

geographical regions listed in Table 3, the number of Jews in Israel – and, consequently, in total Asia – increased in 2004. Moderate Jewish population gains were also estimated for the European Union (including 25 member countries), and Oceania. We estimate that Jewish population size diminished to variable extents in North, Central and South America, the Former Soviet republics in Europe and Asia, and Africa. These regional changes reflect the trends apparent in the Jewish population in each of the major countries. We now turn to a review of recent trends in the largest Jewish populations.

TABLE 5. WORLD JEWISH AND TOTAL POPULATION, 1945-2004

Year	Jewish Population		World Population		Jews per 1,000 of World Pop.
	Total Estimate ^a	Yearly % Change	Total (Millions)	Yearly % Change	
1945, May 1	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,297,000	0.57	2,524	1.87	4.48
1960, Jan. 1	12,079,000	0.67	3,027	1.83	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	12,585,000	0.41	3,702	2.03	3.40
1980, Jan. 1	12,819,000	0.18	4,447	1.85	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,868,000	0.04	5,282	1.74	2.44
2000, Jan. 1	12,900,000	0.02	6,010	1.30	2.15
2004, Jan. 1	12,989,700	0.17	6,314 ^b	1.42	2.06

^a Based on updated, revised, or otherwise improved information. Source: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

^b Mid-year estimate of preceding year. Source: Population Reference Bureau.

2.4.2 North America

In the United States (Table 6), two major studies were undertaken around 2001, the 2000-2001 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS)⁴⁰ and the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS)⁴¹. The 2000-2001 NJPS (for brevity: 2001) was sponsored the United Jewish Communities (UJC), and advised by a National Technical Advisory Committee chaired by Frank Mott and Vivian Klaff. A national stratified Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sample covered the U.S. sub-divided into seven strata based on pre-survey estimates of Jewish population density, with sampling probabilities proportional to Jewish density in each stratum. Over 175,000 households were screened for possible inclusion based on four questions: (1) What is your or other adult's religion, if any? (2) Do you or other adult have a Jewish mother or a Jewish father? (3) Were you or other adult raised Jewish? (4) Do you or other adult consider your/him/herself Jewish for any reasons? Answers to these questions included options other than yes or no, therefore allowing for a non-dichotomic resolution of Jewish population definition. Such screening criteria were known since the beginning to produce results not strictly comparable with the 1990 NJPS. The final unweighted sample included 4,220 Jewish respondents and 303 people of Jewish background (PJB), for a total of 4,523 Jewish households; 625 non-Jews of Jewish background; and 4,027 non-Jews, for a total of 9,175 respondent households. The 4,027 non-Jewish households were interviewed for a National Survey of Religion and Ethnicity (NSRE) to collect data necessary for weighting and thus estimating the size of the Jewish population, and to provide comparative data to Jews and PJBs on socio-demographic topics.

The response rate to the screening interview was 28%. Weights were directly or indirectly estimated and applied to adjust for the number of telephone lines in the household, and to bring

⁴⁰Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003.

⁴¹Egon Mayer, Barry Kosmin, Ariela Keysar, *American Jewish Identity Survey 2001 - AJIS Report - An Exploration in the Demography and Outlook of a People* (New York, Center for Jewish Studies, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 2002). See also Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer, Ariela Keysar, *American Religious Identification Survey 2001* (New York: Graduate Center of City University of New York, 2001).

sample household and respondent data to U.S. Census totals for sampling strata, age, gender and region.⁴² Following claims of excessively low respondent rates, selective population undercounts, and other inappropriate procedures during and following fieldwork, the NJPS was submitted to independent professional scrutiny. It was concluded that – while handicapped by several methodological shortcomings such as low response rates, inconsistent survey coverage of relevant sub-populations, and loss of documentation – the study stood within the range of professionally acceptable research standards and biases.⁴³

The total Jewish population was estimated at 5.2 million, including 4.3 million clearly Jewishly connected people, 800,000 less clearly connected persons of Jewish background, and over 100,000 persons in institutions. Respondents from the first group were administered a long-form questionnaire; respondents from the second were administered a short-form questionnaire, covering a limited selection of the survey's variables. The total number of Jews and non-Jews of Jewish background was estimated at 6.7 million. The total of individuals in 2.9 million households with at least one Jewish member was estimated at 8.7 million, significantly higher than in 1990.

The fact that while a major national Jewish population survey was being undertaken (the NJPS), an alternative one (the 2001 AJIS) was developed testifies of substantive disagreements within the Jewish institutional and research community at the time. AJIS was based on a national RDD sample. Out of all successful contacts, a total of 50,238 respondents agreed to be interviewed. After a series of screening questions, quite similar to those of NJPS 1990, 1,668 respondents qualified to be included in a survey of American Jewish households, at a response rate of 18%.⁴⁴ The estimated core Jewish population, inclusive of Jews with no religion and Jews by choice, and Jews in institutions, was 5,340,000. Of these, 3,460,000 were born Jews whose religion was Judaism, 170,000 were converts to Judaism/Jews by choice, and 1,710,000 were born Jews with no religion. The total of Jews and others of Jewish origin was 7,690,000. The total of individuals in all households surveyed including households without any current "core" Jew was 9,740,000, excluding persons in institutions. The AJIS data (and not those of the 2001 NJPS) conceptually match the 1990 NJPS figures.

Combined reading of these two major surveys suggests a core Jewish population comprised in the range of 5.2-5.35 million. The actual NJPS returns would be below 5.1 million, but including persons in institutions and persons who did not report on age, a round estimate of 5.2 was arrived at. Assuming an intermediate value of 5.3 million, the revised 2001 estimate was at least 400,000 short of the 5.7 million we had projected for 2002 based on the 5.515 million estimated for mid 1990 from the previous NJPS.⁴⁵ Jewish population increase supposedly reflected the inflow over the 1990s of at least 200,000 new immigrants – from the Former Soviet Union, Israel, Latin America, South Africa, Iran, and Western Europe. However, continuing low Jewish fertility rates, the consequent aging in population composition, and comparatively weak propensities to identify with Judaism among younger adults of Jewish ancestry apparently led to a significantly lowered total core population size. In the historical perspective of Jewish population research in the U.S. over the last 50 years, the new findings appeared quite consistent and more the product of actual demographic trends than an artifact of insufficient data.⁴⁶

A 2002 study of the Jews in New York, the major U.S. metropolitan community,⁴⁷ pointed to a stable Jewish population of 1.4 million in the extended 8 boroughs area, but for the first time in over three quarters of a century less than one million in New York City's 5 boroughs.

⁴²Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003.

⁴³Schulman, M., "National Jewish Population Survey 2000-2001: Study Review Memo" (New York: United Jewish Communities) 2003.

⁴⁴Mayer, Kosmin, Keysar, 2002, and Barry Kosmin, personal communication.

⁴⁵See Kosmin et al. *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*, cit.

⁴⁶Sergio DellaPergola, "Was It the Demography? A Reassessment of U.S. Jewish Population Estimates, 1945-2001", *Contemporary Jewry*, 2004 (forthcoming).

⁴⁷See <http://www.ujafedny.org/site/PageServer?pagename=jewishcommunitystudy>

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, 1/1/2004

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	31,600,000	371,000	11.7	B 2001
United States	291,500,000	5,290,000	18.1	B 2001
Total North America^a	323,227,000	5,661,000	17.5	
Bahamas	300,000	300	1.0	D
Costa Rica	4,200,000	2,500	0.6	C 1993
Cuba	11,300,000	600	0.1	C 1990
Dominican Republic	8,700,000	100	0.0	D
El Salvador	6,600,000	100	0.0	C 1993
Guatemala	12,400,000	900	0.1	A 1999
Jamaica	2,600,000	300	0.1	B 1995
Mexico	104,900,000	39,900	0.4	B 2001
Netherlands Antilles	215,000	200	0.9	B 1998
Panama	3,000,000	5,000	1.7	C 1990
Puerto Rico	3,900,000	1,500	0.4	C 1990
Virgin Islands	115,000	300	2.6	C 1986
Other	23,300,000	300	0.0	D
Total Central America	181,530,000	52,000	0.3	
Argentina	36,900,000	185,000	5.0	C 2002
Bolivia	8,600,000	500	0.1	C 1999
Brazil	176,500,000	96,800	0.5	B 2001
Chile	15,800,000	20,800	1.3	C 1995
Colombia	44,200,000	3,300	0.1	C 1996
Ecuador	12,600,000	900	0.1	C 1985
Paraguay	6,200,000	900	0.1	B 1997
Peru	27,100,000	2,400	0.1	C 1993
Suriname	420,000	200	0.5	C 1986
Uruguay	3,400,000	19,600	5.8	C 2001
Venezuela	25,700,000	15,600	0.6	B 1999
Total South America^a	358,420,000	346,000	1.0	
Total	863,177,000	6,059,000	7.0	

^a Including countries not listed separately.

Our national U.S. estimate for 2004 assumes that the lack of growth and actual population decrease manifested through the 2001 surveys, in spite of continuing immigration, is now a well established trend entrenched in aging population composition and effectively Jewish fertility levels significantly below the virtual demographic potential that would include all the children of out-marriages. We therefore suggest a demonstrative reduction by 10,000 versus our 2003 5.3 million estimate to 5,290,000, still the largest Jewish population on Earth.

In Canada, the 2001 population census⁴⁸ indicated a decrease in the number of Jews according to ethnicity (including holders of a non-Jewish religion) from 369,565 in 1991 to 348,605 in 2001 (-20,960 or 5.7 percent). Of the latter, 186,475 indicated to be Jewish as their sole ethnicity, and 162,130 as one of their several ethnic identities. The percentage with an exclusively Jewish ethnicity thus diminished to 53 percent of all those reporting a Jewish ethnicity in 2001, versus 66 percent in 1991, and 90 percent in 1981. On the other hand the number of Canada's Jews according to religion increased from 318,070 in 1991 to 329,995 in 2001 (+11,925 or 3.7 percent). Of the latter total, 22,365 Jews immigrated during the ten year interval between the two censuses. Consequently, were it not for this immigration, the Jewish population would have decreased by 10,440 (3.3 percent). Keeping in mind that some ethnic Jews are not Jewish by religion, and a greater number of Jews by religion do not declare a Jewish ethnicity, a combined estimate of

⁴⁸See <http://www.statcan.ca>

370,520 obtained for Canada's Jewish population, 4 percent up from 356,315 in 1991.⁴⁹ This figure was not strictly comparable with the concept of *core* Jewish population as it included some individuals for whom Jewish was only one among multiple ethnic identities. Some of these would otherwise be included in the *enlarged* Jewish population. Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, we evaluate the 2004 population at 371,000, the world's fourth largest.

2.4.3 Latin America

In Latin America, the Jewish population was generally declining reflecting economic and local security concerns. In Argentina, following a relief in the ongoing economic crisis, but also suspension of special incentives for immigrants on the Israeli side, about 1,500 emigrated to Israel in 2003 versus nearly 6,000 in 2002 – the highest figure ever in a single year from that country.⁵⁰ While, based on the experience of previous years, approximately 20 percent of these migrants were non-Jewish household members in the enlarged population, partial evidence from different sources indicated that less than half of total Jewish emigration from Argentina went to Israel. Contrary to some rumors, the official evidence pointed to high permanence rates in Israel of the new immigrants, at least during the first year, and an expected attrition of about 10 percent re-emigrants within the first three years.⁵¹ We consequently assessed Argentina's Jewish population at 185,000 in 2004, the world's seventh largest.

The 2000 census of Brazil indicated a rather stable Jewish population of 86,828, versus 86,416 in 1991.⁵² Considering the possible non-inclusion of people who failed to indicate a religion we assessed Brazil's Jewish population at 97,000 in 2003 and allowing for moderate emigration, 96,800 in 2004, the world's tenth largest. This appeared to be consistent with a systematic documentation effort undertaken by the Jewish Federation of Sao Paulo,⁵³ and an assumption that about one half of Brazil's Jews live in that city.

In Mexico the 2000 census indicated a Jewish population of 45,260 individuals aged 5 and over.⁵⁴ Of these, 32,464 lived in the capital's metropolitan area while, consistently with erratic figures in past censuses, a most unlikely 12,796 were reported in States other than the Federal District and Mexico State. Allocation of the 0-4 age group based on a 2000 Jewish survey determined a corrected estimate of about 35,000 Jews in Greater Mexico City, and 40,000 nationwide. In 2004 allowing for minor emigration we estimated the Jewish population at 39,900, the world's fourteenth largest.

The other main Jewish communities in South America are located in Chile⁵⁵ whose relatively stable Jewish population is now larger than those of Uruguay and Venezuela.⁵⁶ The latter have experienced significant emigration in recent years.

2.4.4 European Union

Jewish population in Europe (Table 7) tended to be increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent, and within the European Union particularly. On May 1, 2004, the EU expanded from 15 to 25 countries in 2004, incorporating three countries that had been part of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), another five that had been part of the East European

⁴⁹ Charles Shahaar, *The Jewish Community of Canada* (Toronto, 2004).

⁵⁰ See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: <http://www.cbs.gov.il>

⁵¹ Shmuel Adler, *Emigration among Immigrants from Argentina that Arrived During the Period 1.1.89 – 31.12.02* (Jerusalem: State of Israel Ministry of Immigrants Absorption, Division of Planning and Research, 2004).

⁵² See <http://www.ibge.br>; Rene D. Decol, "Brazilian Jews: a Demographic Profile", International Conference on Jewish Demography (Jerusalem, 2002).

⁵³ FISESP - Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo, *Recadastramento comunitário 2000-2001* (São Paulo, 2002).

⁵⁴ See Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, *XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000* (Mexico City, 2002).

⁵⁵ Gabriel Berger et al., *Estudio Socio-Demográfico de la Comunidad Juía de Chile* (Santiago-Buenos Aires, 1995).

⁵⁶ Sergio DellaPergola, Salomon Benzaquen, and Tony Beker de Weinraub, *Perfil sociodemográfico y cultural de la comunidad judía de Caracas* (Caracas, 2000). The survey was sponsored by the Asociación Israelita de Venezuela, the Union Israelita de Caracas, and the Asociación de Amigos de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén.

block (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and two southern European countries (Cyprus, Malta). The EU thus reached an estimated total of 1,121,500 Jews, comprising 73 percent of Europe's total Jewish population. The other former Soviet republics in Europe comprised 360,000 Jews, or 24.4 percent of the total European Jewry. All other European countries comprised 54,200 Jews, or 3.4 percent of the continental total. The EU expanded format symbolized an important historical landmark: the virtual boundary between West and East Europe that had existed since time immemorial ceased to exist.

The largest Jewish community in Europe was in France where a new countrywide survey undertaken at the beginning of 2002 suggested a downward revision to 500,000 Jews and an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members in Jewish households.⁵⁷ Our pre-survey Jewish population estimate stood at 519,000. The difference, cumulated over several years, was primarily explained by a growing pace of emigration of French Jews not only to Israel, amounting at about 1,800 in 2003, but also to Canada and other countries. Emigration tends to respond to increasing manifestations of anti-Jewish intolerance including physical violence. Our 2004 estimate for French Jewry is therefore 496,000, the third largest in the world.

In the United Kingdom for the first time since the 19th century the 2000 national population census provided detailed data about religion.⁵⁸ The total Jewish population of 266,741 for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland closely approximated our 273,500 estimate for 2002. However, considering that 22.8 percent of the UK population stated no religion, and another 7.3 percent did not answer the question, at a time when the organized Jewish community largely supported participation in the census, we suggested the estimate should be raised to 300,000. More detailed data from the same census for Scotland indicated 6,448 people with a current Jewish religion versus 7,446 raised as Jews – a net loss of 13 percent.⁵⁹ Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies Community Research Unit show a continuing excess of Jewish deaths (3,670 in 2002 and 3,592 in 2003) over Jewish births (2,665 in 2002).⁶⁰ To exemplify the consequent Jewish population decline at a time of minor migrations, we estimated the U.K.'s total Jewish population at 299,000 in 2004, the world's fifth largest.

In Germany, significant if slightly diminished Jewish immigration continued. In 2003 6,224 immigrants from the Former Soviet Union were recorded as new members of German Jewish communities, versus 6,597 in 2002.⁶¹ Since 2002 the enlarged total of Jews and non-Jewish family members who came from the FSU was larger than the respective number of migrants to Israel. The total number of core Jews registered with the central Jewish community grew to 102,594 at the beginning of 2004, versus 98,335 one year earlier. Of the current total, less than 13,000 were the survivors of the initial pool of 28,081 members that existed at the end of 1990, and the rest were recent immigrants. The age composition of the Jewish old-timers, and even more so of the newcomers was extremely over aged. In 2003 there were 164 Jewish births and 1,188 Jewish deaths recorded in Germany. This explains why the total growth of the Jewish community is significantly less than the total number of new immigrants. Allowing for delays in joining the organized community and a minority's preference for renouncing the inherent benefits of membership, we assess Germany's core Jewish population at 112,000, the world's eighth largest.

⁵⁷See Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France: Valeurs et identité* (Paris, 2002).

⁵⁸See <http://www.ons.gov.uk>. See also Barry Kosmin, Stanley Waterman, "Commentary on Census Religion Question" (London: JPR, 2002).

⁵⁹United Kingdom, Scotland, General Register Office (Edinburgh, 2002).

⁶⁰The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit, *Report on Community Vital Statistics 2003* (London, 2004). See also Stephen Miller, Marlana Schmoor, and Antony Lerman, *Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Survey* (London, 1996).

⁶¹Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland, *Mitgliederstatistik; Der Einzelnen Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M., 2004). We acknowledge the kind assistance of Ms. Ellen Rubinstein of ZWJD in making these data available.

TABLE 7. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, 1/1/2004

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Austria	8,200,000	9,000	1.1	B 2001
Belgium	10,400,000	31,300	3.0	C 2002
Denmark	5,400,000	6,400	1.2	C 2001
Finland	5,200,000	1,100	0.2	B 1999
France ^a	59,800,000	496,000	8.3	B 2002
Germany	82,600,000	112,000	1.4	B 2002
Greece	11,000,000	4,500	0.4	B 1995
Ireland	4,000,000	1,200	0.3	B 2001
Italy	57,200,000	28,800	0.5	B 2002
Luxembourg	450,000	600	1.3	B 2000
Netherlands	16,200,000	30,000	1.9	B 2000
Portugal	10,400,000	500	0.0	C 1999
Spain	41,300,000	12,000	0.3	D
Sweden	9,000,000	15,000	1.7	C 1990
United Kingdom	59,400,000	299,000	5.0	B 2001
[Total European Union 15]	[380,550,000]	[1,047,400]	[2.8]	
Estonia	1,400,000	1,700	1.2	B 2001
Latvia	2,300,000	8,900	3.9	B 2001
Lithuania	3,500,000	3,400	1.0	B 2001
Czech Republic	10,200,000	4,000	0.4	C 2001
Hungary	10,100,000	50,000	5.0	C 2001
Poland	38,600,000	3,300	0.1	C 2001
Slovakia	5,400,000	2,700	0.5	C 2001
Slovenia	2,000,000	100	0.1	C 1996
Other ^b	1,300,000	100	0.1	D
Total European Union 25	455,350,000	1,121,600	2.5	
Gibraltar	25,000	600	24.0	B 1991
Norway	4,600,000	1,200	0.3	B 1995
Switzerland	7,300,000	18,000	2.5	A 2000
Total other West Europe^c	12,385,000	19,800	1.6	
Belarus	9,900,000	22,000	2.2	B 1999
Moldova	4,300,000	5,000	1.2	C 2000
Russia ^d	145,500,000	244,000	1.7	B 2002
Ukraine	47,800,000	89,000	1.9	B 2001
Total FSU Republics	207,500,000	360,000	1.7	
[Total FSU in Europe]	[214,700,000]	[374,000]	[1.7]	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,900,000	500	0.1	C 2001
Bulgaria	7,500,000	2,200	0.3	C 2001
Croatia	4,300,000	1,700	0.4	C 2001
Macedonia (FYR)	2,100,000	100	0.0	C 1996
Romania	21,600,000	10,500	0.5	B 2001
Serbia-Montenegro	10,700,000	1,500	0.1	C 2001
Turkey ^d	71,200,000	17,900	0.3	B 2002
Total other East Europe and Balkans^c	124,400,000	34,400	0.5	
Total	799,635,000	1,535,800	1.9	

^a Including Monaco.

^b Cyprus and Malta.

^c Including countries not listed separately.

^d Including Asian regions.

In Hungary our core estimate of 50,000 (the world's thirteenth largest) reflects the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population's

vital balance too has been negative for several years in a row. While a Jewish survey in 1999⁶² indicated a conspicuously larger enlarged Jewish population, a demographic extrapolation based on the usually accepted number of post-Holocaust core Jewish survivors and accounting for the known or estimated numbers of births, deaths and emigrants since 1945 closely matches our assessment. It should be noted that in the 2002 Hungarian census a scant 13,000 people reported a Jewish religion.

Belgium's Jewish population was estimated above 30,000, the fifteenth largest worldwide. Quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels. Local Jewish population estimates were quite obsolete in comparison with most other EU countries. The next two largest Jewish communities in the EU were in the Netherlands and Italy. In the Netherlands a survey in 2000 indicated a core Jewish population close to 30,000, of which perhaps as many as one third immigrants from Israel, and an enlarged Jewish population around 45,000.⁶³ In Italy, total Jewish community membership – which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's total Jewish population – declined from 26,706 in 1995 to 25,143 in 2001⁶⁴. Our estimate slightly below 29,000 adequately allocates for non-members.

2.4.5 Former Soviet Union

In the Former Soviet Union, rapid Jewish population decrease continued reflecting an overwhelming unbalance of Jewish births and Jewish deaths, high rates of out-marriage, low rates of Jewish identification of the respective children, and conspicuous though diminishing emigration. Our 2004 assessment of the total core Jewish population in the aggregate of the 15 former Soviet Republics was 395,300, of which 374,000 in Europe and 21,300 in Asia. At least as many non-Jewish family members integrated the respective enlarged households. The ongoing process of demographic decline was only to a minor extent compensated by the revival of Jewish cultural and religious activities.⁶⁵

In the Russian Republic, the October 2002 census unveiled 233,000 Jews as against our core Jewish population estimate of 252,000 (derived from the February 1994 Russian Microcensus estimate of 408,000 Jews).⁶⁶ Allowing for some census undercounts after the compulsory item on ethnicity (*natsyonalnost*) on identification documents had been suppressed, we estimate the Jewish population at 244,000 in 2004, the world's sixth largest. The size of Russian Jewry was comparatively more stable and resilient than in the other former Soviet republics, partly as a consequence of Jewish migrations between the various republics, partly due to lower emigration propensities from Moscow and some of the other main urban areas.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, a striking unbalance of Jewish births and deaths determined continuing population decline and reflected an over aged age composition. The decline in the number of births to at least one Jewish parent was much faster than that of Jewish deaths, and as a result the estimated negative balance of these vital events increased from about -5,800 in 1988 to -6,900 in 1998.⁶⁸

⁶²András Kovács, *Zsidók és Zsidóság a Mai Magyarországon: Egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei* (Budapest, 2002) (*Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey*).

⁶³The survey was undertaken in collaboration between the Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk, and NIDI. See also C. Kooyman and J. Almagor, *Israelis in Holland: A Sociodemographic Study of Israelis and Former Israelis in Holland* (Amsterdam, 1996).

⁶⁴Unione delle comunità ebraiche italiane, *IV Congresso, relazione del consiglio* (Roma, 2002) 162 ff.

⁶⁵Zvi Gitelman, "Becoming Jewish in Russia and Ukraine" in Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin, András Kovács (eds.) *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond* (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2003) 105-137.

⁶⁶Mark Tolts, "Demographic Trends among the Jews of the Former Soviet Union", Paper presented at *International Conference in Honor of Professor Mordechai Altshuler on Soviet and Post-Soviet Jewry* (Jerusalem, 2003). German translation forthcoming in: *Menora* (Bodenheim/Berlin: Philo Verlag, 2004).

⁶⁷Mark Tolts, "Mass Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia: Dynamics and Factors," *East European Jewish Affairs*, 33, 2, 71-96.

⁶⁸Tolts, "Demographic Trends...", cit.

In the Ukraine, the population census undertaken on December 5, 2001 yielded 103,600 Jews, whereas we had expected 100,000 on January 1, 2002. Considering that our baseline for the latter estimate were the 486,300 Jews counted in the previous census of January 1989 (not including a few "oriental" Jews), the fit between expected and actual results was quite remarkable.⁶⁹ Taking into account the dramatic pace of emigration since 1989, the other major intervening changes among Ukraine's Jewry, and also the continuing emigration at the end of 2001, the census fully confirmed our previous assessment of ongoing demographic trends. Taking into account continuing emigration in 2003, we now assess the core Jewish population at 89,000, the eleventh largest in the world.

Of the other former Soviet republics in Europe, after the accession of the three Baltic states to the European Union, the main Jewish population was in Belarus now assessed at 22,000. Pending a new census, a survey in Moldova found an enlarged Jewish population of 9,240⁷⁰ corresponding to a core Jewish population of about 5,000.

2.4.6 Rest of Europe

After the largest Jewish community in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary, together with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU, only 34,400 Jews remained in non-EU East Europe and the Balkans, primarily in Turkey. A survey in Istanbul pointed there too to widespread ageing in a community that has experienced significant past emigration: in Istanbul 14 percent of the Jewish population was under age 18, versus 18 percent above 65.⁷¹

2.4.7 Asia

Jewish population in Asia is mostly affected by the trends in Israel (Table 8). At the beginning of 2004 Israel's core Jewish population reached 5,165,400, forming an enlarged Jewish population of 5,446,800 million together with 281,400 non-Jewish members of households.⁷² Among the latter, most of those who underwent conversions to Judaism were new immigrants from Ethiopia, while a few hundred were immigrants from the FSU. In 2003, 26,100 new immigrants arrived in Israel, of which 16,800 Jewish.⁷³ Current Jewish emigration reduced this to a net migration balance of 5,200. Israel's Jewish fertility rate continued to be stable, at 2.6 children per woman, above that of every other developed countries, and probably twice or more the effective Jewish fertility level across Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Of the 5,165,400 core Jews, in 2004 4,940,000 lived within the pre-1967 borders plus East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and 225,400 lived in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Jewish population in other countries in Asia mainly consisted of the rapidly declining communities in the FSU's eight Asian republics, the largest of which was Azerbaijan with 7,200 Jews.⁷⁴ A minor revision in Georgia's estimate following the 2002 census (-700) brought the Jewish population in the Caucasian country to 3,800. The largest Jewish population in a single country in Asia besides Israel was in Iran. Our estimate there reflects an effort to monitor widespread emigration since the Islamic revolution of the late 1970s.

⁶⁹Ukraine Goskomstat, *Population Census 2001* (Kiev, 2002); Mark Tolts, *Main Demographic Trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, 2002).

⁷⁰Malka Korazim and Esther Katz, "Patterns of Jewish Identity in Moldova: The Behavioral Dimension" in Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin, András Kovács (eds.) *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond* (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2003) 159-170.

⁷¹Data kindly provided by Ms. Lina Filiba of the Jewish Community Council.

⁷²See Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 55, 2004. See also <http://www.cbs.gov.il>

⁷³These data include about 3,000 immigrant citizens, the foreign-born children of Israelis on their first-time entrance in the country. Not included are foreign workers and illegal residents.

⁷⁴Tolts, "Demographic trends...", cit.

