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
SOUTH KOREA T O D A Y




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MAP OF KOREA





South Korea Today

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
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1. Life in South Korea: Facts and Figures

1.1 Demographic Data


Total Population: 61,653,000 Total Land Area (km²): 222,046

North Korea 30.9%



South Korea 69.1%

North Korea 55.3%



South Korea 44.7%


Population Density (per km²): 277.65
South Korea: 429 North Korea: 155

Climate: Temperate Monsoon Zone

Ratio of Cultivated Land Area to the Total Land Area
South Korea: 21.7% North: 16.3%


1.2 Economic Indicators

Gross National Product of South Korea ¹⁾




Per Capita GNP in 1988: \$3,600 ²⁾

Land Ownership Ratio by Strata ³⁾



* Ratio is to the total privately owned land

Import - Export Trend ⁴⁾



Foreign Debt (Unit: 1 million U.S. \$) ⁵⁾


Year	Amount
1980	27,365
1984	43,050
1985	46,762
1986	44,445
1987	35,568
1988	31,714

The Rate of Unrestricted Importation (%) ⁶⁾


Products	Year	1985	1986	1987	1988*
Agricultural & Marine Products		78.2	79.7	79.9	79.9
Manufactured Products		89.8	94.0	96.6	98.7
Chemical Products		95.7	97.9	99.0	99.7
Iron, Steel, and Metal Products		95.6	99.2	99.5	100
Machineries		83.0	89.5	93.6	100
Electrical & Electronics Products		73.8	86.9	96.6	100
Textile Products		93.1	96.1	97.5	97.9
Average Rate		87.7	91.5	93.6	95.4

* At the end of April.


Direct Investment by Foreign Companies (1987) ⁷⁾




Number of Cases by Industry ⁸⁾



Investment Amount by Industry ⁹⁾



Electric Power Production (1987) ¹⁴⁾



Total: 73,800 million kwh

Market Penetration of Foreign Banks (%) ¹⁰⁾

Category \ Year	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
1. Savings	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.6	2.2
2. Foreign Currency Savings	62.5	46.7	49.1	38.3	8.3	5.1
3. Loans	9.0	9.6	10.6	10.2	10.2	10.5
4. Foreign Currency Loans	76.7	82.9	79.3	81.3	79.9	72.1
5. Credit Line	9.9	15.3	18.8	22.4	24.3	29.5
6. Equity	14.3	13.9	17.3	20.2	18.8	18.9
7. Total Assets	12.2	14.5	15.4	16.7	17.3	16.7

Number of Nuclear Power Plants in Operation (1989): 8 ¹⁵⁾

1.3 Social Indicators

Rate of Housing Supply (1988): 69.6% ¹⁾

*Ratio of households renting a house (1986): 42.6% of the total households

*Ratio of households renting a room (1986): 32.6% of the total households

Number of Persons Per Automobile (1986): 63 ²⁾

Number of Abandoned and Overseas Adopted Children Per Year ³⁾

Category \ Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Abandoned	8,500	9,138	11,587	12,114	13,430	14,230	13,887	13,304
Overseas Adopted	4,144	4,628	6,434	7,255	7,924	8,837	8,680	

Number of Children Adopted by the U.S. (January 1980 to June 1987): 39,531 (70% of the total adopted children). ⁴⁾

Infant Mortality Rate (1987): 3.03% ⁵⁾

Economically Active Population (1988): 17,970,000 ¹¹⁾

Ratio of Population in Mining and Manufacturing (1988): 31.8% ¹²⁾

Ratio of Population in Farming, Forestry, Fishing Industry (1988): 11.4% ¹³⁾

Ratio of Population in Commerce, Service Industry: —

Physically Disabled and Facilities for Care ⁶⁾

No. of Physically Disabled Persons	915,000 *
No. of Facilities for the Disabled	104
Total Capacity of the Facilities	11,100
Percentage of Disabled in Facilities	1.2

* South Korean government figure. Social organizations claim a figure of 2,500,000.

Number of Persons Qualified for Government Assistance (1987): 2,340,000 (5.4% of the total population). ⁷⁾

Note: Persons who qualify for government assistance must be earning less than \$100 per month.

Number of Medical Facilities (1986): 13,198 ⁸⁾

Number of Persons Per Medical Doctor (1986): 1,116 ⁹⁾

Distribution Rate of Water Supply Facilities (1988): 74.0% ¹⁰⁾

Rate of Paved Roads (1988): 57.2% ¹¹⁾

Number of Deaths from Automobile Accidents (1988): 11,563 (daily average: 3) ¹²⁾

*South Korea has the highest automobile accident rate in the world.

