

homeland as a result of the penetration of American capitalists into the Korean economy who wanted to take advantage of its cheap labor force (Light and Bonacich, 1988). This explanation, however, does not square with the actual composition of Korean immigrants, nor does it adequately explain the actual motivations of immigration. Post-1965 Korean immigration to the United States has been primarily a movement of middle-class Koreans seeking better opportunities in the United States, such as higher standards of living and educational opportunities for children and higher (Yoon, 1997).

It is also problematic to view the old wave of Korean immigrants who left Korea in the late 19th century as passive people driven out of their homeland by Japanese imperialists. As Han (2001) succinctly points out, as a whole Koreans in Japan should be regarded as a group of people who migrated to Japan to seek better lives there or decided to remain in Japan in expectation of better lives and future, no matter what initial motivations might be. It is too simplistic and biased to view all forms of immigration as the product of colonialism and that viewpoint does not square with complex reality where motivations and forms of immigration differ significantly from time to time and from place to place.

Second, the Juche theory adopts a primordialistic concept of nation or ethnicity, which views blood and language as essential elements of a nation. Such an orthodox concept can be applicable to first- and second-generation Koreans abroad, but are difficult to apply to the experience of third- and later-generation Koreans, who are only weakly attached to the homeland and strongly assimilated to host countries. Also, if we emphasize homogeneity in blood and language as conditions of nationality or ethnicity, we exclude children of mixed marriage between Koreans and non-Koreans and third- and later- generation Koreans who cannot speak Korean and have little knowledge about Korean history and culture. The contemporary notion of nation, which is now widely accepted in social sciences, views it as a situational and emergent entity rather than simply a set of primordial ties. It is a function of the structural situations in which national groups find themselves (Yancy, Erickson, and Juliani 1976). Structural conditions such as residential stability and isolation, common occupational positions,

and shared dependence on local institutions and services, are found to strengthen national affinity. Under certain circumstances, i.e. struggles among competing national groups for scarce social resources, nationality can become more salient.

Third, the concept of overseas Koreans does not distinguish the concepts of nation (or ethnicity) (*minjok*, 民族) and citizen (*kookmin*, 國民). If the concept of overseas Koreans is defined as a group of Koreans who share common blood ties and language, it is identical to the western concept of nation or ethnicity that emphasizes common cultural and historical backgrounds and a sense of community with a common destiny. If the concept of overseas Koreans is defined as nationals of North Korea, it is identical to the concept of citizen of a sovereign nation. An article of the Socialist Constitutional Law related with overseas Koreans states that "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea protects democratic national rights of overseas Korean compatriots and their legal rights and interests publicly acknowledged by international laws." The North Korea's Nationality Act revised in 1995 grants in principle overseas Koreans its citizenship. By doing so, North Korea equates national (or ethnic) membership (belonging to a national (or ethnic) group) with citizenship (belonging to a state). However, as Nielaus Luman points out, social membership and citizenship are different concepts. In the same vein, nationality and citizenship of overseas Koreans are not mutually exclusive and contradictory to each other (Yoon, 2000). Koreans in China, for example, have dual identity as being Korean in nationality and being Chinese in citizenship, and they are proud of that. The same thing is true for Koreans in the CIS who hold *Koryo saram* identity and for Koreans in the United States who take pride in their Korean American identity. In this sense, North Korea seems to try to put overseas Koreans under its political control by defining them as its nationals.

Fourth, despite its initial position that defines overseas Koreans as subjects of the overseas Koreans movement, the theory subordinates them under the control of North Korea by claiming that organizations of overseas Koreans be based on Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il with respects to ideology and structure. However, when North Korea has lost its capacity to take care



of overseas Koreans, it is unlikely that overseas Koreans support North Korea's one-sided policy that demands sacrifice on the part of overseas Koreans without paying them back.

### III. The South Korean Policy of Overseas Koreans

#### 1. ITS COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT

Compared with North Korea's active and aggressive policy, South Korea had taken somewhat passive and defensive policy toward overseas Koreans in the past. However, as its international status rose and democratic legitimacy of governments improved gradually, it began to take more active and inclusive policy toward its overseas compatriots.

There was virtually no government policy of overseas Koreans during the First and Second Republics because the governments were overpowered by political and social confusion immediately after the independence and the Korean War (1950-53). The first president Syngman Rhee even blockaded the home-visiting of Koreans in Japan for an extended period of time. When Chongryun was established in 1955, he took more even extreme actions to restrict all Koreans in Japan from visiting Korea for a while (Y. Kim, 2000: 71).

The Third Republic led by Park Chung Hee established an emigration policy in 1962 as part of its national development plan. Between 1960 and 1975, the South Korean population grew from 24.0 million to 34.6 million, a 44 percent increase. The Korean government regarded this population growth, which exceeded the rate of GNP growth, as a threat to balanced economic development. It therefore encouraged emigration as a means of relieving population pressure. Another goal of the 1962 emigration policy was to secure foreign exchange through remittances sent home by Koreans working or living abroad. For example, about 17,000 Korean nurses and coal mining workers migrated to West Germany

as contract workers between 1963 and 1974 (I. Kim, 1981: 53). During this period, they sent about \$720 million to their families in South Korea.

Because at that time the Korean government regarded emigration as a means of relieving population pressure, unemployment problems, and securing foreign exchange, it was more interested in sending surplus people out than helping them adjust successfully in host countries. Also the Park government, which competed with the Kim Il Sung regime, gave top priority to monitoring and controlling of overseas Koreans in order to prevent pro-North Korea and anti-government activities abroad.

While North Korea has maintained a view of overseas Koreans as its nationals, South Korea started with a view that regards overseas Koreans as "residents of other countries." Kim Jong Phil, a South Korean politician who led the normalization treaty with Japan in 1965, once said in an interview for a Japanese magazine *Chaegun* in 1981, "I wish they (Koreans) live as if they were completely Japanese and raise their children born in Japan in a way that they live as Japanese citizens." As such, government officials at that time expected that Koreans in Japan naturalize eventually as Japanese and viewed that trend positively. Koreans in Japan, however, criticized such a government policy as "the policy of abandoning its nationals."

Because of such attitudes toward overseas Koreans, the Korean government was not enthusiastic about assisting overseas Koreans to adapt well to host societies. Also, the government has kept biased positions toward overseas Koreans favoring those living in advanced countries like the United States and Japan while ignoring those living in less developed countries like China and the former Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union were not counted as overseas Koreans until the early 1990s in the official statistics compiled by the Ministry of Foreign affairs. They remained "forgotten compatriots" until South Korea normalized its diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union and China in 1990 and 1992, respectively. Since then, the total number of overseas Koreans jumped suddenly from 1.47 millions in 1980 to 5 millions in the early 1990s. Discriminatory treatment of overseas Koreans according to their wealth and status still remains.



The Chun Doo Hwan government, which gained a greater sense of confidence and superiority over North Korea as a result of Korea's rapid economic growth in the 1980s, expressed greater interests toward overseas Koreans problems. It accepted an offer proposed by North Korea to hold the convention of Korean nationals (*Daeminjokshoeui*) and made preparation for it. It also proposed in February, 1982 an idea of co-hosting home-visiting visit of overseas Koreans and allowing free passage between South and North through Panmunjom (Y. Kim, 2000: 72).

The Seoul Olympic Games of 1988 was an important turning point in relations between overseas Koreans and South and North Korea. Overseas Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union could observe remarkable economic growth and high standards of living of Korea through televised coverage of the Olympic Games. The Roh Tae Woo government, after it hosted successfully the Olympic Games, proposed in a special declaration for national self-existence, unification, and prosperity the lifting of the ban on free travel between South and North for overseas Koreans. Yet, it maintained an exclusive stance toward overseas Koreans who support North Korea and are sympathetic toward North Korean lines. Article 30 of "the South-North Exchange and Cooperation Law" enacted in August 1990 stated clearly, "in its application members of overseas organizations in line with North Korea are regarded as residents of North Korea" (Sohn, 2001: 97). Accordingly, Chongryun Koreans in Japan were regarded as residents of North Korea and their visit to Korea was strongly discouraged.

After three decades of military rule, South Korea elected Kim Yong Sam as a civilian president in 1993. To fulfill his pledges during his campaign for presidency, Kim Yong Sam pushed forward more inclusive and positive policy of overseas Koreans than his predecessors. He announced the New Policy of Overseas Koreans in 1993 and set out the main goals as (1) to assist overseas Koreans adapt economically and socially well in host countries, and (2) to strengthen emotional ties between overseas Koreans and the homeland. To achieve those main goals, concrete sub-goals of the policy were laid out as follows:

- (1) to assist overseas Koreans to establish solid economic and social standing in their host countries
- (2) to assist national education to maintain national homogeneity and close ties with the homeland
- (3) to assist overseas Korean communities to unite under the banner of freedom and democracy
- (4) to give priority to assisting self-help efforts of overseas Koreans to promote their self-reliance
- (5) to provide unified administrative service to overseas Koreans through local Korean embassies and consulates
- (6) to continue legal and institutional reforms to encourage and facilitate overseas Koreans' economic activities related with the homeland.

During the Kim Yong Sam government, some achievements were made in overseas Koreans policy, but some of original plans were cancelled or modified, thus only partially meeting longstanding demands of overseas Koreans. Overseas Koreans, especially those in the United States have demanded for a long time dual citizenship and the establishment of a government unit in exclusive charge of overseas Koreans affairs, namely Overseas Koreans Office (*Kyonminch'ong*). However, several ministries, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, opposed to the idea of establishing that kind of office for diplomatic and political reasons. As an alternative, a foundation named the Overseas Koreans Foundation was established in October 1997 under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foundation takes charge of research, exchange programs, public relations, cultural enterprise, and education, but cannot take part in more serious affairs of overseas Koreans, such as entry and departure and employment, because many ministries are not willing to hand over important and lucrative undertakings to the Foundation. The demand of dual citizenship met severe criticism and opposition from government circles as well as ordinary Korean people and hence never materialized. Another change was the upgrading of the former Review Committee on Overseas Koreans Policy formed during the Chun Doo Hwan government to the Committee on Overseas Koreans under the direct control of Prime



Minister in February 1996. Like its predecessor, however, the Committee functioned only as a nominal organization meeting once or twice a year after its formation. It did not hold any single meeting in 1999 when heated debate and controversy were raised regarding the establishment of the Overseas Koreans Law. As such, overseas Koreans issues and policy were low in the list of priorities in the Kim Yong Sam government.

President Kim Dae Jung, elected in 1998, followed the same policy of its predecessor. The basic goals of his policy of overseas Koreans are: (1) to assist overseas Koreans to secure stable living and grow as respected members of host countries; (2) to assist overseas Koreans to maintain national identity and strengthen their ties with the homeland; (3) to utilize overseas Koreans for the development of the homeland. The subgoals of the policy include:

- (1) to assist overseas Koreans to enter the mainstream of their host countries and improve their public status
- (2) to increase assistance to Korean language education and cultural events of overseas Koreans to strengthen national pride and self-esteem of overseas Koreans
- (3) to encourage economic activities of overseas Koreans in Korea so as to take advantage of their ability for the development of the homeland
- (4) to reform laws and institutions to utilize overseas Koreans of talents in Korea

To realize those goals, the Kim Dae Jung government considered sweeping changes in its policy of overseas Koreans. The Ministry of Justice proposed the Overseas Koreans Special Law in October 1998, which would grant overseas Koreans who possess foreign nationality the same legal rights as Korean nationals and abolish discrimination against overseas Koreans in entry and departure, stay, politics and economic activities in Korea. Also, the special law would adopt blood lineage as the qualification criterion of overseas Koreans and allow overseas Koreans to stay up to two years and engage in gainful employment in Korea. However, the Ministry of Justice's bold initiative was met with strong objection from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claimed that the special law would create chaos in

Korea's labor market and cause diplomatic confrontations with China and the CIS. In fact, Chinese ambassador to Korea warned that Koreans in China are Chinese citizens and any attempt to define them as Korean nationals would infringe on the sovereignty of China. The China's opposition to a domestic law of Korea seems to be motivated by its concern that if Koreans in China were granted preferential status and privileges, they would become more closely attached to Korea and their national consciousness and identity would strengthen. This would increase the mood of separatism among Koreans in China, the kind of scenario the Chinese authority would vehemently oppose and crush by any means.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to take opposition from other countries as its position against the special law. As a matter of fact, it has been sensitive to the issues of overseas Koreans that may cause diplomatic friction and has a tendency to avoid them as much as possible. Some critics blame the ministry for its low-profile diplomacy with superpowers. It objected to the idea of establishing the Basic Law of Overseas Koreans, initiated by Congressman Je Jung-Koo in 1997 on the following grounds:

- (1) the law that adopts the principle of blood lineage would be regarded as narrow-minded nationalism in the international community and directly interfere with the governing ideology of President Kim Dae Jung aiming at "universal internationalism"
- (2) the law that targets overseas Koreans who possess foreign nationality would irritate other countries and increase a possibility of diplomatic disputes
- (3) if the law that grants overseas Koreans special status were enacted, nationals of other countries would demand the same status and treatment
- (4) the law would raise the level of expectation of overseas Koreans for assistance from the Korean government and this contradicts the goal of overseas Koreans policy to facilitate self-help efforts of overseas Koreans
- (5) it would be more rational to incorporate demands of overseas Koreans in specific laws than to establish a single unified law.



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the Overseas Koreans Law in 1998 for the same reasons outlined above.

Faced with internal and external pressure, the scope of the proposed Overseas Koreans Special Law curtailed significantly. The law finally submitted to the Korean National Assembly in June, 1996 changed its name to the "Law on the Entry and Departure and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans" and blood lineage was replaced by past nationality (or citizenship) as the eligibility criterion of overseas Koreans.

The Overseas Koreans Law that became active in December 3, 1999 has a primary goal of lowering the barrier to the homeland so as to reduce restrictions on entry and departure, stay, and activities in the homeland. Especially, it relaxed all sorts of restrictions on the purchase of real estates, finance, and foreign currency exchanges and allows overseas Koreans to take out money earned from selling their real estates in Korea. These changes aim at helping overseas Koreans exercise their property rights more freely and thereby participate more actively in the economic recovery after the foreign currency crisis in 1997.

As for political activities, it allows overseas Koreans who stay in Korea for longer than 90 days to vote in elections held in Korea. However, from the outset, the law has been criticized as being biased and discriminatory against overseas Koreans in China and the CIS. Various civil organizations, scholars, and policy planners actively participate in a campaign to publicize the problems with the law and find directions of amendment.

## 2. PROBLEMS

The South Korean policy of overseas Koreans has not be as active and inclusive as that of North Korea with respect to the definition of overseas Koreans. As mentioned earlier, article 2 of the North Korea's Nationality Act revised in March 1995 defines its nationals as those who possessed Korean nationality before the establishment of North Korea and their descendants who gave up Korean nationality. The new nationality act

acknowledges denationalized persons and their children as its nationals who were not covered by the old law. Thus, all overseas Koreans including Koreans in South Korea are in principle entitled to North Korean nationality. On the contrary, the Overseas Koreans Law enacted in December, 1999 defines overseas Koreans as "those who possessed nationality of the Republic of Korea or their immediate family members who once possessed nationality of other countries." This definition excludes from the boundary of overseas Koreans those who emigrated prior to the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The number of overseas Koreans in China, the CIS, and Japan, who became ineligible in this way, accounts for more than 50% of all overseas Koreans, questioning the reason of existence of the overseas Koreans Law meaningless.