TABLE 8. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, 1/1/2004

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Israel ^a	6,523,000	4,940,000	757.3	A 2004
West Bank and Gaza ^b	3,755,400	225,400	60.0	A 2004
Total Israel and Palestine	10,278,400	5,165,400	502.5	
Azerbaijan	8,200,000	7,200	0.9	B 1999
Georgia	4,700,000	3,800	0.8	B 2002
Kazakhstan	14,800,000	4,000	0.3	B 1999
Kyrgyzstan	5,000,000	700	0.1	B 1999
Turkmenistan	5,700,000	400	0.1	C 2000
Uzbekistan	25,700,000	5,200	0.2	C 2000
Total FSU in Asia^c	73,900,000	21,300	0.3	
China ^d	1,295,900,000	1,000	0.0	D
India	1,068,600,000	5,100	0.0	B 1996
Iran	66,600,000	10,900	0.2	C 1986
Japan	127,500,000	1,000	0.0	C 1993
Korea, South	47,900,000	100	0.0	C 1998
Philippines	81,600,000	100	0.0	D
Singapore	4,200,000	300	0.1	C 1990
Syria	17,500,000	100	0.0	C 1995
Thailand	63,100,000	200	0.0	C 1998
Yemen	19,400,000	200	0.0	C 1995
Other	881,421,600	300	0.0	D
Total other Asia	3,673,721,600	19,300	0.0	
Total	3,757,900,000	5,206,000	1.4	

a Total population of Israel, including Jews in West Bank and Gaza, 1.1.2004: 6,748,400.
 b Total Palestinian population in West Bank and Gaza: 3,530,000.
 c Including Armenia and Tadzhikistan. Not including Asian regions of Russian Republic.
 d Including Hong Kong and Macao.

2.4.8 Africa

Jewish population in Africa was mostly concentrated in South Africa (Table 9). According to the 2001 census,⁷⁵ the White Jewish population amounted at 61,675. After allocation for a national non-response rate of 14 percent, a corrected estimate of 72,000 obtained. Allowing for a certain proportion of Jews reported among non-whites (11,979 Blacks, 1,287 Coloreds, and 615 Indians) we assessed the total Jewish community size at 75,000. Allowing for a moderate pace of continuing emigration, we assess South Africa's Jewish population at 74,000 in 2004, the world's twelfth.

Our revised estimates for North Africa acknowledge the ongoing reduction in the small Jewish population remaining in Morocco and Tunisia, now assessed at 5,200 overall.

2.4.9 Oceania

Continuing immigration produced some increase in the size of Jewish populations in Oceania (Table 10). Australia's 2001 census indicated a Jewish population of 83,500, up about 4,000 from 1996.⁷⁶ Taking into account non-response but also the community's aging composition, we

⁷⁵See David Sacks, in *Jewish Report*, 2003. See also Barry A. Kosmin, Jaqueline Goldberg, Milton Shain, Shirley Bruk, *Jews of the New South Africa: Highlights of the 1998 National Survey of South African Jews* (London: Jewish Policy Research Institute, 1999).

⁷⁶Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001* (Canberra, 2002). See also Gary Eckstein, *Demography of the Sydney Jewish Community 2001* (Sydney: Jewish Communal Appeal, 2003).

estimate the core Jewish population at 101,000 in 2004, the ninth largest in the world. The 2001 census also pointed to some Jewish population increase in New Zealand.

TABLE 9. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, 1/1/2004

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Egypt	72,100,000	100	0.0	C 1998
Ethiopia	70,700,000	100	0.0	C 1998
Morocco	30,400,000	4,000	0.1	C 2003 X
Tunisia	9,900,000	1,200	0.1	C 2003
Total North Africa^a	258,700,000	5,400	0.0	
Botswana	1,600,000	100	0.1	C 1993
Congo D.R.	56,600,000	100	0.0	C 1993
Kenya	31,600,000	400	0.0	C 1990
Namibia	1,900,000	100	0.1	C 1993
Nigeria	133,900,000	100	0.0	D
South Africa	44,400,000	74,000	1.7	B 2001
Zimbabwe	12,600,000	500	0.0	B 2001
Other	319,700,000	300	0.0	D
Total other Africa	602,300,000	75,600	0.1	
Total	861,000,000	81,000	0.1	

a Including countries not listed separately.

TABLE 10. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, 1/1/2004

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	19,900,000	101,000	5.1	B 2001
New Zealand	4,000,000	6,800	1.7	A 2001
Other	8,400,000	100	0.0	D
Total	32,300,000	107,900	3.3	

2.5 OVERALL PICTURE AND PROSPECTS

2.5.1 Dispersion and Concentration

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation along with growing concentration in a few countries, 97.3 percent of world Jewry live in the largest 15 communities, and 95.6 percent live in the 14 largest communities of the Diaspora – excluding Israel from the count (Table 11).

In 2004, there were at least 100 Jews in 93 countries (Table 12). Two countries had Jewish populations above 5 million individuals each (the U.S. and Israel), another seven comprised more than 100,000 Jews, four had 50 to 100,000, four had 25 to 50,000, ten had 10 to 25,000, and 66 countries had less than 10,000. Only nine communities besides Israel constituted at least about 5 per 1,000 (or 0.5 percent) of their country's total population. In descending order by the relative weight (not size) of their Jewish population they were Gibraltar (24.0 Jews per 1,000 inhabitants), the United States (18.1), Canada (11.7), France (8.3), Uruguay (5.8), Australia (5.1), Argentina (5.0), the United Kingdom (5.0), Hungary (5.0).

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and density we obtain the following taxonomy of the 26 Jewish communities with a population over 10,000 (besides Israel). There are 6 countries with over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 of total population: the U.S., France, Canada, United Kingdom, Argentina, and Australia; another 2 countries with over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 per 1,000 of total population: Russia and Germany; 2 countries

with 10 to 100,000 Jews and about 5 per 1,000 of total population: Hungary and Uruguay; 8 more countries with 10 to 100,000 Jews and at least 1 per 1,000 of total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Belgium, The Netherlands, Chile, Belarus, Switzerland, and Sweden; and 8 countries with 10 to 100,000 Jews and less than 1 per 1,000 of total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, Venezuela, Spain, Iran and Romania.

TABLE 11. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1/1/2004

Rank	Country	Jewish Population	% of Total Jewish Population			
			In the World		In the Diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	United States	5,290,000	40.7	40.7	67.6	67.6
2	Israel	5,165,400	39.8	80.5	=	=
3	France	496,000	3.8	84.3	6.3	73.9
4	Canada	371,000	2.9	87.2	4.7	78.7
5	United Kingdom	299,000	2.3	89.5	3.8	82.5
6	Russia	244,000	1.9	91.3	3.1	85.6
7	Argentina	185,000	1.4	92.8	2.4	88.0
8	Germany	112,000	0.9	93.6	1.4	89.4
9	Australia	101,000	0.8	94.4	1.3	90.7
10	Brazil	96,800	0.7	95.2	1.2	92.0
11	Ukraine	89,000	0.7	95.8	1.1	93.1
12	South Africa	74,000	0.6	96.4	0.9	94.0
13	Hungary	50,000	0.4	96.8	0.6	94.7
14	Mexico	39,900	0.3	97.1	0.5	95.2
15	Belgium	31,300	0.2	97.3	0.4	95.6

Jews represented 765.4 per 1,000 inhabitants in the State of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Jewish but not the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. Jews comprised 60.0 per 1,000 total inhabitants in the West Bank and Gaza. Considering the total legal population resident in the State of Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Jews represented 502.5 per 1,000, or slightly more than half. All of the preceding figures relate to the core Jewish population concept. If non-Jewish members of Jewish households are taken into account, the enlarged Jewish population thus obtained represented 807.1 per 1,000 of Israel's population (as defined above), and 529.9 per 1,000 of the total population of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

The overwhelming urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is evinced by the fact that in 2004 51.5 percent of total world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Tel Aviv, New York, Los Angeles, Haifa, and Jerusalem), and another 25 percent lived in the next 15 largest metropolitan areas (Table 13). Of the 22 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, 12 were located in the U.S., 4 in Israel, 2 in Canada, and one each in France, the U.K., Argentina, and Russia.

2.5.2 Jewish Population Prospects

Population projections to be credible need to take into account a variety of different scenarios and must acknowledge the limits of a generally restrained elasticity in the range of background, non-demographic societal circumstances allowed.⁷⁷ Since World War II, good accuracy standards were achieved with population projections that explored a time span of one or two decades ahead. However, one exemplary challenge to the routine assumption of "other things being equal" or a prevailing continuation of trends observed in the recent past came with the demise of the Soviet Union and the thorough rearrangement of geopolitical order that followed

⁷⁷Lutz, Wolfgang, ed., *The Future Population of the World: What Can We Assume Today?* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1996).

the fall of Berlin's wall. Far reaching implications for Jewish life opportunities ensued, including significant population movements.

TABLE 12. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S JEWS, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION (PER 1,000 POPULATION) IN EACH COUNTRY, 1/1/2004

Number of Jews in Country	Jews per 1,000 Population					
	Total	0.0-0.9	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-24.9	25.0+
Total ^a	93	61	22	6	3	1
100-900	35	31	3	-	1	-
1,000-4,900	22	19	3	-	-	-
5,000-9,900	9	3	6	-	-	-
10,000-24,900	10	5	4	1	-	-
25,000-49,900	4	2	2	-	-	-
50,000-99,900	4	1	2	1	-	-
100,000-999,900	7	-	2	4	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Number of Countries						
Total ^a	93	61	22	6	3	1
100-900	35	31	3	-	1	-
1,000-4,900	22	19	3	-	-	-
5,000-9,900	9	3	6	-	-	-
10,000-24,900	10	5	4	1	-	-
25,000-49,900	4	2	2	-	-	-
50,000-99,900	4	1	2	1	-	-
100,000-999,900	7	-	2	4	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish Population Distribution (Absolute Numbers)						
Total ^a	12,989,700	303,700	707,300	1,150,600	5,661,600	5,165,400
100-900	11,300	9,500	1,200	-	600	-
1,000-4,900	53,200	44,300	8,900	-	-	-
5,000-9,900	58,600	17,500	41,100	-	-	-
10,000-24,900	162,300	66,900	75,800	19,600	-	-
25,000-49,900	130,000	68,700	61,300	-	-	-
50,000-99,900	309,800	96,800	163,000	50,000	-	-
100,000-999,900	1,808,000	-	356,000	1,081,000	371,000	-
1,000,000 or more	10,455,400	-	-	-	5,290,000	5,165,400
Jewish Population Distribution (Percent of World's Jews)						
Total ^a	100.0	2.3	5.4	8.9	43.6	39.8
100-900	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1,000-4,900	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
5,000-9,900	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
10,000-24,900	1.2	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.0
25,000-49,900	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
50,000-99,900	2.4	0.7	1.3	0.4	0.0	0.0
100,000-999,900	13.9	0.0	2.7	8.3	2.9	0.0
1,000,000 or more	80.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	40.7	39.8

^a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 Jews, for a total of 1,100 Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. Israel includes West Bank and Gaza.

Keeping in mind these broad limitations, continuation of current demographic trends – namely the persistence of natural increase in Israel and a vital deficit due to low Jewish birth rates and an elderly age composition across most Diaspora communities – is bound to keep world Jewish population quite stable until 2020 (see Table 4). Israel may soon become the largest Jewish community worldwide, and several tens of years later it might comprise a majority of the total world's Jewish population. The extent and direction of international migration may further affect the total size and geographical distribution of world Jewry. It is important to keep in mind that moderately higher or lower effectively Jewish birth rates may raise or lower by one million, respectively, the total number of Jews globally by 2020.⁷⁸ The policy implications of these alternative scenarios are of crucial importance for the future of the Jews.

⁷⁸DellaPergola, Sergio, Rebhun, Uzi, and Tolts, Mark, "Prospecting the Jewish Future; Population Projections 2000-2080". *American Jewish Year Book*, 100, 2000, 103-146

TABLE 13. METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1/1/2004

Rank	Metro Area ^a	Country	Jewish Population	Share of World's Jews	
				%	Cumulative %
1	Tel Aviv ^{b,c}	Israel	2,663,000	20.5	20.5
2	New York ^d	U.S.	2,051,000	15.8	36.3
3	Los Angeles ^d	U.S.	668,000	5.1	41.4
4	Haifa ^b	Israel	663,000	5.1	46.5
5	Jerusalem ^e	Israel	647,000	5.0	51.5
6	Southeast Florida ^{d,f}	U.S.	498,000	3.8	55.4
7	Be'er Sheva ^b	Israel	347,000	2.7	58.0
8	Philadelphia ^d	U.S.	285,000	2.2	60.2
9	Paris ^g	France	284,000	2.2	62.4
10	Chicago ^d	U.S.	265,000	2.0	64.4
11	Boston ^d	U.S.	254,000	2.0	66.4
12	San Francisco ^d	U.S.	218,000	1.7	68.1
13	London ^h	United Kingdom	195,000	1.5	69.6
14	Toronto ⁱ	Canada	180,000	1.4	71.0
15	Washington ^j	U.S.	166,000	1.3	72.2
16	Buenos Aires ^k	Argentina	165,000	1.3	73.5
17	Baltimore ^j	U.S.	106,000	0.8	74.3
18	Detroit ^d	U.S.	103,000	0.8	75.1
19	Moscow ^l	Russia	95,000	0.7	75.9
20	Montreal ⁱ	Canada	93,000	0.7	76.6
21	Cleveland ^d	U.S.	86,000	0.7	77.2
22	Atlanta ^j	U.S.	86,000	0.7	77.9

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around central city. Definitions vary by country. Some of the estimates may include non-core Jews.

b As newly defined in the 1995 Census.

c Includes Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikva, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Netanya and Ashdod, each with a Jewish population above 100,000.

d Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA).

e Revised estimate. Includes the whole Jerusalem District and parts of Judea and Samaria District.

f Miami-Ft. Lauderdale and West Palm Beach-Boca Raton CMSA.

g Departments 75,77,78,91,92,93,94,95.

h Greater London and contiguous postcode areas.

i Census Metropolitan Area.

j Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

k Capital Federal and Gran Buenos Aires Partidos.

l Territory administered by City Council.

3. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP⁷⁹

3.1 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE

Jewish communal organization worldwide is a reflection and a refraction of Jewish power relationships, played out on local, national, and international levels. There are few opportunities in which the myriad Jewish organizations come together at one time and in one place, an analysis must therefore take place on an agency-by-agency basis. Nonetheless, there are a number of dynamics with respect to governance that cross institutional – and even national and regional – boundaries and these can be explored in the context of change over time.

One important factor in this analysis is that the Jewish Diaspora organizational network emerged long before the State of Israel was established. Consequently, in the mutual dynamics between national center and Diaspora, often the agenda was established long earlier in the Diaspora, and the State of Israel could only acknowledge the existing patterns rather than planning them beforehand and directing them from the center. Another interesting factor about the Jewish organizational map is that it grew and developed from the grass roots upward. Committed Jews organized themselves around specific needs or common agendas and set up agencies accordingly. Similarly, organizations grouped themselves under roof organizations when it became expedient to work together and enjoy the economies and politics of scale. In this way, pyramidal structures came into place in Europe and South Africa especially and to a lesser extent in North America. The question is whether the complex communal organizational infrastructure at all levels reflects the needs and the agenda of the Jewish people in an effective manner.

Governance has traditionally been played out through four vehicles of political control: autocracy, oligarchy, polyarchy, and democracy.⁸⁰ The autocratic model of a single individual or corporate entity monopolizing power was the model for many Jewish communities over many centuries. The *kehilla* (community in Hebrew) leadership and the *Gemeinde* are classic examples. Oligarchy – a closed small group of individuals in control of decision-making – arguably was the model for some of the early Jewish communal organizations polyarchy, the least understood of these political models, is a system in which different interest groups weigh in on decision-making, depending on the issue at hand and their relationship to the issue, the Jewish community in Melbourne today is much like this. Democracy in its *participatory* form has rarely been a useful model for Jewish communal organization. In most Jewish communities the model is some form of *representative* democracy. Most Jewish communities around the world are not Classical Greek polities, in which every citizen automatically has a vote. In the Jewish community everyone is born into eligibility, but affiliation requires some kind of voluntary action, even if the act is nominal that represents a conscious decision on the part of the individual to be part of the community.

The question of whether Jewish communities are representative is addressed, not on the basis of “direct elections,” but on another criterion: if people feel that there is a vehicle for expression, and if by means of their choice (through affiliation) of that vehicle they can cast a vote on policy issues, then the community is representative. Its best expression is in the pluralistic United States, where the multiplicity of Jewish organizations is the strength, and not the burden, of the American Jewish community. The non-American model of which Britain and South Africa are the prime examples has a central representative body, but even it cannot be called truly democratic, but pluralistic representing most but not all of the voices but not necessarily proportionately.

⁷⁹This chapter is based on an original text written by Jerome A. Chanes, Michael Weil and Ahava Zaremski.

⁸⁰See Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity*, pp. 320-327, for useful background.

Theoretical notions of governance are very different, of course, in America and Europe. It is by now commonplace to talk about American pluralism, which informs a society in which the associational basis of the community is purely voluntary; there is no more coercion to be a member of a religious group as there is to be a member of the local chamber-music society. And governance structures in the American "not-for-profit" sector flow directly out of the pluralist ideal. The "federal" idea – inherent in American political and social reality – is that of a contract whereby individuals and institutions voluntarily link themselves to each other, creating partnerships that benefit all the parties. This federal ideal is embodied in concrete institutions,⁸¹ and has become embedded in Jewish political culture.

The reality in Europe and elsewhere has few similarities to that of America: the European model is both territorial and hierarchical. There are specific agencies that are responsible specific turfs such as Jewish Care and Norwood Ravenswood regarding welfare services in the UK or the Fonds Social Juif Unifié regarding culture in France. In many countries there is one umbrella body that represents the Jewish community as a whole such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews in Britain, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France in France and the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland in Germany. Religious life is less unified although there is usually one recognized chief rabbi, one or more Beth din and synagogue organizations representing the different religious streams. Most communities have a unified appeal for Israel which is affiliated to the Keren Hayesod and there is also a Zionist federation.

As security has become a serious issue especially in Europe, security agencies have been set up at times as part of the central communal organization and others a separate organizations such as the Communities Securities Trust in the UK and the CSO in South Africa.

In the past membership organizations were popular and whilst the trend in most countries is towards activity-based affiliation rather than membership-based, branches of WIZO, Na'amat, ORT, Bnei Brith and so on are still active and significant.

Also present and increasingly active in the Diaspora are branches of Israeli organizations, many for the purposes of fundraising such as the "friends of..." organizations, and others associated with Israeli political parties and Zionist movements. The latter also are related to youth movements such as Bnei Akiva, Habonim, Hashomer Hazair and so on which operate in most medium and large communities. In most countries there is an active student organization affiliated to World Union of Jewish Students (WUJS).

It is clear that the organizational dynamics of the Jewish body-politic world-wide have experienced strain in recent years, and a number of long-held assumptions have been called into question. Even the question of "Who does what?" is not easily answered; deeper questions of power, and of the flows of power ("Who is giving direction to whom?") suggest that radical changes have taken place over the past two decades.

There have been a number of issues raised in recent years that cut across the organizational board. The question of whether the "establishment" organizations are representative of Jewish "electorates" has become a vocal – sometimes shrill – issue. The changing demographic pattern of Jewish communities has sharpened questions surrounding governance, affiliation, funding patterns, and other issues; relations between professional and volunteer leadership have come under scrutiny; the issue of duplication of function and of service on the part of the organizations of Jewish communities world-wide (especially in the U.S.) is significant. The rhetoric in intra-communal conversation has become epigrammatic of the deepening "fault-lines" in the community, and the reality of consensus in Jewish communities on key issues has been called into question.

These issues suggest the question of the organizational voices of the polity. Is there a "voice" of or for Jewish communities in specific lands, continents, and world-wide? Ought there

⁸¹The most immediately apparent example in the U.S. is the "Federation," a local organization created out of a community of interests of independent agencies, who voluntarily contracted to affiliate at some level in order to achieve certain goals.

be a single voice? Are there not, in fact, many voices, some overlapping, that produce expressions along a broad continuum of ideologies, views, and needs but that cohere on questions of Jewish security and survival?

With respect to these questions, America and Europe need discussion in the context of different constructs. In the U.S. these questions are viewed against the backdrop of the associational and voluntary nature of the American Jewish community. The associational base of the community, and its federated structure, have permitted and indeed have depended upon affiliation – with a synagogue, a federation, a community-relations agency, a Zionist organization – to a degree far greater than at any other time in Jewish history. Any and all connections with Jewish organizational life in the United States depend on some degree of voluntary association. The sum total of these associations determines, define, and inform American Jewry's organizational structure. Some of the key American Jewish instrumentalities (out of the many thousands of agencies) are discussed in this paper.

In Europe (and also elsewhere), the centralized structure has meant that communities that are able to wield considerable political power despite their relatively small size. At the regional level, there is a void and the European organizations are relatively weak especially in view of the growing importance of the expanded EU and its influence on Jewish life has led to agencies from the "outside", such as the Joint and the American Jewish Committee, to attempt to exercise power and governance in Europe.

It is conventional – and accurate – to talk about five spheres of activity that constitute the organizational matrix of activities in which Jews worldwide are engaged: social services; community relations and public affairs; Israel and other international policy arenas; education and culture; and religion. Issues of governance are crystallized in and distilled through activities in these spheres of activity.

Informing these rubrics or spheres is the question of whether there is a single "Jewish" agenda; or whether each Jewish polity addresses and tests situations as they arise, in terms of local and regional needs. The most reductionist approach to this question is to say that issues are "selected" for action as priorities to the extent that they implicated Jewish security in one way or another – with "security" an elastic concept indeed.⁸²

3.2 GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The international organizations as described here are not presented in order of importance or influence. Largely the first set of organizations are those with a more global and wider perspective and followed by those of a more specific nature and serving defined audiences.

Overarching the discussion of governance is the role played by the **World Zionist Organization (WZO)** and the **Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI)**. The WZO, originally known as the Zionist Organization (which goes back to the First Zionist Congress in 1897), was reorganized in 1960: and membership of the WZO, heretofore a membership of individuals, was henceforth to one of collective bodies only.

The Jewish Agency for Israel is the non-governmental (or quasi-governmental) body, centered in Jerusalem, that historically has organized and facilitated immigration to Israel; fostered settlement, first in Palestine and later in Israel; taken a hand in the development of Israel's economy, and promoted social and educational services. The pre-State functions of JAFI/WZO – the places where Diaspora Jews sat with Israelis to make policy for nation-building – yet exist on some level. But dramatic changes have taken place over the past thirty years within JAFI/WZO. Since 1971 the functions of JAFI and the WZO have been separate, with the Jewish Agency working within Israel and the WZO restricting itself to Diaspora Zionist activities, but

⁸²To be sure, the exercise of institutional imperatives of Jewish organizations (such as fund-raising) in their activities on issues on their respective agendas has long been a reality of Jewish life. This is the subject of an extended discussion, and will not be addressed in this paper.

also settlement activities in Israel in the administered territories. The 1971 agreement reconstituted JAFI to full partnership. For a while the new system worked; but with American donors wanting greater control, by 2004 the flow of power had completely reversed, in effect putting the WZO out of business. In the past, power flowed from the Zionist Organization; the Israeli leadership used the WZO as their instrument to set the agenda of the Jewish Agency and via JAFI for the American system. Today, power flows from American Jewry. JAFI was once the spark for the engine of the American system; today it is almost an extraneous factor in the system. The approximately \$200 million that flows from the federations to JAFI via the U.S. United Jewish Communities (UJC) is the largest single contribution from the federation system; yet it is less than it once was. Analysts suggest that JAFI, once the power, is now one of mendicants at the U.S. Jewish federation table – albeit the largest. Over the last decade, the initiative has shifted to the executives of the large-city federations in America, culminating a two-decade-plus process in which the Americans became full partners.

JAFI's 2004 budget is \$297 million, of which \$195 million comes from the Federations. WZO's budget is approximately \$25 million. The WZO is nominally the policy-making body for the Jewish Agency; but it has become somewhat of a vestigial tail on the dog, with dog (JAFI) wagging the tail. The WZO has become increasingly constricted and the question of its continued existence has been raised. On paper the WZO is still a one-half owner of JAFI (the other half: Keren Hayesod and the UJC). But JAFI, whose work traditionally has been in Israel, is now involved in major enterprises (for example, education) outside of Israel, and the presence WZO has been waning.

Funding arms for JAFI (and for the Joint Distribution Committee, discussed below) are the United Jewish Communities (UJC) in the USA and Keren Hayesod, which remains the fund-raising vehicle outside the United States.

Keren-Hayesod – United Israel Appeal is the central fundraising organization for Israel throughout the world (except the USA). It operates in 45 countries on every continent through 57 Campaigns. **Keren Hayesod (literally “The Foundation Fund”)** was established in 1920 at the World Zionist Conference in London. Jewish communities throughout the world established local campaigns under the Keren Hayesod umbrella, often using local names (UIA, UJIA, IUA, CJA, and AUJF). According to the Reconstitution Agreement of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod is one of the three constituent bodies of the Jewish Agency for Israel (along with the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the United Jewish Committees (UJC) of the USA) and provides 20% of the representatives on the Board of Governors and the Assembly.

Since its founding in 1901, **Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet LeIsrael)** has been a vital part of Zionist history, achieving its goal of purchasing the land that would become the State of Israel, helping to develop that land into a thriving nation, and protecting Israel's environment. Through the support of donors around the world, JNF was able to ensure that Israel was the only nation in the world to end the 20th century with more trees than it had at the beginning. The JNF acts as the caretaker of the land of Israel on behalf of its owners – Jewish people everywhere.

The **World Jewish Congress (WJC)** is an international organization whose mission is to address the interests and needs of Jews and Jewish communities throughout the world. Founded in Geneva in 1936 to unite the Jewish people and mobilize the world against the Nazi onslaught, the WJC is the representative body of Jewish communities and organizations in nearly 100 countries from Argentina to Zimbabwe across six continents. It seeks to foster the unity and creative survival of the Jewish people while maintaining its spiritual, cultural and social heritage. With headquarters in New York, the WJC has affiliate offices around the world including Brussels, Budapest, Buenos Aires, Geneva, Johannesburg, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Sydney and Jerusalem where the WJC's research institute is located. The World Jewish Congress received special credentials and recognition at the United Nations making it unique among world-wide

organizations as it enjoys a diplomatic seat in the U.N. and within many of its institutions, commissions and sub-bodies.

The WJC came to prominence after World War II, when it played a central role in the crafting of Jewish policies with respect to peace treaties, the prosecution and trial of Nazi war criminals, the adoption of plans for indemnification and reparations to Jewish victims of the Holocaust, and the rehabilitation of Jewish life after the war. In recent years the WJC has adopted assertive strategies and tactics, and has been most visible, on such issues as the war record of Kurt Waldheim, and the disposition of Holocaust-era Jewish assets in Switzerland and other countries.

The **American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or “Joint”)** is the main instrumentality for American Jewry to provide for social-service needs of Jews outside the United States. The founding of JDC in 1914 was an example of Jewish communal response to a crisis situation – in this case hardships (including reports of starvation) of Jews in Palestine – in which the “Joint” pulled together and took over the fund-raising and relief operations of three ideologically different organizations. (The organizing of the JDC is a good case-study in the ways in which Jewish groups are often founded, often as “break-aways” from established agencies, or – as was the case with the “Joint” – in the bringing together of agencies in response to exogenous situations.)

The JDC's mandate is to provide social services to Diaspora communities. It has a range of activities and programs, including a range of direct services (e.g. providing food to impoverished communities in Eastern Europe). During the 1980s, JDC was able to return to many countries in Eastern Europe and helped local communities develop welfare services for their needy elderly and community. In 1988 JDC returned to the Soviet Union, initiating programs of cultural and religious renewal, and providing welfare relief destitute elderly Jews. JDC also launched a program to train local Jewish activists and helped them develop communal organizations that would orchestrate welfare and Jewish renewal programs. Today, JDC-supported welfare programs reach 250,000 needy elderly in more than 2,600 cities and towns.

Amongst the smaller yet most important of the organizations that have global impact, and whose work is primarily in Europe is the **Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany**. The “Claims Conference,” as it is known, was established in 1951 and is headquartered in New York. The various restitution and indemnification agreements signed with Germany were largely a result of Claims Conference work. In recent years the Conference has been saddled with controversy over the proceeds resulting from disposition of properties in Germany and other issues.

