하게 되었습니다.

이러한 긴장의 완화를 위해 2002년 9월 17일 일본과 북한간의 정상회담이 평양에서 개최되었습니다. 만약 일본이 이러한 사고와 원칙을 실천할 수 있었다면 일본의 이러한 결정은 동아시아에서의 평화와 번영에 기여할 수 있었을 것입니다.

그러나 부시행정부가 북한의 우라늄개발에 관련된 핵의혹을 주장하며 개입하였습니다. 1994년 10월의 포괄적 협정은 플루토늄의 개발을 동결하였으나 우라늄은 언급하지 않았습니다. 그러나 부시는 북한이 이 협정을 위반하였다고 비난하였으며 미국은 북한에 대한 오일공급을 중단하였습니다.

김 일성이 1994년 6월에 카터전대통령에게 언급하였듯이 북한이 원하는 것은 핵무기가 아니라 핵발전소입니다. 이라크전이 발발하기 전 북한은 핵무기 보유사실을 시종일관 부인하였습니다. 실제로 북한에는 핵의혹이 없었으며, 이는 부시행정부에 의해 날조되었습니다. 무엇을 위해서?

저는 이에 두 가지 이유가 있다고 봅니다. (1) 남북한간 및 일본과 북한간의 관계의 정상화를 막기 위해서. (2) 일본 및 한국에서의 미군주둔의 구실을 유지하기 위해서. 북한의 핵의혹은 미군이 이 지역에서 사라지면 역시 사라질 것입니다. 그때 우리는 21세기에서의 평화에 대해 논의할 수 있을 것입니다. 동아시아의 평화의 전제조건은 미군의 주둔이 아니라 미군의 철수입니다.

## 7. 동아시아에서의 평화의 원칙은 무엇인가?

일본헌법 9조는 전쟁 및 모든 전쟁잠재력을 거부하고 있습니다. 이러한 원칙은 과거의 침략과 전쟁에 대한 반성을 통하여 형성되었습니다. 이러한 원칙을 받기한 사람은 당시의 수상이었던 시데하라 키주로(Shidehara Kijuro)입니다. 이를 지지하고 받아들인 사람은 맥아더 장군입니다.

맥아더 장군은 한국전에서 핵무기사용을 원했던 트루만 대통령과의 이견 때문에 총사령관직에서 해임된 이후 미 상원의 공청회에서 증언하게 되었습니다. 어떻게 하면 군비경쟁을 중단하고 세계평화를 이룰 수 있겠느냐하는 한 상원의원의 질문에 그는 미국이 일본헌법에 명시된 대로 전쟁을 거부하고 군대를 철폐하는 운동의 발기자가 되어야한다고 답변하였습니다. 장군으로서의 직무를 수행한 후 그는 전쟁과 무기 및 폭력의 거부가 세계평화의 원칙이 되어야 함을 깨닫게 된 것입니다.

냉전의 종식 이후 일본정부는 이러한 헌법의 원리를 파기하려는 노력을 가속화 하였습니다. 지난 6월 일본 정부는 전쟁을 거부하는 헌법에 의하면 전쟁법안으로 간주되는 긴급법안을 통과시켰습니다. 일본은 지상군을 투입하자! 고 하는 미국의 요청에 따라 서둘러서 이라크에 군대를 파병하려고 하고 있습니다.

그러므로 일본헌법의 원칙은 21세기 세계평화의 원칙이 되어야 합니다. 이러한 원칙을 실현하기 위해 우리는 국제협력을 통해 함께 노력해야 합니다.

한국전 휴전 50주년 기념일에 즈음하여 한편으로는 거국이 전 세계를 지배하기 위해 완전무장하고 있으며 다른 한편으로는 비무장, 비폭력의 원칙하에 수많은 사람들이 세계평화를 위해 결속하는 거대한 원을 형성하고 있습니다. 이 거국이 국경을 무시하고 전 세계를 지배하는 반면 세계 여러 민족들은 이 거국의 자체 국민들의 힘을 통해 이성과 민주주의, 인권이 회복할 수 있기를 희망하면서 햇빛정책을 지지하며 저항하고 있습니다. 이제 동아시아의 한구석에서 국제화시대의 평화운동을 시작합시다!

## War and Peace in the Global Age

At the 50th Anniversary of the Armistice of the Korean War

Seven Comments

ITO, Narihiko

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the organizer that I am honored to make a key note speech at this important and historical Conference. I think the Korean War never finished even 50 years since the armistice. Therefore, today in the completely new situation we have to discuss how we can finish the war because the definitive end the Korea War means, I believe, that the human kind will be freed from the war itself.

### 1. With what kind of the situation we are facing?

On March 20th 2003, U.S. and British forces struck Iraq. It is the military operation that could never be justified by any means. Its illegitimacy is very clear from the fact that U.S. and British governments failed to have UN Security Councils adopt a resolution of approval despite their intensive efforts of exhausting every conceivable means for six months since September 2002. In fact, international law including U.N. Charter has never been violated so openly as it is since the establishment of the U.N. after World War II.

U.S. and UK governments suspect that Iraq may have been hiding weapons of mass destruction and they claim that one of their objectives is to remove those weapons. However, their use of force undermines the efforts of U.N. Inspection Team to disarm Iraq. U.S.-UK force is killed many innocent Iraqi people and destroyed facilities by the unprecedented magnitude of weapons of mass destruction. Their operation clearly constitutes war crime, which should be condemned as a serious crime against humanity.



Furthermore, even after the declaration of the end of the battle by President Bush the MDWs are not discovered. Moreover there is suspicion that information on it was intentionally fabricated.

U.S. and British governments claimed that they have another mission, namely, to establish a democratic political system in Iraq after overthrowing the Hussein's regime militarily. However, by intervening the political situation of a foreign country militarily, they are denying the right to national self-determination, violating the state sovereignty and destroying the principle of democracy at the same time.

U.S. and British governments are trying to justify their cruel and outrageous military actions on many excuses. Yet it is very clear to the eye of every one that their real objective is to control the share of oil concession in the Middle East, as shown by the sign "No Blood for Oil" on the signboards of anti-war demonstrators world wide. Shortly after the attack of 9.11 in 2001, the Bush administration unilaterally insisted that Osama Bin Laden of al Qaeda were the mastermind behind the attack, and on the excuse of "war on terrorism", the U.S.-UK military forces launched the air campaigns throughout Afghanistan in order to defeat Taliban regime that have sheltered Bin Laden. Obviously, the military operation in Afghanistan was violent infringement of International law. But what was worse is the damage caused by the air campaign, killed

as many as several thousands innocent Afghan civilians. This is clearly serious war crime, and that is why we have been holding public hearings in Japan to investigate the crimes committed in the Afghan war and to seek the responsibility of Bush Administration since December 15, 2002, when we held the first public hearing. However, in spite of our efforts, U.S. and UK continued to commit war crimes in Iraq since March 20, 2003, involving other countries such as Japan.

We need to pay attention to the fact that attack on Iraq was planned by the Bush administration immediately after 9.11, or even before that, sometime in 1997, when "Project for the New American

Century " (PNAC) was formed by people called Neo-Conservatists such as Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Bolton and Armitage. It means that there is an increasing suspicion of "Neo-Conservatism" group being closely associated with the 9.11 disaster although Bush Administration unilaterally asserted that it is "the act of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

## 2. Has the World changed after September 11,?

I was in Palestine in June last year. I was invited to visit a refugee camp in the town of Tulkarem in the Autonomous area of Palestine, where I noticed two impressive slogans written in English on both sides of the stage in the auditorium of a community center. One of them says, "International Law is the basis for the Solution", while the other says, "The Right of Return is Never Outdated". These are the fundamental problems of the "Road Map" today to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The two slogans are obviously the criticism of as well as the protest against the overnment of Israel that has occupied the land of Palestine since 1948, depriving the local people of their right of return after driving them away from their homes and forcing them to remain refugees for decades. At the same time I thought that they must be Palestinian's accusations at the U.S. government who support the oppressive policy of Israel in invading and occupying their land violating their human rights. After September 11, President Bush's remarks like "more than the act of terrorism", "a new war", and "revenge", the words get around in the world that the world has changed since September 11, 2001.

But has the world really changed? To this question, we have to think in view of the two points.