A group of overseas Koreans from China appealed to the Constitutional Court and the Court ruled on November 20, 2001 that it discriminated without rational justification overseas Koreans who left Korea before the establishment of Korea and violates the principle of equality set in Article 11 of the Constitution. At the same time, it called for the removal of the unconstitutional state by revising the law before December 31, 2003.

Second, the South Korean policy is being criticized as being too homeland-centered and selfish by demanding overseas Koreans to do for the homeland without paying back to them. Some critics even say that South Korea has only a policy of sending people out but no policy of caring them after they leave. Rights and duties are two sides of a coin and we need to provide practical assistance to overseas Koreans before we expect them to contribute to the homeland. Assistance to immigrants at their early stage of settlement in their host countries is particularly important, because they urgently need help in areas of employment, entrepreneurship, and education for children. If assisted at this critical state, immigrants would be attached to the homeland and pay back once they secure stable standing in the host countries.

Third, overseas Koreans, especially temporary stayers and permanent residents who keep Korean nationality, are denied their rights to vote. As mentioned earlier, North Korea allows members of overseas Koreans to



participate in the National Assembly. As a matter of course, South Korea allows members of overseas Koreans to become representatives of the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, but their roles are mainly to collect opinions about national unification and deliver to the government. Among 30 OECD countries, South Korea is the only country that does not allow voting rights to overseas countrymen. Japan allowed its nationals abroad to exercise absentee ballot in 1999 and Italy decided to follow the suit in 2003.

South Korea had a precedent for absentee ballot in the Park Chung Hee government. It allowed Korean soldiers stationed in Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1954-73) to vote in elections held in Korea in 1966 and 1972. At those times, Koreans in Germany who went as contract coal mining workers and nurses, and students in the United States and Europe were also allowed to vote in absentee ballot. But the Park government stopped this practice when opposition to his dictatorial rule escalated among overseas Koreans during the early 1970s.

The issue of voting rights for overseas Koreans is not a simple matter. We first have to build public consensus on whether or not overseas Koreans have legitimate claims to exercise their voting rights. We also need to come up with reasonable criteria to determine what groups of overseas Koreans are eligible to vote. At the same time, we need to find fair and efficient methods and procedures of voting.

Nonetheless, voting rights are effective means to make the Korean government and politicians be more accountable for overseas Koreans and plan and implement more responsible policy for overseas Koreans. Only when overseas Koreans participate as subjects of the policy of overseas Koreans in the decision-making process and evaluate the effects of policy, we can expect responsible government policy of overseas Koreans.

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## 한민족 경제공동체와 미국동포 사회

변종수

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### 머리말

원래 '한민족 경제 공동체' 어휘는 1990년대 남북한 통일정책 시행 개념으로 사용되기 시작했다. 그것이 1998년에 한국이 IMF 체제에 들어가자, 어휘의 종래 초점이 통일 시행 개념에서 IMF 체제 극복책의 하나로 바뀐 것으로 보인다. 1998년 중반기부터 '한민족 공동경제권' 형성, '한민족 경제공동체' 구축운동이 활발히 전개되기 시작했고, 학계와 정부기관에서 이에 대한 연구도 깊이 있고 포괄적으로 되어 왔다.<sup>1)</sup> 해외동포 상공인 및 무역인 단체들도 이에 호응하고 있다. 작년 11월 미국 로스앤젤레스에서 해외한인 무역협회 주최로 '해외 한민족 경제 공동체' 대회가 열렸고, 금년 10월에는 재외동포재단 주관 하에 '제1차 세계 韓商대회'가 개최된다. 서울대회에서는 재외동포재단이 구축한 '사이버 韓商 네트워크'를 전시할 예정이라고 안내문에 발표되어 있다.

한국경제 세계화의 일환으로서 그동안 지역별 기능별로 분산되어 있는 여러 해외동포 단체를 결집하여 해외동포와 한국의 경제력을 확장시키는 정부시책은 시기적으로 적절하고 미래 지향적이다. 특히 韓商네트워크 구축을 주도 하고 있는 재외동포재단의 비전과 지도력을 높이 평가해야 한다.

90년 중반기부터 정보통신 기술이 도약적으로 발전하고, 그 발전으로 '네트워

1) 권중달(1998, 2001), 이종훈(1998-A, 1998-B), 윤인진(2002). 이외에도 많은 문헌이 한민족 공동경제권 형성을 위한 Worksho (중앙대학교 민족발전연구원, 1998년 6월 30일), 재외동포초청 워크 (재외동포재단, 1998년 11월18일, 세계화시대 재외인론과 한민족 공동 (조선대학교 2001년 9월)에 실려 있다.

크 기업 (Network Enterprise)'이라는 새로운 기업운영조직이 탄생 했다. 이 기업은 인터넷의 廣帶 송신 (Broadband)과 발달한 컴퓨터網 성능이 디지털 통신망에 통합됨으로써 일어난 새로운 운영 조직체이다(Bar and Borrus, 1993). 이기업의 조직과 운영이 한국에서 관심이 많은 화교경제권 조직운동과 공통점이 많으며 정보 기술시대에 구축되는 한민족 경제공동체에 시사하는 점도 많다.

이글의 목적은 '네트워크기업' 조직과 화교경제권 조직이 한민족경제공동체 구축에 주는 시사점을 고찰하고, 한민족경제공동체 구축에 수반되는 현안과제를 미국동포사회 입장에서 개괄적으로 서술하는 데 있다. 여기서 강조할 것은 한민족 경제 공동체 창출의 기본 원칙은 2개가 있어야 한다. 첫째는, 세계 한민족의 경제 관계 확장이다. 공동체를 통하여 세계각지에 흩어져 있는 동포 기업인 간의 상품 및 인적자원, 금융자본의 이동이 활발해져야 한다. 둘째, 이러한 경제관계 확장을 달성하는 기본 요강은 한민족 공동체 구성원의 복지최적기준(welfare optimality)에 두어야 할 것이다.

이글에서 '한민족경제공동체'는 '한민족경제 네트워크'를 뜻하며, '한민족 공동경제圈'을 뜻하니 않는다. '공동경제권'은 화교경제권 같이 자기민족간의 현저한 교역 투자관계가 지속적으로 계속되는 민족중심의 경제 불력(Bloc)이다. 이런 의미에서 중국측은 '공동경제권'도 형성해 있고 '네트워크'도 갖고 있다. 한민족은 '공동경제권'을 목표로 '공동체'를 이제 시작하는 것이다.<sup>2)</sup>

### 地球族과 민족 경제권 개념

필자는 IMF 체제 전 1996년 동경에서 개최된 '96 세계한민족 통일문제 대토론회'에서 한민족 '지구족' (Global tribe)을 연결하는 '세계 김치문화 정보망' 구축에 대해서 소견을 발표한 바 있다(변종수, 1996). '지구족'은 種族(ethnicity)문화집단을 뜻하며 이 집단구성원의 특징은 세계 방방곡곡에 널리 흩어져 살면서도 종족의 고유문화와 동질성을 유지하며 강대한 상업망과 문화망을 세계적으로 형성 변창하는 것이 특징이다(Drucker, 1993, p.152).

2) 한민족경제공동체의 구성원은 세계에 있는 韓種族(Korean ethnicity)이다. 따라서, 한국인의 혈연을 갖고 있는 사람으로 구성하는 것을 원칙으로 한다.



현재 널리 알려진 지구족으로는 유태족, 영어문화권의 미국-영국족, 일본족, 인도족, 중국족이 있다(Kotkin, 1993). 이스라엘을 돕는 해외 유태족의 막강한 활동은 이미 잘 알려져 있다. 미국 유태민족은 정치참여의 경우 투표권 행사부터 시작하여 주류사회의 정치 및 문화에 적극 참여한다. 로비활동도 강도 높게 한다. 이 때문에 미국정부의 친 이스라엘 정책은 통상적인 정도이다.

근래의 중국경제발전에 결정적인 역할을 한 해외 중국족 즉, 화교의 공로도 이미 많은 문헌이 국내외에서 출판되어 있다.<sup>3)</sup> 지난 근 20년간 급성장한 중국경제는 화교의 투자로서 이루어졌다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 홍콩, 대만 및 동남아 화교기업이 투자한 액수가 중국이 받은 외국투자 총액 전체의 80%를 차지하고 있는 통계 수치가 증명하고 있다(Chang, 1995).

한국문헌에서는 중국의 화교정책과 화교경제권 활동의 성공적인 유대관계에 역점을 주고 있고, 중국의 예를 한민족경제권 형성과 해외동포 정책수립에 중요한 시사점으로 강조하고 있다(권중달, 2001; 손준식, 1998; 윤인진, 2002). 중국의 화교정책이 한국해외동포 정책 시행의 장기적인 목표로는 타당하지만, 단기적인 정부시책으로는 실효성이 그다지 많다고 생각하진 않는다. 왜냐하면 중국의 예는 중국의 경제 발전단계와 화교자본 및 기술이 부합한 시기적인 산물이기 때문이다. 즉, 경제적으로 후진국가였던 중국이 신흥 공업국으로 발전하는데 필요한 자본과 기술을 동남아의 화교가 충당할 수 있었던 것이다. 해외의 일본족의 경우는 이 현상을 反證한다고 볼 수 있다.<sup>4)</sup>

경제학적으로 볼 때, 중국의 예가 시사하는 초점은 중국정부 (대만정부를 포함하여) 정책과 화교경제권 활동이 중국 지구족 전체의 복지를 극대화 시킨 것이다. 다시 말하면, 문화와 전통으로 연계된 화교의 애족심도 작용했지만, 더 중요한 것은 화교 상공인이 시장경제 비교우위원칙에 입각해 資源을 중국에 투자한 것이다. 궁극적으로 중국의 화교정책이 한국민족경제 공동체 형성에 주는 시사점은 한국 정부정

3) 손준식(1998), 권중달(2001)을 포함한 국내문헌과 Chang(1995), Haley, Tiong and Haley(1998)를 포함한 국외문헌을 들 수 있다.

4) 미국과 브라질에 거주하는 일본족은 2차대전 직후에 일본을 도와 줄 수 있는 입장이 못 되었다. 해외 일본족의 경제적 능력도 없었고 거주국과 지리적으로 원거리에 있었다. 그리고 일본족은 현지화에 중점을 두었다. 미국에 사는 일본계 민족은 아시아 인종 미국주류사회에 가장 현지화한 민족이다. 일본족의 현지화에 대한 것은 Chan(1998) 참조할 것.

책의 초점이 韓種族 전체의 복지 최적기준 (Welfare optimality) 달성에 있어야 한다는 것이다.

### 화교경제권과 한민족 공동체

한국의 경제 발전 단계와 중국의 발전단계가 현시점에서 다르고, 해외동포의 경제적, 사회적 자원이 화교경제권의 자원 능력과 현저히 다르다. 첫째, 한국의 경제는 최첨단 기술로 국제시장에서 경쟁하고 있고, 중국의 경제는 아직도 대량생산 공업 제품으로 경쟁하고 있다. 따라서, 예를 들어 두 나라 경제의 인적 자원 필요성이 다르다. Saxenian (1999)에 의하면 미국 대학에서 박사학위를 취득한 중국학생 중 12%가 중국으로 돌아가고 88%가 미국에 영주 또는 취업하고 있는 반면, 한국인 박사학위 취득자 중 87%가 한국으로 돌아가고 있고, 13%가 미국에 영주 또는 취업하고 있다. 이것은 현시점에서 미국에서 교육받은 고급인력을 중국경제가 흡수할 수 없는 입장을 반영하며, 한국 경제는 고급인력이 최첨단 산업경쟁에 필요하다는 것을 의미한다. 그러나 이두나라의 이러한 해외인력의 자국경제 발전 기여도는 두 나라 민족의 세계적인 복지최적기준을 달성한 다고 볼 수 있다.

둘째, 현시점에서 해외 동포의 경제규모와 능력은 화교경제권에 비교대상도 되지 않는다. 손준식교수(1998)에 의하면 대만, 홍콩, 마카오를 포함한 화교는 약 5,500만 명, 이들이 보유하고 있는 유동자산은 약 2조 달러, 외환보유액은 약 2,000억 달러의 거대한 금액이다. (참고로 유동자산 2조 달러는 1993년 일본GDP의 2/3에 상당하다. 외환보유액은 1993년도의 미국, 일본, 독일 세계 3대 경제국의 합계가 2,400억 달러였다) 특히, 태국의 최상위 10대 재벌 중 9개 재벌이 화교이며, 인도네시아에서는 상위 10개 재벌 모두를 화교자본이 차지하고 있다. 화교는 동남아 인구의 10%도 안 되면서 지역 무역의 2/3를 차지하고 있고, 동남아 부호의 86%를 차지하고 있다. 국내 학자(이정훈, 1998; 윤인진, 2002)들이 이미 지적한 바와 같이, 미국동포를 포함한 한민족 공동경제권으로서 한국 경제에 기여하기에는 상당한 한계점이 있다.<sup>5)</sup>

5) 해외동포의 본국송금은 개인송금으로 집계할 때, 1997년 현재 약 35억 달러(한국 전체 수출액의 2.3%) 정도이다. 해외동포 개인명의 본국투자는 98년 현재 약 9억3천만 달러, 전체 외국인 투



결론적으로 화교투자와 기술이 중국경제발전에 기여한 모형은 선진기술과 발전된 기업구조를 갖고 있는 한국경제의 확장에 그리 적용성이 없다. 비교우위와 한민족의 복지최적기운을 달성하는 데는 중국모형이 해외동포의 북한 경제개방과 발전에 더 큰 의의가 있다.<sup>6)</sup>

### 신세기의 새로운 운영조직체 : 네트워크 기업

눈부시게 발전하는 정보통신 기술은 기업운영이념과 방식에 근본적인 변화를 가져왔다. 특히, 90년대 후반기부터 정보기술을 도약적으로 진전하게 한 것은 디지털 통신망, 廣帶송신(Broadband), 그리고 발전된 컴퓨터 망의 작업능력 세 가지가 기업운영에 도입되어 기업에서 이 세 가지 요소를 통합하기 시작했다. 이 통합으로 역사상에 없던 기업체가 미국에 창출됐다. 그 새로운 기업조직체가 “네트워크 기업(Network enterprise)” 이다(Castells, 2000, p186).

이 ‘네트워크 기업’은 商企業의 새로운 운용 單位를 말한다. 관례적으로 商企業의 기본 운용단위는 회사였다. 네트워크기업의 운용단위는 컴퓨터로 연결된 네트워크 자체가 운용단위라는 것이다. 즉, 컴퓨터 망 자체가 기업운영에 필요한 중요한 관리업무, 판촉, 주문접수, 생산관리, 재무관리 등 거의 전부를 컴퓨터 네트워크 자체가 자동적으로 수행한다. 네트워크기업은 많은 독립된 공급회사로 구성된다. 이들 공급회사의 규모는 비교적 작으며, 따라서 신속한 결정과 융통성 있는 기업관리가 가능한 것이 특징이다. 또한 공급회사는 다른 ‘네트워크기업’ 회사의 구성원이 될 수 있다. 네트워크기업의 두 가지 기본 요소는 구성원 업체가 소음없이 교신할 수 있는 연결성(Connectedness)과 네트워크의 구성원의 공동목표를 달성하려는 일관성(Consistency)이 확고해야 한다(Castells, 2000, p187-188). Castells은 네트워크기업의 예로 세계 정보통신업계의 거물회사인 Cisco Systems社를 들고 있다.