Started in New York City in 1881 by a group of Jewish immigrants who found sanctuary in the United States after fleeing persecution in Europe, the **Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society - HIAS** offered food, shelter and other aid to countless new arrivals. This includes the million Jewish refugees it helped to migrate to Israel (in cooperation with the Jewish Agency for Israel), and the thousands it helped resettle in Canada, Latin America, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. As the oldest international migration and refugee resettlement agency in the U.S., HIAS also played a major role in the rescue and relocation of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and of Jews from Morocco, Ethiopia, Egypt and the communist countries of Eastern Europe. More recently, since the mid-70s, HIAS has helped more than 300,000 Jewish refugees from the former Soviet Union and its successor states escape persecution and rebuild new lives in the United States. As the migration arm of the organized American Jewish community, HIAS also advocates on behalf of refugees and migrants on the international, national and community level.

World ORT is one of the largest non-governmental education and training organizations in the world, with past and present activities in over 100 countries. A non-profit, non-political organization, ORT's objective is to meet the educational and vocational requirements of diverse Jewish students throughout the world. Currently, ORT educates or trains more than 280,000 students annually, through its network of programs, training centers and schools, particularly in

the former Soviet Union, South America and Israel. World ORT is responsible for coordinating the international activities of its associate bodies, the National ORT Organizations that span five continents. ORT receives its core funding through the ONAD process of the UJC (see below). Local branches of ORT are both fundraising arms and membership organizations of which the most prominent is Women's American ORT.

The **Alliance Israélite Universelle** is an educative and cultural-orientated organization that works through a network of schools with some 20,000 pupils, also involving the defense of human rights before governmental and international institutions. To the alliance operates in Belgium, Canada, France, Iran, Morocco, Spain and the USA. Its headquarters are in Paris.

WIZO (the Women's International Zionist Organization) has long been a presence in Europe, acts on a country-by country basis, with branch societies in many European countries. WIZO, however, has virtually no voice in governance issues.⁸³

The **International Council for Jewish Women** is made up of 52 Jewish women's organizations in 47 countries, covering between them almost the whole spectrum of the Jewish world. For most of them the main focus of their work is the services they offer to the community, both Jewish and non-Jewish. The core purpose of ICJW is to bring together Jewish women from all walks of life in order to bring a driving force for social justice for all races and creeds. ICJW has consultative status with ECOSOC at the United Nations and is headquartered in London.

Bnei Brith was established in 1843 and is today the world's largest Jewish human rights, philanthropic and community action group, active in 58 countries around the world with its head office in Washington DC, NGO status at the United Nations in New York, an office at the European Union in Brussels, and a world center in Jerusalem. It brings Jews together for the common good, to help the poor and oppressed, and is active in cultural and humanitarian projects.

The **World Union of Jewish Students** was established in 1924 to fight antisemitism and to act as an umbrella organization for national Jewish student bodies. It organizes educational programs and leadership training seminars and has a service program for Diaspora communities. WUJS represents 51 national unions representing over 700,000 students. It is an NGO member of UNESCO and headquartered in Jerusalem.

Following its inception 250 years ago, the **Chabad-Lubavitch movement** – a branch of Hasidism – swept through Russia and spread in surrounding countries as well. The origins of today's Chabad-Lubavitch organization can be traced to the early 1940's when the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchak Schneersohn, appointed his son-in-law and later successor, Rabbi Menachem Mendel, to head the newly-founded educational and social service arms of the movement. In addition to its religious teachings, as an organization Chabad sends 4,000 full-time emissary families to direct more than 3,300 institutions (and a workforce that numbers in the tens of thousands) dedicated to the welfare of the Jewish people worldwide. Chabad is particularly active in religious and educational renewal in the FSU and Eastern Europe. It also works to attract young Jews traveling in the Far East.

Finally, **Ronald Lauder Foundation** has become a voice on the European scene. The Lauder Foundation is a central force in developing educational services and schools in Eastern Europe in particular.

It should be noted that the global scene is probably the weakest, where are relatively few significant organizations and not strong enough or powerful enough to speak and/or act for the Jewish people. In addition there are a number of American based agencies that are operating internationally and that play a significant role. These include the ADL, the American Jewish Committee and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture which are described below in the US section.

⁸³Cf. in this regard Hadassah, *infra*.

3.3 MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS BASED IN THE UNITED STATES

The model for American Jewish organization is America itself, a society based on democratic and cultural pluralism, a dynamic unique in the context of both time and place. It is *voluntary* in nature, and combined with the principle of federalism it permits and depends upon affiliation to a far greater degree than at any other time in Jewish history. Today, organizations are being challenged against the background trend of individualism growing in the US.

The American Jewish organizational matrix, both national and local, comprises a cacophony of agency "voices" who speak for the Jews. In the area of community relations the question of who acts as the voice for the American Jewish community is particularly sensitive, especially in the context of a pluralistic Jewish community that has never been happy when mandates were imposed "from above," by *fiat*.

The central organizing principle for American Jews is those issues on which *there is a consensus of the community that they affect Jewish security*.⁸⁴ In recent years the conflicting tugs of a diminishing exogenous agenda of physical security and survival and a salient endogenous agenda of Jewish continuity (diminishing birth-rates, widespread Jewish functional illiteracy, intermarriage, and so on) have giving new contours to the agenda.

3.3.1 Umbrella and National Organizations

The "**Presidents Conference**". One of the most important – and certainly the least understood – groups in American Jewish life is the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (the Presidents Conference). Founded in 1954, the formal mandate of the Presidents Conference is to express the collective voice of American Jewish organizations on international affairs – particularly those related to Israel – to the Administration in Washington. It has also taken on the reciprocal function of carrying messages from the Administration to the Israeli government. The conference consists of more than fifty American Jewish organizations comprising all spheres and sweeps of communal activity. In recent years the mandate of the Presidents Conference has expanded, owing to aggressive professional leadership. The relationships that the conference enjoys with Israeli government officials, national Jewish organizations, and key federation leadership suggest that it plays a role in governance far beyond that of its original mandate as "spokesman." Indeed, the relationship of the conference's activities and role to its mandate has become muddled. The Presidents Conference, however, does not shape strategy or policy facing Israel. The Presidents Conference, as a "roof" organization, is funded by its constituent agencies.

The **United Jewish Communities (UJC)**. The UJC is the primary system of raising and directing funds from the Jewish community to domestic and international Jewish needs. The functional work of the UJC is done by four "Pillars" – Human Services and Social Policy, Israel and Overseas, development (fund-raising), and Renaissance and Renewal (the latest "buzz-words" for Jewish identity and continuity, to be reflected in education and culture). The Overseas Needs, Assessments, and Disbursements Committee (ONAD) designates UJC's "overseas" funds, *i.e.* going to Israel and other lands. It was created to assure accountability of the Jewish Agency, ensure that the federations control in the decision-making process, seek out other contractors (in addition to JAFI and JDC) for servicing overseas needs, and enhance the flexibility of the local communities in funding what they wanted to fund. ONAD decides what would be "core" funding for JDC and JAFI, and what would be "elective", putting JAFI and the JDC in competition for "elective" dollars.

In 1999, the organization was transformed. For decades, what was known as national United Jewish Appeal (UJA) campaigns incorporated into local (federation) ones and the system

⁸⁴This explains the salience of civil rights on the American Jewish communal agenda. Civil rights was accurately and legitimately perceived not as a "liberal" issue but as one crucial to Jewish security, and American Jews were involved in civil rights – indeed were instrumental in creating the movement – out of self-interest.

worked to build a local and national (or "continental," to use the term that gained currency in the strategic thinking of federation leaders in the 1980s and 1990s) institutional infrastructure. The Council of Jewish Federations (CJF), a confederation of 200 federations, provided guidance to those federations in their community-planning work and in budgeting. The "UJA/federation system,"⁸⁵ or CJF process, grew over the decades in response to emergencies, with crowning achievement in Operation Exodus of true *polity* when the UJA and federations marshaled their political and financial resources on an unprecedented scale to achieve their goals.⁸⁶ In 1999, UJC emerged reflecting a shift in Jewish communal ideology from national to local (that is, federation) "ownership" of decision-making in which intermediary agencies such as the UJA are irrelevant. Increased recognition was placed on the role and the significance of "mega dollar" donors and family foundations in the USA.

Most analysts aver that UJC has been modest in its success. There are two clusters of systemic issues facing the UJC, one in terms of structure, the other reflecting the overall financial potential of the federation system. First is the fact that the United Jewish Communities, is clearly playing a subordinate role, coordinating some programs but not *initiating*, or engaging in agenda-setting in the way in which it ought to be functioning. The initiative is in the hands of a cadre of large-city federations. As of 2004, in at least four critical or crisis situations – the sudden pauperization of Argentinean Jewry; the neediness of an aging Jewish population in the FSU; the economic crisis facing many in the American Jewish community resulting from the long-term economic downturn in the USA; and the failure to educate adequately successive generations of Americans, and the failure to engage the young (the crisis of "continuity") – the UJC did not initiate programmatic efforts that would make a difference. Rather, it has been individual federations, or a groups of large-city federations, that have acted as the mobilizing forces – in effect, have exercised governance; or for individual philanthropists (or family foundations), who, moved by their idiosyncratic commitments, have acted.

Second, the most crucial governance issue is that of managing the financial potential of the system, and it is in this area that the UJC appears to be keeping its head down and not redefine the parameters of fund-raising; the federations have not been keeping pace with the "Jewish dollar." The stark arithmetic question: what percentage of the Jewish dollar has been tapped? The proportion has shrunk; it has not grown with the Jewish position in the economy.

B'nai B'rith. B'nai Brith is an international fraternal and social organization that has become over the past thirty years increasingly active in community-relations issues, with emphasis more recently on the international agenda. Founded in 1843 by German-Jewish immigrants to the USA, B'nai B'rith provided opportunities outside the synagogue for association, and developed, successively, into a fraternal order, social-service facilitator, and community-relations agency. In the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, B'nai Brith had its problems in identifying and articulating a clear purpose and mission. Not the least of B'nai B'rith's issues during this period was being eclipsed in the public-affairs arena by its "child," the ADL, which has aggressively asserted its independence and its own governance.

3.3.2 Community

The category of "community relations" contains all issues that fall under the rubric of public affairs and public-policy – in simple terms, how the Jewish community relates to the external world. There has always been, particularly in the public policy arena, tension between the national agencies, the federations, and the coordinating bodies. This tension is not necessarily

⁸⁵Beginning in the 1970s and continuing until the early 1980s local federation and UJA campaigns were merged. Hence the name, such as "UJA/Federation of Greater New York," of a number of federations.

⁸⁶The emergency fund-raising efforts in the 1990s mirrored the standard pattern of fund-raising in the United States: a "fair-share" formula based on the population of the community and previous campaign (*i.e.* fund-raising) experience.

a bad thing since, in spite of it or because of it, the coordinated activity of national and local agencies is one of the triumphs of American Jewish pluralistic activity.

The Federation and the Federation System. The federation is the central agency for the coordination of Jewish activities on the *local* level. Unlike the case in most other lands, in America, Jews – like everyone else – relate to society as individuals; the concept of "group rights" is foreign to a society that is informed by the principles of democratic and cultural pluralism. The "federal" idea is that of a contract whereby individuals and institutions voluntarily link themselves to each other, creating partnerships that benefit all the parties. Federations, the first, the Boston Federation of Jewish Charities, established in 1895, are responsible for fund-raising and allocations, mostly to local needs, in addition to *communal planning* and the *coordination of social services*. This concentration of functions gives the federations and their leadership considerable power to the point where the federation is recognized as the Jewish "address" in a community. The federations sometimes take on a fourth task: advocating for public sector funding of social services it provides. Prior to 1999, the Federation system comprised of two overhead umbrella structures, the Council of Jewish Federations (CJF) and the United Jewish Appeal (UJA). Since 1999, the CJF and UJA combined to form a single umbrella agency, the United Jewish Communities. The integration put local federations in more control over allocation of dollars, particularly increasing the role of targeted donations from mega donations and family foundations.

The Jewish Council for Public Affairs. The umbrella body for both national and local Jewish community relations agencies is the Jewish Council for Public Affairs (JCPA). For decades known as NJCRAC – the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council – JCPA's mandate is to provide a coordinating function on a national level for community relations councils (CRCs) which handle defense activities on a community level. CRC representatives serve with national agencies on a coordinating and planning council at the JCPA. Over the years, it has been an effective vehicle not only for the sophisticated discussion of public-policy and community-relations issues, but for enabling the network of agencies to bring the message of the Jewish community to the centers of power, in the U.S. Congress, by means of legislative advocacy; and in the federal courts, by submitting *amicus curiae* ("friend of the court") briefs. The JCPA has grown from four national and fourteen community agencies to thirteen national and some 120 local community agencies.⁸⁷ The future of the JCPA as an instrumentality maintaining at least some measure of independence from the federation system (specially the large-city federations) is in question. It is entirely possible that JCPA may be obliged by the federations to merge its functions into the system and to adapt its existing structures to specific federation needs.

3.3.3 Defense and Security

The primary arms for Jewish public affairs in the United States – what was traditionally known as "defense" and now as "community relations" – are a cluster of voluntary agencies that came into being in the early decades of the twentieth century. Three agencies – the American

⁸⁷The four original NJCRAC national member agencies were the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith/Anti-Defamation League, and the Jewish Labor Committee – the member agencies of the General Jewish Council. In 1951 the American Jewish Committee and the ADL/B'nai B'rith withdrew from the NJCRAC following severe disagreement over the recommendations of a report initiated by the LCBC. The study, *Report on the Jewish Community Relations Agencies*, conducted by Columbia University political scientist Robert MacIver, noted the inefficient use of agency resources (including duplication of activity) and recommended that a modified plan for cooperative relationships based upon particular agency expertise and skills be adopted. The two agencies rejoined the NJCRAC in 1965 and 1966. The NJCRAC/JCPA national member agencies include the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, B'nai B'rith, Hadassah, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., the National Council of Jewish Women, the [former] Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, Women's American ORT, and the Women's League for Conservative Judaism.

Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Congress – have primacy in this arena, although many others (including at least one Zionist group) have agendas that cover a range of public-affairs and community-relations matters.

The **American Jewish Committee (AJC)**, the oldest of the defense agencies established in 1906 and enlarged after 1943, is a highly-respected organization that has had a special interest in ethnicity, pluralism, and intergroup relations generally. Following a period of agency introspection during the 1990s, the focus and direction of the American Jewish Committee has shifted to the international arena. The AJC is now a member of the Conference of Presidents and has represented American Jewry to European governments, establishing numerous relationships on the European scene. Consistent with the agency's viewing itself as a "think-tank," the Committee publishes the annual *American Jewish Year Book* and its research department produces valuable studies and surveys on intergroup relations, antisemitism, and issues related to Jewish identity.

American Jewish Congress (AJCongress), founded in 1918, views itself as the "lawyer" of the American Jewish community, with pioneering involvement in landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with the separation of church and state and civil rights. It drafts and promotes legislation to preserve religious liberty, fight anti-Semitism, discrimination and racism, legislates cases at the state, federal and Supreme Court levels and providing counsel and assistance to individuals and communities to protect pluralism, church state separation and religious liberty. The origins of the AJCongress provide an important lesson in the dynamics of American Jewry. Established by a group dissatisfied with the leadership of American Jewish Committee, the group created an *ad hoc* "congress" to represent American Jewish interests at the peace conference following World War I. While the AJC and other organizations wanted the AJCongress to go out of business, and indeed it did formally dissolve in 1920, the pressure for a permanent representative organization resulted in its present formation.

The **Anti-Defamation League (ADL)**, created as a commission of B'nai B'rith in 1913 in reaction to the Leo Frank lynching in Georgia, sees its role as combating antisemitism, in various forms and guises. ADL focuses on monitoring antisemitism – it sponsors periodic polls of anti-Semitic attitudes in the USA and Europe – as well as on prejudice-reduction programs,⁸⁸ on anti-Israel activity, left- and right-wing radicalism, and (since 1981) violations of church and state, as well as on Holocaust education and interfaith work. While ADL has long been nominally associated with its parent organization B'nai B'rith, it has for many decades led a completely independent existence, with its own board and fund-raising mechanism. Unlike the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress, the ADL is not a membership organization, and its staff is uniquely involved in policy formation. Moreover, the ADL's governance has traditionally been more in the hands of the professional staff than in the hands of the lay leadership.

The sources of funding for all of these are identical: each solicits support from its members and individuals who support the agency's mission; and – more importantly in recent decades – from the corporate world. Some private foundation money for special projects is available to national Jewish agencies; less from governmental sources. Until the early 1980s the American Jewish Committee was viewed as the pre-eminent agency of the American Jewish community, with a budget significantly larger than the other two defense agencies. This changed around 1980, with the ADL achieving budgetary parity with AJC.

3.3.4 Politics

American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1950, has been an influential voice in Washington on

⁸⁸ A substantial portion of the budget of the ADL goes to its "World of Difference" program. This analyst of antisemitism has yet to be convinced of the overall efficacy of prejudice-reduction programs; the ADL has yet to conduct a systematic evaluation of "World of Difference."

Israel-related issues. AIPAC is an officially-registered lobby headquartered in Washington but with a growing network of regional offices, whose function it is to develop support for the State of Israel in the American government. (As a lobbying organization, contributions to AIPAC are not tax-deductible.) Its activity includes research of high quality, legislative liaison, and public information. AIPAC, unlike other Jewish organizations in America, is a single-issue agency; its agenda is limited to Israel and Israel-America relations. It normally presents the case for most Israeli government policies, and there is significant respect paid in the Administration and the Congress to AIPAC's skill. AIPAC also draws support from non-Jewish, pro-Israel people in the United States. The organization is regarded as one of the foremost lobbies in the US in terms of its professional nature and efficacy.

PACs. Political Action Committees (PACs) are designed to channel funds to political campaigns of candidates or officials in order to help ensure the victories of their election campaigns. Pro-Israel PACs were established in 1980 to help oust anti-Israel officials in Congress. Today the pro-Israel PACs are used to elect/re-elect candidates considered to be pro-Israel.

National Jewish Democratic Council (NJDC). Established in 1990, the NJDC is designed to promote Jewish involvement and participation in the Democratic Party. In addition to this task, some say the NJDC was established to prevent anti-Jewish/anti-Israel behavior in the Democratic Party, particularly to prevent that which happened in 1988, when 7 state Democratic conventions adopted relations supporting Palestinian self-determination and the issue was debated in the Democratic National Convention.

Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC). Established in 1985 as the National Jewish Coalition, this body is designed to promote Jewish involvement and participation in the Republican Party. During Republican administrations, the RJC is one of the most important sources of Jewish community liaison with the White House.

3.3.5 Religion

The nature of American democratic and cultural pluralism is felt most acutely in its religious sphere, in which the phenomenon of religious "denominations," unique to the United States, is the model. Yet, the situation in American Judaism is somewhat different for while the history of Orthodoxy, Conservative, and Reform in America is a prime exemplar of pluralism, the differences between the groupings are such that there are questions being raised by each grouping of the religious legitimacy of others.

The Orthodox Movement. The Orthodox movement in America is a diverse, complex conglomerate. **The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA** or the "Orthodox Union," "the OU"), established in 1898, claims a membership of some 1000 Orthodox synagogues in the USA and provides a vast and well respected *kashrut* (Jewish dietary) monitoring system, with the OU symbol displayed on product packaging nationally and internationally. The OU is also active youth involvement through the **National Conference of Synagogue Youth** and increasingly in public affairs through its **Institute for Public Affairs**. The **National Council of Young Israel**, founded in 1912, appeals to the same lay audience as OU though its leadership has moved noticeably to the "right" of it. Representing the "Yeshiva" world of the Hasidic, traditionally-observant community is the increasingly influential **Agudath Israel of America**, founded in 1939. Aguda has increasingly involved itself on the public-affairs agenda, and has developed a sophisticated network in the public-policy arena, especially in Washington. Governance of Agudath Israel is controlled by the Mo'etzeth Gedolei HaTorah – the Council of Torah Sages.

There are several rabbinical associations in the US, including **The Rabbinical Council of America (RCA)** which is the largest and most geographically representative of the Orthodox rabbinical organizations and represents the more centrist Orthodox community.⁸⁹ Confronted

⁸⁹ A fine review, although somewhat dated, of contemporary American Orthodoxy is Wolfe Kelman, "Moshe Feinstein and Postwar American Orthodoxy," in *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1987* (London: The Institute for Jewish Affairs, 1988), pp.

with the reality of increasing polarization between "Modern Orthodox," the leadership of the RCA and the UOJCA has moved to address halakhic and social issues and has created several forums to do so including the **Orthodox Caucus** and the **Orthodox Forum**, convened by Yeshiva University. Another group, the **Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance (JOFA)**, has emerged as a vehicle for working on women's issues within Orthodoxy, considered by many to be the salient cluster of issues facing the community.

Chabad plays an increasingly significant role particularly in distant, isolated communities in the US. The organization is discussed in detail in the international organization section of this chapter.

The Conservative Movement. The Rabbinical Assembly, founded in 1890, represents rabbis educated for the most part at the Conservative Jewish Theological Seminary of America. **The United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism** was founded in 1913 as an organization of synagogues affiliated with the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Over time, it became the congregational arm of Conservative Judaism. This body (together with the well-organized **Women's League for Conservative Judaism**) and is heavily involved in public affairs. The Conservative youth organization is **United Synagogue Youth (USY)**.

The Reform Movement. The Central Conference of American Rabbis, founded in 1889 is the oldest rabbinical organization in the United States. Its rabbis are educated at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati and New York. The congregational body for Reform Judaism, the **Union for Reform Judaism**, has over 900 synagogue affiliates and is also the prime mover of the denomination's significant social action activity, whose main vehicle is the **Union for Reform Judaism/CCAR Religious Action Center** in Washington.⁹⁰ The Union, founded in 1873 as Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), moved by the Reform movement's ideological commitment to social justice, is a vocal and active proponent on civil-rights, civil-liberties, and other social-justice issues, and views itself as the "liberal" and "activist" force among the religious bodies. The UAHC was the first congregational body (1952) to establish a professionally-staffed commission on social action. Affiliated with Union for Reform Judaism and the CCAR is the Reform movement's youth organization, the **National Federation of Temple Youth (NFTY)**.

The Reconstructionist Movement. The Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association is the rabbinical group for the Reconstructionist movement. The movement's main voice remains the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College in Philadelphia, an offshoot of the Conservative movement, but considers itself to be a fourth denomination. Its activist rabbinate and constituency, and operations such as the Shalom Center, an institutional base working to build spirituality community, give Reconstructionism a decidedly liberal cast. The Reconstructionist congregational association is the **Jewish Reconstructionist Federation**.

3.3.6 Zionist Organizations

Most American Zionist organizations have traditionally been affiliated with Israeli political parties, either directly or through informal relationships. These include the **Zionist Organization of America**, originally the American voice of the centrist General Zionists but in recent years a vocal advocate of hawkish policies and a myriad of organizations associated with Israel's various political parties. Sixteen Zionist organizations and movements comprise the **American Zionist Movement** (formerly the American Zionist Federation), a non-partisan umbrella that acts as a coordinating body for the promotion of Zionist programming and public information.

173-187.

⁹⁰The RAC, an important Jewish voice in the discussion of the social-justice agenda, was born out of a bitter four-year struggle during the early 1960's within the Reform movement, in which a number of leading Reform congregations were deeply opposed to the idea of any public-issue "lobby."

Israel as an autonomous entity clearly does not take "orders" from American Jewry. Nevertheless, certain issues in recent years (particularly religious pluralism in Israel) have awakened a number of Zionist groups that had been more or less inertial. Notable in this regard are the Zionist affiliates of Reform and Conservative Jewry – **ARTZA** and **Mercaz**, respectively – which have demonstrated considerable organizational strength in international Zionist elections, and have helped prevent the extension of Orthodox power over Israeli Jewish life. Also active in US Jewish life are Zionist youth groups such as **Young Judea** and **Bnei Akiva**. A curious fact of American Jewish life in recent decades is the continuation – indeed enhancing – of a pro-Israel consensus amongst American Jews at the same time as Zionist organizations generally continue in their decline.

Finally, once of the newest introductions to the Zionist scene is the creation of **Nefesh b'Nefesh**, an organization established to bring North American Jews to Israel on aliyah. This organization, working in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, provides financial, bureaucratic, and professional assistance with singles and families moving to Israel on the condition that they stay for a minimum of three years. It has been successful thus far in terms of both increasing the number of olim from North America and in leadership support, though remains semi-controversial due to financial assistance from Christian fundamentalist groups.

3.3.7 Education and Engagement

Until the early 1970s education was neglected by the federation system as a priority. *Chinuch*, education, has now been incorporated as a priority. Yet education remains a troubled arena for the American Jewish polity. Mention should be made of three national agencies in the sphere of Jewish education: **The Jewish Education Service of North America (JESNA)**, the **Coalition for the Advancement of Jewish Education (CAJE)**, and the **Partnership for Excellence in Jewish Education (PEJE)**. JESNA is the coordinating body for central agencies for Jewish education in Jewish communities around the country, affiliated with the UJC, and acts as a resource for local communities. CAJE, one of the more creative agencies on the American Jewish scene, focuses on strengthening Judaic content and pedagogic skills in Jewish schools. It is a membership organization of Jewish educators whose national conference and activities in curriculum development have had an impact on Jewish educators at every level. Finally, PEJE is a collaborative of Jewish philanthropists making grants, providing expertise and advocating for day schools in the United States. It has thus far reached over 150 day schools and invested over \$16 million in the field.

At a local level Boards of Jewish Education work to provide educational services to Jewish educators, Jewish institutions, and individual Jewish community members. While varied to some degree in terms of responsibility, BJE's recruit, train, license and support teachers; provides federations with strategic educational planning and program support; facilitates inter school personnel issues, curricula, and program support; and oversee innovative pilot educational program prior to placement at the appropriate institutions.

Amongst the agencies making an effort to explore issues and provide a range of educational and briefing services to Jewish groups – in effect, act as "think-tanks" – is **CLAL - National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership**. CLAL provides leadership training for a range of Jewish communal professionals, and convenes symposia and conferences. The **Wexner Heritage Foundation** provides a similar service to Jewish communal lay leadership, with the aim of creating a cadre of Jewishly-literate leadership. A related organization, the **Wexner Foundation**, focuses on strengthening a "Jewish civil service in the USA – the rabbinate, the cantorship, and the personnel employed by Jewish communal agencies.

On the campus, a rejuvenated **Hillel: The Foundation for Jewish Campus Life** (formerly B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations), serves as a network, programming agent, and coordinating body for Jewish student campus organizations, and has become a catalyst for Jewish identity and Jewish life on the American campus.

In the community, local **Jewish community centers** serve to provide a range of social and educational programs for individuals, ranging from infant to elderly, and families. JCCs often take on a non-religious option for Jewish involvement and community. They are organized under the umbrella **Jewish Community Centers Association** which boasts more than 350 JCCs, YM-YWHAs, and camp sites throughout North America.

Finally, outreach organizations such as **The National Jewish Outreach Program**, established in 1987, focus on addressing assimilation and intermarriage by reaching out to unaffiliated Jews and offering them creative Jewish educational experiences. **The Jewish Outreach Institute**, established in 1988, focuses on intermarried families helping them stay Jewishly connected via community based programs and internet education.

3.3.8 Culture and Heritage

The fields of American Jewish culture are served and coordinated by the **National Foundation for Jewish Culture**, whose mandate is to enhance and promote the indigenous American Jewish culture *via* scholarship and the arts. The Foundation's activities in the areas of cultural preservation, artistic creativity, and community enrichment are significant in a Jewish community increasingly concerned with Jewish identity and continuity.

The **Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture** was established by Nahum Goldman (via a grant of more than \$10 million from the Claims Conference) in 1965 with a mandate to reconstruct Jewish culture after the Holocaust. Its present mission is the renewal, reconstruction, and enhancement of Jewish culture worldwide through the support of scholarship and research by individuals and institutions.