Firstly, when The Bush Administration says that the world has changed, it seems that they found a good excuse for ignoring U.S. constitution, international law, and Charter of United Nations. Domestically Bush did nothing to stop the increasing incidents of human rights violation afflicted to Arab Americans in the U.S.

Internationally, Bush called for a "War on Terrorism" and launched

indiscriminate bombing to Afghanistan. In other words, The Bush Administration justified every unlawful, unjust and cruel acts by the statement that the world has changed since September 11. We have to stop to take a close look at these facts and to think its meaning.

At the same time, we have to notice the continuity of the world policy of the U.S.A. after the World War<sup>II</sup>. Namely, always as world goes to peace, U.S. government cried "new crisis" and made military tension. Who did make always such "crisis"? According to our experiences they are mainly the Military and the munitions industries so called "Military-Industrial Complex".

George F. Kennan who insisted after the 2nd World War the "containment-policy" against Soviet Union, writes in his book "The Nuclear Delusion. Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age" as follows:

"When I talked about containment, what I had in mind was an effort on our part to stiffen the hope, the confidence of European nations in themselves, and to persuade them that they didn't need to yield to one great power or another, that they could resume life. I didn't think the Russian wanted to attack anyone. I didn't think they wanted to expand any further by force of arms." (George F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion. Soviet-American-Relations in the Atomic Age. Pantheon Books. New York 1982. p. 59-60.)

"For years now, American governmental figures have talked and acted as though the balance of military power was the only significant factor determining the future of Soviet-American relations. In deference to what would appear to be this assumption, endless calls gave gone out for accelerated military preparations on the part of the United State and its NATO allies." (Ibid. p. xxvi.)

It was almost same situation at the beginning of Gulf War 1991. As the Cold War had ended and people had talked about the "Dividend of Peace", suddenly father Bush began the Gulf War under the slogan of the "Establishment of the New World Order". It is not difficult to

imagine that the Military-Industrial Complex felt "crisis" because the Cold War had finished.

The Clinton administration of the Democratic Party also in 1999 carried out bombing campaign in Yugoslavia ignoring the charter of the U.N. and the Status of NATO. What is the difference between Clinton and Bush administration?

While Clinton administration ignored the U.N. charter in the limited scale, Bush administration openly destroyed the U.N. charter and the international laws by ignoring the sovereignty of the nation-states, which mean the destruction of the Westphalia Treaty System.

On October 24, 1998 the University of Osnabruck where many countries involved in the Thirty Years War signed the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 invited me to the special lecture on peace.

The Treaty recognized the national sovereignty of the each county. The people believed that the New Peace Order would be established in the world. But as we know even by this Treaty the human kind could not overcome the war. The Bush, on the one hand utilized this weakness of the Treaty, but on the other hand destroyed the principle of the Treaty and invaded into Afghanistan and Iraq like the Roman Empire in the ancient time or the Habsburg Monarchy in the middle age.

Therefore, Mr. Glyn Ford, member of the European Parliament warns: Hawks in the U.S. dont want to solve the North Korea problem, they want to create a new one. They want to take the opportunity to promote regime change a la Iraq. (The Japan Times, July 5, 2003)

3. Now we are in such situation. Therefore, we have to consider again how we understand the Korean War. I understand it by three elements.

(1) The Japanese colonial rule as an origin of the Korean War

(2) The original character of the Korean War. From Civil War to International War.

(3) The Influence of the Korean War on Japan.

Prof. Bruce Cumings pointed out in his big and prominent book "The Origins of the Korean War" that an origin of the Korean War lies in the Japanese colonial rule. He writes in its preface to the Japanese edition: while Japanese Imperialism decided the destiny of Korea in the first half of the 20th century, the USA brought the big disaster into Korea by deciding her fate in the latter half. But few recognize this fact among the Americans.

I also believe that the Korean War was fundamentally caused from the colonial rule of the Japanese Imperialism. Surely the Korean peninsula was divided by the US policy at the end of the 2nd World War. But if Japan had not ruled Korea she were never involved into the 2nd World War. Therefore, the troops of the Soviet Union might never come in from North and US from South to divide the Korean peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government after the 2nd World War never admitted this fact and never apologized for it. On the contrary, the post-war Japanese government continued its domination over South Korea in another form together with the US government until a certain time.

Therefore, as a Japanese, I must apologize for it to the whole Korean people,

by pointing out this historical facts.

As the 2nd point also was indicated by Prof. Cumings that the original character of the Korean War was a civil war, like Spanish Civil War from 1936. Just as Spanish Civil War internationalized by the intervention of the German Fascists, the Korean War was globalized by the USA who had organized "UN forces" during the absence of the Soviet Union in the UN-Security Council.

The leaders who wanted to unify the Korean Nation through the civil war as in China at that time, could have never imagined such a result. Looking back at the past, we can get a lesson from these experiences as the solution of the political task, even the national unification by means of military powers gives enormous damages to the lives and souls of the people.

The Korean War brought a great disaster on the whole Korean people. On the contrary, Japan and Germany, two defeated countries responsible for the last War, economically rehabilitated by the Korean War. Especially Japan as a bases for war supplies got a huge profits by supporting the military operations of the US Army in the Korea War. The peak of the "special demands" continued from June 1952 till May 1953. Their sum arrived to US\$4,90 million (\180 billion, ca. 20% of the budget). The 1953 income from the "special demands" was 63.7% of the whole export.

The White Book of the Japanese Economics Ministry in 1953 indicated the "achievement of the independent economy" and declared in 1956 "we are no more in the post-war". As I was a student, I saw many destroyed tanks carried back by open wagons from the Korea and many scarecrow GIs lying on the platforms of the station. They looked completely different from the brilliant GIs who came to Japan just after the war. My friend told me that he worked to pack the dead GIs at the Tokyo wharf. He could get much money by this work. Bu he said, one day's work was enough, no more next day.

The Korean War helped not only the economical recovery of defeated Japan, but also stopped the democratization process in Japan. Those responsible for the war crime were released from prisons or from purge. They came back to the important official posts as before the war. Although the Japanese Constitution forbids the rearmament, Japan actually rearmed. The Japanese navy sent minesweepers to the Korean War, and a sailor lost his life.

The Emperor of Japan and other war criminals became a partner of

the USA and were discharged from their crimes. Japan which should become a fortress of democratization in Asia, on the contrary supplied US military bases and worked as a reactionary fort in Asia.

Some Japanese post war writers keenly criticized such situation as opportunism and demoralization of the Japanese people. Hotta Yoshie (1918-199 ) described in his novel "Solitude in the Square" (1951) how the Japanese industries was revitalized by the "special demands" from Korean War and how Japanese journalists called North Korean as "Enemy" without doubt.

Takeda Taijun (1912-1976) critically wrote in his roman "Anemophilous flower" (1952) on amorality of Japanese people, how they forgot the responsibility for the last war and looked for new profits in the new war.

#### 4. What is Japanese fundamental Policy toward both Koreas: New colonial domination through Division of Korea and Isolation of North.

After the Korean War there was a short period in Japan to try to establish the independency and morality in the political course. 1955 the Hatoyama cabinet tried to establish the diplomatic relationship with Soviet Union. In 1956 Ishibashi Tanzan who was elected as the first president of the Liberal Democratic Party insisted upon the diplomatic normalization between Japan and China. He also tried to establish the New Peace Security System composed by 4 countries (USA, China, Soviet Union and Japan) instead of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

If this idea were realized, the situations in Asia would have changed. There might be no Vietnam War. But to our regret, the Ishibashi cabinet lasted only two months because the USA hated and feared it. After Ishibashi cabinet disappeared, Kishi Nobusuke, a notorious colonialist and a war criminal released from Sugamo-Prison because of the Korean War, came to the power supported by US government with huge money through CIA.

From that time began the Japanese reactionary course to obey to the USA and the Japanese possibility to contribute to the Asian democracy vanished.

Kishi and his younger brother Sato Eisaku dominated Japan from the beginning of 1957 till 1960 and from 1964 till 1972. They decided the Japanese fundamental policies on Korea: Neo colonial domination through division of Korea and isolation of North. General Pak Chong-hui seized South Korean government by military coup d'etat in May 1961. He was former Lieutenant of the Japanese imperial army called Takagi. He was trained at the school in Manchuria, which was established by Kishi to recruit the Korean youth as assistants of the colonial rule.