Cisco社는 캘리포니아 산호세(San Jose)에 본부를 둔 전자 통신망 스위치와

자의 4.1% 수준이다. 해외동포가 법인 명의로 한 것이 포함된 수치는 아니지만 해외동포의 본국 투자가 미흡한 것을 엿볼 수 있다(이종훈 B).

6) 해외동포의 남북한 경제협력과 대북경제관계에 대해서는 변중수 (1994, 1995) 참조.

전자 송신 통로 설정기를 세계에 공급하는 회사이다. 1995년과 99년 사이에 주식이 거의 무려 2,356% 상승, 회사 자산이 2,200억 달러로 확장, 한때 세계에서 다섯째로 큰 자산을 가진 회사가 됐다. 닷컴(dotcom) 경제 최성기인 1999년에는 미국에서 제일 큰 자동차 회사인 GM의 4배 자산을 가졌다. Cisco社는 원래 제작업 회사로 시작했으나 현재는 Cisco社 제품을 제작하는 공장 30개중 2개만 자체소유, 나머지 공장은 다른 회사에서 소유, 운영하고 있다. 그러나 이들 공급회사는 Cisco社의 운영산하에 들어와 있다. Cisco 는 주로 인터넷의 상호작용(Interactive) 기술을 이용 고객으로부터 주문을 받는다. 그 주문은 동시에 자동적으로 Cisco와 연계된 공급 회사에 이관되어 공급회사에서 주문상세서에 맞는 완제품을 제작, 제작하는 즉시 직접 주문 고객에게 수송된다(Castells, p180-181). 여기서 강조할 사항은 Cisco社의 네트워크 기업제도도 단순히 세계 각국에 흩어져 있는 공급자로부터 부품을 공급받는 제도가 아닌 것이다. 이 기업제도의 특징은 여러회사가 각자의 장기적인 기업전략으로서 서로 합작하고 또 장기적 거래관계가 없는 회사와도 임시적으로 합작하는 융통성있고 능률을 극대화 할 수 있는 유기적인 기업이다(Castells, p123). Cisco는 제작 회사이면서 제조공장을 거의 소유하지 않은 세계에서 제일 큰 제작회사로 등장한 것이다. Cisco社가 돈을 벌게 되는 것은 Cisco社가 기술 개발 설계, 엔지니어링, 시장정보관리를 하고 또 Cisco 제품의 사용자와 하청 공급자에게 필요한 기술지원을 하는 것이다. 이 회사가 네트워크기업의 선구자로 지칭되는 것은 Cisco社의 조직이 회사운영을 인터넷으로 고용인과의 거의 접촉없이 하는 새로운 업체조직으로 운용되기 때문이다. 이 ‘네트워크기업’ 운용형식은 굴지의 PC 제작회사 Dell 그리고 많은 기업에서 도입, B to B e-business (기업간의 e 거래), B to C e-business (기업과 소비자간의 e-business)로 확산되고 있다.

### 네트워크 기업과 화교 경제권이 주는 시사점

네트워크기업의 조직편성이 한국에서 많이 논의되고 있는 화교경제권조직과 유사한 점이 많다. Cisco Systems사의 네트워크기업은 인터넷과 디지털 통신 기술의 혁신으로 가능한 것이다. 한편 화교경제권은 오랜 세월을 걸쳐 인간 접촉 중심으로 생긴 민족 경제집단이다. Cisco 네트워크기업과 화교 경제권은 시대적으로 상이하



다. Cisco 네트워크가 신세기의 기업모델이라고 하면 화교경제권은 구세대의 기업 운용체이다. 그러나, 동남아를 중심으로 국경을 초월하여 가족 중심 또는 동향인 중심의 소규모 업체가 수평적으로 형성된 화교경제권 같이 Cisco 네트워크 기업의 형성도 공급회사를 수평적으로 연계한 조직이다. Cisco공급회사들도 비교적 소규모의 독립된 업체이다. 따라서 사업결정과 집행을 신속히 할 수 있고, 또 Cisco견지에서 볼 때 거래하는 여러 공급회사가 지리적으로 산재해 있기 때문에 Cisco의 사업 위험을 분산할 수 있다. 이점도 화교경제권의 계열회사가 동남아 여러 나라에 분산되어 있어 계열회사 운용에 자율성이 있고 사업위험이 분산되는 것이 Cisco사와 유사하다(Castells, p.194, Haley, Tiong and Haley, 1998).

이렇게 비슷한 점이 있는 반면, Cisco네트워크 기업과 화교 경제 네트워크는 몇가지 점에서 차이가 있다. 첫째, Cisco 네트워크 기업은 계열 공급업자의 선정을 능률본위로 하여 편제하는데 비하여 화교경제권 계열회사의 경영주는 언어와 문화가 같은 가족이 아니면 동향인이다. 둘째, Cisco 네트워크는 첨단 정보기술로 된 네트워크인 반면, 화교경제 네트워크는 아직도 사람의 직접접촉에 의존하고 있고, 싱가포르 상공회의에서 현재 운영하는 '세계華商상업네트워크 (World Chinese Business Network)' 도 아직은 인터넷 사용이 초보적이며 Cisco 기업네트워크와 비교할 수 없다. 셋째, Cisco 네트워크 기업에는 투자비가 많이 든다. 연구개발, 세계시장의 정보수집, 정보분석이 지칭하는 기업의 기술적 기획과 실천에는 고도의 정보와 조직이 필요하다. 이런 면에서 화교경제권 자체능력이 없다. 화교경제권이 오늘날과 같이 번창할 수 있었던 것은 화교경제권의 미비한 점을 대만 정부나 홍콩정부가 주축이 되어 보완해 주었다는 것이다(Castell, p.194).

또 하나의 화교경제권이 시대의 조류를 잘 탄 것은 화교경제권이 동남아 일대에 중국족의 지역경제 블록을 구축한 것이다. 이런 면에서 화교경제권은 NAFTA, EU, APEC 같은 지역경제화 체제 형성추세에 선구자 역할을 한 것이 된 셈이다. 여기서 지적해야 할 것은 NAFTA, EU, APEC은 국가간의 협상과 조약을 토대로 이루어졌고, 중화 경제권은 정부간의 협상이나 조약 없이 민간기업 자체가 독립적으로 조성했다는 것이다. 이 점은 인터넷이 미국에서 연방정부의 자금지원으로 시작되어 국가간의 사전조약이나 협상 없이 독립적으로 개인의 창의력을 바탕으로 하여 조성된 것과 비교할 수 있다.

결론적으로 Cisco 네트워크 기업운용과 화교경제권 활동의 유사점과 차이점을 우리 한민족 경제 공동체 구축의 타산지석으로 삼아야 한다. 따라서, 한민족 경제 공동체의 청사진을 그려보면 첫째, 한민족 경제 공동체는 인터넷을 토대로 하여 해외동포 단체와 기업체를 수평적으로 연결시키는 디지털조직체계가 되어야 한다. 현재 재외동포재단에서 구축하고 있는 韓商네트워크는 한민족 기업간의 상거래조직 및 운용을 정보기술에 맞추어 거래량을 증대시켜 궁극적으로는 한민족 기업의 선진적인 Cisco 네트워크 기업형으로 발전하는 첫 단계작업이 되도록 해야 할 것이다.

### 한민족 공동체 웹사이트

작년 3월 현재 한민족 관련 사이트는 총 150여개 이것은 유태인의 공동체 사이트 945개, 중국인 공동체 사이트 318개에 비해 적은 수라고 보도됐다. 한국정부차원에 추진하고 있는 한민족 네트워크형성의 예를 든다면 산업자원부가 동포기술인력의 협력 강화책으로 추진하는 '한민족 공동체 기술 네트워크' 정보통신부는 해외 벤처기관을 활용 '한민족 IT 네트워크' 를 구축하고 있다. 재외 동포재단에서는 해외동포 데이터베이스와 韓商 네트워크를 만들고 있다. 민간차원에서는 전국 경제인 산하 국제산업 협력 재단이 세계 벤처 투자협회등과 협력 한민족 벤처 네트워크 구축을 추진하고 있다. 한림대학교 민족 통합연구소는 동포 거주지역에 인터넷을 통한 가상 공동체를 만들어 이를 하나로 통하는 작업을 벌이고있다(김종길, 2001).

현재, 한민족경제공동체의 대들보 역할을 할 수 있는 훌륭한 웹사이트 2개가 이미 한국에서 운영되고 있다. 즉, 대한무역투자진흥공사(KOTRA)와 대한무역협회(KITA)의 홈페이지가 그것이다. 특히, KOTRA의 중소기업수출알선시스템(KOBE.NET)와 인터넷 무역활성을 위주로 하는 실�크로드21(Silkroad21), 그리고 KITA의 무역정보망(KOTIS)는 웹사이트로서 디자인도 잘했고 기능과 내용면에서 세계적인 수준이다.<sup>7)</sup> 무역정보, 자료실, 온라인서비스 등 종합적으로 잘 설계되어 있다. 미흡한 점은 해외동포 상공인단체와의 링크가 턱 희소한 것이다. 이것은 연결할 수 있는 해외동포 상공인의 홈페이지가 희소하기 때문이라고 추정한다. 한 가지

7) 관련 웹주소는 <www.kobo.org>, <www.silkroas21.com>, <www.kotra.or.kr>, <www.kotis.net>, <www.kita.or.kr>.



지적해야 할 것은 KOTRA와 KITA의 웹사이트 간 연결문제이다. KOTRA 홈페이지에는 KITA의 연결 단추가 있으나, KITA 홈페이지에는 'KOTRA' 나 '실크로드 21'의 연결단추를 찾을 수 없었다.

해외동포들이 만든 웹사이트 중 한민족 공동체에 쓸수 있는 것은 총 509개로 산출되었고, 이 중 2/3를 북미에 거주하는 동포들이 만든 것이다. 이것은 국내 웹사이트가 30~50개가 넘지 않는 것과 대조적이다(김영기 2001, pp. 47-48).

미국동포 네트워크 중 가장 오래되고 활성화된 분야는 '과학기술네트워크'이다. 다. 재미과학 기술자 협회는 71년에 설립, 회원수는 1500여명이며, 매주 5회씩 재미과학 회보를 발간 미국 내에서는 물론 세계 각지의 한미주 과학 기술인과 정보 교류유대를 강화하는 한편 국내외 과학자들과 연계한 자체 세미나와 기술동향분석, 공동 프로젝트 수행 등의 활동을 활발히 하고 있다. 회원들은 특히 미국의 최고 연구기관인 국립보건연구원(NIH), 연방항공우주국(NASA)을 비롯 미국내 우수대학 및 연구기관, 기업에 골고루포진해 있어 이들의 전문지식은 국내의 여러 정책수립에도 큰 기여를 하고 있다(남상문, 2001).

과학기술 네트워크 이외에도 미국동포 學界의 네트워크, 한인회 네트워크, 교회네트워크가 다양하게 있다. 문제는 이들 네트워크가 아직 발전단계에 있고 한민족 공동체 네트워크로서는 미흡한 점이 많다. 사이버 한상네트워크의 미국부분의 네트워크 구축은 다음과 같이 시행할 것이 요구된다.

하나, 제 1단계로 미국대학 한인교수, 1.5세, 2세 학생을 동원하여 게시판형의 웹사이트를 지역 한인회, 지역상공인단체 마다 구축한다. 1단계에서는 컴퓨터간의 상호작용보다 e-mail과 같은 기존 기술에 중점을 둔다.

둘, 2단계 작업으로 미국에 Sever를 설치하여 근거리통신망(LAN)과 광범위통신망(WAN)을 사용하여 동포의 중요 경제단체와 문화단체를 연결한다. (2단계 작업은 중요 동포단체의 사무국 능력은 물론 동포기업인의 상업거래량이 많아 자체 데이터 베이스와 정보교환을 신속하게 할 필요성이 있게되는 것을 전제로 한다)

셋, 미국부분의 공동체 네트워크 1단계 구축기간에 해외동포의 컴퓨터 교육홍보운동을 한인회 간부 및 상공인들을 상대로 광범위하게 시작한다. 화교경제권의 전략적 투자 교역을 중국(대만)정부가 주도한 것을 거울로 삼아 재외동포재단 또는 대한무역투자진흥공사의 재정적 후원하에 미주 한인상공인, 무역인 단체가 주도한다.

현재 한국은 인구비례 기준으로 인터넷 접속 家庭數가 세계에서 상위권을 차지하고 있으며(Beal, 2002), 미주동포 상공인의 컴퓨터 사용율도 대단히 높다(부록 표 3참조). 그러나 미국동포들의 인터넷을 이용하는 e-business이나 상호작용(interactive) 기술에는 집중적인 교육이 필요하다.

넷, 해외상공인을 초점으로 하는 '한상네트워크'에 은퇴하는 1세 기업에 대한 Link나 포털(Portal)을 장치한다. 많은 1세업체가 타민족 또는 새로 이민오는 한국인에 양도 된다. 동포 1.5세, 2세 또는 다른 한민족이 양도 받도록 하는적이 목적이다.

다섯, 해외상공인을 초점으로 하는 '韓商네트워크'와 병행하여 한인2세 및 3세를 대상으로 하는 '한민족문화네트워크' (가칭)를 재외동포재단이나 또는 한국 교류재단이 주관하여 구축한다. 이 네트워크에 연결되는 한국 문화 영문사이트는 일단 시작되면 동포 1.5세 및 2세 대학생을 동원하여 확장할 수 있다. 현재 한국문화 소개 웹 사이트는 많다. 그러나 한인 2세나 3세, 혼혈한인을 대상으로 하는 웹 사이트는 그리 많지 않다. 기존 웹 사이트를 링크하는 한편, 2세와 3세 인력으로 웹사이트와 포털을 새로 구축한다는 것이다.

### 미국동포사회의 현황과 과제

비교적 짧은 이민역사에 미국동포사회는 수적으로나 질적으로 도약적인 발전을 했다. 1970년대에서 본격적으로 이민 온 동포는 일과 자식교육에 전념, 두 가지를 공히 성취하였다. 소수민족 중에서 가장 성공한 민족이 됐고 2세 교육도 훌륭히 시켰다. 재미동포가 한민족 문화면에 공헌한 업적의 하나는 고등학교 대학 진학 학생들이 치는 전국 예비고사 중 한국어 시험을 9개의 어학분야 하나로 SAT II에 선정시킨 것이다. 수학, 화학, 외국어 등의 특정과목에 특기가 있는 학생들이 대학 합격율을 높이기 위해 일반 총체적 시험인 SAT-I을 치고 난후 제2단계로 보는 시험이다. 아시아 언어는 일본어, 중국어에 이어 한국어 뿐이고 나머지 6개어는 불어, 독일어, 스페인어, 라틴어, 이태리어, 유태어이다. 한국문화의 세계적인 위상과 경제력을 과시하는 것이다.

앞으로 미국동포사회 구조는 어떻게 변할 것이며, 이 변화가 한민족 공동체 형



성에 미치는 영향은 무엇인가? 미국 인구조사국의 통계에 의하면 2000년 현재 재미 동포 수는 1,228,427명으로<sup>8)</sup> 1970년도의 총 70,598명에 비하면 무려 1600% 증가한 셈이다. 2000년 현재, 아시아계 소수민족으로서는 중국, 필리핀, 인도 다음 4위이다.