1.4 Culture, Education, and Religion

Literacy Rate: 95% ¹⁾

Number of Colleges (1988): 104 ²⁾

Number of College Students (1988): 1,003,648 ³⁾

Number of Public Libraries (1987): 417 ⁴⁾

Number of Seats in Public Libraries Per 10,000 Persons (1987): 1.2 ⁵⁾

Employment Rate of College Graduates: 43.8% (1987) ⁶⁾

Student Demonstrations (1987) ⁷⁾

Number of On-Campus Demos	Number of Street Demos	Number of Total Participants	Number Arrested
2,714	1,855	1,756,000	13,384

Number Detained	Number Booked w/o Detention	Number Summarily Tried
1,433	517	2,417

* Amount of money spent on tear-gas bombs in 1986: 37.3 million U.S. dollars. Source: Korea Pollution Research Center

Number of Assembly and Rally Law and National Security Law Violation Cases Handled by Public Prosecutor's Office ⁸⁾

Category \ Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Assembly & Rally Law	23	240	193	368	310	569	2,480	1,462
National Security Law	—————				60	156	410	583

Size of Religious Populations (Unit:10,000) ⁹⁾

Religion	Protestant	Catholic	Buddhism	Confu- cianism	Islam	Other
Size	999	215	420	127	3	266

1.5 Influence of the Military in South Korean Society

Military Spending as Percentage of Annual Budget ¹⁾

Year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
%	37.0	35.3	34.4	32.8	32.6	33.6	31.2	31.6	32.8

Percentage of Former Military Officers Among Executives of Government-Funded Firms (1987) ²⁾

Position	Chairman of the Board	Chief Executive Officer	Auditor
%	36.0	38.4	46.1

Rate of Former Military Officers Among S. Korean Ambassadors (as of September 1988): 41.2% ³⁾

Rate of Former Military Officers Among Members of the National Assembly (1989): 25% ⁴⁾

1.6 Workers' Life in South Korea

¹⁾

Average Number of Dependents Per Unionized Worker: 2.96

Minimum Monthly Living Cost for a Family of 2.96: \$ 717

Average Monthly Wage Per Unionized Worker: \$392

Average Monthly Wage/Minimum Monthly Living Cost (%): 54.6

Number of Labor Disputes ²⁾

Year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Total	186	88	98	113	265	276	3,749

International Comparison of Nominal Wages and Labor Productivity ³⁾

Category \ Country	S.Korea	Japan	Taiwan	U.S.	Singapore
Ave. Monthly Wage (\$)	399.6	2,164.7	481.6	1,716.0	340.1
Labor Productivity Index	217.4	135.5	158.4	122.8	137.5
Ratio of Wage Increase to Labor Productivity	0.76	1.48	1.36	1.12	1.18

* Compared years: U.S. and Singapore - 1986; others - 1987.

Ratio of Day Laborers to Total Workers(1985): 36% ⁴⁾

Number of Industrial Accidents ⁵⁾

Year	Classification			
	Deaths	Physical Disabilities	Injuries	Total
1985	1,718	19,824	120,267	141,809
1986	1,660	21,923	118,505	142,088
1987	1,771	22,500	118,229	142,500
Total	5,149	64,249	357,001	426,397


* The figure only includes the workers covered by industrial accident insurance. These workers make up about half the total worker population.

Number of Industrial Accidents Per Day ⁶⁾


Deaths	Physical Disabilities	Injuries
4.6	58.6	32.6



International Comparison of Wages and Working Hours ⁷⁾




International Comparison of Industrial Accidents ⁸⁾



* Ratio of victims per 1 million workers per hour.


1.7 Farmers' Life in South Korea



Percentage of Tenant Farm Households and Tenant Farm Land ¹⁾

Year	1960	1970	1981	1985	1986
Household	26.4	33.5	46.4	64.7	
Land	11.9	17.2	22.3	30.5	31.5

Increase of Debts per Farm Households ²⁾




*Farmers movement groups claim the debt reached \$7,164 per household in 1988.

Number of Farm Households Leaving Agriculture ³⁾
(Unit:1,000)


Year	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986	1987	1988
Number	1,206	3,309	2,561	3,384	2,911	620	410	1,360

* No. leaving = Anticipated no. of households - Actual no. of households


Decreasing Rate of Farmer Household Among Total Population ⁴⁾



Changing Rate of Food Self-Sufficiency (%) ⁵⁾




Amount of Imported Foods (Unit: 1 million \$ U.S.) ⁶⁾



1987

1988

Dependence Rate of Major Imported Grains on the U.S. ⁷⁾



Percentage of Farmers Over Age 50 ⁸⁾

Year	1987	1988
%	30.6	32.9

Annual Average Number of Farmers Poisoned by Pesticide Chemicals: 1,250 ⁹⁾

* Only 3% of the poisoned victims received hospital treatment.
Source: Dong-A Ilbo, 2 July 1986.



1.8 Women's Life in South Korea

1)

Female Employment Rate by Industries (1987) Unit: 10,000


Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery	197.7
Mining	0.7
Electric, Gas & Water Works	0.3
Manufacturing	118.7
Construction	6.3
Wholesale, Retail Food and Lodging	148.0
Communications, Banking	21.4
Service	68
Total	561.1

2)

Rate of Female Wages in Industry (male wages taken as 100)

Category \ Year	1971	1976	1980	1985
Whole Industry	43.6	43.9	44.5	48.3
Manufacturing	44.2	44.2	45.6	49.1

Occupation Distribution of Female Workers Over 15 Yrs. Old ³⁾



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- 3) Chosun Ilbo, 15 November 1988.
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- 9) Hankook Ilbo, 21 February 1988.