Just as the USA dominated Japan by supporting Kishi's and Sato's administrations, Sato's government dominated South Korea by supporting General Pak's military regime with the help of the USA.

#### 5. Why did the abduction of Japanese take place? The background of the kidnapping-affairs.

I have to comment here on the abduction of Japanese young people by North Korea in the 1970s. When we talk about the abduction of young people, historically we have to go back to the General Hideyoshi's invasion into Korea from 1592 till 1598. He sent 180 000 soldiers into Korea to occupy the whole Korea. They destroyed Korean country, killed people and abducted about 70,000 Korean as the labor powers to Japan. From 1941 the Japanese government planned to send Korean youth to Japan by force as the labor power because Japanese youth were sent to the battle field. The Korean youth were forced to work hard in Japan as well as on the battle field. Korean girls were forced to serve as the sex-slave. These were also abduction.

On August 8, 1973 Mr. Kim Dae Jung was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo by KCIA. Although there was doubt of assassination of Mr. Kim. However, the Japanese government covered up the truth of the affair with the cooperation of Korean government.

The Joint Statement of Japan and the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea declares:" Regarding the pending problem concerning the life and security of the Japanese people the DPRK confirmed that such a regrettable problem which had been committed under the abnormal relationship between both countries would never be repeated."

Thus, the kidnapping affairs became from "suspicion" to "fact" because Mr. Kim Jong Il clarified the affairs and apologized for it. Then, as to its solution, it is necessary to face the problem sincerely, as the Joint Statement promised.

I believe Mr. Kim Jong Il already showed his sincerity because he admitted the

fact of the abductions and apologized for it.

The solution of the problem which was committed "under the abnormal relationship

between both countries" means the definite end of unhappy chains from Hideyoshi's invasion to the kidnapping affairs of Japanese people. But I am afraid the Japanese government would not understand this meaning.

#### 6. How can we end the Korean War?

On October 12, 2000 USA and DPRK declared in their Joint Communiqué that they would change the Armistice treaty 1953 to the "steady peace security system". In November Ms. Albright, Secretary of State, visited in Pyongyang. It remained only one step to the diplomatic normalization between USA and DPRK.

President Bush appeared thereafter and destroyed the relationship between both countries which had been piled up step by step just before the final stage as a child destroys a castle of blocks.

After September 11, 2001, President Bush named DPRK "rogue state" and counted in the "axis of evils". He also named DPRK as a target of the nuclear preemptive attacks. Therefore, the both relationship

went back again to the cold war. Even the 2nd Korean War is now worried.

On September 17, 2002, in order to mitigate such tension, the summit talking with Japan and DPRK was held in Pyongyang. The Japan-DPRK Joint Statement was signed. The Japanese decision could have possibility to contribute to peace and prosperity in East Asia if Japan could sincerely achieve this idea and principle.

But Bush administration intervened there by holding "nuclear doubt by the development of uranium" in DPRK. The comprehensive agreement of October 1994 froze the development of plutonium but there was no word on uranium. The development of uranium bomb is not so easy as Mr. Kelly said. But he blamed DPRK that they violated the agreement and USA stopped supplying the heavy oil which should be sent from USA.

We have to ask here, which side was not sincere to the agreement of 1994. Surely Clinton administration supplied the heavy oil. However, in another point, they did not push their promises until the appearance of Kim Dae Jung government with "Sun Shine Policy".

What DPRK wants to get is not nuclear weapon but nuclear power plant as Mr. Kim IL Sung already said to Mr. Carter in June 1994.

DPRK officially declared "necessity of the development of the nuclear weapon" in April 2003 just after the Attack on Iraq by Bush-Blair Coalition, which was waged by violation of the UN Charter and other international law. Before the Iraq War DPRK denied consistently their possession of the nuclear weapon. There was not actually "nuclear doubt" in DPRK. It was fabricated by Bush administration. For what?

I believe there are two reasons:(1) In order to block the normalization between South and North and between Japan and DPRK. (2) In order to keep the pretext for the stationing of the US Army in Japan as well as in the Republic of Korea. Now we have to ask: Does the deployment of the US Army really contribute to the peace and security in East Asia? In Palestine I heard that Israel occupied

since the 3rd Middle East War 1967 for 36 years. But USA has occupied both Japan and South Korea in East Asia more than half century, longer than Israel.

Like Israeli Army in Palestine, US Army has usually been menacing the human rights of Japanese and Korean people. They also destroys the environments in both countries. The "nuclear doubt" of the DPRK will disappear if US Army vanishes from this region. Then, we can talk about the peace in 21st century. The pre-condition of the peace in East Asia is not the presence of the US Army but its withdrawal.

#### 7. What is the principle of the Peace in East Asia?

The article Nine of the Japanese Constitution declares the renunciation of the war and the abolition of all the war potentials. The principle was created through the reflection on the invasions and the wars in the past. The initiator of the principle was Shidehara Kijuro, Prime Minister at that time. The supporter and accepter was General MacArthur.

After his dismissal from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, because he had the different idea from President Truman who wanted to use the nuclear weapons in the Korean War, he testified at the Public Hearing of the US Senate. On the question of a Senator, how could you stop the arms race and bring the world peace, he answered that USA should be initiator to renounce the war and abolish the army like the article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. After MacArthur finished all his services as a General, he realized that the renunciation of war, no arms and non-violence are the principle of world peace.

After the end of the cold war, however, Japanese government intensified to destroy the principle of the Constitution. Last June Japanese government made the Emergency Bill which meant the Bill for War under the Constitution renounced war. Japan is hurrying up to dispatch its army to Iraq by request of USA "Boots on the ground!".

The principles of the renunciation of war and non-violence by abolition of army and

weapons do not belong only to the Japanese Constitution. If the US military attacks done in Afghanistan and Iraq would repeat all over the world, the globe would be destroyed. Human kind could not survive on the Earth. We have to protect the Earth and Human kind against such folly action by holding the principles of the non-violence.

Therefore, the principle of the Japanese Constitution should be the principle of the world peace in the 21st century. In order to realize the principle we have to gather ourselves in global cooperation.

At the 50th Anniversary of the Armistice of the Korean War, on the one side of the world a Giant Empire armed to the tips of its toes dominates the world. On the other side of the world unarmed and non-violent countless people are making a great circle of the global solidarity hoping for the world peace. While the Giant Empire reign over the whole world neglecting the national border lines, peoples are standing up in order to embrace by Sun Shine Policy hoping the Giant would recover is reason, democracy and human rights by the its peoples power. Now lets start our peace movement in the Global Age from a corner of the East Asia!

## 미국의대한반도 정책과 북핵 위기, 그 진보적 해법

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### 1. 최근 한반도 정세의 특징

#### (1) 원인과 결과, 그 인식의 틀, 그리고 대응의 기본방향

2003년 중반기에 들어선 한반도는 현재 미국의 세계지배 전략 관철을 위한 동북아시아 정책의 수순인 고강도의 긴장과 대결국면에 그대로 빨려 들어갈 것인가, 아니면 열강의 세력균형 전략과 호흡을 맞춘 전격적인 타협국면에 들어갈 것인가의 기로에 놓여 있다. 우리로서는 실로 생사(生死)의 갈림길인 것이다. 그런데 연일 그 명확한 흐름을 잡기 어려울 정도로 혼란을 가중하면서 어지럽게 보도되고 있는 이 지역의 상황은<sup>1)</sup> 한편으로는 정세의 긴박함과 엄중함을 의미하지만, 다른 한편으로는 우리의 대응 여하에 따라 아직 유동적 여지가 있음을 뜻한다. 하지만 그 “아직”은 언제 그 시한이 종료될지 알 수 없다. 그렇기 때문에 바로 이 유동적 공간을, 더 이상 시간이 흘러 전쟁의 조건이 계속 “불가피한 방향으로 축적되어가지 않도록” 우리가 얼마나 신속하게, 그리고 주체적으로 평화의 역량으로 채워나갈 것인가가 최대의 관건이라고 하겠다.