특기해야 할 사항은 동포인구 1,228,427명 중 43%가 미국에서 출생한 2세대인 것이다. 그리고 총 인구의 12%인 151,555명이 한국인과 외국인 사이에서 태어난 혼혈 한국인이다.<sup>9)</sup> 이것은 국제결혼이 증가하고 있다는 것을 의미하며 앞으로의 동포사회 인구 분포와 민족의식에 상당한 변화가 올 것을 시사하는 것이다. 이들 2세대의 사고방식 및 가치관이 이민 1세와 상당히 다르다.<sup>10)</sup>

한민족 경제공동체 형성에 미국동포들이 기여하는데 가장 중요한 것이 1.5세 및 2세의 민족교육과 미국사회에 대한 한국문화 홍보이다. 왜냐하면, 한민족네트워크를 구성하고 직접 작동할 주인공이 1.5와 2세이기 때문이다. 2세 중의 상당수가 혼혈 한국인으로 이루어지게 된다. 이들에 대한 제도적이고 고답적인 한국문화 교육이 절실히 필요하다.

현재 동포들이 많이 사는 지역에서는 한국어를 정규과목으로 미국 중, 고등학교에서 가르치는 데가 30개로 추정되고 있다(이관규 2002). 그리고 지역한인회, 교회중심으로 토요일 또는 일요일에 실시하는 축소된 한글학교가 있다. 미국실정에 맞는 교재가 필요하고 중, 고등학교에서 가르치는 교사지원도 필요하다. 미국 44개 대학에서도 한국어를 가르치고, 또 UCLA같은 대학에서는 한국학 과목이 있다.<sup>11)</sup> 한국어를 미국 대학에서 가르치는 것도 한국 국의선양에 큰 축이 되지만 2세한국인에게서 한국 문화, 역사를 종합적으로 가르치는 과목이 필요하고 이에 사용되는 교재 개발이 필요하다.

외교통상부가 집계한 재미동포 단체현황에 따르면 한인 회 등 미국 내 단체와 직능, 친목단체가 2000년 7월 현재 842개 있다(한국주간 2002). 미국 각지에는 한

8) 이 통계는 한국정부통상부가 사용하는 집계방법과 영사관 단위한국의 정의가 다르다.  
9) U.S. Census Bureau, The Asian Population: 200 (Census Brief) C2KBR/01-16 Feb. 2002.  
10) 아시아계에서 혼혈이 가장 많은 소수민족이 일본계로 전체 일본계 인구의 31%에 달한다(중앙일보 미주판, 2002.3.6) 전문가들은 동포인구 증가 추세가 일본계 취세를 따를 것으로 보고 있다. 진창욱(2002) 참조  
11) <http://www.kofo.or.kr/english/overseas/01.htm>.

인회가 있고 정기적으로 회보를 발간하는 지역한인회가 많다. 단체의 예는 사업주를 대표하는 상공인단체 총협회, 무역인 총협회(OKTA)가 있고, 지역마다 업종을 대표하는 식품상협회, 세탁인협회 등 단체들이 있고, 전문직 단체로는 의사협회, 과학자협회, 대학교수협회, 한미 경제학회 등이 다양하게 있다. 친목단체로는 도민회, 학교동창회, 종친회 등이다. 이민생활에서 이러한 모임은 회원간의 사회적관계 비즈니스관계의 기회가 되며 상호 신뢰구축의 밑바탕이 되어 궁극적으로 유기적인 상업 네트워크로 발전할 수 있다

한민족 경제 공동체 구축의 북한 동포를 빼 놓을 수 없고, 더욱이 미국동포의 역할을 빼 놓을 수 없다. 북한은 중국의 개방모형을 모방할 것으로 많은 전문가는 예측한다. 대내적으로는 경제특구 제도로 외국자본 특히 해외동포자본을 유치할 것이고 대외적으로는 미국을 비롯한 서방국가와 수교를 맺어 수출을 진흥 시킬 것으로 전망된다. 그때 미국동포는 북한 경제발전에 필요한 자본, 기술이전, 기업관리, 해외시장 개척에 현저히 기여할 수 있다. 특히, 미국과 북한의 국교가 정상화 될 때 따르는 것으로 여정 되는 미국경제 원조를 동포 상공인의 대북 투자 및 교역에 활용할 수 있다. 그 외에 미국정부나 국제기관의 각종 수출 및 해외투자 장려기구를 최대 활용할 수 있다(변중수, 1994, 1995).

### 미국동포사업체의 규모와 생산성

현재 미국동포 경제활동에 대한 통계자료는 비교적 희소하다. 한민족 경제공동체 구축의 해외부분은 미국동포 상공인들이 주도역할을 해야 될 입장에 있다. 이들의 전반적인 경제력, 경쟁성에 대한 데이터베이스에 한몫을 여기서 분석하고자 한다. 미국사업체에 대한 제일 최근 통계는 작년에 발간된 1997년도 경제센서스(1997 Economic Census)이다. 통계는 매5년마다 미국연방정부 상무성에서 집계하는 가장 권위 있는 통계이다.

<표 1>에서 보여주듯이 미국 동포의 경제기업체 업체 수는 1997년 약 13만 6천 업체이며 총매출액은 495억 4천만 달러의 규모였다. 한인사업체 총수는 아시아계 업체총수의 약 15%였고 미국 소수민족 소유업체중의 약 4.5%로 미국 전체 업체의 0.65%에 해당한다. 업체수로나 총 매출액으로 비교할 때 동포기업체는 아시아계 민



족 가운데 중국계, 인도계 다음 셋째로 크다.

〈표 1〉 미국 내 소수민족 경영 사업 총체적 상황 (1997)

구분	업체수	매출액 (\$1,000)	업체당 매출액(\$)
소수민족 전체	3,039,033	591,259,123	194,555
흑인	823,499	71,214,662	86,478
스페인계	1,199,896	186,274,582	155,242
아시아	912,960	306,932,982	336,195
인도	166,737	76,503,357	458,827
중국	252,577	106,196,794	420,453
필리핀	84,534	11,077,885	131,047
일본	85,538	43,741,051	511,364
한국	135,571	45,936,497	338,837
베트남	97,764	9,322,891	95,361
기타	90,239	14,154,507	156,856
미국 전체	20,821,935	18,553,243,047	891,043

출처: U.S. Census Bureau, 1997, *Economic Census, Asian and Pacific Islands* (EC99CS-5), Washington, DC, May 2001.

〈표 2〉 미국 내 유급종업원이 있는 소수민족 사업체 상황 (1997)

구분	업체수	매출액(\$1,000)	종업원수	총 임금액(\$1,000)
소수민족 전체	615,222	516,979,920	4,514,699	95,528,782
흑인	93,235	56,377,860	718,341	14,322,312
스페인계	211,884	158,674,537	1,388,746	29,830,028
아시아	289,999	278,294,345	2,203,079	45,179,519
인도	67,189	61,760,453	490,629	12,585,621
중국	90,582	98,233,262	691,757	12,944,824
필리핀	14,581	8,966,386	110,130	2,667,333
일본	23,309	41,294,865	262,223	7,106,692
한국	50,076	40,745,504	333,649	5,789,472
베트남	18,948	6,768,324	79,035	1,165,550
기타	25,314	20,525,551	235,656	2,920,027
미국 전체	5,295,152	17,907,940,321	103,359,815	2,936,492,940

출처: 표1과 같음. 이 통계는 유급 종업원이 있는 업체만을 포함하고 유급 종업원이 없는 자영업체는 제외된 것임

사업체 규모: 135,571개 동포 업체 중 63%에 해당되는 약 8만5천 업체는 유급종업원이 없는 업체고 나머지 약 5만은 유급 종업원이 있는 업체이다. 유급종업원 수는 약 33만 4천명. 이들에게 지불한 총임금은 약 \$58억으로 집계되어 있다(〈표 2〉참조).

유급종업원이 없는 동포업체의 평균매출액은 \$60,717인 반면 유급종업원이 있는 동포업체의 평균매출액은 \$813,673이다(〈표 3〉 참조). 종업원이 없는 동포업체의 평균매출액은 인도계 다음 둘째로 높은 반면 종업원이 있는 업체의 평균매출액 \$813,673은 일본계, 중국계, 인도계 사업체에 10만 달러 이상 뒤떨어져 있다. 가족 중심의 업체에서는 동포업체의 규모가 크나, 고용인이 있는 업체로서는 동포업체의 규모가 비교적 작은 것을 반영하는 것으로 해석 된다.

〈표 3〉 미국 소수민족 업체 평균 매출액 (1997)

구분	종업원 비고용(\$)	종업원 고용(\$)
소수민족 전체	30,646	840,314
흑인	20,317	604,686
스페인계	27,935	748,875
아시아계 전체	45,972	959,639
인도	148,098	919,205
중국	49,159	1,084,468
필리핀	30,185	614,936
일본	39,309	1,771,627
한국	60,717	813,673
베트남	32,412	357,205
미국 전체	41,561	3,381,950

출처: 〈표 1〉과 같음.

1987~1997 변화추이: 〈표 4〉는 1987~1997년 10년 사이의 미국 내 한국인 사업체 변화추이를 보여준다. 부가가치가 비교적 높은 사업 부분인 제조업, 수송, 통신, 전기업체로 전입하는 경향을 보이며 한인사업체가 전체적으로 규모상 커진 것을 보여 주고 있다.

좀더 자세히 분석한다면, 첫째, 1987~1997년간의 업체증가율이 종업원 고용업체가 종업원 비고용 업체보다 현저하게 크다는 것이다. 전체적으로 종업원 고용업체



가 131%증가 한데 비해 종업원 비고용 업체는 79% 증가율밖에 기록하지 않았다. 둘째, 업종별 증가율은 더 현저하다. 예를 들어 종업원을 고용한 제조업이 156% 증가한데 비해 종업원 비고용 제조업체는 약 45%밖에 증가하지 않았다. 이 현상은 수송, 통신, 전기, 금융, 보험, 부동산 중계업, 소매업으로 나타나 있다. 이것은 한인계 업체규모가 대체적으로 커진 것을 입증하는 한편, 가족중심의 소규모업체에 신규 투자하는 사업이 줄어 든 것을 의미한다.

〈표 4〉 미국 내 한국인 사업체 현황 (1987~1997)


구 분	총업체수			종업원 고용 업체수			종업원 비고용 업체 수		
	1987	1997	증가율	1987	1997	증가율	1987	1997	증가율
총 계	69,304	135,571	95.62%	21,657	50,076	131.22%	47,647	85,495	79.43%
농수산업	557	664	19.21%	112	205	83.04%	445	459	3.15%
광업	16	70	337.50%	3	0	-100.00%	13	70	438.46%
건설 및 토지 개발업	3,249	5,490	68.98%	843	829	-1.66%	2,406	4,661	93.72%
제조업	1,905	3,620	90.03%	769	1,970	156.18%	1,136	1,650	45.25%
수송, 통신, 전기, 가스, 수도	1,582	3,698	133.75%	149	1,225	722.15%	1,433	2,473	72.58%
도매업	*	6,903		*	4,357		*	2,546	
소매업	26,161	42,916	64.05%	10,378	21,610	108.23%	15,783	21,306	34.99%
금융, 보험, 부동산 중계업	2,736	4,096	49.71%	242	599	147.52%	2,494	3,497	40.22%
서비스업(식당, 극장 등)	28,604	58,003	102.78%	8,197	17,948	118.96%	20,407	40,055	96.28%
기 타	2,586	10,156	292.73%	439	1,375	213.21%	2,147	8,781	308.99%

출처: U.S. Census Bureau, 1987, *Economic Census, Asian and Pacific Islands* (mb87-3) Washington, DC, May 1991, 1997년 통계 출처는 〈표 1〉과 같음. \* 1987 통계에는 따로 집계되어 있지 않음.

**자영업 집중:** 재미동포는 인구비례로 볼 때 미국 내 어느 인종보다 제일 많은 자영업을 가진 민족으로 오랫동안 알려져 있다. 1997년 경제 센서스와 2000년 인구 센서스 자료로 계산할 때, 인구 1000명당 재미동포는 110개의 자영업을 경영하고 있는 것으로 나타난다. 이것은 중국계의 1000명당 92개, 인도계의 88개 보다 많으

며 필리핀계보다는 비교가 안 되게 많다(〈그림 1〉 참조). 우리가 경험으로 알고 있는 사실이지만, 한국자영업의 성공률은 대단히 높은 92%로 나타나 있다. 자영업을 시작한 동포중 8%만이 사업에 실패했다는 뜻이다. 이 성공의 이유는 고급학력으로 이민하여 언어장애가 그리 문제가 안되는 소매, 서비스업을 시작, 긴 노동시간으로 열심히 일하는 한편, 검소하게 생활하기 때문이다. 또 하나의 사업 성공율은 가족들이 사업체에서 일하기 때문이다(Min and Jaret, 1985). 이렇게 자영업수가 많은데 과연 사업의 규모나 성장률, 생산성은 미국 타 소수계 인종 특히 아시아계 업체와 비교해서 어떠한가?


〈그림 1〉 인구 1,000명 당 아시아계 사업체 수 (1997)



출처: 〈표 1〉의 출처와 U.S. Census Bureau, *The Asian Population: 2000* (Census Brief) C2KBR/01-16 Feb, 2002.



〈그림 2〉 미국 내 중요 아시아계 사업체 10년간 변화 추이




출처: 〈표 4〉와 같음

재미동포의 사업체수가 1987년부터 1997년까지 10년간 63,304업체에서 135,571업체로 증가했다. 그러나 증가 수의 절대치로 볼 때 일본계를 제외하고는 아시아 민족계에서 상당히 뒤떨어졌다 (그림 2 참조). 중국의 경우 같은 10년간에 약 9만 업체에서 25만3천개 업체로 증가했고, 인도계는 약 5만2천개 업체에서 약 16만7천개 업체로 증가했다. 10년간의 증가율로 분석할 때, 동포 업체확장 부진이 더욱 현저하게 나타난다.

그림3은 10년간의 성장율을 업체특성 2가지로 측정된 것이다. 업체특성은 유급 종업원이 있는 업체와 없는 업체로 구분한 것이다. 1987~1997년 10년간에 종업원 고용업체가 131%, 종업원 비고용업체가 79% 증가했다.

〈그림 3〉 미국내 아시아계 종업원 고용 유무에 따른 업체 성장율 (1987~1997)



출처: 〈표 1〉과 같음

이 증가율은 일본계 하나만 능가하고 인도계와 중국계, 베트남계에 비해 현저하게 낮은 증가율이다. 동포사업 확장이 비교적 부진하다는赤신호로 해석할 수 있다.

〈표 5〉는 종업원 1인 당 매출액과 종업원 평균 임금을 표시한다. 종업원의 생산성과 업체의 규모를 엿보여주는 통계이다. 동포기업의 종업원당 매출액 \$122,121은 흑인, 스페인계, 필리핀, 베트남계를 능가하지만 일본, 중국, 인도계 업체에는 뒤떨어지고 있다. 〈표 5〉에서 보는바 같이 일본계, 인도계, 중국계 업체의 종업원당 매출액과 종업원 평균임금이 한인업체보다 많다. 예로 중국계 사업체의 종업원당 매출액이 한국계\$122,121인 반면 \$142,005이고 종업원당 평균임금은 한국의 \$17,352에 반면 18,713이었다. 인도계 업체와의 비교도 비슷하다. 이것은 인도계, 중국계 업체가 부가가치가 높은 업종에 한국계보다 더 많이 집중되어있음을 의미한다. 실제로 동포기업체의 종업원 평균임금은 베트남계 업체다음 제일 낮은 임금이다.