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- 4) Mal, December 1988.
- 5) Ministry of Labor
- 6) Ministry of Labor
- 7) Heurum, September 1988.
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Farmers' Life in South Korea

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- 2) Hankook Ilbo, 7 July 1988; Chosun Ilbo, 5 June 1989.
- 3) Ibid.
- 4) Hankook Ilbo, 7 July 1988
- 5) Nongchon-sahwe-sajung (Social Conditions of Farming Villages, 1986; Mal, December 1988; Chosun Ilbo, 17 June 1989.
- 6) Korea Social Research Center of Farming and Fishing Arcas, "Nong-Uh-Chon Hwebo (Farming and Fishing Village News)," No. 1.
- 7) Nong-min Shinmun, No. 24.
- 8) Korea Vendors Association, Garosu, No. 24.
- 9) Han-Kyo-Reh Shinmun, 9 March 1989.

Women's Life in South Korea

- 1) Kwangju-ui-sori (Voice of Kwangju), No. 73.
- 2) Heurum, September 1988.
- 3) Kwangju-ui-sori (Voice of Kwangju), Op. Cit.

2. How Has the Korean Armistice Agreement Been Violated?

The repeal of the Korean Armistice Agreement (KAA for short) and its replacement by a Peace Treaty is imperative to end the military confrontation and to establish a genuine peace on the Korean peninsula. A Peace Treaty must be preceded by a thorough reassessment and understanding of the KAA and the history of the violation of its principles. The original intent of the KAA itself was to prevent another war in Korea.

The KAA consists of 5 articles and 63 clauses. In this essay we will focus on Article 4, particularly on Clauses 13-d and 60. Clause 60 recommends a "political conference of a higher level to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question." Clause 13-d prohibits the importation of weapons from foreign countries. A careful analysis of these two clauses of the KAA is key to establishing a correct perspective on the Korean peace issue.

1. Clause 60 and its Violation

Clause 60-d: "In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three(3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korea question, etc." (The signatories of the KAA were the U.N. Command, north Korea, and China.)

The "political conference...on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question" means none other than the discussion of reunification of Korea. It is because, without reunification, the threat of war persists on the Korean peninsula as was before the Korean War. Thus, in three months the political conference was planned to discuss reunification and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. In addition, Clause 62 states that the KAA shall remain

in effect until a peace treaty is concluded at the political conference. Article V, Clause 62 reads, "The Articles and Paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

But the political conference held at Geneva was halted without settling the Korean question.

The political conference was not held until 26 April 1954, almost a year after the signing of the KAA. The signatories could not agree on the agenda, time, place and participants of the conference. Behind these superficial reasons was the basic differences on who should participate and how the conference should be carried out.

The United Nations insisted on a "face-to-face" conference at the exclusion of the neutral countries while China and north Korea advocated a "round-table" conference which would insure the participation of neutral countries.

At the UN General Assembly held on 17 August 1953, the 16 countries who participated in the Korean War, under the U.S. leadership, proposed a joint resolution calling for an exclusive meeting of the UN Command and north Korea. The Soviet representative at the Assembly opposed the resolution, arguing instead for a round-table conference where various concerned countries would participate in the negotiations. He stated that the multi-nation negotiation was in accordance with the international principles of the peace-loving countries. In response, the north Korean and the Chinese Ministers of Foreign Affairs supported the Soviet position.

Why was there such a debate? The qualitative difference between the two formats of the conference is highlighted below:

-A Round-Table Conference: effective in facilitating post-war international negotiations otherwise easily prone to stalemates. Neutral countries can mediate and adjust differences among the parties involved.

-A Face-To-Face Conference: doomed to fail from the start. It is

difficult for the parties involved to work out a settlement without an arbitrator.

Because of these differences, most post-war negotiations tend to take the form of a round-table conference. Why, then, did the U.N. (dominated by the U.S.) and the Syngman Rhee regime insist on the latter for the Geneva conference? Simply put, it was to break up the political conference. There are several evidences for this.

First, the U.S. and south Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, only two months after the conclusion of the KAA. In addition, they agreed to transfer the operational command of the Korean forces to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.N. Command (General Mark W. Clark of the U.S. Army at the time). Forming the military alliance prior to the political conference is a direct contradiction of Article 60 of the KAA. The Defense Treaty guaranteed the permanent U.S. military presence in south Korea and its use of the south Korean soil for military bases.

Second, regarding the means of reunification of Korea, Syngman Rhee, who opposed the Armistice, announced:

1. North Korea should hold a separate election to fill the remaining seats of the south Korean National Assembly.
2. But south Korea is willing to accept a general election by all Koreans if the north Koreans wish to do so.

This meant that he would boycott any political conference unless his claims were accepted at the conference. Upon the break-up of the preparatory meeting for the political conference, the south Korean government declared, "Those countries who assisted south Korea in the war must participate in another war if the political negotiations prove to be ineffective by 22 January 1954."