1) 주로 미국 언론을 통해서 보도되고 있는 미국의 대북정책은 강/온의 교차로 이해되고 있는 동시에, “위기설”로 증폭되면서 어떤 움직임이 정작 미국의 진정한 의도와 목표인가를 혼란스럽게 만들고 있다. 혼란에 빠지지 말아야 할 것은, “그 어떤 움직임일지라도 미국 부시정권의 움직임은 일관해서 우리 민족의 자율적 공간을 최소화하는 본질을 가지고 있다”는 점이다. 외교적 해법이든, 군사적 해법이든 그것이 이러한 본질에서 벗어나도록 하지 않는 한, 우리 민족의 진정한 자주적 평화의 길은 확보되는 것이 아니다. 이는 이른바 “대화론”에 대한 낙관적인 기대를 경계하는 관점이 될 수 있을 것이다. 사태의 위기국면을 해결하기 위해서 흔히 관련 당사자간의 상호 “대화”의 중요성이 강조되는데, 북한과 미국 사이의 대화에서 정작 중요한 것은 미국이 상대의 생존권을 박탈하려는 자세를 버리는 일이다. 그렇지 않고 그 대화가 상대의 굴복을 겨냥하는 것이 될 때 그 대화는 단지 새로운 긴장과 대결 상황을 가져올 뿐이다.

이는 지정학적 관점에 보자면 이 지역에 미국을 중심으로 한 일극체제의 압도적인 지배력이 상황을 계속 주도하게 할 것인지, 아니면 이에 대한 견제력을 높이는 우리 민족 내부의 결속력과 일극체제의 대안인 다극체제의 역량을 결합시킨 결과로 기대할 수 있는 전쟁 통제력이 강화될 것인가가 판가름 나는 사안이라고 하겠다. 미국의 일극 체제적 지배전략은 오늘날 명백하게 밝혀지고 있듯이, 인류사회에 결코 평화가 아니라 전쟁을 가져오고 있다는 점<sup>2)</sup>에서 한반도 위기의 저지를 위한 전략의 초점은 이러한 미국의 행동방식을 규제할 수 있는 틀을 짜나갈 수 있는가 없는가에 궁극적으로 모아진다. 그런 점에서, 우선 언급하건데 북한의 핵 프로그램 가동은 북한 체제의 독자적 군사주의가 아니라, 바로 이 미국의 지배전략에 대한 자기 방어적 (또는 정당 방위적) 대응이라는 연관관계 상의 특징을 무시하지 못하면 우리는 원인과 결과를 혼동하게 된다. 그리고 그로 인해 북한을 제거, 붕괴시켜야 할 “안보위협”으로 규정하는 미국의 논리에 따른 전쟁정책의 근본적인 극복이 어려워진다. 미국에 대하여 북한이 줄기차게 체제 보장을 요구하는 이유도 여기에 있다고 하겠다. 진정한 안보상의 위협은 미국의 세계전략이 가지고 있는 군사력 증강과 그 패권적 과시에 있는 것이다.

그런 차원에서, 보다 선차적으로 해결해야 하는 문제는 어디까지나, 평화에 대한 위협이 되고 있는 미국의 전략이 이 지역에서 압도적으로 그리고 폭력적으로 관철되지 못하도록 하는 일이다. 미국이 현재 “인류 평화의 적”으로 규정하고 있는 북한의 핵 문제는 미국의 논리와는 반대로, 다름 아닌 바로 이 지역안보상의 우려가 되고 있는 미국 부시정권의 전쟁정책상 여러 조처들이 강력한 민족적/국제적 반발 앞에서 합법성과 실현성을 상실해갈 때 그와 동시에 소멸되어갈 수 있는 사안인 것이다. 북한으로서는 핵무장을 통한 자기방어의 필요성을 촉구했던 원인이 제거되기 때문이다. 그렇지 않으면, 북한의 핵무장 체제와 미사일을 비롯한 군사적 장치의 강화는 현실적으로 미국의 전쟁정책에 대한 일정한 저지력(deterrence)으로 기능하게 된다는 점에서 북한 핵 문제 해결과 관련한 우리와 주변 국가들의 외교적인 “대북 설득력”은 한계에 직면하지 않을 수 없으며 이를 빌

2) 미국의 21세기 세계전략은 이후 상론하겠으나, 기본적으로 미국의 <군사력 재편을 중심으로> 펼쳐진다. 이는 미국의 군사정책이 과거, 위협에 대한 지정학적 대처(threat-based defense)에서 방어능력 향상(capabilities-driven approach to restructuring the US military)의 방향으로 바뀌고 있는 것을 보여준다. 한국에서의 미군 재배치와 신무기 도입은 이러한 전략의 산물이다. 주한 미군의 기능은 이러한 관점에서 보자면, 이 지역 최대의 군사력으로 존재하는 것을 목적으로 한다. Tom Donnelly, Memorandum May 25, 2001, *Project for the New American Century*

미로 한 미국의 압박정책 강화로 인해 한반도의 평화체제 수립으로 가는 길은 매우 험난해질 수 있는 것이다.

결론적으로 우리의 해법이 지향해야 할 바를 말하자면, 당연히 <전쟁 통제력을 높일 수 있는 최대의 선택>이 무엇인지 파악하고, 전쟁체제 지향적 조치를 일체 거부하면서 이로부터 이탈하여 새로운 평화의 공간을 내외적 연대의 강화로 이룩하는 일이 될 것이다. 미국의 미사일 방어망(Missile Defense System)수립을 비롯하여 신무기 도입과 병렬적으로 이루어지는 군사력 재편, 한-미-일 합동 군사체제 강화 등으로 나타나는 "전쟁체제로의 편입에 내부적인 정치사회적 압력과 역내 집단안보 체제의 조성을 통해 제동을 거는 것"이다<sup>3)</sup>. 다시 말해서, 이 해법의 기본 방향은 남북을 포괄한 우리 민족 공동의 생존권이 미국의 세계 전략적 대상이 되는 것에 대하여 단호히 저항하고, 이 저항의 기운을 평화적 대안의 창출로 연결하여 "민족 내부의 각종 차원의 결속을 강화하고 최대한 교류를 활발하게 하면서 이를 전 세계의 관심사와 지지의 대상으로 부상시키는 <역 봉쇄전략>에 기초한 국제주의적 노력"을 대폭 강화해나가는 것이다. 이러한 기본적 토대가 없는 전략과 대응은 그때그때 미묘하게 변동하는 정세의 흐름이나 관련 당사자국가 책임자들의 개별적 발언에 좌우되어 문제의 근본을 망각하고 불필요한 비판이나 근거 없는 낙관에 빠질 수 있다.<sup>4)</sup>

## (2) 미국의 대북 압박정책, 그 방향과 수단

그렇다면 미국은 자신의 목표를 실현시키기 위해 어떤 방식을 취하고 있는가? 그에 앞서 이러한 정세 가운데서 핵심적인 사안이 무엇인지 단적으로 정리해보면, 그것은 현재 미국이 추구하는 전략대로 북한을 이 지역 전체의 <공동의 적>으로 고립시키는 방식이 진행되도록 할 것인가, 또는 그러한 방식을 이 지역의 각 세력들이 집단적으로 좌절시키고 새로운 형태의 지역 질서를 만들어내는데 성공할 것

3) 정전(停戰: Armistice)체제의 종식과 종전(終戰)을 확정하는 <평화협정 체결>은 이러한 의미에서 한반도에 전쟁체제 존속과 심화를 저지하는 중대한 국제법적 작업이 된다. 이는 또한 제2차 대전 이후 전후 처리 과정의 미완과 이로 인한 6.25 전쟁의 군사적, 외교적 유산을 해결하는 매듭이 된다.

4) Seymour Hersh의 New Yorker지 기사와 관련하여 후에 서술하겠으나, 미국 부시정권의 대북 정책의 기본 기조는 김정일 체제 붕괴와 정권교체라는 근본적 목적을 철회하지 않는 한 일체의 외교, 군사적 접근은 한반도 정세를 위기 국면으로 가게 하는 "전쟁 지향적 본질"을 가지고 있음을 주시해야 할 것이다. 따라서 언제 어느 때 위기가 발발할 것인가를 놓고 추측성 논란을 벌이는 것 보다 아예 그러한 시나리오가 가능하지 않는 상황의 근본적 변화를 목표로 삼는 노력이 보다 중요하고 의미 있을 것이다.

인가의 문제가 된다.