3.3.9 Women's Organizations

A number of "women's" organizations are active on the American Jewish scene. Included in this is the **National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW)**, founded in 1893 and has a membership of approximately 100,000, it views its mandate as working on behalf of the disadvantaged in both the Jewish and general communities. Women's rights (especially reproductive choice) are high on the agenda of NCJW, yet the organization is most active on many other issues, especially Israel, civil rights, and social and economic justice. NCJW has an active presence in Washington, and is noted for its aggressive stances on the liberal end of the spectrum on most issues; **Women's American ORT** is the most visible and active of those agencies associated with international ORT, an agency that sponsors vocational training programs throughout the world. Founded in 1928 and with a membership of approximately 50,000, it is the support organization for the world-wide ORT network. Its agenda addresses a range of social concerns in the U.S.A.

Hadassah, primarily a Zionist organization, is an exception to the pattern of decline in the American Zionist arena. Over the past twenty-five years Hadassah has given a higher priority to the agenda of its American Affairs Committee, and has an active plate of issues on its community-relations table. Important is the fact that Hadassah is the largest Jewish membership organization of its kind in the United States, with a reported membership of 385,000, making it the largest membership organization in the United States. Hadassah is thus able to mobilize a large cadre of members around issues advocacy, thereby enhancing its significance as a potential actor in the community-relations sphere. While in recent years Hadassah has had to address issues that come with an aging membership, it remains a potent force, a significant voice on Israel-related matters. In terms of board-staff dynamics, Hadassah represents the model of the completely lay-driven organization, in which lay leadership exercise many executive functions.

3.3.10 Emerging Organizations

Reflecting the dynamism of American pluralist society, the American Jewish community is constantly creating agencies to respond to changing needs and to a variety of political views.

This dynamic is another response to a society based on democratic pluralism: if you don't like what is happening in your house, you go across the street; and if you don't like what you find across the street, you start something new.

Over the past decade and a half, U.S. Jewry has experienced an enormous growth of family foundations. The names are well known: the Bronfman families, Steinhardt, Wexner, Mandel, the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Foundation, Crown (the Covenant Foundation), the various Scheuer foundations, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, Koret, and on and on. Family foundations have grown out of a desire to exercise direct control over donations ("donor-directed" giving) and a lack of connectedness on the part of many families of wealth with the Jewish community in the first place. Many of these give primarily or exclusively to Jewish causes; others (Cummings is a good example) give to Jewish causes only if some other interest of the foundation is implicated. The family foundations are loosely organized under the umbrella of the **Jewish Funders Network**, an increasingly important philanthropic organization which seeks help Jewish grant makers be more effective and strategic in their grant making. It has over 850 members – providing them with leadership, programs, and information – and its corpus is in the billions.

An issue that has achieved salience on the American Jewish communal agenda is that of remembrance of the Holocaust. The proliferation of instrumentalities for commemorating the Destruction of European Jewry – the **United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.**, the **Shoah Foundation** (to collect survivors' oral histories), Holocaust museums in many cities around the country, Holocaust memorials, research facilities at a number of universities – attest to the place of the Holocaust in the consciousness of American Jews, rivaling that of Israel. Salient amongst these in the late 1990's and the first decade of the twenty-first century are the outrages of Swiss gold, looted art, and the cynical cooperation of neutral countries with the Nazi regime; and the disposal of material assets (such as properties) in Germany. **The American Gathering and Federation of Jewish Holocaust Survivors**, established in 1980 as an umbrella for a number of organizations of Holocaust survivors, is the central coordinating body for Holocaust-related activity in the United States. Noteworthy as well is the **International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors**, founded in 1981. The Network has provided the means for "Second-Generation" groups around the world to have a voice in Jewish affairs.

Across the "issues-map," agencies such as the **New Israel Fund**, with innovative approaches to Israel-based philanthropy; **Mazon**, to combat hunger in America; the **American Jewish World Service**, for social-service needs internationally; the **Wiesenthal Center**, to give an "edgier" profile of antisemitism; and the **Coalition on the Environment and Jewish Life**; **Maayan**, exploring a range of issues on the agenda of Jewish women, and supporting studies on the role of women in Jewish organizational life; the **Joshua Venture**, looking at new vehicles for cultural expression; the **Jewish Fund for Justice**, supporting social and economic needs in the USA – these are but a few examples of the numerous emerging or "gadfly" voices in the Jewish community.

Finally, the religious expression of American Jews has been influenced by the "Jewish-Renewal" movement, which began in the late 1960s with the founding of three *havurot* – prayer fellowships – in Boston, New York, and Washington, DC. There is no institutional expression for the *havura* and post-*havura* arena other than the individual congregations and occasional conclaves of *havurot*.

3.4 JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

3.4.1 Canada

The organization of Jewish life in Canada is well-structured with strong national governance and a healthy regional/local partnership. Organizational life however has witnessed a

number of significant changes in the 1990s and into the current decade. They are similar, on some level to those that occurred in the US, with major transformations involving the community's primary funding source, and not surprisingly, due to independent moves of major private donors in avenues that are most effective in their eyes. While in the US this meant a transformation of the donation structure, in Canada it meant both a transformation of the donation structure as well as the donation structure shifting transforming its focus, agenda to fit with those of the major donors.

The **UIA/Federations Canada** is the primary funding source, with fundraising and community development at the core of its objectives. It raises funds from communities both for local and Israel needs. It is functionally similar to the UJC in the United States, and in June 1998 had a merger between the United Israel Appeal of Canada Inc., and the Council of Jewish Federations of Canada similar to that which took place between the UJA and Federations in the US in 1999.

In the realms of politics, defense, and communal advocacy, Canada's organizational has historically been noted for the primarily unified voice of the Jewish community (unlike the mentioned cacophony of voices that exist in the United States.) Throughout the 20th century, this major voice was the **Canadian Jewish Congress** established in 1919. It is democratically elected and serving as the community's vehicle for defense and representation, based in Ottawa with regional offices throughout Canada's provinces, and is overwhelmingly funded by UIA/Federations Canada. The secondary voice in this realm is **Bnai Brith Canada**, established in 1975, which is independently funded and tends to take a more conservative stance than the CJC. The relationship between CJC and Bnai Brith has traditionally been a competitive one.

In the area of Israel relations and advocacy, the **Canada-Israel Committee** was Canada's key player. CIC looks to promote the Canada-Israel relationship and addresses matters of Arab-Israel relations in Canada. It communicates regularly with members of parliament, senators, federal civil servants, provincial and municipal governments, journalists, academics and others who have an impact on public opinion in Canada. It too is funded by UIA/Federations Canada. However, since 2001 and the start of the recent intifada, governance, responsibility and structure has been changed drastically. Spurred on by an increase antisemitism and overall discomfort amongst all echelons in Canada's Jewish community, some of Canada most influential Jews thought the existing structure to be inefficient in combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish communal advocacy in Canada. These leaders moved to create a new organization, more powerful in Israel advocacy, similar to the AIPAC model in the United States, and more effective in defense and communal advocacy.

The result was the creation of the Israel Emergency Cabinet, later called **Canada Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy**. Due to the leaders involved, some already involved in communal life, others not, the new organization threatened to sway dollars from the current UIA/Federation and its funded political, defense, and advocacy arms. The UIA/Federation managed to incorporate CIJA under its umbrella six months after its creation yet upon the heavy condition that CIJA be given primary dominance and authority in these areas.

The incorporation usurped much of the power of the CJC, and restructuring has caused disagreement between many in the CJC leadership and those implementing the change. The independent Bnai Brith Canada has remained relatively untouched by the transformation and continues to be the competitive yet weaker voice to now both CIJA and CJC. The CIC, on the other hand, is incorporated into the responsibility of CIJA, with its funding now being channeled through CIJA which has oversight on its activity.

Many questions remain with the restructuring. In addition to questions of effectiveness and the impact of disagreement on the overall community, what remains is the impact of the shift on issues of identity and connectedness. With finite organizational focus and resources shifting towards the area of Israel and Jewish advocacy and defense, will internal issues in the Canadian Jewish community be short-changed? What impact will it have on initial signs of assimilation in

Canada, such as a rise in intermarriage? As of this point, no study exists tracking the development of Jewish identity and connectedness in Canada, similar to National Jewish Population Survey in the US. How will the shift provide for the external and internal health of the Jewish community with its finite resources?

3.4.2 Europe

a. Pan-European Organizations

The critical issues in Europe are to what extent European communities on the whole are represented and secondly is there one European voice that can address the newly enlarged and increasingly volatile European Union. The interaction of the European agencies provides a vehicle for examining the dynamics of governance in Europe. These dynamics are played out in the question of which agencies have an impact – and, more important, which do *not* – in Europe. The answer increasingly depends on the strength of the leadership of these groups, in which “interlocking directorates” are often found. A key example is that of the European Council of Jewish Communities, which has long been the coordinating body for Jewish-social-service delivery in Europe and closely aligned with the JDC. The “Joint” itself, however, functions in Western Europe on a very minimal basis – very little in France and Great Britain, small activity in Spain – and is active mostly in Eastern Europe and the countries of the FSU. The JDC's visibility, in turn, is via the ECJC. The “Joint” itself has been dependent on the Claims Conference to finance its activities in Eastern Europe and former Soviet lands, especially Ukraine, as well as from the UJC and Keren Hayesod. Much of the funds deriving from the sale of Jewish properties in Germany are being used to finance JDC projects in Eastern Europe. Critically missing is a strong organization able to act with and against and lobby the European Union and its constituent bodies. Similarly lacking is a strong pan European effort to deal with common issues such as rising antisemitism, an increasingly aggressive and expanding Moslem presence and the presentation of Israel in the media.

The key Jewish organizational voices in Europe are the **European Jewish Congress**, the **European Council of Jewish Communities**, the **World Jewish Congress**, the **American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee**, and the **American Jewish Committee**. The active presence of American and Israeli (such as the **Jewish Agency for Israel**) organizations in the representation of European Jewish interests points to a persisting gap between ambitions and goals, and operational effectiveness among native European Jews. There are numerous other agencies in Europe, but an examination of these and others will elicit important observations about governance and the flow of power in European Jewry.

The Paris-based **European Jewish Congress** is one of the main European organizations operating in foreign, political and public affairs, and serves as the spokesman for Europe's Jewry in these matters. Established in 1986, it constitutes an autonomous regional branch of the World Jewish Congress. The EJC was previously the European Branch of the World Jewish Congress. The EJC incorporates 38 Jewish organizations (most of them umbrella organizations) from all EU states and also Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, the Baltic States, Croatia, the states of former Yugoslavia, Gibraltar, Turkey and Monaco. Since the eruption of the anti-Semitic tirade in 2000, the EJC has been particularly active (usually with its parent organization the World Jewish Congress) in efforts to thwart it. Its activity focused on interacting with the EU's various institutions, and the heads of the various states. The ECJ has also been active in establishing a dialogue with the Catholic Church.

The **European Council for Jewish Communities (ECJC)**, established in 1968, is the coordinating and planning body for social-welfare services, education, and culture for the European communities. The organization was founded in 1968 by the Western European communities, to interact with the communities of East Europe, especially on matters of welfare and education. During the '90s, after the collapse of the communist bloc, the ECJC was joined by organizations of Jewish communities from other countries, including the former communist bloc.

The change in the ECJC's composition led to a change in its objectives. In addition to providing welfare, education and culture, it took upon itself the role of developing the communities and restoring Jewish property from the Nazi period. Since the European GA sponsored by the ECJC in 2004, its headquarters have moved to London. The (mainly financial) support for the ECJC comes from American Jewish organizations, with which the ECJC began to develop ties: the Joint Distribution Agency, the American Jewish Community, Bnai Brith and the Presidents' Conference.

At the beginning of 2004 the ECJC consisted of 70 organizations from 41 states, including all western, central and eastern European states, some former Soviet Union states (including Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan), Turkey and Tunis. Morocco has an observer's status at this stage. The organizations are not homogenous: most of those from western and central Europe are welfare organizations. Only few states are represented by one umbrella organization, or by a number of organizations.

The symbiotic relationship between the ECJC and the Joint Distribution Committee is played out in the **General Assembly of European Jewry**, jointly convened by the two bodies, the third of which was held in May, 2004, in Budapest. The GA is another vehicle through which the JDC shows its presence via the ECJC. The GA has yet to become a true policy and decision-making body, with international impact.

The Conference of European Rabbis (CER) consists of the rabbinic organizations in England, France, Germany, Holland, Italy and Russia, and private members from 20 states. It is presently headed by France's chief rabbi. The Conference of European Rabbis has filled a vacuum, and in the 1980s, owing to the presence of strong individuals in the rabbinic leadership, was able to effect such watershed events as the visit of Pope John Paul II to the Great Synagogue in Rome. The CER deals with the communities' religious and halakhic affairs and convenes once a year. It holds meetings on specific halakhic issues with various Jewish bodies, such as the problem of *agunot* (abandoned women who cannot get divorced due to their husbands' disappearance or refusal) held in Zurich in 2003.

Highly-significant in terms of the nature and quality of its research on European affairs is the **Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)**; formerly the Institute for Jewish Affairs – IJA). Headquartered in London, the IJA produces high-level reports on Jewish demography, culture, antisemitism, and political matters relating to European Jewry.

Also filling the political vacuum is the **American Jewish Committee**. The European desk of the AJC – an agency that has in recent years become identified with its European agenda, a radical departure from the Committee of most of the twentieth century has achieved a measure of success, and considerable visibility, by the many missions it conducts and the access to European governments it has assiduously cultivated. The AJC has forged strong links with many government officials in Western and Central Europe, and, equally important, can call on all Jewish leadership to confer and consult on a range of issues.

b. Local Jewish Communities

Most European Jewish communities have a similar hierarchical model of Jewish organizations with a generally recognized Chief Rabbi. Jewish communities have umbrella organizations that represent the community in public-affairs work. The "board-of-deputies" model is one that is found in the English-speaking world (for example, the Board of Deputies of British Jews), France's CRIF, Italy's UCEI, and other national councils are examples as well. Zionist federations are active in most countries. There are a few large welfare organizations in each locale such as Jewish Care in the UK.

There are three large umbrella organizations of France's Jewish community. The **Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF)** is the main political umbrella organization officially representing all the Jewish organizations to the French government. It was established during the Vichy regime in 1944.

The **Concistoire Israelite de France** is responsible for the Jewish communities' religious and ritual affairs. It supervises the Chief Rabbinate, the Rabbinical Court and the Rabbinical Seminar. It was established in 1808 by order of Napoleon and is recognized by the state.

The **Fonds Social Juif Unifié** coordinates and supervises all the Jewish community's cultural, educational and social affairs.

The main representative institution the **United Kingdom** is the **Board of Deputies of British Jews** founded in 1760. It is composed of synagogue delegates from all religious denominations, as well as delegates from other organizations and interest groups such as, most recently, Jewish Care. The Board of Deputies acts as the voice of British Jewry and speaks on behalf of the community.

The **United Synagogue** is the largest synagogue grouping consisting of 64 synagogues in Greater London and associated synagogues in the provinces. It is mainstream Orthodox. The current Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Professor Rabbi Jonathan Sachs, is formally the religious head of the United Synagogue and also is the spiritual head of British Jewry. Alongside the **Chief Rabbinate** is the *Beth Din* (Court of the Chief Rabbi) that acts as the religious court for mainstream Jewry. Also prominent is the United Jewish Israel Appeal which not only is the communal fundraising vehicle for Israel but also actively involved in Jewish renewal.

Germany's Jews are organized in 86 official communities (*gemeinden*), which constitute corporations that are eligible to government assistance by law. The official body representing all the communities is the *Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland* (the Central Council of the Jews in Germany). The Council interacts with the various government officials in charge of the compensation for Holocaust victims and foreign relations.

A similar structure appears in the communities of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and Scandinavia.

Communities in **Eastern Europe** are largely following the pattern of other more established communities in the west with one central communal organization and a chief Rabbi. A number of international organizations are active in establishing Jewish communal life. Notable amongst these are the JDC, Lauder Foundation, World Ort and Chabad as described above.

Some 230 Jewish organizations function in the **Russian Federation**. Most of them come under the auspices of various Jewish umbrella organizations of who the three largest representative organizations are: **REK (Rossiiskii Evreiskii Kongress)** – the Jewish Russian Congress. This was founded on January 30th 1996 by a group of wealthy Jews. Most of its activities are in the realms of education and welfare. One of the branches of this umbrella organization is the **KEROOR organization (Kongress Evreiskih Religioznih Organizatzi I Obedinenii Rossii)** – The Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Jewish Communities in Russia. **FEOR (Federatziia Evreiskih Obschin Rossii)** – the **Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia**. This was founded at the end of 1999 by the Jewish (Israeli) mogul, Lev Leviev, on the principals adopted by the Chabad movement and on the initiative of the President of Russia.

In early 2002 another large umbrella organization known as **EAJC (Evroasiatski Evreiskii Kongress - the Euro-Asiatic Jewish Congress)** was established on the initiative and funding of Aleksander Mashkewitz, a financial magnate from Kazakhstan, aiming to represent Soviet Jewry, South-East Asian Jewry and even the Australian Jews at the World Jewish Congress.

Approximately 210 Jewish organizations and communities are registered in some 120 towns with a Jewish population in the **Ukraine**. These organizations and communities are assembled under many umbrella organizations, notably the **Federation of Jewish Communities**, the **Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities**, and the **Jewish Confederation**.

3.4.3 Latin America

Latin American Jewry is characterized by a network of organizations including culture and sports, community centers, synagogues, health and welfare institutions, and youth clubs. Umbrella organizations exist in each country, while the Latin American Jewish Congress, a branch of the World Jewish Congress represents all the Latin American communities. Its main activities are fighting anti-Semitism. Unlike Europe, community centers play a central role in communal life both in terms of organizational politics and also activities. Sporting activities and country clubs are prominent too.

In Argentina the **Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA) – the Delegation of Argentine Jewish Institutions** is the main Jewish political organization, representing the communities and organizations before the Argentinean authorities, and the **Asociación Mutualista Israelita Argentina (AMIA) – the Argentinean Jewry Mutual Aid Association**. This organization is involved in the religious, social and cultural activity of the Ashkenazi community and with relief and welfare issues. The **Zionist Federation** and its institutions are active throughout Argentina.

In Brazil the community structure in Brazil is federative and reflects the Brazilian federal structure. A federation of Jewish organizations exists in each state in Brazil. The **Confederación Israelita do Brazil (CONIB - The Jewish Confederation of Brazil)** is the Brazilian umbrella organization. It amalgamates 200 groups, institutions and organizations involved in Zionist activity, education, culture and so on. Most of the Jewish activity occurs in social clubs such as **Hebraica**.

In Mexico the **Comite Central Israelita (The Central Jewish Committee)** represents all the communities in Mexico is an umbrella organization of all Mexican Jewry representing the political interests of the entire community, responsible for foreign relations and for coordinating the activities of its organizations. **Tribuna Israelita** is the main operational arm of the Central Jewish Committee. It nurtures the connections between the community and the majority population, assures its public relations, executes a variety of projects with universities and government offices and monitors manifestations of anti-Semitism. Almost all the Jews in Mexico City are members of the **Centro Deportivo Israelita** (the Jewish Sports Center). It has about 27,000 members, i.e., close to 70% of all Mexican Jewry.

3.4.4 Africa and Australia

Australia is a State-based country with a federal system of government and this structure is mirrored in the Jewish community. There are representative councils and/or Boards of Deputies as well as comprehensive communal infrastructures in most States and urban centers of Jewish population. At the national level the communal structure is considered by most to be weaker and less important.

The three main national organizations are the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), the Australia-Israel Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and the Zionist Federation. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry is an umbrella organization with delegates from the State and local Boards of Deputies, Jewish Community Councils and eight major communal organizations such as WIZO and Bnei Brith. The Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) is the premier public affairs organization. The Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) is very active promoting Israel and Zionist activities also through its local constituent Zionist councils. It is also the lead institution working with the schools and youth movements. The United Israel Appeal of Australia is the only general national fund raising campaign.

In **South Africa**, the central organization of the Jewish community is the **South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD)** which acts as the representative assembly of the community and maintains the official ties with the authorities. The SAJBD was instrumental in the

establishment of the African Jewish Congress and with providing Sub-Saharan communities with assistance and support. The Congress co-ordinates the cultural, religious and social activities of these communities.

The **Union of Orthodox Synagogues (UOS)** is the roof organization of most of the Orthodox congregations. It also appoints the Chief Rabbi and finances its office and that of the Beth Din. The Community Security Organization (CSO) was set up to counteract the threats and attacks to property and persons. The most prominent Zionist organization is the Zionist Federation of South Africa (ZF) which at one time was the leading Jewish institution in the community.

3.5 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Since World War II, the organizational structure of the Jewish people in the Diaspora has become more cohesive. In most communities (Australia, Brazil and the U.S. being exceptions), there is a clearly defined hierarchical structure with fewer central, yet more powerful, representative organizations and a chief rabbi. Even the U.S. Jewish community, with its strong local organizational infrastructure, is becoming more effective at the national level, with a select number of representative organizations such as the Conference of Presidents, AIPAC, the UJC and AJC.

However, at the international level, the Jewish community is less unified. There are a plethora of international Jewish organizations, yet no one body that can speak for the Jewish People globally. Indeed, it may be argued that the global dispersion of the Jewish people creates diversities of interests and perspectives, and also conflicts of interest, thus precluding a strong global structure. One case in point is the different assessment of preferred strategies and objectives in the highly delicate issue of reparations to Shoah survivors, including insurance policies, Swiss banks accounts, etc. Another is the emergence of mega donors who have set up their own organizations "outside the system" and attempt to influence communal agendas by virtue of their economic weight.

One of the related reasons for the lack of organizational affectivity at some levels is leadership. There are some significant organizations who have reached prominence largely through the charisma and drive of their individual leaders and others who are far less effective only because of the weakness of their leadership. This is the case even in North America where there are training facilities for leadership development. In the rest of the world, the quality of leadership development is even more worrisome.

The Jewish people constitute a fluid, voluntary and self-organizing system that consists of some central, and many local and sectorial, institutions. Yet, there are few organizations that view the Jewish people from a global perspective. Two prominent examples are the Jewish Agency, as the global platform of the Jewish people, and the World Jewish Congress (with its network of affiliates in Europe, Latin America and the FSU) as a political instrument. Neither they nor any other organization, however, represent the Jewish people in its totality. Many international Jewish institutions, such as Bnei Brith, Keren Hayesod, WIZO, HIAS, the Conference on Material Jewish Claims against Germany and the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) are concerned with particular issues and spheres of activity.

In addition, a number of large American organizations have a global focus, e.g. the UJC, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, AIPAC, ADL, the Joint Distribution Committee, the American Jewish Committee, Hillel and Hadassah. Similarly there are both Israeli-based organizations that are concerned with the Diaspora (focusing on Jewish and Zionist education, aliyah, religious life, philanthropy) and Diaspora-based institutions that are focused on support for, and interest in, Israel. Interestingly enough, with the formation of the UJC, an Overseas Needs Assessment and Disbursement Committee (ONAD) was established. Thus,

Israel's once separated and privileged status was downgraded and became part of a generic "overseas" rubric.

While there is significant cross-fertilization, a common global Jewish agenda that unites all these organizations and their activities is lacking. Some key issues, such as support for Israel and its representation in the media, antisemitism, the revival of Jewish life in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the distribution of reparations and restitution funding, are of common concern to world Jewry. However, the strategic priorities and the policies to achieve them are sometimes deeply different and express very different ideal assumptions and goals and more specific conflicts of interests between the various organizations. Organizations in the Diaspora tend to focus on problems such as Jewish continuity, Jewish education, assimilation and welfare services that are often common in most communities, but essentially local in scope.

The religious organizations are among the most focused and globally oriented. The Orthodox Union, Chabad, Reform and Conservative movements aim to propagate their respective religious styles and messages throughout the larger Jewish community.

Efforts have been made to address the model of the Israel-Diaspora connection, which has traditionally been parochial in nature, based to a large extent on uni-directional philanthropy rather than true partnership. Some attempts have been made to revise this model and develop a greater sense of mutuality in which contributions from all sides complement each other. The first successful example of partnership – Project Renewal in the early 1980s – has since been superseded by Partnership 2000. This partnership is based on the establishment of a network of sister communities in the Diaspora and Israel. Other significant examples include People to People, the Israel Experience and Birthright.

On a regional level, the lack of an effective pan-European Jewish lobby and umbrella organization (other than the European Jewish Congress and the European Council of Jewish Communities) is of great concern, particularly in an era in which an expanded European Union is interested in playing an increasingly visible role in Middle-Eastern affairs and combating antisemitism.

Generally speaking, organizational pluralism and the absence of over-arching structures facilitate the expression of diverse sectors and interests. Having said that, excess competition, scarce coordination and complex interaction patterns hinder the ability of a global Jewish organizational infrastructure to effectively serve the Jewish people.

4. STRATEGIC CHALLENGES: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION⁹¹

4.1 OVERALL BALANCE

Multiple factors are at work in the direction of a thriving Jewish people, including:

- Strength of spiritual values and sense of mission;
- Widespread commitment to Jewishness;
- Much soft and hard power;
- Outstanding human resources;
- Improvements in Jewish education;
- Positive effects of globalization;
- Economic assets and philanthropy;
- Cultural creativity;
- Impressive self-organizing institutional structure;
- Devoted leadership.

However, opposite trends clearly move in the direction of decline. Foremost among them are the threats to Israel's security and to large parts of the Jewish people everywhere. In particular, we are confronted with an existential threat that manifests itself in the growing ability of fewer and fewer to kill more and more, the rise of Islamic aggressive fundamentalism and increasing violent antisemitism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass killing in the hands of anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli actors.

Equally worrying is the significant threat to the Jewish character of Israel because of demographic trends and some social and ideological developments, accompanied by bitter disagreements. A recent survey highlighted that about a quarter of all Israeli Jewish youth wish to live abroad; although this survey reflects attitudes rather than concrete intentions, the findings are nevertheless ominous. This attitude among Israeli Jewish youth reinforces the situation outside of Israel, where a considerable number of the younger generation of Jews are losing interest in, and have a weaker identification with, Israel.

No less dangerous are the demographic decline of the Jewish people in both absolute and relative numbers, identificational drift, large scale out-marriages, decreasing involvement in community activities and adoption of post-modern values.

Adding up these and additional trends, as discussed in this volume, leads to the following overall evaluation:

The survival of the Jewish people is not assured, though there are great opportunities for a thriving future. Therefore, determined and large-scale efforts are needed to maximize the opportunities and ward off the dangers. Doing so requires significant resources, judicious coping with critical decisions and a careful crafting of long-term grand-policies.

It is impossible to summarize in a few words the manifold findings of this volume, but a first cut cannot avoid mentioning the following top priorities on the Jewish agenda:

- Acting to rescue Jewish communities that are still endangered in their current locations, e.g. Iran, and ensuring personal security for Jews worldwide;
- Managing Jewish sovereignty, finding the balance between preserving crucial assets in the domain of security and realpolitical interests of the Jewish state, maintaining enlightened Jewish human and social values, and deepening the ties between Israel and the Diaspora;
- Achieving peace and security for Israel;

⁹¹This section was mainly written by Yehezkel Dror, Sergio DellaPergola, Michael Weil, Morton Weinfeld, Amos Gilboa.

- Encouraging Jewish cultural and demographic continuity, strengthening Jewish identity, knowledge, self-respect and participation, and sustaining Jewish population resilience and the natural process of generational replacement;
- Harnessing Jewish unity and solidarity, encouraging internal Jewish dialogue, mutual understanding and tolerance, consensus building and common action in the spirit of *clal Israel*, the communal Jewish family, while not ignoring a wide spectrum of Jewish ideas and forms of expression;
- Confronting hostility toward Jews, explaining the Jewish position and tackling all forms of intolerance and physical aggression that persist from the past or proliferate in the present;
- Projecting Jewish values, encouraging the study of Jewish heritage, and engaging in *Tikkun Olam* – making a uniquely Jewish contribution to the welfare and enlightenment of world society;
- Developing Jewish human resources of the highest quality that will take the lead in accomplishing these tasks.