Until arrangements for the conference were finally agreed upon at the Berlin meeting of the four countries (the U.S., England, France and the U.S.S.R.) in February 1954, the preparatory process was repeatedly obstructed by the conflict over the participation of the neutral countries.

Meanwhile, two days after the Berlin Conference, south Korea officially declared its position opposing the political conference. At this time, the U.S. was feeling international pressure to hold the

political conference as arranged at the Berlin Conference. Then, to persuade south Korea to attend the political conference, the U.S. provided the following conditions:

-While attending the conference for a certain agreed period, both countries will pull out if there is no progress.

-Both countries will expand and strengthen their land, air and sea forces in preparation for the break-up of the political conference.

This revealed the underlying intention of the U.S. to abort the conference. Its nominal participation was only a way of deflecting international pressure. Moreover, the above proposal is a flagrant violation of Article 13-d of the KAA.

The Geneva Conference opened on 26 April 1954. The participants were: the 16 U.N. members which had sent troops to Korea (minus South Africa), south and north Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The U.S. and south Korea with the intention to abort the conference, made a proposal on reunification that they knew to be unacceptable to north Korea. They claimed that since south Korea has been established by free elections under the U.N. supervision, what remained to be done was a similar observation of free elections in north Korea alone to elect representatives to fill the vacant seats reserved for north Korea in the south Korean National Assembly. This was opposed by north Korea, the U.S.S.R., and China on the grounds that the U.N. was itself a belligerent in the Korean War.

On the contrary, north Korea proposed a bi-partite Korean commission, operating on consensus and with equal representation from north and south, that would be complemented by a supervisory (and neutral) international commission. The principle that north Korea put forward was that the Korean people's role comes first.

Concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops, the U.S. insisted on maintaining the foreign troops until the establishment of a unified government. North Korea and China on the other hand called for a prompt withdrawal of foreign troops.

As a result of these differences the Geneva conference came to a halt on 15 June 1954 with no fruitful outcome for the peaceful solution of the Korean issue. Korea still remains under the semi-state of war without a peace treaty today.

2. Clause 13-d and Its Violation

Clause 13-d: "Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof."

The clause prohibits military expansion i.e. the importation of weapons, strategic equipments, and military supplies. But south Korea spends billions of dollars to import massive quantities of U.S. weapons. The U.S. has explicitly violated the clause by deploying nuclear weapons in south Korea.

The U.N. started to introduce modern weapons to south Korea under the pretext of north Korea and China's breach of Clause 13-d. The U.N. representative of the Korean Armistice Committee issued the following statement on 21 June 1957:

1. There is a gap between the Air Force power of north and south Korea; the U.S. sent the latest-model jets (capable of carrying nuclear bombs) to south Korea from Japan and other bases.
2. At this moment, the U.S. has no plan to send nuclear weapons or missiles to south Korea.
3. The U.S. is considering the modernization of the R.O.K military through military aid.

Let us examine if the U.N. claims are valid. There are several evidences that are inconsistent with its claims.

First, the south Korean government interfered with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission whose role was to oversee the KAA signatories to fulfill Clause 13-d. The Syngman Rhee regime pursued reunification by force, a policy that directly repudiates the clause. This position was incompatible with the objectives of the Neutral Supervisory Commission.

Second, the claim that north Korea's air power is superior to

that of south Korea is false. The south Korean air forces were supported by the U.S. which boasts by far the strongest air power in the world. To compensate for this "military imbalance", the U.S. sent nuclear bomb-carrying jets to south Korea. North Korea, on the other hand, had just been completely destroyed by sustained U.S. bombing. It is obvious that north Korea could not possibly have the resources to build up the military comparable to the combined military power of the U.S. and south Korea. It is generally assumed that north Korea received military aid from the U.S.S.R. after the war. But in fact there was no Soviet military aid until the late 1950's. Throughout the 50's, the Soviet air power was far inferior compared to the U.S.

Third, during the immediate post-war period, north Korea had to pour all its energies and resources into social reconstruction. To secure the necessary labor force, north Korea proposed a bilateral reduction of troops to less than 100,000. Although the south did not respond, the north alone cut back 80,000 troops.

Fourth, the U.S. violated the KAA at least twice, long before its official announcement to repudiate Clause 13-d. The first was the signing of the R.O.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953. The second was the dispersal of the Geneva Conference as explained earlier.

Thus, considering all these evidences the claims of the U.N. are not convincing. Ever since Clause 13-d was repudiated, north and south Korea have been whirled into the billion-dollar arms race at the expense of economic and social development.



3. The Problems in the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea Agreement (SOFA)

1. The Historical Background of Signing the SOFA

With the establishment of the Republic of Korea (south Korea) in 1948, the U.S. armed forces, which had occupied Korea south of the 38th Parallel since the surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945, withdrew leaving behind only a small number of military advisors. The U.S. troops returned at the outbreak of the Korean War. On 12 July 1950, in the heat of the war, the south Korean government concluded through correspondence the 'Taejon Agreement' which gave the U.S. direct command over the R.O.K. armed forces and complete jurisdiction over the U.S. troops. On 14 May 1952 the south Korean government concluded the agreement concerning unified command and economic regulations (Meyer Agreement) which gave the UN Forces complete power to carry out the war. In effect, the south Korean government abandoned its sovereignty.