전자는 북한이 미국의 적대정책에 항복을 하지 않는 한, 한반도를 중심으로 하는 동북아시아에 군사주의 노선의 대립과 충돌을 가져올 수밖에 없으며 우리 민족에게는 말할 수 없는 재앙을 뜻하게 됨은 물론이다. 후자의 경우에는, 우리가 바라마지 않는 일이다. 그러나 <평화의 과정>을 국제적 연대라는 방식으로 동북아시아 전체의 체제적 전환의 문제와 관련시킨다는 점에서 우리의 현재적 역량상 간단치 않으며 우리의 주체적 대응이 결여될 경우 자칫 우리가 알지 못하는 사이에 열강정치의 담합구조에 우리 민족의 행동반경이 갇힐 수 있다는 점에서 고도의 정세인식 능력과 외교역량이 절실한 사안이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 미국의 제국주의적 질서를 의미하는 "일극체제에 맞설 다극화 체제 전환을 지향하는 해법"이야말로 이 지역 평화의 집단적 보장을 이루어낼 수 있는 길이 될 것이다.

그런데, 미국의 한반도 정책은 바로 이 두 가지 사안을 자신의 전략 속에서 통합하여, 하나의 일관된 방향을 향해 가고 있는 중이다. 냉전시대의 봉쇄전략을 새로운 진영 재편의 방식으로 추구해나가고 있는 것이다. 다극체제의 출현을 적극 저지하면서 자신의 압도적 패권을 관철시키는 일체의 전략전술에 주력하고 있다. 즉, 북한을 고립시키고 동북아시아 지역 국가들의 연대와 결속을 해체, 자신의 진영으로 결속시켜나가는 방식이다. 이른바 "반 테러 전선"을 중심으로 자신의 주도권이 안정적으로 지속될 수 있는 <진영 편성전략>이라고 할 수 있다. 냉전은 국제적으로 종식되었으나 냉전 시대의 패권질서가 가지고 있는 본질은 그대로 유지하려는 새로운 접근이다.<sup>5)</sup> 미국이 추진하려는 소위 "다자회담의 구조"도 바로 이러한 의도를 반영하는 것이라고 하겠다. 이는 "당사자 회담"을 통해 미국과 북한의 대립 구도가 가진 모순<sup>6)</sup>이 국제적으로 드러나 미국의 군사주의적 접근이 비

5) 한반도의 위기는 근본적으로 바로 여기에서 발생한다. 냉전의 조건이 소멸한 상태에서 그에 맞는 방식의 질서 재편이 아니라, 냉전구도의 국제적 권력구도를 보다 강화하기 위해 한반도의 냉전장치를 고착시키고 있기 때문이다. 이는 한반도 정세 해결에 있어서 기본적인 모순으로, 내부적으로는 완만한 탈냉전 해법인 햇볕정책에 대한 지지와 이에 대한 폐기라는 정치적, 이념적 대립으로 나타나며 외부적으로는 봉쇄정책의 지속, 강화와 역봉쇄전략 추진외교의 대립으로 표현되고 있다.

6) 당사자 회담에서는 체제보장과 선제공격 철회, 그리고 북한의 핵무장 제거가 중심의제가 될 수 있으나, 다자회담에서는 북한의 핵무장 프로그램 제거가 우선적 의제로 가동할 수 있게 된다. 미국은 이를 지역 안보상 공동의 우려로 제기하고 있고, 이를 북한의 핵무장을 원하지 않고 한반도의 비핵지대화를 바라는 중국, 러시아가 받아들일 수 있는 여지가 있기 때문이다. 그러나 당사자 회담의 우선적 해결을 근거로 다자회담이 이루어지면, 이는 미국의 대북 압박 및 선제공격정책 철회가 주안점이 될 수 있다는 점으로 해서 미국은 이를 가급적 회피하려 하고 있다고 하겠다. 회담의 양식은 그 주 의제가 무엇이 될 것인가의 문제와도 깊은 관련이 있으며, 이 대목이 제대로 해결되면 다자회담은 향후 동북아 지역 안보



관의 대상이 되지 않고, 다층적 압박을 북한에게 가할 수 있는 방식으로 이해되고 있다. 그래서 동북아시아가 지역적 독자성이나 상대적 자율성을 갖지 않고 자신의 지배전략의 반경 속에 있도록 하며, 그로써 미국의 세계지배 전략상 요구되는 이 지역의 지정학적 안정, 즉 “자신에 대한 이 지역의 의존도를 높이는 질서를 확보”하려는 것이다. 그런 틀 속에서 “지역 안보에 대한 위협”으로 규정되는 북한의 역설적인 전략상 가치는, 반 테러 전선을 내세운 진영결속과 그를 기반으로 한 지속적인 미국의 패권체제 유지를 위해 매우 필요한 것이 된다.<sup>7)</sup> 북한 문제는 미국의 동북아시아 전략에 있어서 핵심 고리인 것이다.

그런 관점에서 미국의 대북 전략은 그간의 상황을 돌이켜 보면 무엇보다도 다음을 기초로 하고 있음을 알게 된다. 즉, (1) 북한의 군사적 “위협”을 최대한 부각시킨다. (2) 핵문제를 비롯하여 각종 인권 문제와 기타 국제법적 규범에서 일탈하는 “범죄”국가로 이미지화한다.<sup>8)</sup> (3) 국제적 대화의 노력에 제대로 응하지 않는 “상대하기 어려운” 나라로 인식시킨다. (4) 경제적 실패를 “불법적 무기시장 확대”로 해결하려는 나라로 규정해간다. (5) 지도체제와 민중의 분리를 통해, “지도체제만 교체되면” 사태는 달라질 수 있다, 등이다. 즉, “깡패국가(rogue state)”에 대한 실증적 증명과정을 밟아나가는 것이다. 주로 언론을 통한 프로파간다에 해당하는 이러한 이미지 격하의 과정이 꾸준히 지속되고, 국내외적으로 일정한 지지 분위기가 형성되면, 그 다음 공세의 수순은 훨씬 수월해질 수 있음은 물론이다. 이는 이후 미국의 전략과 관련하여 설명하게 되는 것처럼, 붕괴와 정권교체를 통한 이른바 <국가건설 점령정책(Nation-building Occupation)> 전략을 겨냥한 전 단계

의 새로운 틀을 짜는데 필요한 국제적 절차가 될 수 있다. 당사자 회담과 다자회담의 가치는 따라서 형식논리가 아니라, 그 내용상의 차원에서 접근할 때 그 본질이 드러난다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 차원에서 보자면, 노무현 정권의 다자회담 접근 방식은 민족 내부의 주체적 해결의지를 포기한 미국 위주의 다자회담 수용이라는 점에서 비판되고 있는 것이다.

7) 이는 북한의 자기 방어적 조처조차 도발(provocation), 위협(threat), 공갈(menace)로 해석하고 규정하려는 미국 부시정권의 태도에서 잘 드러난다. 부시정권의 군사주의 세력들은 북한 움직임을 모두 미국의 선의와 대화제외에 대한 거부, 그리고 국제법적 규제에 통제할 수 없는 집단으로 몰아가고 있는 것이다. 그런 규정이 국제화되면, 다음 수순인 선제공격의 정당성이 확보된다. 바로 이러한 과정이 하나하나 지속적으로 축적되지 않도록 하는 우리의 대응이 긴급하다.

8) 미국의 대북 적대정책은 다만 군사적 공세만을 중심으로 진행되는 것이 아니라, 일체의 동원 가능한 자원을 통해 이루어지고 있는 총공세라고 봐야 한다. 그런 과정에서 보다 결정적인 국면과 시기가 도래하면 이를 놓치지 않고 전면적 공세로 나갈 수 있는 환경을 만들어가고 있는 것이다. 황장엽의 방미 의회 증언 계획과 구상은 그러한 점에서 미국의 전쟁 정책을 위한 조처에 우리가 협력하는 것이 된다는 점에서 심히 우려가 되지 않을 수 없다. 정체를 위한 조처에 우리가 협력하는 것이 된다는 점에서 심히 우려가 되지 않을 수 없다. 후에 설명하겠지만, 이른바 “인도주의적 개입(humanitarian intervention)”을 위한 전단계 조처의 성격을 가지게 되는 것이다.

조처라고 할 수 있다.