Ideally, these challenges should be understood, analyzed and met through a holistic approach that integrates the interests of the Jews in Israel and in the Diaspora, where a majority still resides.

4.2 THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ON THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND JUDAISM

4.2.1 Critical Events and Trends

External factors profoundly affect the central challenges facing the Jewish world in the Diaspora and Israel. The impact of recent trends is analyzed for a medium-term time frame of 5–10 years. Many exogenous factors do not directly influence the Jewish world: major environmental or bio-medical events, like global warming or epidemics of new diseases (AIDS, SARS, etc.). These affect all humankind with no particular impact on the Jewish people.

Relevant external factors are of two types:

- Longer term geopolitical and sociocultural trends in the non-Jewish world that affect both Jewish security and Jewish identity concerns.
- Specific events and “ruptures” that primarily affect the security of Jews, such as the eruption in 2000 of the current Palestinian uprising, the collapse of the Oslo peace process, 9/11, the war on terror and the American campaign in Iraq.

External trends influence five main dimensions in which the Jewish people operate. On balance, these developments are more a matter for concern than satisfaction:

- Physical security of Jews: the globalization and diffusion of ethnic, religious and political conflicts blurs the boundary between the frontline and rear, and exposes Jews to violence and hatred;
- Socioeconomic and political status of Jews in their respective countries: Jews are successfully represented in intellectual, cultural and decision-making elites, reflecting growing acceptance by the majority, but tend not to appear as proponents of a distinct Jewish message. Socioeconomic deprivation is on the rise in some communities, including Israel;
- Jewish identity and Jewish communal vitality: Jewish population stagnation and aging, reflected in a weakened propensity to identify and affiliate, and translating into a diminishing share of total society, threaten or hinder the ability of Jews to maintain an effective cultural presence and defend community interests;
- Unity of the Jewish people and the interrelationship between the Diaspora and Israel: notwithstanding the extensive amount of interaction between distant sections of world Jewry, the pressures of current processes and events often lead to internal tensions, disagreements and competition rather than to a sense of unity and purpose that translates into concerted action;

- Jewish creativity and culture: impressive socioeconomic advances and acceptance are not equally matched by remarkable achievements in Jewish cultural creativity that bear relevance to civilization as a whole.

The following twelve longer-term global processes lie at the foundation of these developments and crucially affect the specific environments in which world Jewry exists:

a. The interdependence, fluidity and unpredictability of the international environment

- A basic feature emerging in the world system – in tandem with key, relatively stable trends – is its general fluidity and unpredictability. Global integration and the interdependence of forces operating at distant points on the planet produces a seemingly paradoxical mix of effects on Jewish individuals and communities: greater independence combined with greater dependency on external trends.

b. Geopolitical shifts

- Within a fluid global geopolitical equilibrium featuring one single superpower, old conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one, do not seem to be finding a resolution as new conflicts arise. These conflicts can mutually feed off each other.
- The new world order, with the U.S. as the leader in the war on global terror, increases the political influence of U.S. Jewry and strengthens Israel strategically, but at the same time creates a trilateral (U.S.-Israel-Jewish) axis hated by large sections of the developing world.
- The demise of the Soviet Union, and its aftermath, is still strongly felt nearly fifteen years later. Primary consequences include Russian Jewish migration; the huge contribution of human capital from the FSU to Israeli society; the establishment of large Russian-speaking communities in the U.S. and Germany; the renewal of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe; the emergence of out-marriages in Israel; acute problems of personal status and religious conversion in Israel. Within a fluid global geopolitical equilibrium featuring one single superpower, old conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one, do not seem to be finding a resolution as new conflicts arise. These conflicts can mutually feed off each other.
- The expansion and consolidation of the European Union creates new opportunities for the political integration, social mobility and cultural expression of European Jewry – particularly those from Eastern Europe, subsequent to accession in May 1, 2004. It also poses a double challenge: the need to build an effective pan-European Jewish community organization and leadership, and the need to find an appropriate mode of discourse at the institutional level in the EU.
- Arab control of oil resources hampers U.S. global influence and may detrimentally affect American-Israeli relations.
- A large Islamic country, Pakistan, already holds nuclear capabilities. The effort to obtain nuclear weapons persists in Iran, and other countries, as well as on the part of terrorist groups. Israel is an obvious target of unconventional threats, as well as the U.S. and its large Jewish population.
- The events of 9/11, 2001, and the recurring impact of Al-Qaeda, demonstrate that fewer can kill more.
- The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the American occupation of Iraq removed a danger on the Eastern front and strengthened Israel’s strategic position. The long-term consequences of American occupation (in terms of actual or perceived success/failure) are not yet clear.
- The accelerated increase in economic and political power that is taking place in China, and, to some extent, India, occurs in societies virtually free of a Jewish presence and uninfluenced by Biblical images of the Jewish people.

c. Arab-Israeli conflict

- Seemingly permanent turmoil in the Middle East continuously polarizes attention in a dynamic world, tarnishing Israel's image and international standing, and adding pressure on Diaspora Jews.
- Escalation of the conflict with the Palestinians engenders new modes of violence that are difficult to effectively confront. The consequences project not only on political values, but on basic human outlook as well.
- The weakening of the capacity for an Arab conventional attack is counterbalanced by the proliferation of non-conventional weapons.
- The U.S.'s pro-Israel leanings antagonize other countries, including some in the West, thus generating hostility against Jewish communities.

d. Demographic trends

- The rapid demographic growth in less developed societies, including Moslem countries, and the prolonged slowdown in natural population growth in most western societies, alters the global demographic balance, particularly in Europe and North America. There is a constant decline in the demographic share of the more economically developed countries where most of world Jewry reside.
- The negative natural increase among the general European population creates a significant demand for foreign workers, stimulates large-scale immigration, partially from Moslem countries generating ethnic and religious cleavages in predominantly Christian and secular societies. This may strongly and negatively impact on the Jewish presence locally.
- Aside from creating a dramatic imbalance between the young and old, the erosion of the conventional nuclear family effects a deeper transformation in traditional basic social norms, and reflects a pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future.
- Moslem migrants, especially in Western Europe, have provided the infrastructure for spreading anti-Jewish violence. Socioeconomic deprivation, coupled with pre-existing xenophobia among the veteran population, induces many of the migrants to support fundamentalist Islam as an expression of collective identity, and of the dilemmas and tensions of being a Moslem in a modern Western country.

e. Science and technology

- Knowledge is an increasingly important foundation for competitiveness and power and a key driver for other changes. This provides great opportunities for the Jewish people, but also harbors some dangers.
- 21st-century technologies allow for consolidating the links between distant Jewish communities in the Diaspora and Israel. This is feasible by aggregating and exchanging information, meeting visually and interacting personally, confronting crises, improving information, education and scientific research on Jewish themes, developing databases, broadening cultural experiences, and adopting more pluralistic cultural outlooks.
- New technologies have radically altered the nature of economic activity, information, and potentially, education.

f. Cyberspace and distance transformation

- Cyberspace generates radical changes in the meaning of distance and creates new arenas with open-ended and, as yet, unclear potential;
- It enabled intensive interaction, strong epistemic communities and cost-effective and user-friendly opportunities for learning.

- Enhanced communication networks serve terrorist purposes by augmenting the potential for destruction through diffusion of knowledge, logistical support and international connections.
- The same technology serves the propagation of antisemitism, given the global accessibility of ideas and visual symbols.

g. Cultural shifts and community values

- The emerging trend of greater individualism at the expense of community solidarity projects problematic impacts on particularistic cultures, community (including Jewish) commitments and membership, and the family.
- Post-modern values question some of the basic assumptions underlying the existing system of religious and national identities, and deeply affect behaviors in the personal, family and social spheres.
- In western countries, a renewed search for meaning related to post-materialism drives people to either greater fundamentalist manifestations of identity and ties within established religious movements, or away from the Judaic and Christian mainstream, in favor of more exotic cults and cultures.
- Greater openness toward the "other" and cultural pluralism allow recognition of Jewish symbols and spaces in general culture and policies. Examples include the establishment of days of Shoah remembrance and events dedicated to Jewish culture in most EU countries.

h. Islam

- The perception of a "clash of civilizations" between Islam, particularly in its radical and fundamentalist forms, and Christianity, as the prevalent religion in the West, has offered – and to some extent imposed upon – Jews the opportunity to identify with the West, where most of them reside. The concept of a Judeo-Christian alliance has been sometimes stressed. Jews, especially in the U.S. and Israel, made the obvious comparison between the terror acts of 9/11 and suicide bombings in Israel, both initiated by fundamentalist Moslems. Yet this perception is not free of substantial problems, which call for a balanced Jewish response, between engagement and disengagement.
- Within Islam, a crisis emanates from the conflict between traditionalism and modernity, and between globalization and tribalism.
- In the struggle between moderate and fundamentalist Islam, the latter is gathering momentum.
- An antisemitic world outlook has emerged, particularly among fundamentalist Moslem organizations. Distinctly different from traditional Islamic anti-Jewish attitudes, this manifestation of antisemitism emphasizes the Israeli-Arab conflict, from both a religious and ideological perspective. It embraces the struggle against Judaism as a primary element in the struggle between Islam and western civilization.
- Islamic terrorist organizations envisage a common enemy in the U.S. and Israel, but also in the Judeo-Christian world at large. Judaism becomes entangled with Christianity in the historical struggle between Islam and Christianity.
- Jewish organizations the world over have become targets of terrorist attacks. The required defensive alignment is much more complex than against "conventional" antisemitic events, and requires substantial means and new counter-strategies.

i. Christianity

- The Christian world is in turn affected by trends in the Moslem world, and directs its policies towards Middle Eastern populations and communities, so as to avoid endangering the interest of Christian minorities. This implies that a precarious blend of attitudes and

political measures is often adopted that may compromise Jewish and Israeli interests in the area.

- The more relevant change in the Christian world concerns the intensive policies that Pope John Paul II adopted regarding the Jewish people and Israel. Beginning with the historical, unprecedented visit of the Pope to the Great Synagogue, and his meeting with Chief Rabbi Toaff in Rome in 1986, important steps were initiated through the document on antisemitism, the document on the Shoah, the new Catechism and a reassessment of the responsibility for the crucifixion of Christ, and recognition of the state of Israel to bring Christendom closer to the Jewish world. The Pope's visit to Israel in the year 2000 was the climax of this intricate process. However, support for the new course within the Catholic Church is not unanimous. The consequences for the interfaith dialogue are not yet clear.
- Evangelical churches (primarily consisting of fundamentalist Protestants) develop a warm and supportive attitude to the Jews and the state of Israel, largely as an expression of their Messianic beliefs and their recognition of the role the Jewish people play as an intermediary in the fulfillment of the gospel. At least in the short run, and perhaps more for tactical than for strategic reasons, these are favorable developments in the standing of the Jewish people and Judaism vis-à-vis Christian society, particularly in the United States.

j. **Antisemitism and the emergence of new forms of Judeophobia**

- Antisemitic rhetoric and action, in its classic and modern manifestations, attacks Jewish targets, assets and symbols – including the perception of a sovereign Jewish state. A number of new antisemitic arguments and motifs have appeared: 1) denial of Israel's right to exist, ostensibly because of its "racist/colonialist character" and its "murderous attack on the Palestinians"; 2) delegitimation of the right of the Jewish people to a sovereign political framework; 3) denial of the Shoah.
- The flag bearers are Moslem fundamentalists, the extreme and less extreme left, and the extreme right. A coalition of these disparate groups demonstrated at the Durban conference against racism how opposing interests can coalesce around an anti-Israeli agenda. Some supporters of the anti-global movement view globalization as a manifestation of Jewish dominance on world affairs. The media's often limited, and frequently unilateral, reporting from the Middle East promotes a biased and oversimplified impression of a very complex conflict. A small-scale, but significant, development is virulent anti-Israelism with some antisemitic overtones among some academic circles.
- Both veteran and new forces stand behind these developments: Christian antagonism toward Jews perceived as the "other" and "different"; impatience towards the "strong and victorious" state of Israel, an image that stands in contrast to the traditional negative view of the weak and deprived Jew; the strong link between a Jewish Israel and the U.S.; the quest of the left and the right alike to find new adversaries; and the attitude of radical Islam towards Judaism spurring the growth of Islamic (as distinguished from Arab) antisemitism.
- As a result of these trends, Jews, especially in Europe, find themselves returning to a situation in which they are the object of hatred and violence. Following physical attack, destruction and damage of Jewish property, sentiments of fear spread throughout Jewish communities, primarily in Europe. Self-defense and patrols become a central topic in community discourse. On university campuses, Jewish students face a serious dilemma.
- Jews consider, and, to some extent, actually implement, emigration projects, especially in France: internally from more endangered areas, or internationally, to Israel and North

America. Migration may increase if antisemitic trends become more virulent and widespread.

- One important result of the new manifestations of antisemitism and Israel-linked Judeophobia is that the organized Jewish community, together with Israel, mobilizes against the new trend. Overwhelmed and embarrassed by the attitudes of European liberals who stand at the forefront of antisemitic/anti-Israeli activities, Jewish liberals, especially in France, tend to renew ties with the organized Jewish community.
- Empirical observations to date tend to validate the notion that antisemitism motivates an increase in Jewish identity and solidarity, rather than stimulating denial. However, the potential for "flight" and distancing from Jewish identity exists.
- At the same time, greater awareness in western societies of the symbolic and practical implications of the Shoah and of antisemitism translates into official governmental initiatives to incorporate the Jewish people into the mainstream of collective memory.

k. **Economic globalization**

- Economic enterprises, both small and large, which can operate globally, may draw advantages from globalization. National economies are less dependent upon local resources and more open, but also more vulnerable, to international competition. Globalization engenders significant potential advantages and some disadvantages for Israel's economic structure and for world Jewry's economic opportunities.
- Globalization will likely enhance international specialization, stratification and social dependency. It may impair social justice globally, which has generated violent anti-global reactions.
- The opening of national economies to international competition has had a disruptive effect on the Jewish middle class in certain countries, particularly in Latin America.

l. **Global governance**

- The continuation of unresolved political and security crises may lead to the emergence of more decisive global governance systems. Possible consequences of global governance range from less personal freedom for individuals to greater interdependence between national security systems.
- International organizations, such as the United Nations, influenced by the majority of member countries, exhibit a distinct bias against Israel.

4.2.2 **Opportunities and Challenges**

The forces of the external world pose both opportunities for, and threats to, the Jewish people.

Among the opportunities are:

- Most Jews currently find themselves living in the most powerful countries and cities in the developed world, combining wealth, military might, technological sophistication and political freedom. Jews in Diaspora communities are well suited, in terms of education, income, and position in key global industries, to defend Jewish interests. The Jewish people have at their disposal an enormous array of resources that can be mobilized to support Jewish identity and culture and defend Jewish communities against external threats.
- Globalization can enhance Jewish solidarity across Diaspora communities, and between them and Israel. Through networking, Diaspora communities can also become more effective.
- Traditional indications of antisemitism in North America continue to be weak.
- Western Jews continue to find themselves and their cultural attributes welcome. This can invigorate Jewish culture through innovation and creativity.

- Jews are well represented at the center of political and economic decision-making. They are also able to yield influence, although affected by global trends.
- The technological aspects of globalization can be harnessed to promote Jewish interests and cultural vitality, as well as a global and interdependent Jewish community.
- The defeat of Iraq and the war on terror in the short term improves Israel's strategic position.

But the dangers and challenges arising from these factors are formidable:

- A weakening in the power of the American hegemony, or in the West in general, or an increase in the manifestation of anti-Americanism, or a rift between the United States and Europe, would bode ill for the Jewish people and Israel. The outcome in Iraq may play a role here.
- The access of terrorist groups to unconventional weapons endangers the long-term security of Israel and Diaspora communities. Fewer individuals increasingly have the capacity to kill a greater number of victims with less effort and per capita cost.
- Natural demographic growth will take place primarily in non-western societies and populations. This is likely to precipitate instability and violence in developing countries, as well as population pressure in the West, resulting from migration flows. The latter is a cause for growing ethnic conflict and xenophobia in the West. Economic growth in China and India, and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass killing, may diminish western dominance. Moreover, the absolute and relative decline in Jewish populations will generate problems of critical mass, and will decrease Jewish influences in the political affairs of the respective countries.
- Patterns of Jewish geographic migration, resulting from the global market for educated labor, may work against Jewish community political and cultural interests.
- The increase of Moslem and Arab populations in Western Europe and North America poses challenges to the sociopolitical efficacy of Diaspora Jewry in defending Israel and related interests.
- The campaign to undermine the legitimacy of Israel is escalating, not only by Moslem radicals but by other segments of the Moslem and Arab world and by liberal factions in the West. One outcome of the campaign might be to alienate left-liberal Jews. This could weaken the links between Israel and Diaspora Jews. The new antisemitism demoralizes Diaspora Jews while the continuation of terrorist attacks may have similar effects in Israel.
- Post-modern individualism undermines Jewish identity and community as historically understood.
- Challenges to conventional Jewish family life, such as interfaith marriage, civil and religious gay marriage, and radical feminism, both within and without the synagogue, can also potentially lead to increasing tensions within the religious Jewish world, between Orthodox and non-Orthodox movements, in the Diaspora and in Israel.

A central challenge that continues to face world Jewry is how to maximize the benefits of external influences and participation in the global context, while minimizing the erosion of Jewish identity and commitment.

4.3 MAJOR INTERNAL TRENDS WITHIN THE JEWISH PEOPLE

Challenges to the existence and thriving of the Jewish people come also from the inside. They involve the ability to generate a recognizable and attractive culture, the ability to cope with and resolve disagreements on important matters of principle, the ability to organize internal defense from physical dangers and economic self-sustenance, and the ability to develop an adequate network of organizations to support meaningful internal interaction, to promote communication, and defend corporate interests toward the outside world.

4.3.1 Continuity and Identity

Jewishness has become more a question of choice than birth. Part of that choice is still expressed in a high adherence to Jewish tradition. But perceptions of the essence of Jewish identification tend to shift from a more conventional notion of Jewishness as a mode of being intimately related to a given set of beliefs and behaviors, to one in which Jewish identification is expressed by connecting, traveling, journeying, listening, or even surfing and zapping.

The Jewish people can be roughly divided into two distinct groups – the committed and the non-committed. The majority are less involved. Membership in Jewish organizations and institutions is dwindling.

As Jews become better integrated into the wider society, they tend to look outward and abandon their traditions. Most, however, still adhere to traditional rituals and rites of passage, such as *brith milah*, *bar mitzvah*, Passover Seder, Shabbat candle-lighting and so on, as evidenced in most major surveys conducted in Jewish communities. This phenomenon is probably more an expression of interest in Jewish culture and heritage and an acceptance of Jewish symbols, rather than an expression of Jewish religion and values. But for many, there is less involvement in Jewish causes and activities. Jews are less inclined to belong. As Jews get better educated and more professional, they manage their leisure time and spiritual and cultural interests accordingly. In particular, membership organizations are in rapid decline. Yet, many Jews are still interested but searching for new and alternative forms of Jewish engagement, e.g. studying the Kabala, listening to Klezmer music and so on.

Even amongst the less-involved majority, more Jews formally identify themselves as such. Recent censuses in Canada, the UK, South Africa and Australia show that the vast majority of the Jewish population formally answered the voluntary question on religion as "Jewish." However, when it comes to adherence to substance, Jews tend to identify more with universal values, issues and culture. Israel is a strong drawing force, but also a factor of divisiveness.

The committed minority, especially the religious, but also traditional and secular Jews, are better educated and more knowledgeable about Jewish matters than in the past. Attendance at Jewish day schools is increasing. Jewish adult education is expanding and the number of Jewish study programs, especially at universities, is growing. Jewish scholarship is flourishing in North America, Europe and Israel. Committed Jews, while constituting a smaller percentage in most communities, are becoming stronger. They are better educated than ever before (and many, if not most, have academic degrees) and are better versed in Jewish and religious matters.

The Orthodox and Haredim, in particular, are growing numerically and proportionally to the total Jewish community, and are increasing in strength both in the Diaspora and in Israel.

Support for Israel remains steadfast. In Israel, the vast majority identify themselves as Jews and to most, their Jewishness is important, although it is often not expressed through religious rituals. Assertively secular Israeli Jews are a relatively small minority and many search for some Jewish heritage and meaning.

The reasons for the decline in involvement are numerous:

- Jews are less often accused of dual loyalty and there are fewer barriers to acceptance in the general society;
- Assimilation and interfaith marriage mean that much of the next generation will have little or no Jewish background;
- The rise of individualism and the eclectic interpretation and redrafting of traditional social norms negatively impact on the propensity to seek individual and social identity in the Jewish community;
- The weakening of traditional family units, rise in divorce and the increase in single-parent families discourage involvement in Jewish community frameworks that are often family oriented;
- Absence or weakness in Jewish education and knowledge has led to lower Jewish identification;

- Jewishness has become more a matter of choice than birth;
- Jewishness does not appeal to, or engage, many Jews who can choose many cultural and social alternatives;
- Participation in the organized Jewish community involves a heavy cost.

Assimilation and, more specifically, interfaith marriage rates are on the rise in most communities outside of Israel. In one sense, interfaith marriage is a direct function of the degree of Jews' acceptance in their general communities. The consequences, however, are alarming, as on average half of all marriages take place outside the faith. In some communities, such as the FSU and Eastern Europe, the percentage exceeds 75%.

As out-marriage increases around the Jewish world, so does the number of non-core individuals increase, namely the non-Jewish spouses and offspring of Jews. While no accurate estimates of their number exist, they likely run into many millions. With concerted action, many non-core Jews could be brought into the fold of Judaism.

The last twenty years have brought a significant rise in enrollment at Jewish day schools (and a parallel decline in supplementary Jewish education) in Diaspora communities, as it has become clear that the home and the communal environment are insufficient in providing a solid Jewish background. The greatest increase is in the religious sector where enrollment is approaching 100%.

The majority of Jewish parents in Diaspora communities prefer to enroll their children in public or other private schools. One reason is cost. In the U.S., Latin America and Australia, for example, school fees are very expensive. Another reason is motivation. Many Jewish parents do not rate Jewish education or Jewish socialization as being as much a priority as a good secular education.

In Israel, the educational system has been considering the incorporation of more Jewish content into the syllabus in secular schools.

Although the size of Jewish communities is contracting, Jewish creativity has continued. Jewish scholarship, religious study, responsa, Jewish music, literature, art, theater and cinema, the media and other forms of expression, enjoy high visibility.

Hebrew, a language that a century ago was used only for prayer and learning, is now a normal, modern and fast-developing language spoken by most Jews in Israel, and is studied, and to a lesser extent, spoken, by numerous Jews outside Israel. However, there are signs of decline in the teaching of Hebrew in some communities.

Feminism and individualism affects the Jewish community as it does the western world. As Jews in general, and women in particular, become better educated and more knowledgeable of Judaism, they demand greater status in the community and the synagogue. Change is taking place, albeit slowly, as more egalitarian minyanim open up. The Jewish gay movement is on the rise in North America, Europe and in Israel.

4.3.2 Unity and Division

Jewish identity is also a reflection of major events, issues and crises. Since 1948 and the establishment of a Jewish state, there have been five major causes that have kindled a spirit of identification and action amongst Jews worldwide. These are:

- Support for the survival of Israel, especially around the time of the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars. Solidarity with Israel continues to be strong during this current violent stage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- The struggle for Soviet Jewry, especially in the 1970s and 1980s;
- Preserving the memory of the Shoah, and combating Shoah denial movements;
- The rise of antisemitism in Europe in the last three years, which correlates, to a large degree, to the rise of Islamic activism and developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;

- A sense of common history, culture and destiny, which most Jews wish to preserve for future generations: significant Jewish community investments are creating new opportunities for Jewish culture.

Relentless attacks on Israel in the media, and the rise of antisemitic incidents and sentiments in Europe, have resulted in increased solidarity with local Jewish communities, with Israel, and, ultimately, with Jewish destiny.

Since World War II, the organizational structure of the Jewish people in the Diaspora has become more cohesive. In most communities (Australia and the U.S. being exceptions), there is a clearly defined hierarchical structure with fewer central, yet more powerful, representative organizations and a chief rabbi. Even the U.S. Jewish community, with its strong local organizational infrastructure, is becoming more effective at the national level, with a select number of representative organizations such as the Conference of Presidents, AIPAC and the UJC.

However, at the international level, the Jewish community is less unified. There are a plethora of international Jewish organizations, yet no one body that can speak for the Jewish People globally. Indeed, it may be argued that the global dispersion of the Jewish people creates diversities of interests and perspectives, and also conflicts of interest, thus precluding a strong global structure. One case in point is the different assessment of preferred strategies and objectives in the highly delicate issue of reparations to Shoah survivors, including insurance policies, Swiss banks accounts, etc.

Jews are divided between religious and non-religious. They are also divided along religious denominational lines. They are divided on priorities. If there may be an agreement on common causes and issues as described above, there is no common recognized agenda for the Jewish people. Aliyah is a case in point. Most Israelis see this as a major priority for the Jewish world, but this is not accepted by most Diaspora communities.

Whilst the majority of Jews define themselves as such, the Orthodox establishment and the formal institutions of the state of Israel do not necessarily recognize them as Jews, especially those converted by Reform rabbis. The "who is a Jew" question has yet to be worked out. Non-recognition of non-Orthodox marriages and conversions is likely to push many away from the core of the Jewish world. Furthermore, as interfaith marriage increases, so does the number of those who are intimately connected with their non-Jewish relatives. If efforts are not made to reach out to this growing sector, they may be lost to the Jewish world in a generation.

While Jews around the world are concerned with Israel and its fate, most Israelis and official institutions give insufficient weight to the rest of the Jewish world in their decision-making processes or concerns, except in times of particular crises.

Within Israel, there are stark divisions in religious and socioeconomic matters, although the ethnic divide between Ashkenazim and Sephardim is slowly dissipating. The most controversial issue emerging in Israeli society concerns the continuation of Israel's presence in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza. Divisiveness – which peaked with the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin – may once again be reaching dangerous levels.

4.3.3 Numbers and Security

World Jewry faces a prolonged trend of population stagnation and decline. Steady population growth in Israel is hampered by a decline in most Diaspora communities.

- World Jewish population dispersion and international migration patterns are significantly affected by the distribution of economic and political constraints and incentives worldwide;
- Jews are generally well educated, socially and geographically mobile, economically well off, and politically active;
- Jewish marriage and birth rates outside Israel are as low as, if not lower than, Gentile marriages and birth rates in the majority of western societies;

- A high percentage of young adults marry non-Jewish partners and do not bring up their children within any Jewish framework;
- The consequent aging of the Jewish population results in a negative demographic balance and an economic and social burden on the community.

Numerically speaking, the Jewish people in the Diaspora are declining. An exception is the religious and Haredi minority. Low birth rates, rising interfaith marriage, and an aging population, lie at the root of these diminishing numbers. The Jewish population of Israel continues to grow, albeit at a slower rate than in the 1990s, and is expected to exceed that of the United States in the coming decade.

Critical mass has always been an issue. What is the minimum requirement for a vibrant healthy Jewish community to support synagogues, Jewish day schools, community centers, kosher food outlets and welfare services?

Over the course of three generations, the majority of Jews have moved from the periphery of the world to the centers of decision-making processes. Jewish population patterns have shifted, becoming concentrated in two distinct geographic areas – Israel and North America, and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe and Australia. Jews have moved out of Eastern Europe and Latin America.

Diaspora Jews have become increasingly urbanized. Previously scattered throughout thousands of small towns and communities, Jewish populations are now centered in a small number of major metropolitan areas – New York, Los Angeles, Greater Miami, Chicago, Boston, Paris, London, Moscow, and so on. The largest urban concentration of Jews globally is in Greater Tel Aviv.

Up until recently, aliyah to Israel was fuelled mainly by the “push factors” of antisemitism, oppression, social barriers and adverse socioeconomic conditions. With the decrease of these conditions in most countries today, and the collapse of the Former Soviet Union, the potential for “push aliyah” has diminished (with the possible exceptions of France and South America).