With the signing of the armistice in July 1953, the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded during the following October. President Syngman Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles acknowledged the need for the SOFA in a joint statement made on 7 August 1953. But because the Taejon and Meyer Agreements were so favorable, the U.S. continually opposed concluding the SOFA. However, with the rising protest and condemnation of violent crimes committed by U.S. soldiers against the Korean people and the increasing demand for signing the SOFA after 1960, meetings between administrators began in 1962. When the south Korean government agreed to the U.S. demand for sending Korean troops to Vietnam in 1965, SOFA was signed in return. After 13 years of negotiations, SOFA was signed in 1966. The atmosphere at the time welcoming the signing of SOFA was such that there were not many criticisms of the inequality inherent in the concluded SOFA.

Because of U.S. arrogance and the lack of autonomy by the south Korean government, it took 16 years after the beginning of U.S. military occupation to conclude SOFA.

2. The Inequality in SOFA

A. The Problem of Base and Facilities Use

U.S. armed forces are stationed in south Korea in accordance with Article IV of Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty which stipulates, "The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea...." At the present, the total number of U.S. military bases is 120, the total number of buildings used is 10,512, and the total land area used by the U.S. armed forces is 300 square kilometers - half the size of Seoul.

1) The U.S. troops have free use of facilities and areas in south Korea as stipulated in Article V, paragraph 2 of SOFA, "...the Republic of Korea will furnish...without cost to the United States and make compensations where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way...."

2) It is further stipulated in Article V, paragraph 2, "The Government of the Republic of Korea assures the use of such facilities and areas to the Government of the United States and will hold the Government of the United States as well as its agencies and employees harmless from any third party claims which may be advanced in connection with such use." Thus, if a facility or an area is privately owned, then the south Korean government would compensate for its use by the U.S. military.

3) As stipulated in Article IV, paragraph 1, "The Government of the United States is not obliged, when it returns facilities and areas to the Government of the Republic of Korea..., to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces, or to compensate the Government of Korea in lieu of such restoration," the U.S. is exempt from the responsibility and liability for all accidents, damages, and environmental destruction caused by the U.S. troops in Korea.

B. The Problem of Public Utilities and Services Use

Article VI of SOFA stipulates that the U.S. troops in Korea have the right to use public utilities and services, and paragraph 2 of the Article stipulates; "The use of such utilities and services by the

United States shall be in accordance with priorities, conditions, and rates or tariffs no less favorable than those accorded any other user." Thus the U.S. troops are guaranteed special privileges. In fact, the U.S. military in Korea pay only 43% of the electricity and 25% of gasoline prices paid by the Korean military. They also pay very cheap prices for other commodities and have first priority in the right to use them.

C. The Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction

The problem of criminal jurisdiction has been exposed to the general public through countless crimes that have been committed by the U.S. soldiers in Korea and is considered the symbol of inequality inherent in SOFA. Article XXII, paragraph 1, seems to stipulate the U.S. and south Korea have equal rights concerning the criminal jurisdiction, but various other provisions and supplementary documents put a great limitation on Korea's jurisdiction. The number of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers during the period between 1967 and 1987 was 39,425, and only 0.6% of these, 234, fell under the jurisdiction of Korea. Compared to 32% for NATO countries and 21.2% for the Philippines, this percentage is conspicuously low, and most of the cases ended without prosecution.

1) According to Article XXII, paragraph 3(c), the Korean government has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses except "offenses solely against the property or security of the United States, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or of a dependent," and "offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty." However, the power to issue a permit which defines "performance of official duty" is given to U.S. officers with a rank of brigadier general or higher. Thus, if the U.S. military authorities claim an offense was committed during a "performance of official duty," it is excluded from the criminal jurisdiction of Korea.

2) Article XXII, paragraph 3 further stipulates, "The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its rights..." and subtly obliges Korea to waive its right to exercise jurisdiction.

3) The issue of jurisdiction waiver is more concretely specified

in exchange letters. It is stated that unless the Korean government finds it important to exercise jurisdiction on specific cases, the U.S. military authorities will have the right to exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, in a separate, related document, the agreed understanding section, it is stipulated that only a) offenses against the security of Korea, b) murder, c) robbery, and d) rape are defined as serious offenses. This forces Korea to waive its jurisdiction over assault, the most common offense committed by U.S. soldiers.

4) Even in the case of serious offenses, criminal jurisdiction cannot be exercised most of the time. It is stipulated in the exchange letters that unless the Attorney General of south Korea submits a written charge within 15 days after the offense, the primary right to exercise jurisdiction is automatically waived.