가령, 지난 6월 중반에는 11개국이 스페인의 마드리드에 모여, 대량살상 무기 확산 금지를 명분으로 북한 선박에 대한 해상봉쇄를 국제법적 근거가 있는 행동으로 만들기 위한 회동이 있었으며 이를 기반으로 하여 이른바 <확산안보 선제행동(Proliferation Security Initiative: PSI)>이 결성되었다. 이와 같은 장치는 북한의 군사적 위협을 부각시키기 위한 조처임과 동시에, 북한의 대외 경제적 고리를 차단하고 만약의 경우 군사적 충돌이 발생했을 경우 북한에 대한 다국적 군사행동으로 들어갈 수 있는 조건을 마련한 것이라고 하겠다. 이는 미국이 이라크 침략 과정에서 동맹체제의 기반이 견고하지 않았던 상황을 극복하기 위한 것이자 대북 군사행동에 대한 국제법적 명분을 축적해나가기 위한 움직임이라고 할 수 있다. 이러한 동향은 미국이 북한을 겨냥한 “도발적 봉쇄정책”이 얼마나 실질적인 수준에 이르고 있는지를 보여주는 보기라고 하겠다.

이와 함께 북한의 핵무장 프로그램과 관련한 불확실한 정보 흘리기를 통한 언론 작전<sup>9)</sup>, 북한의 인권상황에 대한 개입 필요성 강조, 탈북자 수용 발언 등을 통한 체제 불안정 부각 등이 전개된다. 그리고 이를 근거로 하여 앞서 언급했듯이 북한의 외교적 고립, 주변 국가들의 우호적 대북 접근차단, 그리고 더 나아가서 북한 체제 붕괴와 지도세력 제거 등이 추진될 수 있는 것이다. 고도의 정보 취재로 이름이 높은 중견 언론인 세이무어 허쉬가 뉴요커(The New Yorker)지 2003년 1월 27일자에 기고한 글에서 그는 한 정보 관리가 백악관의 회의에 참석, 부시 대통령과 딕 체니 대통령의 북한 관련 발언을 밝힌 것을 다음과 같이 증언하고 있다. “부시와 체니는 김정일의 목을 원하고 있다. 미국이 북한과 오고가는 협상이야기로 정신이 헛갈리지 말라. 협상은 있겠지만, 백악관은 따로 계획이 있는데, 이라크 문제가 끝난 다음에는 이 자를 처치하겠다는 것이다. 김정일은 이들에게 오늘의 히틀러와 다를 바 없다.”<sup>10)</sup> 북한과 미국 사이에 협상의 줄다리기가 아무리

9) New York Times 2003년 7월 20일자, “North Korea Hides New Nuclear Site, Evidence Suggests” 이런 종류의 기사들이 가지고 있는 특징은, 그 증거 내용에 대한 명확한 공개가 없고 증거 제보자의 위치가 분명하지 않으며 내세운 증거의 확실성에 대해서도 단정을 피하고 있다는 점이다. 그러면서도 기사의 제목이나 내용은 북한의 핵 무장을 기정사실화하고, 기사 말미에는 그로 인해 북한의 핵무기가 밖으로 흘러나가 매우 위험한 사태를 결과할 수 있다는 논조로 일관한다. 증거가 북한의 핵무기 은폐를 확인(confirm), 또는 명확히 보여주고 있다(clarifies)가 아니라 “~인 듯 하다” 는 식의 “suggests”를 사용하고 있는 것은 이러한 기사가 정보 확인이나 증거제시에 있지 않고 북한에 대한 부정적 이미지 증폭을 위한 언론작업의 가능성이 높음을 말해주고 있다.

10) Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker, 2003년 1월 27일 자 “One American Intelligence official

여러 형태로 벌어져도 미국의 본심은 결국 북한 지도부의 제거, 체제 붕괴와 정권 교체, 그리고 이라크의 경우에서처럼 이 지역의 식민지화라는 것을 보여주고 있는 셈이다. 이러한 허위의 보도는 미국의 세계전략이 궁극적으로 지향하는 질서가 내세우고 있는 명분과는 다른 지배점령 정책의 본질을 가지고 있는가를 드러내주고 있다. 따라서 우리의 대응은 이미 앞서 지적한대로 바로 이러한 미국의 제국주의적 지배체제에 우리가 하위단위로 복속되지 않도록 하는 다양하고도 전면적인 저항과, 민족 내부의 결속과 결합한 국제적 연대에 기초한 역 봉쇄전략 추진이 중심이 되어야 함을 거듭 일깨우고 있다고 하겠다.

## 2. 미국의 세계전략

### (1) 지구 제국 건설을 위한 일극체제(Unipolar system)

그렇다면, 우리가 직면하고 있는 오늘날 미국의 세계전략이 가지고 있는 본질은 어디에 있는가? 이를 보다 명확히 정리해야 우리의 대응 방향과 방식이 보다 확고하게 결정될 수 있을 것이다. 미국의 21세기 세계전략은 미국이 주도하는 자본주의 체제의 세계적 완결을 의미하는 <지구제국(Global Empire 또는 Planetary Empire) 건설>을 그 기본 목표로 삼고 있다.<sup>11)</sup> 미국 부시 정권의 대외정책은 바로 이러한 목표에 봉사할 수 있는 일체의 수단을 무제한적으로 동원하는 것에 집중되어 있으며, 무엇보다도 세계 최강의 군사력으로 다른 나라들을 강도 높게 관리할 수 있는 대단히 노골적인 “군사주의 노선”이 그 중심에 존재한다. 이는 한

who has attended recent White House meetings cautioned against relying on the day-to-day Administration statements that emphasize a quick settlement of the dispute. The public talk of compromise is being matched by much private talk of high-level vindication. 'Bush and Cheney want that guy's head - Kim Jong Il's - on a platter. Don't be distracted by all this talk about negotiations. There will be negotiations, but they have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq. He's their version of Hitler.'

11) 미국의 전 세계 지배를 관철하겠다는 신보수주의자들의 전략은 Project for the New American Century가 가장 분명하게 보여주고 있다. 1992년 3월 8일자 New York Times가 일부 보도한 비밀 국방계획지침 문서(Defense Planning Guidance)는 Project for the New American Century가 추구하려는 전략의 골간과 이후 미국의 국가안보전략보고서의 기본을 담고 있다. 이 문서의 작성자는 국방부 장관 Paul Wolfowitz로서 그는 레이건 시대로부터 지금에 이르기까지 군사력을 중심으로 내세운, 그래서 일체의 도전을 허용하지 않는 미국의 세계제패 전략 작성에 주력해왔다. 그리고 이 문서를 통해서 확인되는 것은 “미국의 21세기 세계전략상 지정학적 목표는 유럽과 아시아를 연결하는 유라시아 지역 전체를 최대한 장악하는 것”이다. 이라크에 대한 침략과 한반도에 대한 공략은 바로 이러한 지정학적 전략의 산물이라고 하겠다.

마디로 고전적 파시즘의 존재양식과 크게 다르지 않은, 독점 대자본과 군사주의 세력의 반동적 동맹 체제<sup>12)</sup>를 근간으로 하는 <세계지배를 위한 제국주의 프로젝트><sup>13)</sup>이자 <제국의 통제 시스템>이라고 할 수 있다.

즉, 21세기 미국의 세계전략은 미국의 주도권에 대한 일체의 경쟁과 도전, 그리고 저항을 허용하지 않는, <압도적인 일극체제(unrivaled unipolar system)>의 수립에 그 핵심이 있으며<sup>14)</sup>, 그 추진 방식의 특징은 “전쟁체제의 강화”로 나타나고 있는 것이다. 이는 전쟁의 승리를 통해 아메리카 제국의 위력을 전 지구적으로 확인시키고, 이를 근거로 하여 <미국이 중심이 되는 세계적 지배체제(Pax Americana)><sup>15)</sup>를 “인류 보편의 자연법적 질서”로 수용하도록 만드는 과정이라고

12) 정치 이데올로기는 자유주의를 내세우지만, 실제로는 미국 자본주의 위기에 대응하여 대자본의 권력이 집중된 국가로서 파시즘의 양상을 보이고 있는 미국의 현실에 대해서 Bertram Gross는 “미소 짓는 파시즘(Friendly Fascism)”이라는 말로 표현했다. 그는 미국 사회와 정치가 대기업의 수중에 사유화되고 있으며 이로써 “대기업에 의한 노예제(corporate serfdom)”가 작동하고 있다고까지 주장했다. Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America, (Boston: South End Press, 1980) 부시정권에 대한 파시즘 규정은 최근 미국의 진보적인 정치 철학계에서 제기하는 중요한 논란의 하나이다.