〈표 5〉 미국 소수민족 사업체 종업원 생산성 비교 (1997)

구분	종업원 1인당 매출액	종업원 평균 임금
소수민족 전체	114,510	21,160
흑인	78,483	19,938
스페인계	114,257	21,480
아시아	126,321	20,507
인도	125,880	25,652
중국	142,005	18,713
필리핀	81,416	24,220
일본	157,480	27,102
한국	122,121	17,352
베트남	85,637	14,747
기타	87,100	12,391
미국 전체	173,258	28,410

출처: 〈표 1〉과 같음.

총괄적으로 분석할 때 동포업체의 증가율이 아시아소수민족에 뒤 떨어지고 있으며, 사업체 규모도 중국, 인도계, 일본계에 비해 적으며 업종의 분포도 이들 외국계 업체가 동포업체보다 부가가치가 높은 사업에 더 밀집해 있는 것을 시사한다고 볼 수 있다.

### 미국동포 상공인 현장 설문조사 요약

필자는 금년 6월 샌프란시스코에서 개최된 미국한인상공인 단체협회 총연합회 년차회의에서 참석회원을 대상으로 현장설문조사를 하였다. 총 126명의 회원에게 설문지를 배포하여 36.5%의 응답율인 46개 응답을 받았다. 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다.

미주 동포 상공인의 컴퓨터 사용율은 대단히 높은 85%이며 E-메일 사용율도 높은 76%이다. 이민전의 고급학력 배경이 많이 작용되고 있는 것이며 변천하는 정보기술에 대비하는 저력을 표시하는 것이다.

상업 네트워크에 대해서 국제적 개념과 인식은 비교적 내향적이다. 거의 과반수되는 48%의 미국 동포상공인은 동포상공인과 지난 3년간 거래접촉이 없었다. 중

국의 화교 상업네트워크에 대한 인지도는 10%밖에 안됐다. 그러나, 그러한 상업네트워크가 한국인을 중심으로 구성될 때 87%의 응답자가 적극 참여하겠다고 표시했다. 韓상네트워크를 통하여 접촉하고 싶은 동포 상인은 미주동포가 제일 많고(79%) 다음이 한국동포(55%), 중국동포(38%), 일본동포(24%)이다. 구라파동포나 구소련 동포와 접촉하고 싶은 미국 동포 상공인은 각각 14% 정도이다.

한국 상품을 취급하는 미국동포 상공인은 35%이고 나머지 65%는 한국 상품을 취급 하지 않는 것으로 집계되었다. 이것은 동포 업체의 대다수가 식료품 소매업, 식당경영등 한국물품을 거의 취급하지 않는 상업이기 때문인 것으로 해석된다. 한국 상품을 취급하는 상공인의 연간 평균 취급량은 약 3백 50만 달러로 측정됐다. 이 결과는 응답자 중에 무역업과 도매업을 경영하는 상공인이 현장 설문조사장인 회의에 비례적으로 많이 참가 한 탓이라고 생각한다. 그리고 구입량 분포의 통계 편차가 극심한 것으로 보아 미주 전체의 상공인의 한국 상품 구입량을 대표적으로 표시하는데는 신뢰성이 적다고 해석된다.

설문조사에 의하면, 35%의 미국 동포 상공인이 소매, 도매업을 자영한다. 미국 1997 경제 센서스 통계치와 비슷하다. 무역업 20%와 제조업 15%의 설문조사결과는 1997 경제센서스보다 통계치가 상당히 차이가 난다. 특히 제조업의 15%는 센서스 통계치 9%에 비해 너무 많다. 그 외의 업종분포통계는 신뢰성이 있다. 업체당 고용인 평균수 23명은 1997 경제센서스에 비해 약간 상향 왜곡된 경향이 보이나 20명 이하의 업체분포 통계치는 미국 동포 업체 규모를 잘 반영하고 있다. 약 70%의 미국 동포 상업이 가족을 포함해서 평균 10명 미만이라는 것이다. 설문조사 통계는 부록에 첨부되어 있다.

### 맺는말

우리가 접하고 있는 시대는 모든 것이 혁신적으로 변하는 정보기술시대이다. 한국무역투자공사의 '실�크로드21' 과 한국무역협회의 '무역정보망' 같은 세계 수준의 홈페이지가 이미 활발히 작동되고 있다. 과제는 한민족 경제공동체 구축에 화교경제권의 특성과 네트워크기업의 장점을 통합해야 한다. 특히, 정보통신기술을 토대로 수평성의 조직, 네트워크자체가 사업체 전반을 운영하는 기업체제, 그리고



기업전략에 필요한 연구개발(R & D)이 정부 주도하에 이루어져야 한다는 점은 한민족 경제 공동체 운영에 지침이 되어야 할 것이다.

현시점에서 미국동포사회 경제력이 한국경제에 미치는 영향은 상당한 제한점이 있다. 그러나 種族을 기반으로 한 한민족경제공동체는 장래의 한민족 경제복지 확대에 중요한 축이 될 것이다. 미국동포사회의 1.5세 및 2세의 인적 자원은 상당하며, 특히 사이버 韓商네트워크와 '한민족문화네트워크' (가칭) 창출에 막강한 기여를 할 수 있다. 이들에 대한 민족 교육이 시급히 필요하며, 특히 2세 및 혼혈 한인에 대한 교재를 집중적으로 개발해야 한다.

한민족 공동체를 경제면에 적용할 때 개념상에 애매한 점이 있다. 한편으로는 새로운 市場을 개척하는 세계화 지향의 민족 경제 체제 같고 또 한편으로는 세계에 흩어져 있는 韓民族만으로만 구성되는 배타성 있는 국민국가 경제 체제 같기도 하다. 한민족 경제 공동체가 민족의 동질성을 넘어 강조하는 것은 공동체 자체 발전을 위축하게 하는 요소가 되고 또 해외동포들이 거주국 사회에서 환영받지 못하는 민족 집단이 될 우려가 있다. 중국계 지도자들이 화교들에게 거주국에서 정착하여 거주국에서의 수용(Acceptance), 소속감(Belonging) 그리고 거주국에 대한 기여(Commitment)가 중요한 것을 강조했다(손준식, 1998). 이 점은 한국정부가 설정한 재외동포지원사업의 기본방향과도 일치한다(이정훈 1998A). 중요한 점은 한민족 경제공동체가 배타적체제로 인식되는 것을 사전에 방지할 필요가 있다.

미국동포사회에는 지역별, 직능별 여러 단체가 많이 있다. 각 단체들의 자체 활동, 예를 들어 회보발간과 정기적인 모임 등의 자체활동이 활발하다. 문제는 여러 단체의 모임을 유기적으로 연계하여 사업네트워크로 전환시키는 장치가 미흡하다. 사이버한상네트워크 구축의 1단계 사업으로 미국동포상공인 단체의 웹 사이트 형성이 필요하며, 집중적인 컴퓨터 작동과 인터넷에 대한 교육이 필요하다. 미국대학의 한인교수, 유학생 및 2세 학생을 동원하여 그리 많은 자금 소요 없이 할 수 있다.

재미동포 1세의 거의 반 이상이 자영업으로 경제 안정을 추구해 왔다. 인구비례로 미국내 어느 인종보다 많은 자영업을 경영한다. 미국동포의 업종은 소매, 도매, 식당 증 서비스업 같은 노동 집약적이고 업체간 경쟁이 심하다. 1세 경영자들은 은퇴연령에 도착, 이들의 자산과 경영노하우가 대를 이어 가느냐 안 가느냐의 기로에 있다. 설문조사에 의하면, 약 반수의 동포 상공인이 타인에게 양도할 계획으로 나타

났다. 이런 추세가 이미 미국의 경제센서스(Economic Census)에 나타나 있다. 1987-1997년 10년 사이에 동포 사업체는 규모도 커지고 부가가치가 높은 업종으로 변했다. 그러나, 업체 증가율이 중국계, 인도계, 베트남계에 비하여 현저히 낮았다. 또한 동포업체 규모가 중국, 인도, 일본계보다 적어 동포사업 확장이 비교적 부진하다는 것을 반영하고 있다. 이 추세가 변화되려면, 전문지식을 갖추고 언어장벽이 없는 1.5세 및 2세가 1세의 자영업을 이어 받아 1세의 자산과 상업경험을 활용해야 한다. 한민족 경제공동체 조성이 이러한 문제를 능률적으로 해결 할 수 있다.

한민족경제공동체 구축은 한민족의 비교우위와 韓種族 전체의 복지최적기준의 정의에 의하여야 한다. 미국대학에서 박사학위를 받는 중국학생 중 12%가 중국으로 돌아가는 반면 87%의 한국계 박사학위 취득자가 한국에 돌아가는 것은 각자 민족의 비교우위와 복지최적기준을 달성하는 것이다. 한국계 미국시민이 한국의 대학총장에 부적당하다고 반대하는 한국의 풍조, 박세리가 국적을 미국으로 바꾼다는 보도에 비판의 소리가 높았다는 것은 민족의 비교우위와 복지최적기준을 고려치 않은 것이다. 한국계 미국시민의 한국대학총장, 박세리의 미국시민권 취득은 두 사람 개인의 재능을 극대화하는 동시에 민족전체의 복지를 최대화시키는 것이다.

현재 우리민족이 보유하고 있는 비교우위는 우수한 인적자원과 발달된 정보통신기술이다. 한국은 세계에서 개인소득 당 인터넷 접속이 가장 많고 이동전화 기술도 최첨단이다(Beal, 2002). 미국에는 우수한 1.5세 및 2세 인재가 풍부하다. 이러한 민족의 비교우위를 효과적으로 연계하고 발달시킨다면 세계 각지의 한민족 기업이 모두 함께 번영할 수 있을 것이다.



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부록 <표 1> 미주동포 상공인간의 접촉과 한국상품 거래상황

거래상황	빈도	%	
지난 3년간 동포 상공인과 거래접촉 경험	있었음	22	52.38%
	없었음	20	47.62%
한국상품 취급여부	취급함	16	34.78%
	취급하지 않음	26	56.52%
	무응답	4	8.70%
취급한 업체의 연간 구입량 (도매가격)	\$50,000~100,000	2	12.50%
	\$300,000~500,000	1	6.25%
	\$800,000~1,000,000	4	25.00%
	\$1,500,000~2,000,000	1	6.25%
	\$2,000,001~2,500,000	1	6.25%
	\$2,500,001~3,000,000	1	6.25%
	\$3,000,001~5,000,000	1	6.25%
	\$5,000,001~10,000,000	2	12.50%
	\$20,000,000~30,000,000	1	6.25%
	무응답	2	12.50%
가중평균	\$	3,471,000	

출처: 미국상공인 단체협회 총연합회 연차회의 (2002년 6월: 샌프란시스코), 참석자 대상 표본 현장 설문조사, 표본인원수 126명 중 46명 (36.5%)이 응답한 것을 집계한 것임

부록 <표 2> 미주동포 업종분포와 업종 규모

거래상황	빈도	%	
사업업종 분포	소매/도매	16	34.78%
	무역	9	19.57%
	제조업	7	15.22%
	금융, 회계, 부동산	6	13.04%
	자문, 전문직	4	8.70%
	건설업	2	4.35%
	운송업	1	2.17%
	전자서비스	1	2.17%
업체 고용인 수(가족 포함)	1~5명	15	38.46%
	6~10명	12	30.77%
	11~20명	5	12.82%
	21~30명	2	5.13%
	41~50명	1	2.56%
	100~150명	1	2.56%
	151~200명	1	2.56%
	200~250명	2	5.13%
가중평균	22.7명		

출처: 부록 <표 1>과 같음.  
 주: 매출액에 대한 무응답이 많고 매출액 분포의 편차가 심함으로 집계하지 않았음



부록 <표 3> 미국동포 상공인 컴퓨터 사용률과 상업네트워크 감지도

구분		빈도	%
현재 컴퓨터 사용률	사용한다	39	84.78%
	사용안한다	1	2.17%
	무응답	6	13.04%
현재 e-mail 사용률	사용한다	35	76.09%
	사용안한다	5	10.87%
	무응답	6	13.04%
세계 중국화교 상업 정보망에 대해서	잘 알고 있다	4	8.70%
	약간알고 있다	25	54.35%
	아는 바 거의 없다	17	36.96%
중국화교 사업정보망과 같은 세계 한국 상업정보망이 설치된다면	적극 참여하겠습니다	40	86.96%
	글쎄요	6	13.04%
세계한국상업정보망을 통해 접촉하고 싶은 주요 대상인은?	미주동포	33	78.57%*
	한국동포	23	54.76%*
	중국동포	16	38.10%*
	일본동포	10	23.81%*
	구라파동포	6	14.29%*
	구 소련동포	6	14.29%*

출처: 부록 <표 1>과 같음. \*복수응답으로 %합계는 100% 초과.

부록 <표 4> 미국동포 상공인의 이민년도 및 사업개업, 사업처분계획

구분		빈도	%
업체주 이민년도	1965년 이전	8	17.78%
	1970년대	24	53.33%
	1980년대	9	20.00%
	1990년대	4	8.89%
현 사업 시작년도	1962~1968	3	7.32%
	1970~1973	3	7.32%
	1980~1989	17	41.46%
	1990~1999	14	34.15%
	2000~2002	2	4.88%
	불명확 답	2	4.88%
이민 후 사업 시작할 때까지 기간	5년 이내	11	26.83%
	6~10년	14	34.15%
	11~15년	9	21.95%
	16~20년	4	9.76%
	20년 이상	1	2.44%
	불명확 답	2	4.88%
	가중평균		9.2년
은퇴 시 업체는	자손에게 상속	15	32.61%
	타인에게 양도 또는 정리	24	52.17%
	불명확 응답(아직 계획 없다 포함)	7	15.22%

출처: 부록 <표 1>과 같음

# 3

15:50~18:30

## 한민족분산의 이론화를 위한 종합토론

- Korean Diaspora : A Comparative View (전혜성, Hesung Chun Koh)
- 토론: 이종훈 Jong-Hoon Lee
- Discussant: 정성호 Song-Ho Jung
- 이진영 Jin-Yong Lee
- 진희관 Hee-Kwan Chin 및 발표자



## Toward Theorizing the Korean Diaspora and Strategy for Global Networking

*Hesung Chun Koh*

East Rock Institute and Yale University

For the past four millennia, Koreans not only survived but also flourished on the Korean peninsula situated at the crossroads of several major civilizations in the East Asian corridor—Mongolia, Siberia, India, China and Japan. It is only within the last 150 years that some of its people have involuntarily begun to cross their national borders first to CIS, China, Japan and the United States; a substantial number of people began their voluntary immigration to the United States and all corners of the world following World War II. Today, an estimated 73 million Koreans, a culturally homogeneous people, are scattered throughout 160 different countries within Europe, North and South America Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia and New Zealand(Oegyo Chaeoe Ijugwa (ROK), June 30, 1999 and United Nations Publication, Sales No. E99.Xiii 90) See Map 1.

The paradigm of “community” as the largest manageable unit of human life studied, once central to social science in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is no longer adequate to use in studies of human life in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A dynamic, nomadic and dispersed quality in our life has replaced the old paradigm of a static community in which a person can live his or her entire life without moving outside its boundaries. Through the study of diaspora, particularly that of the Korean diaspora, our understanding of human life in general, and Korean culture in particular, will reflect this current reality.

Moreover, with the globalization of the economy and communications technology, in addition to the possible contributions of



overseas Koreans toward the unification of Korea, both policy-makers and scholars alike have increasingly turned their attention to those Koreans who live outside of the Korean peninsula. An event such as September 11 was a wake up call for concerted efforts toward the globalization of freedom. The active alliance and mutual support of all members of the Korean diaspora along with peninsular Koreans, in some form of a Korean World Community, is an urgent matter of life and death, and not of mere armchair contemplation.