5) The actual exercise of jurisdiction requires the power to arrest and detain the offenders. But Article XXII, paragraph 5(c) stipulates, "If [the accused] is in the hands of the Republic of Korea, he shall, on request be handed over to the military authorities of the United States...." Thus, the Korean authorities' right to investigate is severely limited. The accused cannot be arrested once he is inside a U.S. base and unless the testimony of the accused is submitted by a representative of the U.S. government or a lawyer, it is not permitted as evidence.

6) In the mutual agreement proceedings record, it is stipulated that the prosecutor cannot appeal a decision of acquittal or a decision which the defendant has not appealed.

7) In the case of a conviction, south Korea is infringed upon its right to carry out the sentence in its own prison facilities. Article XXII, paragraph 7 stipulates, "The authorities of the Republic of Korea shall...give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the United States for the custody of any member of the United States armed forces..., who is serving a sentence of confinement imposed by a court of the Republic of Korea." The south Korean government is prevented from intervening when the offender is detained in loosely monitored facilities (inside U.S. bases) and released unilaterally.

8) The waiver of right to exercise jurisdiction creates difficulty for Koreans seeking compensations for damages. Because most of the jurisdiction is exercised by the U.S., the contention of the U.S.

military is more convincingly presented than that of the Korean victims. In the case of an offense committed by a U.S. soldier during performance of official duty, the victim must apply for reparation to the south Korean government, and 25% of the reparation amount is paid by the south Korean government. Furthermore, the Korean prison facilities must meet U.S. standards. The U.S. military authorities have the right to inspect the facilities where U.S. military personnel or their dependents have been detained or are being detained. Such terms as the right to refuse trial if the conditions are deemed improper to the prestige of U.S. armed forces (i.e. handcuffing of U.S. soldiers) make it doubtful this agreement was concluded between equally sovereign nations.

D. The Problem of Labor Rights

The Article on labor in SOFA seems to acknowledge the labor rights of the Korean workers employed by the U.S. military. But various provisions make it impossible to exercise the basic labor rights.

1) It is stipulated in Article XVII, paragraph 3, the U.S. military will conform with the provisions of the south Korean labor laws to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Article and the military needs of the U.S. armed forces in Korea. With the military needs not specifically defined, there is ample ground for denying the three basic labor rights under such a general rule.

2) It is stipulated in Article XVII, paragraph 2, that the U.S. military can recruit, hire, and administer their personnel. This means the U.S. military also has the right to lay off Korean workers according to need. In fact, there are many workers who are unjustly dismissed.

3) The right to exercise collective action is obstructed. In case of a labor dispute, it is first referred to the south Korean department of labor, and if it is not resolved here, it is passed on to the joint committee. The decision of the joint committee is binding and the workers disobeying the joint committee can be dismissed.

After a case is referred to the joint committee, all acts of labor disputes are forbidden for at least 70 days. In such a long period the employer can carry out operations to split and destroy the worker force, and thus, general strikes can almost never take place.

If a worker dispute is not resolved by any of the avenues mentioned, the workers can exercise the right of collective action, but any act obstructing the military maneuvers of the U.S. armed forces are excluded. In the end, collective action is effectively blocked.

E. The Problem of Customs and Duties

In accordance with SOFA, the U.S. military enjoys tremendous benefits of tax exemption and freedom of entry and exit. U.S. military ships and airplanes have free use of any port or airport in Korea. The benefit gained by the U.S. military from exemption of tariffs and other taxes as stipulated in Articles IX and XIV, in 1987 alone, was \$72,800,000. The U.S. soldiers and civilian military personnel and their families can import almost all household goods duty-free. Even goods brought in for private use are free of duties or other charges if the owners are arriving in south Korea for the first time. Personal items and household goods which are ordinarily purchased in the U.S. are also free of duties or other charges. As a consequence of this, a great quantity of goods imported by U.S. soldiers and civilian military personnel spill into the south Korean domestic market (black market for PX goods). The freedom of entry and exit for U.S. armed forces makes it difficult for south Korean authorities to restrict the main carriers of AIDS, namely the U.S. soldiers. Measures to address this problem is urgently needed.

3. Conclusion

The various Articles with provisions unfavorable to south Korea demonstrate the unequal status of south Korea in relation to the U.S. within SOFA. The inequality of status inherent in SOFA effectually denies sovereignty of south Korea. The main text of SOFA appears to promote equal status, but the various provisions for exceptions and vague, overly general wording promote inequality.

The south Korean government has accepted such an unfair agreement because it is subordinate to the U.S. When seen in this light, the basic solution of achieving south Korean autonomy is the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the dissolution of SOFA. If these cannot be achieved immediately because of various internal and external conditions, then as a transitional measure, SOFA must be revised and made into a more reasonable and equitable agreement.

In a time when the hope of Koreans demanding the revision of SOFA is becoming more concrete, the south Korean government must begin the work to completely revise SOFA in the immediate future. At the same time, the U.S. government must take a respectful attitude toward the Korean people's right to exercise autonomy and begin working on the complete revision of SOFA.