Since the recent wave of mass emigration from the FSU, Israel is no longer perceived by most Jews considering migration as the sole haven from oppression, even in times of crisis – as witnessed by the relatively small number of Jews who immigrated to Israel from Argentina since the economic crisis in that country. Nevertheless, Israel is still viewed by many as the refuge of last resort.

Serious threats to Jewish communities still exist in a few countries. The Jewish community in Iran faces a perilous existence, as do Jews in North Africa, Yemen and Syria.

Jews in the Diaspora have moved on the defensive since the second Palestinian insurgency, or Intifada. A contradiction frequently emerges due to the gaps between Israeli action aimed at defending essential security interests and the basic values of western societies. The bias of a large part of the world media, coupled by the ineffectiveness of Israeli advocacy efforts, have not only caused Israel to be relentlessly attacked in the press, but have also pinpointed the Jewish people, in general, given their general support of Israel, as a “cause” of the Middle-East conflict. In Europe, recent public opinion polls reveal that Israel is considered to be a “danger to world peace.”

4.3.4 Economic and Social Standing

One of the significant trends of the post-war era is multi-cultural acceptance. The Jewish people have become accepted into their respective national societies in the Diaspora. In the West, few economic, social, political or cultural barriers remain and any Jew can pursue his or her personal ambition. Jewish political influence is stronger in the U.S. than in Europe and elsewhere.

On average, the Jewish community fares better than the population at large in most parts of the Diaspora. They earn more, are better educated and professionally trained, and gravitate to

the more profitable sectors of the economy. Israel also ranks in the top 25 most affluent countries in terms of per capita GDP, higher education and life expectancy.

Yet poverty is still a serious Jewish concern in many places. Without considerable international assistance from the Jewish community, many of the Jews in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Argentina would subsist in sheer misery. The collapse of Argentina’s Jewish middle class threatens the future of that community and similar concerns prevail in other parts of South America, albeit to a lesser degree. Even in the United States, over 200,000 Jews live beneath the poverty line.

Since 2000, the Israeli economy has been experiencing a serious recession. Poverty in Israel has reached an all-time high with 350,000 Israeli households (18.5%) living below the “poverty line” (mainly Arabs, Haredim and elderly FSU immigrants, but also touching the lower middle class). There are clear signs that the economy is continuing, and will continue, to improve in 2004-2005, but it will take time before this improvement – if robust – will trickle down to the bottom echelons of the socioeconomic pyramid.

Living a Jewish lifestyle has become increasingly expensive. The costs of synagogue memberships, Jewish community centers, day school education, and even Jewish burials, are burdensome. The entry cost into the Jewish community is driving away some Jews, who would like to, but cannot afford to, belong. Others that are involved in the Jewish community are struggling under the financial burden.

Zedaka (charity) has always been a strong Jewish tradition and religious obligation. Although the scope of Jewish philanthropy has not decreased, its patterns and placement have altered rapidly. The younger generation has a weaker collective memory of the Shoah and their willingness to contribute is motivated by other considerations. Jews are no less wealthy than they were in the past, and not less likely to give, but they tend to donate proportionately less to specifically Jewish causes. Prominent Jewish donors direct only a third of their charitable contributions to Jewish causes and two thirds to museums, universities, hospitals, medical institutions, and other cultural institutions and general causes.

As the Jewish population ages, there are greater social needs. Public funds are shrinking, while Jewish organizations, schools, old age homes, welfare services and charities have to turn to outside sources. Jewish organizations face the challenge of generating Jewish funding, and making it more attractive both to those who already give and to those that do not.

Any discussion of the social factors must take into account the changes in Jewish leadership. The young people of today, particularly community leaders, both professional and lay, differ from their predecessors. It is no longer considered crucial for Jews to stick together and invest in Jewish values and heritage. Their commitment and devotion appears to be more intellectual and less emotional.

Business leaders in the Diaspora are drawn from the world of finance, media and the communications and high-tech industries. Professionals, however, such as lawyers, accountants, doctors and so on, provide the professional foundations for the new community leadership. The professional leaders tend to be highly qualified, trained and sophisticated and arrive at the top echelons of the major Jewish organizations with cutting edge skills and tools. Today’s leadership is more demanding, more critical and highly professional. However, there are clearly not enough of them.

4.3.5 Israel-Diaspora Interactions

Interaction between the state of Israel and the Diaspora strengthens the Jewish people and is a crucially important factor in shaping their future. There are five major dimensions to the complex dynamics governing the relations between Israel and the Diaspora, and between various Jewish communities throughout the world:

a. **The Cultural and Ethical Dimension**

Israel constitutes one of the dominant factors shaping the identity of the Jewish people today. It unites and divides at the same time. Israel is a source of honor, solidarity and pride, yet, at times, it is also a cause for concern and target of criticism.

Israel is neither universally accepted as being the center of the Jewish world nor as being its cultural fountainhead and source of spiritual inspiration. American Jewry invests considerable efforts into creating an alternative center for rich and vibrant Jewish life – in line with the Babylon-Jerusalem metaphor.

Cultural trends born in the Diaspora have limited impact on Jewish life in Israel. Religious pluralism and feminism are filtering into Israel, and much religious scholarship originates outside of Israel's shore. At the same time it can be argued that Israel's impact on spiritual life in the Diaspora is minor, though there has been some infiltration of Israeli culture, music and literature abroad.

Diaspora leaders and organizations have had limited impact on Israeli political life, although they have been mobilized to promote Israeli policy when it was considered expedient to do so. By-and-large, Israeli politics function independently of world Jewry. For the most part, Israeli policies are set without consideration for their impact on the Diaspora. Jewish communities are expected to rally around Israel and tender support without having any significant input in the decision-making process.

Support has been primarily a one-way process and is often expressed in monetary assistance from the Diaspora to Israel. Nevertheless, in some instances, Israel provided assistance – both financial and other – to Diaspora communities, especially those that were poverty-stricken or physically threatened. Ethiopia is just one example.

b. **The Political and Security Dimension**

The political and security situation in Israel directly affects the Diaspora and outlines part of its communal agenda. The increase in terrorism in Israel and seemingly biased media reporting have served to increase Jewish solidarity. At the same time, however, these factors have also created confusion and have caused many Diaspora Jews to assume a defensive posture, since they feel disenfranchised and helpless in influencing events in a significant way.

This anomaly has manifested itself in several ways:

- A concomitant rise in criticism of Israel's policy towards the Palestinians and an increase in solidarity;
- A drastic reduction in individual Jewish tourism to Israel against an increase in organized solidarity missions;
- An increase in donations to Israel, especially for security-related purposes;
- A change in aliyah patterns from certain countries;
- A strengthening of leftist-moderate elements in the Diaspora and weakening of the same within Israel.

The severe rise in antisemitism, particularly in Europe, has served to increase interest in, and solidarity for, Israel, and likewise has increased Israeli solidarity for their brethren abroad.

c. **The Economic and Social Dimension**

Economically speaking, Israel still lags behind the most affluent western countries, where large numbers of Jews live and prosper. This tends to encourage yeridah and suppress aliyah. On the other hand, it is this very disparity that facilitates the Diaspora's philanthropic relationship with Israel.

Fundraising campaigns are one of the mainstays of organized Jewish communal life in the Diaspora. This is especially true of the Federation system in the United States. Recent national budget cuts in Israel have drastically reduced the assistance given to immigrants and serve as a disincentive to aliyah. They have also affected important partnership ventures such as Birthright.

In addition to their economic impact, such budget cuts have also created a spirit of resentment and disillusionment.

The Israeli high-tech industry is one of the most significant in the world. As a world leader in scientific publications, Israel is a source of pride for all Jews. This is one of the realms where Israel has much to offer. The downside during periods of economic recession is the brain drain of Israeli scientists and engineers to the West.

d. **The Geographic Dimension**

The potential sources for aliyah have shifted dramatically. While aliyah from the FSU still exists, it is limited and many Russian Jews currently favor Germany over Israel. Pockets of "distress" will always be a source for aliyah. These currently include Argentina, South Africa, and possibly Iran. For these groups, the destination of choice is not Israel, but rather the U.S., Canada and Australia. These also constitute the preferred destinations for yordim.

Otherwise, the main potential for aliyah is in the West, but at the present time this is not perceived as a real alternative for the vast majority of Jews, a situation that is unlikely to change, unless major changes take place in Israel or communities experience severe crises abroad.

e. **The Institutional and Organizational Dimension**

The Jewish people constitute a fluid, voluntary and self-organizing system that consists of some central, and many local and sector-specific institutions.

There are few organizations that view the Jewish people from a global perspective. Two prominent examples are the Jewish Agency, as the global platform of the Jewish people, and the World Jewish Congress (with its network of affiliates in Europe, Latin America and the FSU) as a political instrument. Neither they nor any other organization, however, represent the Jewish people in its totality. Many international Jewish institutions, such as Bnei Brith, Keren Hayesod, WIZO, HIAS, the Conference on Material Jewish Claims against Germany and the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) are concerned with particular issues and spheres of activity.

A number of large American organizations have a global focus, e.g. the UJC, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, AIPAC, ADL, the Joint Distribution Committee, the American Jewish Committee, Hillel and Hadassah. Similarly there are both Israeli-based organizations that are concerned with the Diaspora (focusing on Jewish and Zionist education, aliyah, religious life, philanthropy) and Diaspora-based institutions that are focused on support for, and interest in, Israel. Interestingly enough, with the formation of the UJC, an Overseas Needs Assessment and Disbursement Committee (ONAD) was established. Thus, Israel's once separated and privileged status was downgraded and became part of a generic "overseas" rubric.

While there is significant cross-fertilization, a common global Jewish agenda that unites all these organizations and their activities is lacking. Some key issues, such as support for Israel and its representation in the media, antisemitism, the revival of Jewish life in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the distribution of reparations and restitution funding, are of common concern to world Jewry. Organizations in the Diaspora, however, tend to focus on problems such as Jewish continuity, Jewish education, assimilation and welfare services that are often common in most communities, but essentially local in scope.

The religious organizations are among the most focused and globally oriented. The Orthodox Union, Habad, Reform and Conservative movements aim to propagate their respective religious styles and messages throughout the larger Jewish community.

Efforts have been made to address the model of the Israel-Diaspora connection, which has traditionally been parochial in nature, based to a large extent on uni-directional philanthropy rather than true partnership. Some attempts have been made to revise this model and develop a greater sense of mutuality in which contributions from all sides complement each other. The first successful example of partnership – Project Renewal in the early 1980s – has since been

superseded by Partnership 2000. This partnership is based on the establishment of a network of sister communities in the Diaspora and Israel. Other significant examples include People to People, the Israel Experience, and Birthright.

On a regional level, the lack of an effective pan-European Jewish lobby and umbrella organization (other than the European Jewish Congress and the European Council of Jewish Communities) is of great concern, particularly in an era in which an expanded European Union is interested in playing an increasingly visible role in Middle-Eastern affairs and combating antisemitism.

Generally speaking, organizational pluralism and the absence of over-arching structures facilitate the expression of diverse sectors and interests. Having said that, excess competition, little coordination and complex interaction patterns hinder the ability of a global Jewish organizational infrastructure to effectively serve the Jewish people.

4.3.6 Diaspora-Diaspora Interactions

The Talmudic notion of *kol yisrael arevim zeh lazeh* (all Jews bear responsibility for each other) resonates loudly in the Diaspora. This is clearly expressed in interpersonal relations and in the way Jewish communities foster support for Israel. It is also manifested in the concern and assistance the Diaspora displays and provides to Jewish communities in distress. Indeed, some of the major Jewish organizations were conceived from the concern for fellow Jews in crises, be it in Russia a hundred years ago or in central Europe in the aftermath of the Shoah.

The primary areas of current concern include the rehabilitation of Jewish communities in the FSU and Eastern Europe and the efforts to cope with crises in South America. Many European and American communities and organizations have adopted communities in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Assistance to the Argentinean Jews during the economic crisis in 2001-2002 was given in the form of money, community involvement and the sponsorship of Argentinean Jewish immigrants to western communities.

The major U.S.-based institutions have been particularly active in these countries, including: the JDC, HIAS, UJC, AJC and ADL. Since the American Jewish community is the largest in the world, and has a long-standing tradition of community voluntarism, it feels a greater sense of responsibility for its fellow Jews. European Jewry is no less concerned, but does not share either the resources or the scope of voluntarism. One example of a European-based organization is the World Jewish Relief, which is headquartered in London.

Prominent international Jewish organizations such as the Jewish Agency, Bnei Brith, Habad and other religious bodies are also actively involved in Jewish rescue missions and renaissance. The latter have systematically established international networks of rabbis, synagogues and educational institutions.

Antisemitism has traditionally been a common problem that brings Jews together both locally and internationally. American Jewry, while not a victim itself of antisemitism in any significant way, is highly concerned about recent occurrences in Europe. There is an even greater need now to preserve the physical edifices of Jewish heritage, such as synagogues, cemeteries, schools, museums that have fallen into disuse and artifacts, as small Jewish communities are disappearing from the communal map.

5. FUTURE PROSPECTS

5.1 DECISION MAKING MECHANISMS: A SECOND HOUSE?

The Jewish people in Israel and abroad are facing shared challenges unique to our generation. These challenges have bearing on long-term ability to thrive and flourish as a national, religious and cultural entity.

In response to these challenges, in his address at the opening of the 15th Knesset, Israel's President Moshe Katsav called for the establishment of a Second House alongside the Knesset. Such Jewish People House would represent the Jewish people and be an expression of the bonds of solidarity and shared destiny which bind the state of Israel and Jewish communities the world over.

5.1.1 Statement of Purpose

The Jewish People House will provide a forum for policy recommendation, and for dialogue and discussion between representatives of the Jewish people abroad and the elected representatives of Israel on the vital matters affecting the Jewish people. This dialogue is essential in order to increase the mutual understanding and unity of the Jewish people, in the aim to offer more effective and appropriate answers to the critical needs of Jews and Judaism, and to successfully confront the obstacles and challenges which face the entire Jewish people.

The State of Israel cannot address on its own many of the vital issues of our day which concern the Jewish people in its entirety. Among the topics which require a joint approach by all parts of the Jewish people are:

- The Spiritual and Mutual Bonds which unite the State of Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora;
- Demography and Assimilation;
- Jewish Education in the Diaspora;
- Conversion and "Who is a Jew";
- The Revival of Anti-Semitism;
- The Terrorist Threat to Jewish Communities and Institutions;
- Relations between the Jewish People and Islam and Christianity;

The Second House will serve as a consultative body by the Knesset for discussion of these and other issues of crucial import, towards the purpose of developing effective strategies, maximizing capacities, and exercising united leadership with shared vision.

5.1.2 Competence

The Jewish People House will be a consultative body in which the ideas, thoughts, trends and various approaches within the Jewish people abroad may find expression. It will not be a legislative body and therefore not on par with the Knesset.

Appropriate issues for deliberation in the Jewish People House are those which face the Jewish people as a whole, and those which are of vital concern for the Jewish communities in the Diaspora, and for their relations of mutuality with the state of Israel. The Jewish People House may raise any issue with ramifications for the existence of the Jewish people and its heritage, or which impacts on the values and ethical content of Judaism. The Jewish People House may choose to discuss issues of Israeli policy which have ramifications for the Jewish people as a whole.

Issues which bear directly upon the Israeli state interest, such as: national security, peace agreements, and the national economy are for decision making by the Knesset and the Israeli government, and are not on the agenda of the Jewish People House.

The Knesset and Israeli government will consult with the Jewish People House prior to making decisions which impact directly on the Jewish people abroad or which have important ramifications for the future welfare of Jewry.

5.1.3 Representation, Modes of Operation and Steps Towards Realization

The Jewish People House will be constituted of an appropriate representation of the entire Jewish people abroad – its communities, institutions, organizations, thinkers and leaders.

The representative assembly of the Jewish People House will be constituted by a method which faithfully reflects the hopes, variety of opinion and essential needs of the Jewish people in the Diaspora. The assembly will give expression to the relative size of each community, and representation of every community will be assured.

The mode of election and/or appointment of representatives, the total number of representatives, representation per country and area, the standing of the established Jewish organizations, procedural rules and other questions of representation will be addressed at the founding stage.

In the assembly, there will be assured representation for the major Jewish organizations in consideration of their high standing and important contributions in the life of the Jewish people; on the condition that the said organizations are representative and are organized democratically.

The Jewish People House will convene twice a year according to a schedule to be set in the procedural code. Committee and staff work of the Jewish People House will be ongoing and continue throughout the year.

A preparatory meeting will be convened in the coming year (2005) to be attended by distinguished Jewish thinkers and leaders from abroad and from Israel for the purpose of a special consultation on the establishment of a Jewish People House. The attendees will recommend members for a Preparatory Committee which will continue the work of preparing the draft principles. Attendees will receive the Statement of Principles beforehand, on the basis of which the meeting will take place.

5.1.4 Further Approaches to Diaspora Representation

Israel's President proposal, if implemented, will create an entirely new framework and rules for interaction and decision making across the global Israel-Diaspora complex. Yet, an even more radical proposal might be to allocate voting rights to Israelis and other Jews across the world in the regular Israeli electoral process. Provisions in the sense already exist in a number of democracies. One example is the U.S. which allows its citizens who are permanent resident abroad to vote at presidential elections. Another country which will soon adopt the same policy is Italy. For the time being, Italian citizens who are permanent residents abroad are entitled to vote at distance in national Referenda. Beginning with the next parliamentary elections scheduled for 2006 they will concur in electing several members of Parliament based on broad continental circumscriptions.

Another interesting example of an approach to giving political representation to the Diaspora has been implemented in recent years by the Italian government. It consists of two related layers. One is the election in each consular region with a sufficient number of permanent residents of a local representative council (Com.It.Es.). These councils are meant to represent the interests of Italian citizens in front of both the Italian diplomatic authorities and the local public authorities in the respective country. Moreover, the elected members of these councils participate in electing a worldwide Consiglio Generale degli Italiani all'Estero (CGIE). The goals of such a world council stress promotion of the Italian cultural presence and interests abroad. While the CGIE's mandate includes some of the objectives mentioned in Israel's President suggestion for a Jewish People House, the latter aims at affecting a broader range of issues – including general political issues – than the Italian counterpart which already exists.

It seems fair to add that the Israeli President's proposal is not going to pass unanimously among Israel's public opinion. The position also exists in Israel that a clear-cut separation should prevail between actual political decision-making, whose competence should exclusively rest with the permanently resident citizens, while the role of persons who live abroad should be limited at most to lobbying, and to financial and affective support. Clearly this second position expresses the point of view of those for whom the existence of a Diaspora is not very important – if at all – which implies a considerable departure from the historical and cultural premises upon which the State of Israel gained its independence.

5.2 PEOPLEHOOD SURVIVAL AND INTERACTION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Beyond the technical aspects of formal representative democracy, the substantive issue raised extensively all across this Report and also alluded to in the last remarks of the preceding section concerns the long term maintenance of a collective identity that will meaningfully incorporate the locally resident and the Diasporic components of the extended nation. Under the cultural and socioeconomic conditions that have been developing in the contemporary context of globalization this is not certain. Very much due to the growing global integration of national productive systems, easier transportation, and especially enhanced cultural interaction through communication networks and cyberspace, maintenance of distinct national patterns of cultural or ethnic or religious identities will become increasingly problematic during the 21st century.

But precisely because of the same reasons, entailing greater geographical access, international work opportunities, and growing cultural familiarity with remote societies and surroundings, it can be assumed that in general the diffusional processes typical of Diasporas will continue to be highly visible and at the center of public attention. In the case of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, it is virtually certain that the commitment to maintain a viable mutual relationship will continue to constitute a high-profile element of public policy on both sides – beyond the unavoidable forces of assimilation and loss of collective memory.

APPENDIX 1

ISRAEL'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.

Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, *ma'p'ilim* [(Hebrew) - immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive legislation] and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood.

In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.

This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.

This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT,

ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel".

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel.

WE APPEAL to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations.

WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.

WE EXTEND our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.

WE APPEAL to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel.

PLACING OUR TRUST IN THE ALMIGHTY, WE AFFIX OUR SIGNATURES TO THIS PROCLAMATION AT THIS SESSION OF THE PROVISIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE, ON THE SOIL OF THE HOMELAND, IN THE CITY OF TEL-AVIV, ON THIS SABBATH EVE, THE 5TH DAY OF IYAR, 5708 (14TH MAY, 1948).

APPENDIX 2

ISRAEL'S "LAW OF RETURN"

The "Law of Return" was passed by the Knesset on July 6, 1950. It has also been amended twice. The first amendment (September 1, 1954) is underlined in the text below, whilst the second amendment (March 19, 1970) is *italicized*.

Original translation from Hebrew into English by Dr. Susan Hattis Rolef, *The Political Dictionary of Israel*, Appendix II, 1987.

1. Every Jew has the right to immigrate to the country.
 2. (a) Immigration shall be on the basis of an immigration visa.
(b) An immigrant visa shall be issued to any Jew who has expressed a desire to settle in Israel, unless the Ministry of the Interior is satisfied that the applicant:
 - (i) acts against the Jewish nation;
 - or
 - (ii) is liable to threaten the public health or security of the state; or
 - (iii) has a criminal past which is liable to endanger the public's peace.
 3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and after his arrival expresses a desire to settle in the country may, while in Israel, obtain an immigrant certificate.
(b) The exceptions specified in Article 2(b) shall apply to the issue of an immigrant certificate as well, though a person shall not be regarded as a threat to public health as a result of an illness which he has contracted after his arrival in Israel.
 4. Every Jew who has immigrated to the country before this law goes into effect and, every Jew who was born in the country, either before or after the law is effective, enjoys the same status as whoever immigrated on the basis of this law.
- 4A. (a) *The rights of a Jew under this law and the rights of an immigrant under the Citizenship Law - 1952, as well as the rights of an immigrant under any other legislation, are also imparted on the child or grandchild of a Jew, and on the spouse of a Jew and on the spouse of the child or grandchild of a Jew; excluding a person who was a Jew and willingly changed his religion.*
(b) *It is immaterial whether the Jew by virtue of whom the right is claimed under clause (a) is or is not alive and whether he did or did not immigrate to the country.*
(c) *The reservations and conditions laid down with regard to a Jew or immigrant in this law, or under it, or in legislation as mentioned in clause (a) will apply to those who claim a right under clause (a) as well.*
- 4B. *For the purpose of this law a "Jew" - anyone born to a Jewish mother or who has converted, and is not a member of another religion.*
- The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of the enforcement of this law and may enact regulations in connection with its implementation and for the issue of immigrant visas and immigrant certificates to minors up to the age of 18.

Regulations regarding clauses 4A and 4B require the approval of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset.

APPENDIX 3

Summary of

ISRAEL'S NATIONALITY LAW

(See Law of Return above for acquisition of nationality according to the **Law of Return**.)

Israel's Nationality Law relates to persons born in Israel or resident therein, as well as to those wishing to settle in the country, regardless of race, religion, creed, sex or political belief. Citizenship may be acquired by birth, the Law of Return, residence, or naturalization.

Acquisition of nationality by **Birth** is granted to:

1. Persons who were born in Israel to a mother or a father who are Israeli citizens.
2. Persons born outside Israel, if their father or mother holds Israeli citizenship, acquired either by birth in Israel, according to the Law of Return, by residence, or by naturalization.
3. Persons born after the death of one of their parents, if the late parent was an Israeli citizen by virtue of the conditions enumerated in 1. and 2. above at the time of death.
4. Persons born in Israel, who have never had any nationality and subject to limitations specified in the law, if they: apply for it in the period between their 18th and 25th birthday and have been residents of Israel for five consecutive years, immediately preceding the day of the filing of their application.

Acquisition of Nationality by **Residence**: special provision is made in the Nationality Law for former citizens of British Mandatory Palestine. Those who remained in Israel from the establishment of the State in 1948 until the enactment of the Nationality Law of 1952, became Israeli citizens by residence or by return. According to an amendment (1980), further possibilities to acquire citizenship by residence, were included in the law.

Acquisition of Nationality by **Naturalization**: adults may acquire Israeli citizenship by naturalization at the discretion of the Minister of the Interior and subject to a number of requirements, including:

1. they must currently reside in Israel and have resided in Israel for three years out of the five years preceding the day of submission of the application.
2. they are entitled to reside in Israel permanently and have settled or intend to settle in Israel;
3. they must have some knowledge of Hebrew (former Palestinian citizens are exempt from this provision);
4. they have renounced their prior nationality, or have proved that they will cease to be foreign nationals upon becoming Israeli citizens;
5. they must take an oath of loyalty to the State of Israel.

The Minister of the Interior may exempt an applicant from some of these requirements.

Adapted from the Israel Foreign Ministry Website

CATEGORIES OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY OF IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION

New Immigrant

Minor Immigrant

Immigrant Citizen

Child of Immigrants

Immigrant Family

Returning Minor

Returning Resident

New Immigrant

A new immigrant is a person who came to Israel and received the status of "new immigrant" from the Ministry of Interior, according to the Law of Return - 1950.

The Law of Return states that every Jew, his/her spouse, his children and grandchildren and their spouses are entitled to immigrate to Israel (except for several irregular cases that are mentioned in the Law.)

Persons with a "new immigrant" status are entitled to special assistance given to immigrants by government ministries and various other organizations, according to predetermined criteria.

Conditions for receiving Ministry of Immigrant Absorption assistance

In order to be eligible for Ministry of Immigrant Absorption assistance, it is necessary to receive "new immigrant" status from the Ministry of The Interior.

Ministry of Immigrant Absorption assistance includes the following:

Absorption Basket.

Income Insurance during the first year following immigration and for immigrants who do not receive the Absorption Basket or who are studying in courses.

Hebrew Studies (ulpan).

Assistance in Housing.

Assistance in Employment.

Assistance in establishing independent business - Business Entrepreneurship.

Tuition Fee Assistance at institutions of higher education.

Assistance for Soldiers.

Temporary Resident - A/1

The status of Temporary Resident - A/1 - is temporarily granted, upon request to the Ministry of Interior to individuals who are eligible for "immigrant" status. This status is given for a period of

three years, at the end of which the temporary resident receives permanent status. Temporary residents are not entitled to receive direct assistance from the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and other ministries, with the exception of those who received Temporary Resident status prior to 1/1/92. Such individuals receive the same assistance as all other immigrants.

Assistance is dependent, among others, on periods of stay in Israel during the seven years prior to immigration. Any person who stayed in Israel for a continuous or cumulative period of 3-5 years on a tourist or A/1 visa and changed his status to "immigrant" will receive less assistance.

A person who stayed in Israel on a tourist or A/1 visa for more than five continuous or cumulative years during the seven years prior to immigration will not be entitled to immigrant assistance from the Ministries of Immigrant Absorption and Housing.

Immigrant Minor

An Immigrant Minor is an immigrant who falls into one of the following categories:

A. One who came to Israel between the ages of 14-17, without his parents, and received a "new immigrant" visa from the Ministry of the Interior.

An immigrant minor receives absorption basket assistance according to age. Other types of assistance may be provided from the age of 17, or upon the completion of studies.

B. One who made aliyah before the age of 14, who resides in an educational framework for the first year following aliyah, and remains in that framework until at least age 17, and whose parents do not make aliyah. Such an immigrant receives assistance from the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption from the age of 17 only.

An immigrant minor may be eligible for assistance in the following areas: absorption basket, Hebrew studies, housing, employment, business entrepreneurship, assistance for soldiers, tuition fees at institutions of higher education and income insurance.

The period of eligibility for an immigrant minor is different from that of an adult immigrant. Consult with an absorption coordinator at a branch or district office of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption for details

Immigrant Citizen

An immigrant citizen is a person who was born abroad to an Israeli citizen, and would be eligible to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return if they did not already hold Israeli citizenship.

Immigrant citizen who does not have an Israeli passport

Period of eligibility: from the time of receipt of an Israeli Identity Certificate (*te'udat zehut*).

Assistance: Assistance is the same as that for a new immigrant, unless otherwise stated in Ministry regulations.