It is the shared opinion of the organizers and sponsors of today's conference that scholars of the Korean diaspora have much to contribute not only to the further growth of the world's fund of knowledge, but also toward improved policy decisions that affect all Koreans worldwide. Currently, the Korean diaspora is the fourth largest in the world, followed by that of the Chinese, Jewish, and Italians, respectively. The four largest Korean diasporas, which comprise nearly 90% of the total overseas Korean population, offer an opportunity to compare the Korean diasporas of communist and democratic countries on the one hand, and diasporas of eastern and western cultures on the other.

The purpose of this paper is to present the salient characteristics of the Korean diaspora through

comparative observations of the four major Korean diasporas found in China, Kazakhstan, Japan and the United States (Fig. 2. Distribution of the Korean diaspora).<sup>1</sup> In addition, I will attempt to offer a vision of strategic collaboration among the global Korean community.

This paper is based primarily on the publications and research findings of the East Rock Institute on Korean and Korean Americans since 1984, and more recently on the four major Korean diasporas. Important additional sources are the Proceedings of the ERI Korean Diaspora conference of 2001 held last March in conjunction with the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois and the experience of 17 annual conferences that ERI has sponsored on the Yale University campus (Koh, Kwang Lim and Koh, Hesung Chun, 1973). Further materials are also drawn from comparative articles from the book on the Korean

diasporas, which Edward Taehan Chang and I have edited. (Koh and Chang, 2002)

All of you will agree that the state of current research is such that it is rather premature to theorize about the Korean diaspora using tested propositions. While there are some theories of assimilation, acculturation, and ethnic resource mobilization that have been tested largely with data on Koreans in the United States (Yoon, In Jin, 2001: 15-24, Min, Pyong-Gap 1999) and Koreans in China (Olivier, Bernard, 2001), I am not fully aware of theories that have also been tested with data on Koreans in Japan or Kazakhstan. Not many will disagree, however, that the sooner we work toward such theories, the more likely we are to reach our goal.

To be faithful to the conference title, I wish to first define key concepts related to diaspora, compare four major Korean diaspora around such concepts and observe similarities and differences in the hope that we can work toward identifying some hypotheses for future testing. Also to present a recommendation toward the founding of a global network among scholars of the Korean diasporas, which I consider to be an essential step toward theorizing the Korean diaspora. Through a decentralized process of data gathering and analysis, we will be able to gain a sufficient amount of quality data that will assist us in our efforts to formulate and test theories. Such decentralized cooperative efforts toward data gathering and analysis will require a general agreement on the standards of information processing, and above all, a firm commitment toward this common goal from the people of the different diaspora groups. Conducted thus, these efforts will not only expand the current scholarship on the Korean diaspora, but can also work toward building a cohesive, Korean world community.

#### **Part I.**

#### **Characteristics of the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative View**

In comparing the topical categories covered by studies of the four major Korean diasporas, the following questions come to mind.



What are the differences and similarities among the four diasporas with regard to the challenges, the adaptation strategies or patterns, and the contributions of Korean immigrants and their descendants, within socialist or democratic political milieu, respectively?

I have organized these questions around the key concepts of diaspora and identity.

1. What are the key concepts for the studies of the diaspora?
2. What are some of the key factors that shape identity issues (national, ethnic and/or individual or situational/ gender/generational ), which are an essential component of the diaspora studies?
3. What aspects of Korean culture are trans-historical, and also operative across political and cultural boundaries?
4. How adaptive are Koreans in new and changing environments? (e.g. case of Kobonjil of *Koryo Saram* and women-centered family structures of small business in the United States)?
5. How can studies of the Korean diaspora benefit Korea, the people of the diaspora, and also contribute to the advancement of knowledge about human life?

It is not possible to fully address each of these questions in this paper, but I will try to answer at least some of these questions.

### 1. Meaning of Diaspora

The word "diaspora" describes a homogeneous people uprooted from their native land by irreversible social and historical forces. It bespeaks of a yearning among the people of the diaspora to return to their homeland. The Korean diaspora, in particular, describes a community of Koreans who are rooted in Korea but no longer feel compelled to live there; they thrive in other societies while concerned with the continuity of their cultural heritage.

This broad definition of diaspora suggests the evolution of a new relationship between peninsular Koreans and those Koreans living in other parts of the world: Despite geographical dispersal and differences in nationality or citizenship, there is unity among Koreans worldwide in their

efforts to seek continuity of their heritage, customs, rituals and cultural values.

### HOMELAND OR SENSE OF HOME, REAL OR IMAGINARY

On defining diaspora, Ji-Yeon Yuh of Northwestern University, says:

What strikes me most deeply is the human desire for home, that is, the desire to belong fully and be accepted fully and the difficulty of efforts in this direction (Yuh, 2001).

What constitutes "home" seems to differ among the various Korean diaspora groups, and undergoes generational change. "Home" is sometimes imaginary, as is the case among many Korean residents in Japan; some of these residents have neither lived nor intend to live in North Korea, yet believe North Korea to be their home. For them, it appears that the sense of home is more important than the actual, physical place of residence.

The confusion over self-identity among Korean residents in Japan originates primarily from the lack of a national "home," and the difficulty of claiming Korean ethnic or cultural identity as distinct from Korean nationality. Korean nationals in Japan have created monopolies of Korean culture that make it difficult to separate ethnic identity from national identity. Despite such hardships, the collective experience of Koreans in Japan are turning more from concerns of nationality/homeland issues toward ethnicity/diaspora issues. This shift has taken place since the end of the Cold War, and especially during the period of 1989 to 1991 (Lie, John, 2000: 22-23).

To describe the relationship between the place of residence and ethnic identity of the *Chosonjok* of China after the Korean War, Olivier uses the concepts of "situational ethnicity," "ethnic resilience," and "ethnic mobilization" by borrowing from a theory developed by Fredrik Barth and other Scandinavian social anthropologists. Rather than analyze the distinctive cultural traits of the Korean diaspora in isolation, Olivier takes into consideration the relationship between the groups in question and the social, economic, and political environment that shapes ethnic identity. To do so, he draws upon Barth's



understanding of the important factor of "change" whereby ethnicity and culture are "situational" rather than "static." Thus, for the *Chosonjok* of China after the Korean War, ethnicity, real or perceived can be manipulated by how one defines it, and fluctuates accordingly. For instance, ethnic groups can be mobilized into collective action to justify a political enterprise (Olivier: 2001: 6).

Like the Koreans in Japan, diaspora Koreans in China also draw comfort from the thought of an ancestral homeland of Korea, real or imaginary, which provides an alternative place to move to and seek a better life. This hope brings with it "imagined continuity," or "imaginary coherence" of the civilization of "Mother Korea." If life in the adopted country progresses well, the need for an imagined homeland is not acute. When difficulties arise, however, such as political change in China or the CIS, this sense of home becomes a vital resource to hang onto. Some of those *Chosonjok* who do, in fact, return to North Korea find their new lives to be much more regimented than life in China, which allowed greater freedom in self-determination. Consequently, some *Chosonjok* choose to return to China.

As disillusionment with one country leads to immigration or return to another, people of the diaspora are able to compare and choose their place of residence—whether it is the country of ancestral origin or sometimes birth, or the country of birth and/or adoption and residence. This case demonstrates that people can simultaneously have allegiance to their ancestral culture or way of life, and to the country in which they live. Thus, ethnic identity assumes that national identity does not have to be the same as one's cultural identity (Eriksen 1993: 39, Olivier, 200, 17).

In their desire to preserve their language and culture, Koreans in China became "Chinese citizens of Korean nationality, called "*Chosonjok*." This collective identity is linked to "self-ascription as well as to ascription by others; to the boundaries that define the group; and to the ways, which the group is perceived in relation to others. These factors strengthen the group's "collective consciousness" of the specificities of its customs, life styles, and values as well as its sense of being different" (Olivier, 2001: 11). In this way, language and culture become concrete symbols of political rights and the core of identity becomes free access to a self-managed and durable economic development through privileged minority status granted by authorities.

In the case of Korean Americans, collective ethnic identity likewise shifted from close association with the Korean homeland toward a hybrid Korean American culture after the 1992 Los Angeles Riots. Such change is especially true of the Korean diaspora community in California. (Chang, Edward T., 1993.)

Today, the people of the Korean diaspora still may wish to visit Korea; they may also take genuine pride in the country's recent success in the World Cup games and economic recovery following the IMF crises. Younger-generation Koreans in Japan, US, China and Kazakhstan, however, as well as first-generation intellectuals in Japan have no intention of returning to Korea. It thus appears that the content and expectation of the homeland among the diaspora community have become more conceptual than real.

In addition, what is generally true for most diaspora communities seems to be the absence of political or economic stability in the homeland. For instance, the division of Korea into the socialistic North and democratic South seems to have a profound impact on the people of the Korean diaspora, some explorations of which are found in popular Korean American novels such as the "Foreign Student" and "One Thousand Chestnut Trees." These novels refer to the parallel split in the Korean American psyche and ancestral lands of the Korean peninsula. Because of the limitation of time, further discussion of this important topic will be set aside for another time (Koh, H.C., 2000).

## 2. Identity

### THE NATURE OF IDENTITY

The changing and complex nature of identity, and the challenges of seeking identity seem to be the cardinal issues addressed in Diaspora studies.

By identity, I mean the inner sameness of reality between the past and future. A person's sense of self is formed through a series of encounters with other individuals (including one's parents and family) Thus, the perception and attitude toward the Korean diaspora community by the host



society and consistency, or harmony, between self-perception and ascription by others are very important for the development of collective identity. This identity stems from a collective consciousness of the specificities of the group's customs, lifestyle, and values, as well as its sense of being different.

Peter Kwong's nationality thesis argues that there are direct correlations between the status of immigrant groups in the United States and the strength of the home nation, whereas Alexander DeConde examines ethnicity and race and their impact on America's foreign policy. Ethnic groups often mobilize their resources to influence not only their own status in the United States, but also policies affecting their homeland (Chang, Edward, 2002).

In addition to one's attachment to a nationalistic "home," other key factors also shape identity among people of the Korean diaspora; they are: (1) the notion of self that shares more Eastern than Western values; (2) the importance attached to nationality, ethnicity, or cultural identity by the diaspora population (3) the principle of nationality and citizenship law (by blood or by soil); (4) gender status; (5) generational differences; and (6) the shifting nature of others' perception in tandem with international politics, national ethnic polity and policies of the host country (e.g. pre- or post-Cold War; political, structural changes of the host country, as in the dissolution of the former Soviet Union into the independent states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc.). For instance, the perceptions and attitudes of the host society toward the Korean diaspora community have fluctuated with the gyrations of geopolitical events, i.e. the Korean War, bribery scandals in Korea, the Korean economic miracle, and the Los Angeles riots.

#### CHANGE IN IDENTITY OF THE KOREAN DIASPORA

All four of the major Korean diasporas, varied in length of history, see the recurrence and continuous evolution of identity issues.

Among the Korean diaspora, the *Koryo Saram* comprise the oldest diaspora community and dates back to 1852. There are some among them who are the sixth generation of the diaspora. In contrast, Korean

immigration to China began in 1870; and the Korean diaspora communities in Japan and the US span only three or four generations. As the oldest Korean diaspora community, the *Koryo Saram* have the most experience in living and adopting to multicultural and multiethnic communities. (Ross King, 2001 in Koh and Chang, 2002). By 1920, the *Koryo Saram* experienced a shift in ethnic identity from "Korean" to "Russian Korean." For the next two generations, they identified themselves as "Soviet Korean" before they settled upon the present-day self identification of "Kazakhstan Korean" (King and Kim, 2001: 14). Again, in contrast, Korean Americans have only recently undergone a transformation of ethnic identity, as observed in their public shift from close association with the homeland toward a hybrid Korean American culture after the 1992 Los Angeles Riots (Chang, 2002:); identity among Koreans in Japan continues to undergo a similar transformation from national/homeland identity to ethnic/diasporic identity (Lie, John, 2000: 22-23) ; the ethnic identity of Chosonjok has evolved from "Korean Chinese" to a "negotiable identity," or "situational ethnicity," as posited by Bernard Olivier borrowing a concept from Barth.

#### NOTION OF SELF

There are differences across cultures regarding the sense of self, particularly between the cultures of East Asia as a group and Western society. Many scholars of personality and culture describe the Korean sense of self as a "collective self," or "family ego," rather than "individual ego." In Eastern cultures, the self requires an "other" for its definition. For Koreans in Japan and China, who espouse such values, acceptance by a group or society carries far greater currency than for those in Western society. In the context of "collective self," nationality was once the sole means of self-identification in the past for Koreans in Korea. For this reason, national identity still remains the most important factor in the development or continuation of an inner sameness of reality with the past and future. The great importance attached to nationality as a symbol of acceptance, and the denial of such acceptance from both the Japanese and



Korean governments, render the degree of deprivation felt by Koreans in Japan the most extreme among the four major Korean diasporas.

Moreover, the cultural monopolies of Korean nationals in Japan have blocked access to the culture for other Koreans in Japan who are in search of their ethnic and cultural identity. (Kashiwazaki, 2000: 49-70) The government policy of Japan, the host country, and Korea, the home country, have also contributed to this situation. While Koreans in China, Kazakhstan and the United States have all been able to obtain citizenship from their adopted country, only Koreans in Japan were denied such status until recent years.

#### NATIONALITY LAW OF HOST COUNTRY AND IDENTITY

One of the most tangible difficulties that some diaspora communities contend with is nationality law. Nationality law based upon *jus sanguinis* (right of blood; nationality defined by one's descent or parentage) as compared to *jus soli* (the law of soil, defined by the place of birth rather than by bloodline) deprives many Koreans in Japan of a national identity. Since Koreans in Japan share an Asian notion of selfhood, the deprivation of national identity also undermines their sense of an ethnic and cultural identity. In contrast, Koreans in the United States see the coexistence of multiple nationalities and are able to obtain citizenship under *jus soli*; they can become citizens of the host country while retaining the ethnic identity of the homeland.

Nationality principles and citizenship laws are all rooted in the cultural values of the host society where diversity or multiculturalism is accepted or rejected. The US, Kazakhstan and China believe diversity and multiculturalism to be the norm, whereas Japan and Korea value their homogeneity despite the reality of increasing ethnic diversity in both of these latter countries.

Placed along a continuum of greatest and least acceptance of such diversity, one could imagine the Korean diaspora in Japan (much like the Chinese diaspora in Korea) at one end, where identity crises are most severe; the Korean diaspora in the United States, which allows for a hybrid identity, would occupy the other end.

The cases of the former Soviet Union and China may be situated at intermediate points along this continuum.

The socialist ideologies and nationalist ethnic policies of these latter two countries seem to have played decisive roles in affecting the identity issues of their Korean residents.

#### IDENTIFY CRISES: CASE OF FLUCTUATING AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD KOREAN AMERICANS

Over the years, East Rock Institute has convened 17 Annual Korean and Korean American conferences on the Yale University campus, through which, I learned one of the most important lessons on ethnic identity: We found that the fluctuating perceptions and changing attitudes among Americans toward Korean American youth contributed to identity crises among Korean Americans.