13) James Petras는 이러한 미국의 지배체제가, 자본의 사유화(privatization)를 지구촌 전체에 걸쳐 전면적으로 확산시키면서 이루어진 세계화(globalization)를 통한 <제국주의적 기획>을 지향하고 있다고 갈파했다. 그리고 그는 이러한 제국주의적 기획의 근간에는 미국 자본주의 체제의 지배계급에 의한 반혁명전략과 사회보장 제도의 해체가 중심이 되어 있음을 주목해야 한다고 강조했다. 부시 정권의 세계 지배전략을 극복하는 문제는 이러한 차원에서 볼 때, 각 국가 내부의 계급정치의 차원과 연결해야 함을 의미하게 된다. James Petras & Henry Veltmeyer, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century, (New York: Zed Books, 2001)

14) Phyllis Bennis, US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis, (New York, Olive Branch Press, 2003) 국제질서에 대한 일방주의적 대외정책에 대하여 비판적으로 분석한 필리스 베니스는 다음과 같이 표현하고 있다. “From their first moment in office, Bush officials brought to the White House an aggressive brand of unilateralism, characterized by disdain for global opinion and contempt for international law and institution.” p. 1 미국 부시정권의 전략가들, 그리고 이들과 함께 입장을 하는 언론인들은 부시정권의 세계전략 추진으로 마침내 “제국의 기회(Imperial moment)”가 왔다고 주장하기 시작했다. 이는 또한 앞서 언급했던 Paul Wolfowitz의 비밀국방계획 지침 문서(Defense Planning Guidance, 1992-1994)에 이미 그 골격이 정리된 개념이라고 하겠다. 냉전의 종료와 함께 미국의 압도적인 제국적 지위 확보를 향후 미국의 최대 세계 전략적 목표로 정한 것이었다.

15) 이 Pax Americana와 대조되는 개념이 Pan-Americanism으로서 이는 미국과 여타 아메리카 대륙의 국가들이 자주적 지위를 유지하면서 하나의 대륙 연방 체제를 지향했던 것이다. 그러나 남북 아메리카 대륙의 독자적 블록화를 구상했던 이러한 Pan-Americanism은 미국의 개입주의 전략에 의해 무너지고 라틴 아메리카에 대한 제국주의 적 지배질서가 형성되게 된다. 이와 관련하여 라틴 아메리카의 지식인들은 특히 유럽의 제국주의 개입에 대한 방파제로 선언되었던 먼로 독트린이 이후 보다 노골적으로 <정복의 일반적 체계(general system of conquest)>로 변했다면서 다음과 같이 비판했다. “If the Monroe Doctrine might conceivably have been a guarantee during the past century of the ‘principle of nationalities’

하겠다. 이로써 여타 민족국가들의 주권과 생존은 중대한 위협에 봉착하게 된다.

이는 세계 전체에 대한 아메리카 제국의 독점적 지배권 행사를 위한 피라미드형 위계질서를 형성, 유지하고 이에 다른 나라들을 미국의 이해관계에 봉사하는 하위 구조로 통합시키는 폭력적이고도 강제적인 과정을 요구하고 있다.<sup>16)</sup> 그리고 그 통합에 제대로 순응하지 않는, 핵심 고리에 해당하는 국가에 대해서는 "인류적 차원의 적(악의 축/the pillars of evil)"으로 규정하고 외교/경제/군사 등의 영역에서 자원을 총동원하여 고립, 압박, 봉쇄, 포위, 공격, 붕괴, 점령, 정권교체, 식민지화 등의 조치를 취하는 대상이 되게 한다. 그리하여, 미국의 대외정책은 "이러한 위계질서를 계속 확대재생산"하는 것에 그 현실적 목표가 있게 된다.

이 거대한 제국주의 프로젝트는 따라서 미국이 선택하고 결정하는 방식을 다른 나라들과 국제법적 규약, 그리고 유엔과 같은 국제조직이 승인, 동조하고 협력하도록 하는 세계질서를 끊임없이 지향한다. 부시정권은 바로 이러한 프로젝트 추진의 최전선에 독점 대자본과 군사주의 세력의 동맹체제가 계급적, 권력적 이해관계를 매우 의식적으로 관철하기 위해 선택하고 내세운 <국가운영위원회>라고 할 수 있다.<sup>17)</sup> 그러므로 이러한 부시정권의 세계전략은 그 내세우는 명분이 무엇이든 부시 개인의 정치적 성향이나 정권 내부의 주요 인사들이 가지고 있는 개별적 특징과 정책사고의 차이에도 영향을 받기는 하겠으나, 보다 본질적으로는 배타적 지위를 안정적으로 확보하려는 아메리카 제국주의의 체제적 합의와 요구를 반영

against the 'right of intervention', it is evident today that that Doctrine....sets forth the 'right of intervention' of the United States as against the Latin American 'principle of nationalities.'...." Anonso Aguilar, Pan-Americanism: From Monroe to the Present, (New York: Monthly Review, 1968. p. 59

16) 이러한 과정을 통해 우리는 중심(core)과 주변부(periphery)의 위계질서(hierarchy)가 형성되는 것을 보게 되며, 이것이 하나의 세계체제의 유형을 만들어 내게 되는 것을 확인하게 된다. 중요한 전쟁은 이 과정에서 기존의 체제를 전환시켜 헤게모니를 새롭게 이동시키거나 또는 기존 체제의 결속을 강화하는 수단으로 등장하게 된다. 부시 정권의 전쟁정책은 기존의 위계질서가 위기에 직면한 것에 대한 대응이자, 새로운 체제적 도전의 발생을 저지하는 선택이 된다. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structure of the World Economy, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991)

17) Nicos Poulantzas의 경우, 파시즘을 제국주의 단계에 이른 자본주의의 위기국면의 공세전략으로 파악하고, 국가는 이 공세전략의 헤게모니를 장악하려는 각 자본본파의 내부적 투쟁의 장이 된다고 갈파한다. 그러한 그의 논지에 따르면, 부시정권의 내부에는 금융자본과, 오일 자본 및 군수산업 자본의 일정한 긴장과 대치상태가 있는 것을 발견하게 되는데 현재의 중심은 오일 자본 및 군수산업 자본에 기울어 있다고 하겠다. 그러나 이들 모두의 이해가 공동으로 위협에 처해 있다는 인식이 있는 한, 리버만(Lieberman)의 경우에서 나타나듯 민주당의 부시 정권의 전쟁정책에 대한 지지는 구조적 필연성을 가지고 있다고 하겠다. Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, (London: Verso, 1974)

하는 것임을 주목해야 한다.

여기에서 우리는 그 통제범위와 강도가 달라진 제국주의의 새로운 단계를 비롯하여, 자신의 체제적 이해를 대리 관철할 권력구조의 수립을 위해 지배와 정복을 겨냥하는 침략전쟁을 정당화하는 논리, 그리고 이를 실현하기 위한 여러 차원의 움직임들을 목격하게 된다. 이를 단순화 시켜 말하자면, 우선 "자유와 인권, 민주주의와 시장경제"를 존중하는 문명권 전체의 가치와 안전을, 냉전 시대 이후 새롭게 등장하게 된 테러라는 야만으로부터 방어하기 위한 미국의 인류사적 책임이 강조된다. 19세기 제국주의가 내세웠던 "백인들의 의무적 책임(White man's burden)" 이데올로기의 변형이다. 미국 정치 내부적으로는 공격적 애국주의를 전면에 내세워 정치적 이견(異見)의 배제 내지는 주변화를 위한 민주적 공화정의 약화<sup>18)</sup>, 외부적으로는 미국을 선두로 한 제국 동맹의 결속과 군사적 공격 대상이 된 지역에서의 점령정책 전개로 그 구체적인 면모가 드러난다.