Required documents:

- Passports
- Update Identification Certificate
- Two passport photos

Immigrant citizen who has an Israeli passport

The period of eligibility for one who received an Israeli passport before receiving an Identification Certificate (*te'udat zehut*) is as follows: from the date of entry into Israel following the issuance of an Israeli passport, for a period of four months or more in one year. If the individual visited Israel following receipt of an Israeli passport for a period of less than four months, the date of entry is not considered as the commencement of the period of eligibility.

Conditions affecting an immigrant citizen who has an Israeli passport

1. **Army service:** It is necessary to register at an IDF induction center and bring authorization of the registration, or else authorization of exemption for service or deferral of service.
2. The following categories do not need authorization from the IDF:
3. Those under the age of 17.
4. Women over the age of 25
5. Married women or mothers
6. Men over age 40
7. **Time spent in Israel that does not affect eligibility:**
8. Visits for a period of less than four months in one calendar year.
9. Service in the I.D.F. or National Service - stays in Israel of up to four months before or after service.
10. Academic year: one year of study at a recognized educational institution, a Jewish Agency program, youth movement or pre-military program.

Required documents:

- Passports or alternative documents that testify to lengths of visits to Israel.
- Updated Identification Certificate.
- Approval of registration at an IDF induction center.
- Two passport photos.
- Authorization of one year of study in Israel (for those who studied in the country).

Customs:

information concerning exemption from taxes can be obtained from the Customs Authority. Only this information is trustworthy.

An immigrant citizen receives immigrant assistance only from the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. You should directly contact the Customs Tax office and other ministries to clarify their requirements

Child of an Immigrant

The child of an immigrant is a single individual who immigrated to Israel close to the time of his parents.

Age of immigration:

Adult child of immigrant - age 17 to 25

Minor child of immigrant - under 17 years old

Immigration close to the time of this parents:

Adult child of immigrants - immigrated with his parents, or one year before his parents, or within the year after his parents.

Minor child of immigrants - immigrated with his parents, or one year before or after his parents, and he was under 17 years of age at the time that he and his parents received "immigrant" status.

What are the Rights of a Child of Immigrants?

The child of immigrants is entitled to all rights given to any other immigrant, except in the following two areas:

Housing: a single child of immigrants is not entitled to housing assistance (mortgage, rent or public housing) separate from his family.

Comment - a child of immigrants who marries an immigrant is entitled to a mortgage for an immigrant family. Children of immigrants who marry other children of immigrants, or children of immigrants who marry veteran Israelis, are entitled to the rights of young veteran couples.

See Tables of Mortgage Assistance.

Exact tables of assistance appear in the section on "Regulation for Assistance".

Customs Grant: for immigrants from "countries which are entitled to a customs grant". Children of immigrants are entitled to this grant if they are over 23 at the time of their immigration, and they married an immigrant, or a child of an immigrant, during their first year in the country.

Customs Tax: in general, any person who came to Israel as a minor is not entitled to an exemption from customs tax. Details on eligibility for this should be clarified at the Customs Tax offices.

Immigrant Family

1. A family where all members have an immigrant status.
2. A family where one of the spouses has an **immigrant status**, or **immigrant citizen** status, or **returning minor** status, and the other spouse is a veteran Israel, and they have a child who was born abroad.

Terms for receiving "immigrant family" status when only one of the spouses is an immigrant

- The child was born **before** the eligible parent received "immigrant" status, or
- The child was born **after** the eligible parent receive "immigrant" status, and at least one year has passed since both spouses left the country.

A family, where one of the spouses has "immigrant", "immigrant citizen" or "returning minor" status, might receive housing assistance like an immigrant family. Other areas of assistance should be clarified at the various branches of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.

Assistance in other fields, such as employment, is given to each spouse according to their eligibility. Terms for assistance should therefore be clarified prior to immigration

Returning Minor

A returning minor is one who left the country with his parents before the age of 14 and returned after the age of 17.

Criteria for receiving assistance as a "returning minor" are as follows:

1. **Duration of stay abroad:** lived abroad for four continuous years.
2. **Stay in Israel that does not affect eligibility.**
3. Visits of less than four months every year do not count as returning to Israel.
4. A stay of up to four months before or after Army or National service does not count as returning to Israel.
5. **School year:** stays in Israel for one academic year at a recognized institution, or on a Jewish Agency, youth movement or pre-military program. This year is in addition to the four years spent abroad.
6. **Status of citizenship:** returned to Israel as an Israeli citizen. At his time of return would be eligible to an immigrant visa according to the Law of Return - 1950 if he weren't an Israeli citizen.
7. **Army service:** the returning minor must register at the induction station and bring written approval of this, or receive an exemption from enlistment.
8. Exempt from the requirement to present registration form and exemption (*ptor*): women over 25, non-single women or mothers and men over 50.

His and his parents' occupation abroad:

he and his parents did not live abroad on behalf of an Israeli, private or public employer, during the five years prior to their return to Israel.

Required Documentation:

- Authorization of registration at an I.D.F. recruitment office or exemption from army service or authorization of postponement of service.
- Updated Identification Certificate (te'udat zehut)
- Passport with date of leaving the country prior to the age of 14.
- Passports or alternative documents proving continuous stay abroad (study authorizations, annual report cards from primary or high schools, institutions of higher education or yeshivot, excluding diplomas, official authorizations from income tax authorities or national insurance abroad.)
- Passports with the date of the parents' departure of the country (or alternative documents).
- Two passport photos.
- Letter of approval of one year of study in Israel (where applicable).

Customs: information concerning exemption from taxes can be obtained only at the customs offices; only this information is trustworthy.

Where can one obtain exact information and assistance?

Abroad: information and assistance for returning to Israel can be obtained at the Immigration Centers and Department of the Jewish Agency and from **authorized immigration emissaries** (*shlichim*). Final approval of status will be obtained in Israel from the bureaus of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and Customs offices.

In Israel: Information and guidance can be obtained at the **bureaus and branches of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption**. Matters concerning customs tax can be obtained only at the **Customs Tax offices**.

Returning Resident

A returning resident is an Israeli citizen who spent at least two years abroad.

Criteria for receiving assistance as a "returning citizen" are as follows:

1. Has Israeli citizenship.
2. Spent at least two years abroad.
3. Scientist - requirements for receiving assistance from the Center for Absorption in Science is a stay of at least three years abroad.
4. Has visited Israel for less than four continuous or cumulative months in every year, during the years prior to his return to Israel. Scientist - visited Israel for less than four months in the three years prior to his return to Israel.
5. The determining age for receiving assistance is 17 and up. In the fields of assistance that have an age limitation - the age is that determined in Ministry of Immigrant Absorption regulations.
6. He, his spouse, or his parents were not on any public mission during the five years prior to their return to Israel. Public mission refers to any position on behalf of a state organization, the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund (J.N.F.), Keren Hayesod or the Bonds.

For details on assistance please see chapter on **Returning Residents**.

Adapted from the Israel Immigrants Absorption Ministry Website

Россия и ее диаспора в новых государствах

Константин Затулин,
депутат Государственной Думы Федерального
Собрания Российской Федерации IV созыва,
директор Института диаспоры и интеграции
(Института стран СНГ)

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

Немного истории	407
Русские за новыми рубежами России.....	408
Кто и как занимается в России соотечественниками за рубежом	410
Международные соглашения России по защите прав соотечественников за рубежом	413
Что с нами происходит?.....	414
ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ	418
Приложение 1. ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ И ОБРАЩЕНИЯ ОРГАНОВ ВЛАСТИ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ В СВЯЗИ С НАРУШЕНИЯМИ ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА НА ПОСТСОВЕТСКОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ	418
Приложение 2. СОВРЕМЕННАЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ СИСТЕМА ЗАЩИТЫ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ МЕНЬШИНСТВ (НАЗВАНИЯ ДОКУМЕНТОВ).....	424
Приложение 3 ПРАВА И СВОБОДЫ РОССИЙСКИХ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ СООТЕЧЕСТВЕННИКОВ В СОГЛАШЕНИЯХ ГОСУДАРСТВ — УЧАСТНИКОВ СОДРУЖЕСТВА НЕЗАВИСИМЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ (НАЗВАНИЯ ДОКУМЕНТОВ)	425
Приложение 4. ПРАВА И СВОБОДЫ РОССИЙСКИХ СООТЕЧЕСТВЕННИКОВ В ДОКУМЕНТАХ МЕЖГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЙ НА ТЕРРИТОРИИ СНГ ...	427

Немного истории

Российская диаспора формировалась, в основном, в течение XX века, когда вследствие сложных, трагических событий в истории России миллионы наших соотечественников были вынуждены покинуть родную землю.

Самые главные потери явились следствием Октябрьской революции 1917 года, когда была разорвана русская культурная традиция, произведено разделение русских на «красных» и «белых», своих и чужих, правильных и неправильных писателей, философов. Интеллектуальная элита России была выслана на так называемом «философском пароходе» в 1922 году. И огромное количество людей, которые думали о судьбе России, оказались за пределами своей страны.

Возникло такое явление как первая волна русской эмиграции, затем вторая, потом третья. Третья волна, безусловно, имеет свои особые черты, но, по крайней мере до начала перестройки в Советском Союзе, было очевидно, что государство, его руководство относится как к врагам к тем, кто не по своей воле уехал из распавшейся российской империи — Советского Союза. Слово «эмигрант» - было синонимом слова «предатель». К эмигрантам относились примерно так же, как к мужьям, бросившим свою жену: негодяй за то, что уехал, и вдвойне негодяй за то, что не вернулся. В это же время у нас в стране

происходило насаждение атеизма, не давшего полноценной замены духовной и нравственной школе, которая была в жизни русского народа в лоне церкви.

В результате распада Советского Союза в последнее десятилетие прошедшего века российская диаспора пополнилась почти на 40 миллионов. Население СССР накануне распада составляло 293 миллиона человек, из них в Российской Федерации проживало 147 миллионов, в республиках Прибалтики – 9 миллионов, в остальных союзных республиках 137 миллионов. Около 50 миллионов советских людей в результате упразднения Советского Союза оказались за пределами своих «этнических родин». Около 30 миллионов русских проживали в то время вне РСФСР, что составляло четвертую часть от 120 миллионов русских россиян. Таким образом, в одночасье русские стали крупнейшим разделенным народом в мире.

Крушение коммунизма как мессианской идеи всемирной справедливости привело к потере исторического оптимизма у людей, которые привыкли говорить на русском языке и отождествлять себя с советским народом, с новой исторической общностью. Фактически, после крушения коммунизма новой позитивной объединительной идеи не выработано. Повсеместно происходит совершенно оголтелое насаждение индивидуализма, культа успеха. И, конечно же все это противоречит самим духовным основам того, что мы называем русским миром.

В настоящее время мы переживаем тягчайший кризис самоидентификации. И прежде всего этот кризис поразил само государство, в котором мы живем – Российскую Федерацию.

Естественно, что кризис самоидентификации приводит и к разночтениям и расхождению в том, что мы называем отношением к нашим соотечественникам, к самому определению того, что является современной российской диаспорой. Из соображений политкорректности в условиях, когда не выработано четкого представления о том, кто же является сегодня нашей диаспорой, мы очень часто пользуемся заменителем – словосочетанием «соотечественники за рубежом». Хотя по сегодняшний день не стихают споры о значении этого понятия, оно уже проникло в официальные и нормативные документы, в правительственные программы и даже в название некоторых структур законодательной власти, как, например, Комитет Государственной Думы по делам СНГ и связям с соотечественниками. В составе Первой Государственной Думы 1993-1995 годов мне довелось руководить этим Комитетом и в нынешнем составе Думы – я также работаю в его составе.

Русские за новыми рубежами России

Одновременно на общественных началах я являюсь директором Института диаспоры и интеграции (Института стран СНГ) и с уверенностью могу сказать, что сегодня все постсоветские государства, за исключением России и Белоруссии, строятся как моноэтнические, как государства национального типа, не предоставляющие никакого удовлетворительного решения русского вопроса и проблемы русскоязычных. По сути, русских и русскоязычных

русскокультурных людей ставят перед дилеммой: или эмигрировать в Россию, или добровольно согласиться на ассимиляцию – вначале политическую, затем культурную, языковую и прочую.

Ближайшим следствием такого неблагоприятного самочувствия русских и русскоязычных является устойчивая и масштабная депрессия, охватившая русское население всего бывшего Советского Союза. Я хочу привести только один пример, чтобы не быть голословным. Конечно же, социальные проблемы не миновали ни одно из постсоветских государств, резко возросла смертность, уменьшилась рождаемость. Например, на Украине смертность рожениц выросла в два раза. Эти проблемы коснулись всех народов без исключения. Численность населения на постсоветском пространстве за последние одиннадцать лет сократилась на 6 млн. человек. Уменьшилось население в России, Украине, Казахстане, Грузии, в Прибалтийских странах, Молдавии. Но именно русские понесли самый большой урон лишившись более 11 млн. человек. При этом миграция русских в Европу, США и другие страны из всех постсоветских стран за этот период составляет не более полумиллиона человек. Эти колоссальные потери и есть результат депрессии, которую испытывают русские люди. Например, в Восточно-Казахстанской области в 1996 г. на 1 тыс. человек русских родилось в 2,3 раза меньше, чем казахов, а умерло в 1,6 раза больше. Притом, что демографические показатели казахского населения также значительно ухудшились по сравнению с советским периодом, все-таки на каждую тысячу казахского населения прибавилось 8,5 человек, а раньше прирост составлял 13 человек на тысячу. А у русских из каждой тысячи убыло 7,4 человека только из-за «естественных» причин, без учета мигрантов. Этим я хочу обратить внимание на тот, в общем-то достаточно уже проанализированный факт, что распад Советского Союза и все происходящее сегодня в новых независимых государствах является катализатором депопуляции не только русского народа, если мы договорились говорить о русском мире, то и русского мира тоже.

К этому я бы добавил и тот факт, что движение новых независимых государств по пути превращения их в национальные государства, прежде всего характеризуется отрывом от прежней исторической и культурной традиции, в процессе образования и воспитания, объяснения подрастающему поколению совершенно новой версии истории. В этой исторической версии русские и Россия являются врагами и ее колонизаторами. При этом забывают о подъеме целинных земель, которые дают сейчас одно из главных богатств Казахстана – твердое зерно, о том, что инженеры, ученые, рабочие, приехавшие из России построили и обучили тот самый Казахстан почти с нуля в 30-60-е годы. В настоящее время при том, что в Казахстане русские составляют треть населения, на руководящих должностях в органах власти они представлены только 8%.

Я привожу в пример Казахстан, но такие же процессы, утверждающие в сознании местного народа тот факт, что он наиболее пострадавший, и именно русские заставляли его страдать, – звучат и в Литве, Латвии, Эстонии, и на Украине. В результате такого отношения к прошлому, общей истории страдают не только русские. Прежде всего, вымывается слой русскоязычных. Белыми воронами в Средней Азии, называемой сейчас Центральной Азией,

становятся прежде всего представители местных этносов, которые в течение своей жизни, в предыдущих поколениях уже превратились в составную часть этой новой исторической общности, мыслящих, говорящих и думающих по-русски. В силу этого они, прежде всего, объявляются «пятой колонной» и именно они сокращаются опережающими темпами.

Национальные государства, возникшие на обломках общей державы, не торопятся учитывать естественные интересы своего русского населения, вымещают на нем вчерашний страх местных элит к имперскому центру. На взгляд новой национальной власти, русские в силу своего прежнего влияния, своей большой массы слишком медленно перевариваются, плохо вписываются в новую политическую реальность. А русские, почти утратившие в советские годы сопротивляемость национальному притеснению, но не все доверие к государству как таковому, крайне растеряны встречая враждебность новой власти к их мифам, идеалам и жизненным потребностям. Наши соотечественники еще не усвоили новые правила игры, не овладели ее инструментарием, не выработали механизмов самозащиты. Не стали еще полнокровной диаспорой по образцу существующих в мире. На этом первом этапе они оказываются недостаточно способными бороться за свое достойное существование, за справедливое представительство в политической и общественной жизни, за образование своих детей на родном языке. Возникает протест, но умение постоять за себя не возникает так сразу, как сам протест.

Исключение представляют только русское и русскоговорящее население Латвии, которое подняла на массовый протест проводимая в стране реформа образования. В результате ее с началом 2004 учебного года резко сокращаются возможности обучения в средней школе на русском языке. А за этим следует и неизбежная ассимиляция, утрата своей этнической идентичности. Латвийская реформа активизировала политическую жизнь русскоязычного, русскокультурного населения страны. Сейчас движение «За права человека в единой Латвии» имеет фракцию в Сейме Латвии, своего депутата в Европарламенте. С европейских трибун звучат слова о неблагоприятии с правами национальных меньшинств в этой стране Евросоюза.

Но Латвия — это всего лишь исключительный пример для нашей постсоветской диаспоры. И русские, и русскоязычные в своем большинстве адресуют свои беды, невзгоды и надежды России. Тому государству, которое отгородилось от них в 1991 году новыми границами, но с которым они связывают свои надежды на защиту своих прав и свобод.

Кто и как занимается в России соотечественниками за рубежом

Россия очень долго не отвечала на призывы организовать диаспору. Новая Россия, которая возникла в 1991 году, не принимала обременительной ответственности за судьбы своих соотечественников за рубежом.

Еще на начальном этапе, когда распался Советский Союз, максимум, что позволяло руководство новой России времен Ельцина, это заявить, что если русским в союзных республиках будет плохо, все они найдут пристанище в Российской Федерации. Демократически настроенные депутаты Верховного

Совета в августе 1991-го года организуют первый Конгресс соотечественников, чтобы вспомнить о печальной судьбе эмиграции и призвать ее детей к сотрудничеству с возрождающейся Россией. По иронии судьбы, в тот день, когда на паперти Успенского собора в Московском Кремле должен был выступить Патриарх Алексей и призвать к объединению всех сил и слоев страны, чтобы примирить эмиграцию и новую Россию, в этот день произошел августовский путч 1991 года, и эта проповедь осталась не услышанной.

И хотя в отношении старой эмиграции были сделаны некоторые шаги к сближению, общение с объединениями русских людей в республиках Прибалтики, Приднестровья, которые первыми выразили протест против националистических правительств в новых государствах, считалось вредным и политически некорректным. На поток беженцев и эмигрантов в Россию, который хлынул в результате дискриминации наших соотечественников, прежде всего в бывших союзных республиках, мы ответили созданием в 1992 году Федеральной миграционной службы и ратификацией соответствующих международных конвенций.

Постепенно под впечатлением от нарастающего вала миграции в России начинает приходиться осознание масштаба обретенной проблемы. В это время, в 1994-1995 годах, кое-что было продекларировано.

До 24 мая 1999 г., когда Президентом РФ был подписан Федеральный закон «О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом» №99-ФЗ (далее — Закон о соотечественниках) головным документом в системе нормативно-правовых актов, предусматривающих меры защиты прав и интересов российских соотечественников в странах СНГ, Латвийской, Литовской и Эстонской республиках, являлись Основные направления государственной политики России в отношении соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, утвержденные постановлением Правительства РФ от 31 августа 1994 г. №1064 во исполнение указа Президента России от 11 августа 1994 г. №1681. Как это предписывалось тем же указом, постановлением Правительства РФ 11 декабря 1994 г. было утверждено Положение о Правительственной комиссии по делам соотечественников за рубежом, на которую было возложено обеспечение реализации первоочередных мероприятий по поддержке соотечественников в государствах — участниках СНГ и странах Балтии.

Озабоченность политической и экономической, правовой и социальной дискриминацией русского и русскоязычного населения в государствах — республиках бывшего СССР, созданием законодательного механизма его вытеснения за пределы их территории, дискриминацией русского языка, русской культуры, закрытием русских школ, изгнанием представителей некоренного населения с руководящих должностей, особенно в государственных учреждениях, попытками принудительных роспусков российских общин и преследованием их лидеров, обеспокоенность судьбой российских соотечественников — участников второй мировой войны, российских военных пенсионеров, православных верующих, отдельных лиц на территории новых независимых государств находила выражение в документах Верховного Совета и Федерального Собрания России, внушительный перечень которых приведен в

Приложении 1. Основным документом, определявшим политику России в тот период стала утвержденная постановлением Государственной Думы от 8 декабря 1995 г. № 1476-1 ГД Декларация о поддержке российской диаспоры и о покровительстве российским соотечественникам. В 1995 году в Бюджете Российской Федерации появляется отдельная строка статьи расходов на соотечественников за рубежом – все это было сделано, хотя все это было капле в море огромной проблемы.

В том же 1995 году при Государственной Думе Федерального Собрания России был учрежден Совет соотечественников (Постановление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания РФ от 5 апреля 1995 г. № 636-1 “О Совете соотечественников при Государственной Думе”).

Совет соотечественников был задуман и действовал как “предпарламент” для обсуждения тех документов, которые проходили в Госдуме и которые прямым или косвенным образом затрагивали интересы российских соотечественников за рубежом. Он работал и был самым авторитетным органом, представляющим интересы соотечественников в России в трех созывах Государственной Думы.

Ведущим министерством по проблемам соотечественников в середине 90-х годов было Министерство по делам Содружества Независимых Государств (Минсотрудничество), в котором работал и небольшой аппарат Комиссии. Делами миграции, которые непосредственно связаны с проблемами наших соотечественников из нового зарубежья, занималась Федеральная миграционная служба, созданная в 1992 году. В 2000 году Минсотрудничество, как и ФМС, были ликвидированы. Их вопросы были переданы в Министерство по делам федерации, национальной и миграционной политики.

В соответствии с Программой мер по поддержке соотечественников за рубежом постановлением Правительства РФ от 16 октября 2000 г. № 785 утвержден Порядок использования средств, выделяемых из федерального бюджета на реализацию мероприятий по поддержке соотечественников, проживающих в государствах — участниках СНГ и государствах Балтии. Порядок предусматривает следующие приоритетные направления использования бюджетных средств: 1) содействие в проведении в Российской Федерации мероприятий с участием общественных организаций соотечественников, проживающих в государствах — участниках СНГ и государствах Балтии (далее именуются — соотечественники); 2) приобретение и доставка учебной и учебно-методической литературы, а также учебного оборудования в школы и высшие учебные заведения с преподаванием на русском языке в государствах — участниках СНГ и государствах Балтии; 3) проведение в Российской Федерации мероприятий для соотечественников в области образования, науки и культуры, а также мероприятий лечебно-оздоровительного характера; 4) оказание содействия соотечественникам в области реализации права на получение информации на родном языке; 5) оказание гуманитарной и безвозмездной материальной помощи особо нуждающимся категориям соотечественников; 6) оказание помощи в защите основных прав и свобод соотечественников. Таким образом, именно на этих

направлениях Российское государство предполагало сосредоточить свои усилия в 2000 — 2002 г.

22 мая 2002 г. правительственным постановлением № 330 вышеизложенное постановление “Об утверждении Порядка использования средств, выделяемых из федерального бюджета на реализацию мероприятий по поддержке соотечественников, проживающих в государствах — участниках СНГ и государствах Балтии” признано утратившим силу. Взамен его тем же постановлением утверждены Правила использования средств федерального бюджета, выделяемых на реализацию мероприятий по поддержке соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом. С того времени перечень направлений использования средств федерального бюджета, выделяемых на поддержку соотечественников, должна была определять Правительственная комиссия по делам соотечественников за рубежом.

Вопрос о поддержке соотечественников за рубежом нашел отражение также в «Концепции государственной национальной политики Российской Федерации», утвержденной Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 15 июня 1996 г., № 909; в «Концепции приграничного сотрудничества в Российской Федерации», утвержденной распоряжением Правительства Российской Федерации от 9 февраля 2001 года № 196-р; в «Плане мероприятий по поддержке экспорта образовательных услуг образовательными учреждениями Российской Федерации», утвержденном распоряжением Правительства Российской Федерации от 1 ноября 2002 года № 1536-р; в «Основных направлениях поддержки Российской Федерацией соотечественников за рубежом на 2003-2005 годы», утвержденных распоряжением Правительства Российской Федерации от 28 ноября 2002 года № 1663-р.

Международные соглашения России по защите прав соотечественников за рубежом

В числе важнейших мер по оказанию эффективной помощи российским соотечественникам за рубежом названные внутригосударственные нормативные акты называют активизацию уже существующих международно-правовых механизмов по защите прав человека и национальных меньшинств, разработку аналогичных механизмов в рамках Содружества Независимых Государств, а также заключение двусторонних соглашений между Российской Федерацией и государствами — бывшими республиками СССР.

Относительно термина “национальное меньшинство” следует заметить, что при отсутствии нормативно закрепленной дефиниции большинство специалистов сегодня склоняется к подходу, согласно которому меньшинством является любая группа, находящаяся в численном меньшинстве в составе населения данного государства и не занимающая в нем ведущего положения, причем члены этой группы отличаются от основного населения по своим национальным, этническим, языковым или религиозным характеристикам и проявляют чувство солидарности, направленное на сохранение собственной культуры, традиций и языка. Таким образом, понятие национального меньшинства образовано совокупностью трех признаков: 1) самосознание и

самоидентификация себя с доминирующей группой другого государства — как правило, это государство способно защищать интересы такого меньшинства на международной арене; 2) достаточная многочисленность в государстве своего постоянного проживания, но не более, чем титульная нация; 3) наличие гражданства страны своего постоянного проживания, причем как граждане они лишены определенных гражданских прав.

Документы международного права различаются как по своему географическому охвату (для всего мирового сообщества, региональные, двусторонние), так и по объему регулируемых прав (универсальные и узко функциональные). Международно-правовые нормы защиты меньшинств включают в себя индивидуальные права, групповые права и международные гарантии. К последним относятся поручительство или заверение государства или группы государств выполнять международно-правовые нормы. Равноправие граждан государства, предоставление гражданских и политических прав без различия по расовому, этническому, языковому и религиозному признакам и другие виды гражданских свобод предусматривают правовую защиту не этнической группы, а индивидов, объединенных этническим происхождением. Осознание факта, что гарантии личных прав лиц, принадлежащих к национальным меньшинствам, недостаточно для сохранения их культурных особенностей, происходило постепенно. Концепция групповых прав, идея защиты меньшинств как сообществ укрепились лишь с конца 1980-х гг. и в значительной степени была вызвана переменами, которые начались в Восточной Европе.

Современная международная система защиты меньшинств основывается на правовых актах, перечень которых приводится в качестве Приложения 2 данного доклада.

Немало документов, закрепляющих права и свободы граждан Российской Федерации, постоянно или временно проживающих на территории государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств, других категорий лиц из числа российских соотечественников за рубежом принято в рамках СНГ и на сегодняшний день вступили в силу для России. Перечень этих документов приведен в Приложении 3. Соглашения в рамках иных межгосударственных образований, существующих на территории СНГ приведены в Приложении 4.

Что с нами происходит?

Новый этап и новые надежды на активизацию работы с соотечественниками за рубежом связывают с Президентом В.В.Путиным. Он стал инициатором встреч с представителями российских соотечественников в странах СНГ, которые прошли в рамках его официальных визитов в Казахстан, Азербайджан, Украину.

В октябре 2001 года он выступил на Конгрессе соотечественников, состоявшемся в Москве, где, в частности сказал, что «за прошедшие 10 лет в работе с соотечественниками государство сделало слишком мало, можно даже сказать - недопустимо мало. Были тому и объективные причины. Думаю, что все мы это прекрасно понимаем. Но были и очевидные недоработки со

стороны официальных властей, со стороны государства. До сих пор остаются пробелы в законодательстве, а принятые законы подчас несовершенно, запутаны, а иногда просто даже неисполнимы.

Работа Правительственной комиссии по делам соотечественников в предыдущие годы тоже не отличалась успехом. Сейчас, как все-таки кажется на первый взгляд, удастся наладить ее деятельность на основе новых подходов, новых идей и, я очень надеюсь, на основе новых кадров. Надеюсь, что уже в обозримой перспективе мы получим видимый и конкретный результат ее деятельности.

В этой связи несколько слов хотелось бы сказать о приоритетах государственной работы с соотечественниками и о тех задачах, которые, как представляется, надо решать в самую первую очередь.