4. U.S. Troops In South Korea: Past and Present

South Korea was stirred up in 1986 when students evoked a shearing criticism on the subordination of the Korean military to the U.S. Yet the U.S. has long deemed the Korean military to be its mercenaries. The Defense Monitor, a famous U.S. military journal, quotes a U.S. general as saying, "...the Korean forces have always been our mercenaries, and nothing but a shield for our forward deployment in Asia."

The U.S. military presence in south Korea is generally believed to have contributed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In recent times, however, there have emerged numerous counterarguments on the necessity of stationing U.S. troops in south Korea. Many Koreans are voicing their concerns about the enormity of military expenses related to the U.S. military presence and the Korean sovereignty question. This article intends to affirm the legitimacy of the Korean people's call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and aspirations for national self-determination by reviewing the forty four years' history of the U.S. military presence in south Korea.

U.S. Troops in South Korea, Entitled to Extraterritoriality:

The Korean people were outraged by the frequency and barbarity of crimes committed by U.S. troops after their first entry on the Korean soil in 1945. Anti-American sentiments gradually increased among the Korean people when the Park Chung Hee regime started to dispatch south Korean troops to the Vietnam War in 1964. To forestall the Korean people's strong resistance to U.S. troops in south Korea, the U.S. concluded the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea Agreement (SOFA) in 1966. But as in the Taejon Agreement (1950) and the Meyer Agreement (1952), U.S. troops in south Korea are virtually entitled to extraterritoriality.

According to a recent report by the south Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 39,425 cases of crime were committed by 45,000 U.S. troops in south Korea from 1967 to 1987. This indicates that every year, 2,000 crimes were committed by U.S. troops for 20 years. The total number of U.S. soldiers involved in crimes since 1945 hovers around 100,000. Even after the conclusion of the SOFA --there was no judicial basis for the punishment of U.S. troops before 1966-- the

south Korean government could put no more than 315 soldiers (0.7% of 45,000) on trial.

It is easy to figure out how these 100,000 outlaws were protected under the specious legality. The SOFA forces the south Korean government to give up its right to jurisdiction at the request of the U.S. military as far as circumstances permit. If the south Korean government does not demand a trial within 15 days, its right to administer a trial becomes nullified. Because of these loopholes, only 0.7% of all U.S. troops who committed crimes were tried under the south Korean judicial system, which is a striking contrast to 32% for NATO countries, 32% in Japan and 21% in the Philippines.

Military Occupation and Neocolonial Rule over South Korea:

Yet the fundamental problem facing Koreans originates not from the SOFA, but from the forty four years of neocolonialism which has penetrated south Korea in all its aspects since the U.S. troops set foot in Korea in 1945. Put simply, forty four years of U.S. troops in south Korea means forty four years of U.S. neocolonial rule over south Korea. Owing to the continued U.S. auspice, the south Korean dictatorships have prospered despite political upheavals such as the 1980 Kwangju People's Uprising. South Korea's subjugation to the U.S. has been intensified, to the point where even a bridge or a subway entrance cannot be constructed without the consent of the U.S.

The national tragedy of Korea started when the U.S. divided the Korean peninsula into halves. The arbitrary line drawn at the 38th parallel provided a condition for the U.S. to forcibly occupy the southern half of Korea. From 1945, the U.S. solidified its neocolonial rule over the south. In 1948 Syngman Rhee established a puppet regime under the tutelage of the U.S. military.

Once established, the passage of the pro-U.S. regime ran smooth. The firm grip of the U.S. (troops) on south Korea has never been challenged. The dictators could not have come into power without the approval of the U.S. military which has seized the operational command of the south Korean forces.

The U.S. military not only deepens military subordination of south Korea, but also keeps all other aspects of south Korea --from

politics to economy -- chained to the neocolonial system.

The Landing of U.S. Troops: A Foreboding Start

From the start, the Korean people's encounter with U.S. troops was somehow inauspicious. On 8 September 1945, U.S. troops greeted a crowd of people welcoming the "Liberation Army" with a stray of bullets. Two Koreans were shot to death. Six days prior to U.S. troops' landing on Korea, Lt. General Hodge, Commanding General of U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK), issued the following statement:

"Decrees and other orders to Koreans will be announced through the existing government departments. Since orders from Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in the Pacific (i.e. General Douglas MacArthur) purport to aid you Koreans, I advise you to strictly observe and put them into practice. Therefore, unlawful activities will be treated with harsh measures."

The "existing government departments" mean the Japanese Government-General of Korea. No doubt, the Korean people were aghast at the implication of Hodge's statement. Furthermore, General MacArthur declared the U.S. military occupation of Korea through General Order No. 1, dated on 9 September 1945. The Order reads, "..... Today the victorious forces under my command occupied the southern half of Korea below the 38th parallel..... The Korean people should immediately follow the orders announced under my authority. Those who do not obey the U.S. Occupation Army or destabilize social order will be subject to severe punishment....."

"Glorious" Transfer of Operational Command to the U.S. Military:

On 15 July 1950, right after the outbreak of the Korean War, Syngman Rhee handed over to the U.N. Command the command authority over the south Korean forces. Rhee had just executed 8,000 Korean political dissidents. In his letter to General MacArthur, which is known as the Taejon Agreement, Rhee remarked:

"I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities..... The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and

Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who.....possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations....."