## (2) 위기의 돌파, 제국의 방어전략

이러한 미국의 지구제국 건설 방식은 미국 역사 속에 이미 깊은 뿌리를 가지고 있는 제국주의 정책의 절정을 보여주는 동시에, 단기적으로는 지난 클린턴 정권 말에 경험하고 있었던 미국 자본주의 체제의 동요와 곤경, 이에 따른 패권의 약화에 대한 대응의 산물이다. 다시 말해서 1990년대 후반기에 이르러 세계적 차원에서 자본축적 과정에 중대한 위기가 발생하고, 이로 인한 미국 경제의 주도권이 타격을 입으면서 미국의 지배체제에 대한 도전이 생기자 이를 제어하는 가운데 체제위기를 돌파하려는 제국의 자기방어에서 비롯되었다. 냉전 대결주의 전략의 논리였던 "현존하는 명백한 위협 (the present and clear danger)"의 새로운 유형 앞에서 <제국의 안보>를 재정비하겠다는 전략인 것이다.

그런데, 애초에는 자기 방어적 수세형 전략으로 출발했던 부시 정권의 대외정책

18) 제국의 전쟁정책은 공화정의 권리를 포기하는데서 가능해진다는 논리는 J. A. Hobson의 제국주의론에서 이미 명백하게 밝혀진다. "Finally, the spirit, the policy, and the methods of imperialism are hostile to the institutions of popular self-government, favouring forms of political tyranny and social authority which are the deadly enemies of effective liberty and equality." Imperialism, (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan, 1965) p. 152 Gore Vidal의 경우에도, 미국의 전쟁 체제도 공화정의 민주적 권리와 가치가 테러 위협을 막는다는 구실로 포기되어지면서 중앙연방정부의 권한이 극대화되고 이로써 영원한 전쟁의 구조가 형성된다는 것을 날카롭게 갈파했다. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got To Be So Hated, (New York: Thunder' Mouth Press, 2002)

은 9.11 사태와 그 직후 이어진 아프가니스탄 전쟁의 승리 이후 자신감을 회복, 공격형으로 전환되었다. 그 결과는 2002년 9월 백악관이 공개한 <미국의 국가안보전략(The National Security Strategy of the United States of America)>보고서에 명시된 "선제공격 정책(preemptive strike strategy)"의 선택<sup>19)</sup>과, 이에 기초한 2003년 3월 이라크 침략전쟁의 수행으로 나타나게 되었다. 이는 단기적으로 볼 때에는 <자본의 자유화 전략>에 따라 통제되지 않은 투기적 자본시장의 세계적 팽창이 1990년대의 경기상승 국면을 지나 거품이 꺼지면서 부채(負債)경제가 심화, 자본축적 전략에 이상이 발생한 것과 관련이 있는 것이다<sup>20)</sup>. 즉, 국가권력으로부터 시장을 해방시킨다는 명제 하에 "노동에 대한 규제 강화, 자본에 대한 규제 해제"를 통해 세계화 논리를 추진해왔던 신자유주의 세력의 발언권이 위기국면에서 약화되고 이들의 퇴각이 정치적으로 결정된 1999년 미국 대선이 낳은 현실이라고 할 수 있다.

헌정질서 위기까지 논란이 되었던 대선을 통해, 일극적 체제의 군사적 확보를 세계전략의 기본으로 내세우는 이른바 신보수주의 세력의 소위 선거 쿠데타에 가까운 전격적인 권력 장악은 다음의 상황을 반영하고 있다. 즉, (1) 세계은행(World Bank)이나 국제통화기금(IMF) 등 국제기구와 협약, 그리고 국제적 협력 체제를 통해 미국 자본의 지위를 강화해왔던 신자유주의 노선의 한계가 드러난 것, (2) 유럽의 급속한 정치경제적 통합, 독자적 군사 블록 조성 움직임과 중국의 성장에 따른 도전이 위협적인 수준에 이르게 된 상황,<sup>21)</sup> (3) 지구 온난화 문제 해결을 위한 교토 의정서(Kyoto Treaty)나 전쟁범죄 처리를 위한 국제형사재판소(International Criminal Court) 설립 등 미국에 대한 국제적 규제 움직임이 나타난 상황 등이다. 보수 세력의 최종 보루인 대법원의 선거판결은 바로 이러한 현실을 어떻게 해결할 것인가를 놓고 이루어진 체제적 논란과 합의의 결과였으며, 그래서

19) "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.....To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

20) Paul Sweezy의 경우, 이미 1980년대 말, 미국 경제가 부채경제의 부담(debt explosion)과 통제력을 잃은 투기자본의 운동(dizzying spiral of speculation)으로 장기적인 불황에 시달리게 될 심각한 위기에 직면한다는 것을 정확히 예견했던 바가 있다. Paul Sweezy & Harry Magdoff, The Irreversible Crisis (New York: Monthly Review, 1988)

21) Robert Brenner는 미국 경제가 1970년 대 이후 지속적인 스태그플레이션 현상에 빠져 경쟁력을 상실해가고, 유럽경제의 통합적 역량의 도전 앞에서 위기에 처해 세계경제의 체제 변동에 중요한 영향을 미치게 될 것이라고 분석했다. 부시정권의 군사주의 체제는 이러한 체제변동의 위기에 대한 직접적인 대응의 성격을 갖게 된다고 하겠다. The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy, (London: Verso, 2002)

신보수주의 권력 등장은 합법성을 획득했다.

신자유주의 노선의 문제는 통제되지 않은 투기자본의 과잉에 따라 수차례의 연방정부 개입이 필요한 상황이 될 만큼 자본시장의 불안정이 가속화되었고<sup>22)</sup>, 세계은행, 국제통화기금 등의 기구가 반세계화 운동을 무시하기 어려워진 현실에서 개혁의 요구에 직면하게 된 것을 비롯하여, 아르헨티나를 중심으로 라틴 아메리카 등의 경제현실이 파국적 국면에서 벗어나지 못하는 사태로 확인되었다. 이러한 상황에서 유럽과 일본, 중국 등은 각 지역 경제의 독자적 결속력을 강화하려는 경향을 노골화하기 시작했고, 미국의 일방주의적 세계전략에 대한 국제법적 규제조치를 강구하는 쪽으로 기울어갔던 것이다.

### (3) 그 전략적 핵심 과제와 딜레마

바로 이와 같은 현실 앞에서 미국 지배계급의 위기의식이 날카로워졌고, 미국에 도전하는 일련의 세계적 동향을 일거에 통제하고 제국의 위력을 새롭게 다지는 보다 강도 높은 선택이 절실했다. 이는 지난 2차대전 종결과 함께 확보했던 미국의 주도적 패권체제를 그대로 온존시키고 더 나아가 냉전 이후 "진영 적대전선이 소멸한 현실"에서 대적(對敵) 결집력이 떨어진 아메리카 제국의 지배질서를 재편성, 지구촌 전체에 걸쳐 전면화하는 작업이 된다.

따라서 부시 정권을 통해 등장한 이들 신보수주의 세력의 지정학적 전략의 중심 과제는 매우 분명해진다. 즉, 제국 동맹 내부에서의 압도적 지위와, 제3세계 지역의 노동과 자원에 대한 통제력을 강화하는 것이 그 골자가 된다. 그리고 이를 위해서 "도전이 용납되지 않는 세계 최강의 군사력 보유와 실제적 과시", 즉 <전쟁 정책>이 국가정책의 핵심으로 부각되는 것이다.

22) Federal Reserve Bank는 최근 또다시 이자율 인하정책을 통해서 투자촉진을 강화하려고 있는데, 투기 거품 이후 형성된 부채경제의 극복이 어려운 상태이며, 미국 정부 자체가 적자재정의 위기에 처해 있어 시장 조정력이 상당한 정도로 떨어지고 있다. Robert Gutmann은 미국 경제의 본질적 문제 가운데 하나가 부채의 증가를 막아내지 못하는 신용 체제를 비롯하여 투기적 자본시장의 성격이라고 갈파했다. 이러한 현실은 미국 자본시장의 안정을 해치는 요인이 되어 미국의 세계 경제적 주도권을 약화시키고 있는 요인이 되고 있는 것이다. How Credit-Money shapes the Economy: The United States in a Global System (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994) "The preceding process of credit overextension now explodes into the open in the form of bankruptcies, loan defaults, and creditor panics. Speculative bubbles, built on expectations of continuously accelerating inflation, burst as expected price increases suddenly fail to materialize. These incidents of financial crisis spread pessimism, paralyze lending activity, and force spending cutbacks." p. 47.