For example, through the prism of the Korean War in the 1950s, most Americans viewed Koreans as war refugees in need of enormous economic aid. With the Pak Tong-Sun era of bribery and scandal on Capitol Hill came unfounded suspicion of all Korean Americans; one Korean American student returned home from school crying because his teacher had misconstrued the student's gesture, and refused his customary Christmas gift. When Sung-Myong Moon, the cult leader, rose in prominence in the United States, one of my Yale students spoke of his wish to change his last name of Moon to escape association with Reverend Moon and the ridicule he elicited. Then, several years later, the worldwide telecast of the 1988 Olympics created a far different impression, and people came to acknowledge and appreciate Korean culture. Public perception of Korea was equally favorable during the economic boom of the early 1990s, when Hyundai cars and Samsung TVs and VCRs were popular consumer goods in the United States. During this time, the self-image of Korean Americans grew in tandem with this positive general perception of others, who regarded Korean Americans as citizens of a civilized and affluent country. Such feelings of good will were short-lived, however. Just four years after the Seoul Olympics, the outbreak of the Los Angeles riots in 1992, and the



subsequent unfavorable depiction of Koreans as racist and mercenary, turned public opinion against the Korean community. Such events inevitably shape the sense of self-worth felt by Korean American youth. In this way, international politics, and Korea's place in it, have a deep impact on the identity formation of Korean Americans.

### 3. Diaspora Name as Symbol of Ethnic Identity

Inasmuch as diasporic identity depends upon the people of the diaspora and others' perception of them, I want to now examine the ways in which various diaspora communities have come to name themselves, and be named by others. Koreans in China refer to themselves as *Chosonjok*, while Koreans in Kazakhstan are the *Koryo Saram* (the term "Koryoin" is not used since many are unfamiliar with and cannot recognize the Chinese letter "in"; neither are the terms, "Soviet Koreans" or "Koreski" acceptable). Koreans in the United States refer to themselves as "Korean Americans" without the hyphen between terms.

As I will explain further, the most difficult case of determining widely-accepted and proper nomenclature for a Korean diaspora community is that of Koreans in Japan.

The term, "*Zainichi*," which has often been used to refer to Korean residents in Japan, simply means "living in Japan" and lacks reference to ethnicity of any sort. The term can be further amended as "*Zainichi Chosenjin*" to refer to North Korean supporters; and "*Zainichi Kankokujin*," to refer to those who regard South Korea as their homeland. The name *Zainichi* is very frequently used by many Koreans in Japan, but some scholars and leaders among Koreans in Japan are strongly opposed to its use for reasons that Professor Sonia Ryang has articulated :

The term does not denote any Koreanness at all--whether North or South... Some leftist-minded or more sympathetic Japanese intellectuals began to use this term because it avoids any identification with the North-South conflict. The term, "*Zainichi*," means simply "living in Japan." Some

indigenous Korean Japanese literary critics, including Takeda Seiji, are also responsible for disseminating this viewpoint. Nowadays, many *Zainichi* writers of the younger generation, including myself, explicitly reject this usage. Naoko Isho, the most recent winner of the Naoki Prize, happens to be a Korean in Japan and he explicitly denies that *Zainichi* is his heritage-identity. He regards the term as originating with the Japanese, and the Japanese cannot feel secure unless they tame or accommodate Koreans by naming them in this way. So he refuses to accept this identity (Ryang, 2001, in East Rock Institute, Korean Diaspora Conference Proceedings).

From this discussion alone, we can surmise the severity of identity crises felt among Koreans in Japan. Such difficulties are due in large part to the absence of social and legal acceptance by the host country of Japan and the "homeland." Moreover, the Cold War division of the home country of Korea further undermines the efforts of Koreans in Japan toward a unified sense of self and home.

### 4. Language and ethnic identity

The average period of language retention among Koreans in Japan and the *Koryo Saram* is three generations. The period of language retention among Korean Americans in the United States is the shortest in length while it is the longest among the *Chosonjok* (King, Ross, 2001, ERI Korean Diaspora Conference Proceedings).

The commonly held view that language retention is important to one's sense of ethnic identity is challenged by the linguist, Ross King; German Kim offers additional supporting evidence that shows the lack of clear correlation between one's ability to speak the Korean language and one's self-determination of ethnic identity. Kim describes the *Koryo Saram* as follows:

There are not many Koreans in Kazakhstan who can speak fluent *Koryo mal*, but there are many non-Korean ethnic minorities who have lived within the Korean community and speak fluent *Koryo mal*. There is a young



Kazakh whose fluency in *Koryo mal* is worthy of mention. As for my own family, I have older siblings who strongly identify themselves as *Koryo Saram*. Their sense of ethnic identity is stronger than my own, even though they can't speak a word of Korean, whereas I do speak Korean. One older brother was particularly adamant about finding a Korean spouse (2001. Proceedings of East Rock Institute Korean Diaspora Conference).

#### KOREAN LANGUAGE EDUCATION FOR ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION.

Ross King also asserts that the importance of Korean language education in maintaining ethnic identity is overrated. He adds that the current method of language education and underlying assumptions of any language education program will seriously curtail the effectiveness and endurance of the Korean language among the Korean diasporas. He explains, "the *hangul hakkyo*'s vision of language is very much as Korean as *minjogo*, and some of its contents are completely irrelevant to American or Canadian students of Korean language." An alternative model, he continues, is a Korean language immersion program on a *national* level that teaches Korean as *kukjeo*, i.e. Korean as an *international* language, so that Koreans in Russia and elsewhere can come together to converse. The current teaching standards for the South Korean language of *p'yojuno* is constantly changing and not fully relevant to diaspora Koreans. The subsequent confusion and lack of confidence generated by such standards can do more damage than good, he concludes.

These assumptions of the *hangul hakkyo* reflect the basic paradigm that situates the Korean peninsula at the center around which many planets of the diaspora orbit. Unless this paradigm can be revised, the mutual benefits of global networking among the people of the diaspora cannot be expected to materialize.

## 5. Religion and Identity

Religion, whether it is Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity or any combination thereof, provides a set of ideological definitions that are important in forming one's notion of self. While Taoism and Buddhism advocate the "abolition of the smaller self" so that the "greater self" may emerge, Confucianism promotes the formation of the "virtuous" self through proper social relationships and Christianity teaches love as the basis for human relations. The latter two religions are more concerned with the relationship of the self to others. Religion also offers mechanisms for coping with tension, conflict, and tragedy (e.g. 9/11 terrorist attacks, natural disasters such as floods that cause death, epidemic and famine). In traditional Korean religion, humanistic ritual, or *cut*, allows for *hanp'uri*—the release of tension known as *han*, or a deep-rooted unresolved and unfulfilled rancor. Borrowing Paul Tillich's words, like a gyroscope when navigating the ocean, one's religion provides direction to our lives.

In the Jewish diaspora, religion, education and culture are the building blocks of Jewish identity, the foundation for which is instruction in the Torah; the observance of Jewish religious rituals has been the central effort in support of a sustained Jewish identity (Gordis, David M. and Yoav, Ben Horin, 1991).

With the Jewish diaspora as a model, I pose the following question: How should the Korean diaspora community "invigorate a subjective inner sameness of reality and continuity" (Eriksen, T. 1993) from its people much as the Jewish people have done? Is religion to support a sustained collective, Korean identity, as well? If so, I see a number of challenges:

1. Korea's synchronistic approach to religion allows the individual to draw upon a wide range of different belief systems, such as Shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Christianity and many new religions, to suit individual needs and temperament.
2. Though Christianity is the dominant religion in North America—and increasingly so in China and Kazakhstan through the work of



missionaries—Christianity is not an indigenous Korean belief system like that of Judaism to the Jewish people. Moreover, there is strong adherence to Shaman and Buddhist rituals and to their hybrid among Koreans in Japan.

3. The ability of Christian churches to bring about culturally relevant Korean Christian theology will require a greater understanding of Korean history and culture on the part of Christian leaders; they currently lack such understanding.
4. Christian churches have yet to address the growing voices of Korean American youth and intellectuals among the *Koryo Saram*. Inclusion of such voices would create a stronger association between the mission of the church and the continuation of Korean culture. Neither do the churches offer diaspora Koreans with a place to learn and practice the Korean culture so as to sustain an inner sameness of reality (Koh, 2001: "Role of Korean American Churches in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," ERI-Yale Conference Proceedings.).
5. The role of religion among the Korean diasporas as a theological or spiritual base for Korean identity is not yet fully identifiable. Perhaps the gathering place of Christian churches provides a "sense of home" for many people of the Korean diaspora and is sufficient as such. An informed, inclusive theological base, however, must be developed for religion to be relevant to, and synthesized among, all Korean diasporas across the board within the context of each culture.
6. Race, Gender, Generation toward development of Identity

Because of the limitation of time, I will simply mention, without elaboration, that literature on the identity formation of Korean women in Japan and the United States explores the additional variables of race, gender, sexuality, and generation (Wender, Melissa, 2000, Park So Young, 2001 and Kim, Luke, 1999: 27-41).

In sum, I would argue that the notion of identity and degree of identity deprivation among people of the diaspora are related to whether their primary interactions are with members of the host society or with members of their own ethnicity, gender, generation or race. Furthermore, the following factors all shape

the identity of the diaspora population in varying magnitude and order: (1) The diaspora Koreans' notion of self; (2) the host country's principles of nationality and related ethnic policies (e.g. blood or soil as the basis for determining one's nationality); (3) the host country's perception of their own society as culturally homogenous or diverse; (4) race; (5) gender and sexuality; and (6) generation. For instance, race is the first order of differentiation when the host society and the Korean diaspora population are racially distinct. Race is then followed by considerations of ethnicity, gender and generation, respectively. I will add that one can anticipate identity crises among the diaspora population when the nationality policy of the host society is not in harmony with self perception.

It is my hope that the subject of identity formation can be further investigated and systematically tested by individually isolating each of these variables. An interdisciplinary collaboration by specialists on language, literature, religion, psychology and women's studies are necessary for such research in the future.

#### 7. Preservation and transformation of Korean culture

My second major point concerns the contributions of diaspora Koreans to the understanding of Korean culture. I submit that Koreans abroad serve not only as a bridge between Korea and their respective adopted countries, but that they also contribute to the preservation of some aspects of Korean culture that have been lost in the homeland. At the same time, the adaptive strategies of Korean diaspora communities, and the way in which they have transformed Korean social structure to meet new challenges, can provide tested options for Koreans in adjusting to the demands of globalization. This view also calls our attention to the underlying adaptive values of Koreans as exhibited so vividly in their folk paintings, mask dance drama, *p'ansori* music, *kayagum sanjo*, and in the rules of Korean inheritance, and wedding rituals, just to mention a few (Koh, Hesung Chun, 1982).

The original focus of the 1973 Koreans Abroad conference, which I convened at the AAS Annual Meeting, sought to address this very issue of



the simultaneous preservation and transformation of Korean culture. In studying the Korean diaspora, I felt that the essence of Korean culture could be observed in that aspect of the culture that endures outside of the peninsula. This model might then hold true for other cultures and other diasporas.

What can readily be observed are six aspects of Korean culture that diaspora Korean communities have perpetuated: language; life-cycle rituals; educational values; corporal punishment of children and employees; male dominance in ethnic organizations (e.g. *haninhoe*, Korean American ethnic associations, and Korean ethnic churches in America); and the adaptability of Koreans, especially among women. For example, the tradition of *hwangap* (60<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration), a life-cycle ritual, demonstrates the continuity of the Korean cyclical notion of time in the diaspora community, and the value of transcending the self. In contrast, areas of transformation, or adaptive strategies to new political and cultural environments, are readily observable in the pattern of economic innovation and kin-networking, especially among the small business of Koreans in the United States and Japan.

1) *Language*. Spoken Korean language originally included a half vowel sound in addition to what we have now. Before World War II, only native speakers of Cheju Island retained the half vowel, "oe" sound. To hear the use of this vowel today, however, a linguist must travel to Korea town in Tsuruhashi, Osaka, which is home to a large number of immigrants from Cheju Island. In addition, Sonia Ryang has observed in her ethnography that the Cheju dialect is best preserved in Ikaino, Osaka rather than in Chejudo. Ross King further notes that the Yukchin dialect of the northernmost Hamgyong province is Korea's most archaic and under-researched speech variety to the north, and is paradoxically most easily accessible through speakers of this dialect in the former Soviet Union (King and Kim, 2001: 17-1). Other obvious areas of cultural preservation are found more in material cultures such as food (*kimchi*); clothing (women's *ch'ima chogori*); and artistic forms such as percussional music.

2) *Life-cycle rituals*. Rites of passage, the rituals of becoming an adult (*song'insik*), were practiced during the Choson dynasty until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Korea. Such rituals are no longer practiced in Korea, but are elaborately observed among the Koreans in Japan who are careful to preserve them. For instance, one Japanese Korean women's club, the *Seiwakai* (Association for Conversation) in Tokyo, has published a book and videotape on Korean life-cycle rituals. Given such careful documentation, perhaps it isn't surprising that even third-generation Japanese Koreans join in these ritual practices.

Among Koreans in China, the former Soviet Union and the United States, additional rituals have been preserved with some modification. For instance, the first birthday, weddings, *hwangap*, and funeral and ancestor worship have survived in these diaspora communities. In particular, the ways in which Korean Americans have created an effective hybrid of Korean and American values can be observed during wedding and funeral ceremonies that meld the best of both cultures. (Koh, Howard, Ed. 1980 and 1992)

3) *Educational values*. A high valuation of education, based on the assumption that education is the surest means to upward social mobility, is shared by Koreans in all four of the major Korean diasporas. Even in cases where upward mobility of the educated are limited, as with the Koreans in Japan until recent years, the diaspora communities, nonetheless, place great emphasis on attending a reputable school to earn a degree. The high degree of education also achieved by Koreans in Kazakhstan, China, and the United States needs much more systematic comparison.

4) *Corporal punishment of children and employees*. One aspect of the Confucian disciplinary pattern of child-rearing, which accepts corporal punishment, is unheard of among Japanese in Japan, yet persists among the Korean Japanese; the literature on Koreans in Japan indicates that spouses often physically assault Korean mothers and wives. Elsewhere, Kwang Kyu Lee's article in *Koreans in China* (2001), mentions the shocked reactions of Chinese Korean migrant workers in Korea to the corporal



punishment they receive from their Korean employers; they consider this sort of discipline to be physical abuse. I am also reminded of the frequent references in the case reports of social workers to child abuse and wife-battering that occur in Korean American families.

5) *Persistence of hierarchical structures and male dominance in Korean American organizations.*

Korean American churches in the United States adhere to patterns of male dominance that began in Korea around 1650 A.D. The relative equality of Korean women prior to that period has been amply documented by scholars and by my own research, which compares eighteenth-century criminal cases in China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam. (Koh, Hesung Chun, 1998) The values undergirding human rights also existed in traditional Korea; it is important to note that such values are not Western in origin. The question then arises, "Out of the four long millennia of Korean history, why should the structural patterns peculiar to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Confucian culture be preserved in Christian churches in the United States today? Why is it that the office of the Elder—which holds great power and prestige among Korean American congregations—has been open solely to men while excluding women of equal education, service and dedication? These questions beg further research and discussion.