Давно известно: одна из причин неэффективности работы с российскими общинами за рубежом — это чиновничье равнодушие и бюрократизм, несогласованность. Причем, к сожалению, на всех уровнях — надо это признать. И, думаю, что те, кто в зале сидят, знают это лучше меня.

Поэтому задача первая — устранить множественность и дублирование структур, которые, по сути, в ходе своей деятельности только размывают ответственность органов власти и должностных лиц. Давно известно, что "у семи няnek — дитя кривая", но у нас и одной нет, это точно. Нужно хотя бы создать одну государственную структуру, которая бы занималась всем комплексом тех сложных проблем, которые вы сегодня будете рассматривать».

К удивлению большинства, кто слышал эти слова, 16 октября 2001 года, через 5 дней после Конгресса соотечественников, вышел Указ Президента Российской Федерации «Вопросы структуры федеральных органов исполнительной власти», которым было упразднено Министерство по делам федерации, национальной и миграционной политики Российской Федерации, ведущее федеральное ведомство, которое в тот период занималось проблемами соотечественников за рубежом и миграцией.

Его функции были перераспределены между МИДом, Минэкономразвития и торговли, МВД. МИДу России поручалось вести всю работу по поддержке соотечественников. Все вопросы миграции были переданы в ведение Министерства внутренних дел. Прошедшие три года показали правоту тех, кто сомневался в правильности этого решения. Для МИДа работа с соотечественниками никогда не сможет стать главным, профильным направлением деятельности также как миграция — главным делом для МВД. Оба ведомства обязаны участвовать в этой работе, но искусственное разделение сообщающихся проблем соотечественников и их переселения в Россию (из тех стран, где это единственный способ сохранить русских для России) требует единого руководства. Собирающаяся раз в квартал Правительственная комиссия в принципе не в состоянии была эффективно выполнять эту работу. К Президенту России неоднократно обращались и соотечественники, и Мэр Москвы Ю.Лужков с просьбой о создании постоянно действующего федерального органа исполнительной власти по делам соотечественников за рубежом и миграции (в части репатриации) для формирования и практического

осуществления государственной политики в отношении соотечественников. К нынешнему Председателю Правительства России и я обращался с аналогичным предложением. Но мы остались не услышанными. А события последних месяцев свидетельствуют о том, что структуры исполнительной власти России не испытывают интереса к проблемам соотечественников. В нынешнем созыве Государственной Думы до сих пор не возобновлена работа Совета соотечественников. Этот факт в полной мере отражает индифферентное отношение к данной проблеме нового Правительства России, которое является «властителем дум» подавляющего большинства депутатов Государственной Думы.

В ходе идущей в настоящее время в России реформы государственного управления прекратила свою деятельность Правительственная Комиссия по делам соотечественников за рубежом, а новой федеральной структуры по работе с зарубежными соотечественниками пока не создано.

Недавно принятым законом в связи с разграничениями полномочий федерального Центра и субъектов Российской Федерации вся деятельность по поддержке соотечественников за рубежом отнесена к исключительному ведению Российской Федерации. Сейчас субъекты Российской Федерации исключены из Закона о соотечественниках, как сторона, которой дано право на данную деятельность. Этот шаг может трагически сказаться на реализации всей политики России в отношении диаспоры. Около двух третей небольших в абсолютном выражении средств, которые в России тратятся на поддержку зарубежных соотечественников, выделяют субъекты Российской Федерации, в первую очередь Москва. В частности, на 2004 год в федеральном Бюджете предусмотрено 252 миллиона рублей, то только Москва потратит на эти цели 158 миллионов рублей. Москва ведет большие программы по поддержке образования на русском языке, в первую очередь в Прибалтике, где эта проблема давно стала болезненной. Москва первой поддержала наших ветеранов в ближнем зарубежье, начала помогать Черноморскому флоту. Но с нового 2005 года, если не будет изменений, российские регионы не смогут на законных основаниях потратить ни копейки на программы поддержки соотечественников.

Правительство России заверяет, что еще осенью нынешнего года, то есть в ближайшие недели, право работать с соотечественниками Центр делегирует регионам в рамках специального закона. Будем на это надеяться.

А пока в условиях неопределенности государственной политики дискуссии по поводу определения «соотечественники за рубежом», о которых говорилось вначале, приобретают исключительно теоретический характер. Лично я склоняюсь к тому определению, которое было сформулировано еще в 1995 году при подготовке первого Съезда российских соотечественников, проведенного в Государственной думе Комитетом по делам СНГ и связям с соотечественниками. Съезд соотечественников поддержал такое определение: «российскими соотечественниками признаются все лица, кто считает себя таковыми и кто относится к народам и народностям, не обретшим нигде, кроме как в Российской Федерации своего национально-государственного самоопределения». Таким образом, к российским соотечественникам с равным правом могут относиться себя

русские, татары, адыги, башкиры, проживающие за границами России. Безусловно, термин «соотечественники за рубежом» – не равноценная замена понятию диаспора, однако его принятие отражает специфику распада многонационального Советского Союза и переходный характер процессов, происходящих после этого в Российской Федерации и на постсоветском пространстве вообще.

К сожалению, не ослабевает тревога о судьбе государственной политики России в отношении соотечественников за рубежом. От ее успехов (или провала) зависит судьба не только диаспоры, но и самой страны.

Вне взаимосвязи со своей диаспорой россияне и Россия не выживут. Ибо сказано: *«Царство, разделившееся в себе, не устоит»* (Евангелие от Матфея, 12 глава, 25 стих).

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЯ

Приложение 1. ЗАЯВЛЕНИЯ И ОБРАЩЕНИЯ ОРГАНОВ ВЛАСТИ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ В СВЯЗИ С НАРУШЕНИЯМИ ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА НА ПОСТСОВЕТСКОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ

1. Заявление Верховный Совет Российской Федерации «О правах человека в государствах Балтии» 17.07.1992 № 3326/1-1
2. Постановление Верховного Совета Российской Федерации «О правах человека в Эстонии» 17 июля 1992 года N 3326-1
3. Обращение Верховного Совета Российской Федерации к Верховному Совету Латвийской Республики от 23 декабря 1992 г.
4. Постановление Верховного Совета Российской Федерации от 1 июля 1993 г. № 5311-1 «О мерах в связи с нарушением прав человека на территории Эстонской Республики»
5. Заявление Комитета Государственной Думы по делам СНГ и связям с соотечественниками «В связи с арестом гражданина Российской Федерации Б.Ф.Супрунюка 12 апреля 1994г. в г.Петропавловске» - 22 апреля 1994г.
6. Заявление Государственная Дума «В связи с принятием Сеймом Латвийской Республики Закона о гражданстве» 06.07.1994 №159-1 ГД
7. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К парламентам, президентам и правительствам Латвийской Республики, Литовской Республики, Эстонской Республики" 12.04.1995 №686-1 ГД
8. Обращение Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации (далее - ГД СФ РФ) к Сейму Литовской Республики в связи с готовящейся депортацией из Литовской Республики группы граждан Российской Федерации. Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ от 18 января 1995 г. № 468-1 ГД
9. Постановление ГД ФС РФ от 24 марта 1995 г. № 621-1 ГД «Об экономических санкциях в отношении Эстонской Республики»
10. Обращение Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К парламентам, президентам и правительствам Латвийской Республики, Литовской Республики, Эстонской Республики». Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ от 12 апреля 1995 г. № 686-1 ГД
11. Заявление Комитета по делам СНГ и связям с соотечественниками в связи с арестом в г.Павлодаре Республики Казахстан атамана Иртышской линии Сибирского казачьего войска Н.И.Шибанова - 6 мая 1995г.
12. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации от 26 мая 1995 г. «В связи с нарушением основных прав и свобод граждан Российской Федерации и российских соотечественников в Республике Казахстан»
13. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «В связи с отказом Литовской Республики выдать визы группе депутатов Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации — членов Комитета Государственной Думы по делам Содружества Независимых

Государств и связям с соотечественниками». Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ от 23 июня 1995 г. № 931-1 ГД

14. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «В связи с попыткой принудительного роспуска Российской общины Севастополя и закрытия ее газет». Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ от 6 октября 1995 г. № 1172-1 ГД
15. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «О пятидесятой годовщине Организации Объединенных Наций». Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ № 1210-1 ГД от 18 октября 1995 г.
16. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «В связи с нарушением общепризнанных норм международного права в отношении граждан Российской Федерации и российских соотечественников в Республике Казахстан». Утверждено постановлением ГД ФС РФ от 17 ноября 1995 г. № 1338-1 ГД
17. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Президенту Латвийской Республики" 22.03.1996 №190-11 ГД
18. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Сейму Литовской Республики» - 22 марта 1996 года N 191-11 ГД
19. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Президенту Российской Федерации в связи с нарушением основных прав и свобод граждан Российской Федерации и российских соотечественников в Эстонской Республике» -22 марта 1996 года N 192-11 ГД
20. Заявление Государственной Думы «О нарушении прав православных верующих в Эстонии» - 22 марта 1996 года N 193-11 ГД
21. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Президенту Российской Федерации о дискриминации русских, постоянно проживающих в Латвийской Республике» - 21 июня 1996 года N 501-11 ГД
22. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "Об обеспечении конституционного права граждан Российской Федерации, проживающих или находящихся на территориях Латвийской Республики и Эстонской Республики, на участие в выборах Президента Российской Федерации" 07.06.1996 №452-11 ГД
23. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Президенту Российской Федерации о дискриминации русских, постоянно проживающих в Латвийской Республике" - 21.06.1996 №501-11 ГД
24. Заявление Комитета Государственной Думы по делам Содружества Независимых Государств и связям с соотечественниками «В связи с непрекращающимися преследованиями русского населения в Республике Казахстан» - 18 сентября 1996 г. №3.17-1106
25. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с принятием Сеймом Латвийской Республики так называемой декларации об оккупации Латвии" . 04.10.1996 №652-11 ГД
26. Обращение Государственной Думы «О политическом судебном процессе в Литовской Республике» -18 октября 1996 года N 710-11 ГД

27. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Парламентской Ассамблее Совета Европы и к Межпарламентскому Союзу в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями общепризнанных прав человека в отношении А.Рубикса" 18.12.1996 № 942-II ГД
28. Обращение Государственной Думы «В Организацию по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) по поводу судебного процесса в Литве над учеными-историками профессорами М. Бурокаявичюсом и Ю. Ермалавичюсом» - 5 февраля 1997 года N 1065-II ГД
29. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Сейму Литовской Республики по поводу судебного процесса в Литве над учеными-историками профессорами М.Бурокаявичюсом и Ю.Ермалавичюсом» - 5 февраля 1997 года N 1066-II ГД
30. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания "К президентам и парламентам государств - участников Содружества Независимых Государств и к президентам и парламентам Латвии, Литвы, Эстонии об объявлении 1999 года Годом А.С.Пушкина" 16.05.1997 №1429-II ГД
31. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Сейму Латвийской Республики об освобождении из заключения А.П.Рубикса" 04.06.1997 №1466-II ГД
32. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи со взрывом у Мемориала Победы в городе Риге" . 24.06.1997 №1641-II ГД
33. Заявление Государственной Думы «О судебной расправе в Литовской Республике над гражданином Российской Федерации В.Ивановым» - 12 сентября 1997 года N 1704-II ГД
34. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "О военных маневрах НАТО вблизи границ Российской Федерации" 26.09.1997 №1756-II ГД
35. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с подписанием Хартии о партнерстве между Соединенными Штатами Америки, Латвийской Республикой, Литовской Республикой и Эстонской Республикой" 23.01.1998 №2143-II ГД
36. Обращение Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Президенту Российской Федерации в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями общепризнанных прав человека", - 06.03.1998 №2261-II ГД
37. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Межпарламентской Ассамблее государств - участников Содружества Независимых Государств, Парламентской Ассамблее Совета Европы и Межпарламентскому Союзу в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями общепризнанных прав человека" - /06.03.1998 №2261-II ГД
38. Заявление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "Об отношениях между Российской Федерацией и Латвийской Республикой" - 06.03.1998 №2261-II ГД
39. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с актом вандализма в

- отношении братской могилы советских воинов - освободителей в городе Лиепая (Латвийская Республика)" 11.03.1998 №2276-II ГД
40. Заявление Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «В связи с событиями 3 и 8 марта 1998 года в Латвийской Республике» - 12 марта 1998 года N 70-СФ
41. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К главам государств и правительствам, парламентам государств- членов Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе в связи с проведением в городе Риге шествия ветеранов СС" . 20.03.1998 №2311-II ГД
42. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Президенту Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельцину в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями прав и свобод человека» - 1 апреля 1998 года N 142-СФ
43. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Межпарламентской Ассамблее государств - участников Содружества Независимых Государств, Парламентской ассамблее Совета Европы и Межпарламентскому союзу в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями прав и свобод человека» - 1 апреля 1998 года N 143-СФ
44. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Сазэму Латвийской Республики в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями прав и свобод человека» - 1 апреля 1998 года N 144-СФ
45. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Рийгикогу Эстонской Республики в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями прав и свобод человека» - 1 апреля 1998 года N 145-СФ
46. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Сейму Литовской Республики в связи с нарушением латвийскими властями прав и свобод человека» - 1 апреля 1998 года N 146-СФ
47. Постановление Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации от 20 мая 1998 г. № 204-СФ "О создании Временной комиссии Совета Федерации по изучению соблюдения прав соотечественников в Латвийской Республике"
48. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Сейму Литовской Республики» - 22 мая 1998 года N 2507-II ГД
49. Обращение Государственной Думы «К высшим должностным лицам Литовской Республики - Президенту Литовской Республики Валдасу Адамкусу, Председателю Сейма Литовской Республики Витаутасу Ландсбергису, Премьер-министру Литовской Республики Гядиминасу Вагнорюсу» - 26 июня 1998 года N 2696-II ГД
50. Обращение Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе «К Межпарламентской Ассамблее государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств, Парламентской Ассамблее Совета Европы и Межпарламентскому Союзу в связи с нарушениями украинскими властями общепризнанных прав человека» - Принято на IX заседании Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе 30 июня 1998 г.
51. Обращение Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе «В связи с нарушениями эстонскими властями основных прав и свобод человека» - Принято на IX заседании Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе 30 июня 1998 г

52. Обращение Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе «К Президенту Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельцину о продолжающейся дискриминации языковых и образовательных прав русского населения Украины» - Принято на IX заседании Совета соотечественников при Государственной Думе 30 июня 1998 г.
53. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "О забвении итогов Второй мировой войны руководством Латвийской Республики" 02.07.1998 №2735-II ГД
54. Обращение Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «К Президенту Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельцину в связи с продолжающимся нарушением прав человека и основных свобод в Латвийской Республике» - 9 июля 1998 года N 293-СФ
55. Заявление Совета Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации «В связи с продолжающимся нарушением прав человека и основных свобод в Латвийской Республике» - 9 июля 1998 года N 294-СФ
56. Заявление Совета Федерации в связи с продолжающимся нарушением прав человека и основных свобод в Латвийской Республике 21.07.1998
57. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с арестом правоохранительными органами Латвийской Республики полковника В.М.Кононова как бывшего командира партизанского отряда, боровшегося с фашизмом в годы Второй мировой войны" 02.09.1998 №2908-II ГД
58. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Сейму Литовской Республики о недопустимости дискриминации проживающих в Литовской Республике ветеранов Второй мировой войны, воевавших на стороне государств антигитлеровской коалиции» - 2 октября 1998 года N 3036-II ГД
59. Заявление Государственной Думы «В связи с закреплением в Конституции Автономной Республики Крым украинского языка как единственного государственного языка на территории Автономной Республики Крым» 23 октября 1998 года N 3158-II ГД
60. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Сейму Латвийской Республики" 04.12.1998 №3330-II ГД
61. Обращение Государственной Думы «К Парламентской Ассамблее Совета Европы, Парламентской Ассамблее Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе и Европейскому парламенту в связи с политическими судебными процессами в Литовской Республике» - 13 января 1999 года N 3491-II ГД
62. Обращение Государственной Думы «К главам государств и правительств, парламентам государств - членам Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе в связи с нарушением властями Литовской Республики общепризнанных принципов и норм международного права в области прав человека в отношении М.Бурокавичюса» - 12 февраля 1999 года N 3649-II ГД
63. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К депутатам Сейма Латвийской Республики в связи с проведением в городе Риге шествия ветеранов латышского легиона СС" 18.03.1999 № 3788-II ГД

64. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с судебным преследованием в Латвии депутата Рижской думы от политической организации "Равноправие" Т.Жданок" 12.05.1999 №3957-II ГД
65. Заявление Государственной Думы «О дискриминации российских военных пенсионеров в Эстонской Республике» - 26 октября 1999 года N 4452-II ГД
66. Заявление Государственной Думы «О дискриминации российских военных пенсионеров в Эстонской Республике» 3.11.1999
67. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с принятием Сеймом Латвийской Республики 8 июля 1999 года Закона Латвийской Республики "О государственном языке" 19.11.1999 №4568-II ГД
69. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с вынесением Рижским окружным судом обвинительного приговора по делу В.М.Кононова как бывшего командира партизанского отряда, боровшегося с фашизмом в годы Второй мировой войны" 2 28.01.2000 №28-III ГД
70. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с государственной политикой дискриминации российских соотечественников в Латвийской Республике" . 05.04.2000 №237-III ГД
71. Заявление Государственной Думы «В связи с проводимой на Украине дискриминацией русского языка» 19.07.2000 №596- III ГД
72. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "О продолжении преследования властями Латвийской Республики бывшего командира партизанского отряда В.М.Кононова" 25.01.2001 №1092-III ГД
73. Заявление Государственной Думы «О нарушении прав православных верующих в Эстонии» 27.06 2001
74. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К депутатам Сейма Латвийской Республики о содействии в освобождении из заключения М.Фарбтуха" . 22.06.2001 №1685-III ГД
75. Постановление Государственная Дума «О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "О дискриминационной политике латвийских властей в отношении русского населения Латвийской Республики" 07.06.2002 №2833-III ГД
76. Постановление Государственная Дума О заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В связи с грубыми нарушениями в Латвийской Республике прав человека и прав национальных меньшинств" 14.10.2003 №4441-III ГД
77. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Сейму Латвийской Республики в связи с ситуацией вокруг законопроекта о внесении изменений в Закон Латвийской Республики "Об образовании" 04.02.2004 №42-IV ГД
78. Постановление Государственная Дума «Об обращении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "К Европейскому парламенту в связи с выборами депутатов от Латвии и Эстонии" 10.06.2004 № 699-IV ГД

Приложение 2. СОВРЕМЕННАЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ СИСТЕМА ЗАЩИТЫ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ МЕНЬШИНСТВ (НАЗВАНИЯ ДОКУМЕНТОВ)

Универсальные (по объёму регулируемых прав и кругу участников) юридически обязывающие международные документы:

- Устав ООН (1945 г.);
- Всеобщая декларация прав человека (1948 г.);
- Конвенция о предупреждении преступления геноцида и наказании за него (1948 г.);
- Женевские конвенции 1949 г. о защите жертв войны и дополнительные протоколы 1977 г.;
- Конвенция МОТ № 111 относительно дискриминации в области труда и занятий (1959 г.);
- Конвенция ЮНЕСКО о борьбе с дискриминацией в области образования (1960 г.);
- Международная конвенция о ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации (1965 г.);
- Международный пакт о гражданских и политических правах (1966 г.) и Факультативный протокол к нему 1966 г.;
- Международный пакт об экономических, социальных и культурных правах (1966 г.);
- Конвенция о правах ребёнка (1989 г.).

Региональные юридически обязывающие международные документы:

- Европейская конвенция о защите прав человека и основных свобод (1953 г.);
- Заключительный акт Соперничества по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (1975 г.);
- Африканская хартия о правах человека и правах народов (1981 г.);
- Документ Копенгагенского совещания Конференции по человеческому измерению СБСЕ (1990 г.);
- Парижская хартия для новой Европы (1990 г.);
- Европейская рамочная конвенция по защите национальных меньшинств (1995 г.);
- Конвенция государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств об обеспечении прав лиц, принадлежащих к национальным меньшинствам (1994 г.).

Универсальные рекомендательные международные документы:

- Декларация о принципах международного культурного сотрудничества ЮНЕСКО (1966 г.);
- Декларация ООН социального прогресса и развития (1969 г.);
- Декларация ООН о принципах международного права, касающихся дружественных отношений и сотрудничества государств в соответствии с Уставом ООН (1970 г.);
- Декларация ЮНЕСКО о расе и расовых предрассудках (1978 г.);
- Декларация ООН о ликвидации всех форм нетерпимости и дискриминации на основе религии или убеждений (1981 г.);
- Декларация ООН о правах лиц, принадлежащих к национальным или этническим, религиозным и языковым меньшинствам (1992 г.).

Региональные рекомендательные международные документы:

- Итоговый документ Мадридской встречи 1980 г. представителей государств — участников СБСЕ (1983 г.);
- Азиатско-Тихоокеанская декларация человеческих прав индивидов и народов (1988 г.);
- Тунисская декларация о правах человека и правах народов (1988 г.);
- Итоговый документ Венской встречи 1986 г. представителей государств — участников СБСЕ (1989 г.);
- Группа принципов по национальным меньшинствам, предложенных Совету Европы Европейской комиссией по содействию демократии через закон (1990 г.);
- Документ Копенгагенского Совещания Конференции по человеческому измерению СБСЕ (1990 г.).

Приложение 3 ПРАВА И СВОБОДЫ РОССИЙСКИХ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ СООТЕЧЕСТВЕННИКОВ В СОГЛАШЕНИЯХ ГОСУДАРСТВ — УЧАСТНИКОВ СОДРУЖЕСТВА НЕЗАВИСИМЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ (НАЗВАНИЯ ДОКУМЕНТОВ)

— Алма-Атинская декларация (Алма-Ата, 21 декабря 1991 г.) // Дипломат. вестн. 1992. № 1;

— Соглашение между государствами — участниками Содружества Независимых Государств о социальных и правовых гарантиях военнослужащих, лиц, уволенных с военной службы, и членов их семей (Минск, 14 февраля 1992 г.; вступило в силу с момента его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1993. № 1;

— Соглашение о гарантиях прав граждан государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств в области пенсионного обеспечения (Москва, 13 марта 1992 г.; вступило в силу с момента его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1993. № 4;

— Соглашение о порядке пенсионного обеспечения военнослужащих и их семей и государственного страхования военнослужащих государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств (Ташкент, 15 мая 1992 г.; вступило в силу с момента его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1994. № 6;

— Соглашение о порядке пенсионного обеспечения военнослужащих Пограничных войск, членов их семей и государственного страхования военнослужащих Пограничных войск государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств (Ташкент, 15 мая 1992 г.; вступило в силу с момента его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1994. № 9;

— Соглашение государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о сотрудничестве в области культуры (Ташкент, 15 мая 1992 г.; вступило в силу со дня его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1994. № 6;

— Соглашение государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о сотрудничестве в области образования (Ташкент, 15 мая 1992 г.; вступило в силу со дня его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1994. № 6;

— Соглашение государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о сотрудничестве в области информации (Бишкек, 9 октября 1992 г.; вступило в силу в день его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1993. № 10;

— Конвенция государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о правовой помощи и правовых отношениях по гражданским, семейным и уголовным делам (Минск, 22 января 1993 г.; вступила в силу для Российской Федерации 10 декабря 1994 г.) // СЗ РФ. 1995. № 17. Ст. 1472;

— Декларация глав государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о международных обязательствах в области прав человека и основных свобод (Москва, 24 сентября 1993 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1994. № 9;

— Договор о создании экономического союза (Москва, 24 сентября 1993 г.; вступил в силу для Российской Федерации 28 марта 1995 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1995. № 1;

— Соглашение государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о помощи беженцам и вынужденным переселенцам (Москва, 24 сентября 1993 г.; вступило в силу 1 сентября 1994 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1995. № 5;

— Соглашение о порядке пенсионного обеспечения и государственного страхования сотрудников органов внутренних дел государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств (Ашхабад, 24 декабря 1993 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 9 июля 1999 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2000. № 1;

— Соглашение о сотрудничестве в области трудовой миграции и социальной защиты трудящихся-мигрантов (Москва, 15 апреля 1994 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 1 сентября 1995 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1997. № 2;

— Соглашение о гарантиях прав граждан в области выплаты социальных пособий, компенсационных выплат семьям с детьми и алиментов (Москва, 9 сентября 1994 г.; вступило в силу для России 12 апреля 1995 г.) // *Азаров А. Я. Права человека. Новое знание.* М., 1995. С. 157—159;

— Решение Совета глав государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств о создании Межгосударственного фонда помощи беженцам и вынужденным переселенцам (Алматы, 10 февраля 1995 г.; вступило в силу с момента его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1995. № 11;

— Конвенция Содружества Независимых Государств о правах и основных свободах человека (Минск, 26 мая 1995 г.; вступила в силу для Российской Федерации 11 августа 1998 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1999. № 6;

— Соглашение об оказании медицинской помощи гражданам государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств (Москва, 27 марта 1997 г.; вступило в силу со дня его подписания) // Рос. газ. (Экон. союз). 1997. 12 мая;

— Учредительный договор о создании Фонда поддержки культурного сотрудничества Содружества Независимых Государств (Москва, 11 сентября 1998 г.; вступил в силу со дня его подписания) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2000. № 8;

— Соглашение о сотрудничестве государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств в области периодической печати (Минск, 4 июня 1999 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 10 апреля 2000 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2000. № 12;

— Соглашение о создании Межгосударственного совета по сотрудничеству в области периодической печати, книгоиздания, книгораспространения и полиграфии (Минск, 4 июня 1999 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 28 августа 2000 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2001. № 4;

— Соглашение об основных направлениях сотрудничества государств — участников Содружества Независимых Государств в области защиты прав потребителей (Москва, 25 января 2000 г.; вступило в силу для России 2 июня 2000 г.) // *Содружество. Информ. вестн. Совета глав государств и Совета глав правительств СНГ.* 2000 № 1 (34).

Приложение 4. ПРАВА И СВОБОДЫ РОССИЙСКИХ СООТЕЧЕСТВЕННИКОВ В ДОКУМЕНТАХ МЕЖГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЙ НА ТЕРРИТОРИИ СНГ

— Договор между Российской Федерацией, Республикой Беларусь, Республикой Казахстан и Киргизской Республикой об углублении интеграции в экономической и гуманитарной областях (Москва, 29 марта 1996 г.; вступил в силу для Российской Федерации 11 февраля 1997 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 1997. № 8;

— Заявление глав государств — участников Договора от 29 марта 1996 года «О десяти простых шагах навстречу простым людям» (Москва, 28 апреля 1998 г.) // *Тамож. ведомости.* 1998. № 7;

— Соглашение о предоставлении равных прав гражданам государств — участников Договора об углублении интеграции в экономической и гуманитарной областях от 29 марта 1996 года на поступление в учебные заведения (Москва, 24 ноября 1998 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 15 сентября 1999 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2000. № 3;

— Соглашение об обеспечении свободного и равного права пересечения физическими лицами границ государств — участников Таможенного союза и беспрепятственного перемещения ими товаров и валюты (Москва, 24 ноября 1998 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 24 января 2000 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2000. № 6;

— Договор о Таможенном союзе и Едином экономическом пространстве (Москва, 26 февраля 1999 г.; вступил в силу для Российской Федерации 2 июля 2001 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2001. № 12;

— Соглашение об основных принципах приграничного сотрудничества государств — участников Договора об углублении интеграции в экономической и гуманитарной областях от 29 марта 1996 года (Москва, 26 февраля 1999 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 25 декабря 2000 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2001. № 7;

— Соглашение о создании и функционировании филиалов высших учебных заведений в государствах — участниках Договора о Таможенном союзе и Едином экономическом пространстве от 26 февраля 1999 года (Минск, 23 мая 2000 г.; вступило в силу для Российской Федерации 26 октября 2000 г.) // Бюл. междунар. договоров. 2001. № 4.