6) *Adaptiveness of Koreans to new socio-cultural environments: Kobonjil and its value and acceptance in the socialist Soviet economy.*

*Kobonjil* was a unique semi-capitalistic, kin-based economic organization developed by the *Koryo Saram* of Central Asia. The term, *Kobonjil* described "farming activities seeking individual profit" in the context of a socialist economy; these activities were capital and labor intensive in nature. According to Ross King, *kobon* of *kobonjil* is defined as the investment capital of "several investors of former times who pooled their funds for the sake of a joint venture." The *Koryo Saram* of Central Asia successfully practiced this particular form of kin-based agricultural production and marketing micro community with competitive management skills and strong work ethics, superior farming techniques and group

solidarity. Groups of individual families coordinated their work through a migratory form of lease-farming; families would live at the farm during the agricultural season and return home after the harvest. The entire system, which included family members and kin of both husband and wife, functioned much like an efficient brigade. It is this remarkable combination of a socialist, collective system; small-scale capitalist farm management; and semi-capitalistic, innovative marketing techniques to maximize personal profit that led to great success. Because of its superior productivity, *kobonjil* was legalized rather belatedly in 1985 under the socialist economy of the Soviet era, thus allowing the *Koryo Saram* to freely practice this semi-capitalistic form of farming and marketing. The size of the *kobonjil*, usually about three acres per family, often varied according to the size and farming abilities of each family. One family unit would often farm one *kobon*, but others, with the help of many more farm hands, sometimes managed to farm two or three *kobon* at a time. The products were often rice, cabbage, onions, beets, etc. All *kobonjil* was practiced solely by the *Koryo Saram* (Back, 2001).

Upon reflection, the case of the *kobonjil* of Kazakhstan seems to have been an amalgamation of traditional Korean farming and work organizations such as: *ture*, or *kye*, a mutual assistance association whereby groups organized themselves to pool resources during times of hardship; and *chang*, a market system held every 5 to 7 days in rotation at various towns for the selling and buying of local farm goods.

RISE OF SISTER-DRIVEN AND WOMEN-CENTERED ORGANIZATION OF FAMILY AND WORK AMONG SMALL BUSINESSES

A common phenomenon among the Korean diasporas is the large number of small business owners who make up approximately 30% of the diaspora population in the United States. Moreover, in Kazakhstan and China, an increasing number of former professionals are becoming small-business owners as the economic situation has changed in the post-Cold War era. For instance, small- and medium-sized businesses are owned by *Koryo Saram* who were once



professionals in education, science, health care, architecture and the arts (Back 2001: 74). Koreans in the United States and Kazakhstan are highly educated; and enjoy considerable prestige and respect due to their intelligence, educational achievement and skill. Among the Koreans in Japan and China, small business owners are most often shopkeepers by trade. These businesses are run largely by women.

An important aspect of the phenomenon of small business ownership in the diaspora communities is the central role of women within the businesses: Small business activities in America and Japan have made possible the rise of sister-initiated kin mobilization and women-centered kin organization...work in the small business is considered as an extension of family. Moreover, in this process, work itself redefines the family and kinship structure" (Park, 1997: 112, Koh's personal observation in Osaka, Japan during 1996-1999).

The favorable circumstances that gave rise to a woman-centered organization of family and work in the United States were the result of immigration law. After 1965, Korean War brides and their kin, as members of a preferential quota established by US immigration law, were allowed to settle in the United States. These women immigrants invited a large number of their relatives to join them, thus spurring a new period of female-initiated migration that began after the Korean War (Park, 1997: 97). The results of such migration patterns are seen among married Korean couples in Queens, New York whose families reflect the preferential quota; members of the wife's family who reside in the United States outnumber those of the husband's family" (Park, 1997: 94). Since 1976 and the restrictions placed on occupational preference, kinship has become the principal channel of immigration.

With the influx of Korean War brides and their kin, shared work in a family-owned small business served as an arrangement from which all could benefit. Small business owners needed reliable, inexpensive labor; and in return, could offer an initial foothold for new immigrants, as well as emotional and economic support. The new immigrants who joined these family businesses were more often from the wife's side of the family. Because of this practical reliance on kinship networks among Korean

Americans, ties between siblings were important, and elder sisters assumed a central role in guiding the lives of fellow siblings. The proximity of their residences was important to the kinship structure, and they would often live in the same apartment building or town. In this arrangement, sisters and daughters wielded economic and familial power, while sons and brothers, who immigrated much later, had less important roles; unlike the traditional Korean family structure in which the man's role is dominant, Korean women carried the upper hand in business and family matters. I have personally observed a similar arrangement of family and business among Korean residents in Japan.

Women-centered kin organization among the Koreans in Japan is further evident in the ritual of ancestor worship, or *chesa*. Guests who attend the *chesa* are most often friends and relatives of the wife of the household. Moreover, the boundaries of this kinship structure tend to be flexible and expansive as even distant relatives, by Korean standards, are considered to be kin and also attend the *chesa*. It is a common practice for much distant relatives to seek each other out and remain in close contact as kin. In this sense, the nature of kin relationships among Koreans in Japan or in the United States are much more substantial than formal (Park, Kyeyoung, 1997, Koh, Hesung Chun, from personal observations 1996-1999.)

## Part II.

An important point to make is that all of us have our systematic biases in our formal observations, research and writing. That our place of residence informs our biases was evident last year during our first conference on the Korean Diaspora. For instance, we discovered that the perspective of peninsular Koreans with regard to their overseas counterparts is very different from the perspective of Koreans living outside of the peninsula. If we are aware of our own systematic biases, we will be more tolerant of others' views, and more readily able to work together for mutual benefit.



Inasmuch as this paper will serve to facilitate our final discussion of the conference, I wish to address the latter half of the conference title, "Strategy for Global Networking."

### **Strategy for Global Networking and Theorizing the Korean Diaspora**

Both strategies toward global networking and theorizing the Korean diaspora seem to be closely interrelated and also highly interdependent. Decentralized database development and scholarly information exchange will promote our common goal of collecting a tangible pool of information that will serve our common benefit.

To theorize well is to test a hypothesis with reliable data. To this end, the data must be relevant and comprehensive in scope, as well as allow for comparative analysis. Given the impossibility of conducting a controlled comparison within a laboratory setting, the best means of research available to scholars is systematic, comparative data analysis.

In this effort, I wish to propose the methodology of Decentralized Korean Diaspora Information Processing and Analysis through an interactive website. Such work must be based on standard information principles to ensure the necessary quantity and quality of data. I propose that a consortium of international institutions and individuals is best suited to the task. A number of models exist for a collaborative venture; they are OCLC (Ohio College Library Center), and HRAF (Human Relations Area Files) at Yale University.

The proposed consortium must include at least one or two research centers in Korea with the commitment and scholarly expertise of graduate students and young dynamic scholars, who will work in tandem with institutions and graduate students from the Korean diaspora community. This collaborative effort will also need scholarly consultants and a wide range of advisors.

Active both here and abroad, I have devoted the past 40 years to the development of a cultural information system called KOCIS, Korean Cultural Information System. Work on KOCIS began at HRAF at Yale University in the 1960s and has continued at ERI to this date. Thus far, the KOCIS project has received support from major United States, Japanese and Korean foundations. I feel the time is now ripe for the development of an international information exchange on the Korean diaspora through scholarly collaboration. I believe that funding for such a project can be obtained, if there is enough evidence of commitment from competent individuals and a few leading institutions. In fact, I am happy to report that East Rock Institute has received a start-up grant from the Overseas Koreans Foundation for the proposed Korean diaspora project. Thanks to interest and vision of the Chairman, Ambassador Kwon Bong Hyun, with regard to global networking among the Korean diasporas, we are finally launching this important project after a year-long period of planning and preparation.

- **Information system requirements**

To develop a cultural information system that adheres to the data quality control method, we will need to seek analyzed data; references to the sources of these data, or bibliography; an inventory of tested hypotheses, otherwise called theories; and data quality control information, which is essential for the user in canceling out systematic author and research bias.

As for the gathering and selection of worthwhile data to include in this information system, we will need a body of scholarly consultants who can devise standards, as well as evaluate the materials to be processed.

To ensure coder reliability and consistency of the indexing method, the analysis of data must be based upon tested classification principles for all cultural materials, and carried out by trained staff or graduate students in the social or human sciences.

In addition, the analysis and indexing system must be adequate to meet the requirements of the diverse and complex nature of information on the Korean diaspora. For instance, such a system must have the capabilities



to handle both the Roman or Non-Roman characters of various languages. Korean diaspora studies also require an unusually large data set that includes Korean cultural data of substantial historical depth, in addition to data on the individual Korean diasporas worldwide and their host countries. To study the 1937 deportation of Koreans in the former Soviet Union, alone, one must know the history and culture of the Russian Far East; as well as the history and culture of Koreans before and after the period of 1850 when they first began to immigrate to the CIS; in addition, of course, to information about the various Korean groups in the former Soviet Union. To accommodate such data, we will need the triple type of cultural information systems to be interlinked. Given that there are an estimated 160 Korean diasporas in the world, it may be prudent to begin with a few major cultures among them.

The proper storage of such gathered data should include the use of a well thought-out indexing system, which will allow local options and eventual integration into frequently updated concordances. Also essential is a mechanism to monitor the quality of data in terms of systematic bias (data quality control) before data can undergo the expensive process of digitization. The economy and efficiency of the entire storage process require careful planning and coordination.

In sum, the core system requirements that address each of the above issues are as follows:

- 1) Decentralized data input and processing according to a standardized system;
- 2) Decentralized indexing using Web technology;
- 3) Use of modifiable core indices, and centralized index editing and maintenance;
- 4) Adherence to universal data markup standards, such as XML and TEI, and well-tested international index structures, such as OCM and KOCIS, along with the use of standard querying languages and techniques. Also important are tools for recording, analysis and data navigation that are sophisticated and user-friendly.

There are about 40 years of experience in this regard at ERI, in addition to a legacy of digitized data on Korean culture, law and the diaspora.

In conclusion, the confluence of established data markup and indexing standards, and the interactive capabilities of web technology is a promising innovation; it has the potential to bring a new level of flexibility and data quantity to information handling. The depth and complex nature of information on the diaspora, and its concepts and characteristics, make imperative such an approach to information management.<sup>5</sup> What we need now is your cooperation and agreement on a new form of work organization that can maximize the participation of scholars from the various diasporas. I would be happy to hear from scholars and institutions who would be interested in such a collaborative venture.

### Conclusion

Diaspora Koreans now thrive in 160 countries as geographically diverse as Almaty, Kazakhstan; Osaka, Japan; Yenbyen, China; and Houston, Texas. Although they may feel great national pride in Korea's recent economic recovery and success in world sports, diaspora Koreans are quite at home in their adopted countries now more than ever. Despite their wide dispersal, a unity of some customs and rituals exist among all Koreans, regardless of their nationality or country of residence. Since this preservation and continuity of the Korean tradition is our common concern, we must forge a new partnership of equals as required for the study of the Korean diaspora. The current paradigm of study that places the Korean peninsula at the center of the satellite diasporas is no longer useful. Ross King has described well the inefficiencies created by such ethnocentrism with regard to Korean language education in North America. He also spoke of one particular exchange where the dominant peninsula-centered worldview managed to drown out alternative ideas about the *Koryo Saram*.



The new paradigm of diaspora studies must be balanced and equal if it is to be universally relevant. It is Korean culture, rather than nationality, that the peninsular and diaspora Koreans share most fully. A much more optimistic vision for the future rests on this assertion that we must recognize the world as multicultural, where identity is shaped by a multitude of forces; nationality is but one influence among many, such as ethnicity, culture, gender and generation.

Adaptive strategies used by diaspora Koreans—*kobonjil*, for instance, among the *Koryo Saram*, and female-centered work and family organization among small business owners in the United States—illustrate a successful model of cultural options for the future globalization of Korea; the successful example of diaspora Koreans can help all Koreans to define their lives within a global context. These strategies also delineate the enduring characteristics of Korean culture, as well as new ways of observing the dynamic forces in contemporary world culture. Diaspora studies have revealed how aspects of Korean culture, such as language and life-cycle rituals; and specifically material culture, such as food and clothing, are preserved in the diaspora communities, but lost in the Korean peninsula. The study of these adaptive strategies can thus provide valuable insights for the work of policy-makers and scholars alike.

Due to the diversity and complexity of the data, theorizing the Korean diaspora is challenging work, but possible when scholars and institutions collaborate in a decentralized international effort. This venture is not only a scholarly project, but also a national priority, and a practical way to build a world Korean community. As peninsular and diaspora Koreans become more secure and self-confident, both groups will realize that they share the interdependent aim of promoting pluralism, prosperity and cultural continuity. The Korean diaspora is as critical to the survival of the Korean peninsula as the peninsula is to the survival of the diaspora Koreans.

#### Illustrations:

Fig. 1 Map of Korean Diaspora of the World

Fig. 2. Distribution of the Korean Diaspora

Fig. 3. Korean Diaspora: A Comparison

#### Notes

1. In 2000-2001, East Rock Institute published four special issues of the bi-annual journal, *Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin*, on Koreans in Japan, China, the former USSR and the United States. ERI is currently publishing a combined book of these four diaspora volumes with additional articles of comparative analysis, and with additional bibliographies on Koreans in Japan. Hesung Chun Koh and Edward T. Chang are co-editors for the volume. The volume also includes the Proceedings of the first Korean Diaspora Conference, sponsored by ERI and funded by the Overseas Koreans Foundation in 2001.
2. Here, Ross King describes an exchange where the dominant peninsula-centered worldview managed to drown out alternative ideas about the *Koryo Saram*: "Back in the late 1980s, I saw Songmoo Kho—a pioneer in research on the Koreans in the former Soviet Union—shouted off a stage once in Korea at the *Hangul Hakhoe* for using the term, "*Koryo Saram*." Some good patriot in the audience got up and made an impassioned speech about how we're all Koreans and we shouldn't call them *Koryo Saram*; they are *hanin*, this person insisted." This ethnocentric perspective is the dominant view that is reflected in earlier studies of Koreans abroad by first-generation scholars living in Korea.
3. For further discussion of religion among Koreans in Kazakhstan and Koreans in Japan, see the ERI Korean Diaspora Conference Proceedings, 2001. Comments are by German Kim and Sonia Ryang.

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Discussion Outline for the International Conference on  
 The Korean Diaspora and Strategies of Global Network  
 October 11, 2002, Incheon Memorial Hall, Korea University

Discussant: Jeanyoung Lee (Dept. of Int'l Relations, KyungHee University)

## 1. Overview

1. national identity 國民意識 公民意識 and ethnic identity 民族意識  
 discrepancy between national and ethnic identity; nation, people, race, ethnicity  
 use of two concepts interchangeably: chaotic misunderstanding  
 socialist theory of nation with modernist theory: invention of a new nation and erosion  
 of particular ethnic identities

The CCP中國共產黨 redefined the notion of nation國民, 上位民族 to mean citizenship公民 of the new communist China新中國 according to the state nationalism and imposed it on society as an ideology for modern multi-ethnic state多民族國家 building. Here, nation is purely a creation of the Chinese state. There are 56 sub-nations or nationalities 族, 亞民族 including the Han Chinese 漢族 under the newly defined *Chinese nation* 中華民族 or Chinese citizen 中國人. Therefore, Korean-Chinese 朝鮮族 becomes a nationality within the scope of the Chinese nation 中華民族. They are a part of Chinese nation and cannot be regarded as a part of the Korean nation韓民族. It is the rationale of the statement spoken by *Wangyi*, deputy minister of the Foreign Office of China in an interview in January, in saying that, "Please do not say that Korean-Chinese is overseas Koreans 在外同胞. They are an inseparable part of Chinese nation中華民族的一部分."

2. from Korean nation to ethnic Korean minority 조선인에서 조선족으로, 고려인으로, and now looking for a new identity

1945	1949	1992
Korean nation조선인	Korean nationality조선족	which ethnic-nation,
immigration	social reform	reform, open door
compact community	Chinese citizenship	part of Chinese
paddy cultivation	invention of Chinese nation	erosive society
national education	ethnic education	erosive education
nationalism	separate from the peninsular	third identity