Because of the Taejon Agreement, the U.S. signed the Armistice Agreement (1953) as the representative of the Allied side in the Korean War. Thereafter, no peace settlement was agreed upon to end the state of war. When the 1975 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Korea called for the termination of the U.N. Command (UNC), withdrawal of U.S. troops in south Korea and conclusion of a peace treaty, the U.S. bypassed the resolution by forming the Combined Forces Command (CFC) with the Korean forces in 1978. In this way, the U.S. military retained the supreme command of the Korean forces under a different name. And the Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea came to head the CFC, the UNC and the Eighth U.S. Army, not to mention the Korean forces.

Unfair Burden on South Korea in Maintaining U.S. Troops:

Today an increasing number of host nations are reassessing their military relations with the U.S. and are challenging base agreements. The Philippines, for instance, has pressured the U.S. to remove its military bases by demanding 1.2 billion dollars for its usage of the Filipino terrain. But the U.S. military pays not a single penny for using south Korean land. On the contrary, the south Korean government has to pick up half the tab to maintain U.S. troops in south Korea. According to the south Korean government statistics, in 1988, south Korea spent 2.22 billion dollars on maintaining U.S. forces, an increase of 260 million dollars from 1.96 billion in 1987.

The seeds of economic harm caused by the U.S. military lie in the 1953 R.O.K.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (the legal basis of the U.S. presence in south Korea). According to Article IV of the treaty, **"the Republic of Korea (south Korea) grants, and the United States accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement."** Moreover, the treaty **"shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party."** (Article V) Consequently, the U.S. military is entitled to set up bases wherever it wants and use south

Korean land forever at no cost.

The U.S. military has a total of 40 bases throughout south Korea including Yongsan (the USFK Headquarters), Tongduchon, Kunsan (the Eighth Tactical Wing), Osan (the Fifty-First Tactical Fighter Wing), Pusan and Taegu (the 497th Tactical Fighter Squadron). 43,000 U.S. troops cover an area of 300 square kilometers, an equivalent of half of Seoul. One cannot even demand compensation from the U.S. for one's private properties, if used by the U.S. military.

The U.S. 8th Army Headquarters in Seoul, south Korea



South Korea, Region of the Highest Density of Nuclear Weapons in the World.

It is well known that U.S. troops in south Korea are armed with nuclear weapons which can reduce the whole Korean peninsula to ashes in a flash. The current stockpile in Korea includes nuclear mines (Atomic Demolition Munitions), nuclear sacks, nuclear-tipped missiles and artillery shells.

It was in the late 1950's that the U.S. first started to deploy nuclear weapons in south Korea--in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. On 29 January 1958, the UNC made an official announcement that the U.S. brought tactical nuclear weapons to south Korea. Recognizing the importance of the Korean peninsula to its global military strategy, the U.S. stored about 1,000 nuclear weapons in south Korea in the 1970's. The nuclearization of south Korea ruthlessly continued in the 1980's in accordance with the U.S. "doomsday scenario"--the doctrine of horizontal escalation, which calls for the U.S. to respond to a Soviet incursion with a counter-

offensive in another region of the world. South Korea has now become a region of the highest concentration of nuclear weapons per unit area in the world, quadruple the concentration of nuclear weapons in NATO countries. In south Korea at least one nuclear weapon is deployed every 100 square kilometer, and 10 in each province.

Japan prohibits any defense treaty which allows importation of nuclear weapons to Japan, by stipulating the principles of denuclearization in the constitution. Meanwhile, the entire Korean people have become helpless hostages to U.S. nuclear weapons. On the basis of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. can transfer an unlimited number of nuclear weapons to south Korea and use them without consulting the Korean people.


U.S. Troops in South Korea: Symbol of Subjugation

Military independence is essential to the survival of a nation and its independent progress. It is military independence that secures political and economic independence. The presence of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in south Korea is not only a symbol of the Korean people's subjugation to the U.S., but also a massive obstacle to independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. Therefore, the U.S. troops must be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, so that the Korean people may safeguard national survival and achieve self-determination.



Table 1. R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command

Commander-in-Chief	-----	U.S. Commander
Deputy Commander	-----	R.O.K. Commander
		;
Chief of Staff	-----	U.S. Lt. General
Assistant Chief of Staff	-----	R.O.K. Major General



(Source: Dong-A Daily, 8 November 1978)

5. Nuclear Weapons and the Team Spirit Military Exercises in South Korea

The Formation of the U.S. Anti-Communist Military Bloc:

The U.S. which emerged as a leading world power after the World War II, is now facing a rather bewildering reality. As Germany and Japan was destroyed and England and France impoverished, anti-Capitalist, Socialist or nationalistic nations as well as anti-imperialist nations, emerged in full force. Furthermore, the revolutionary spirit that was then sweeping the West was a menacing reality to the U.S. Such were the conditions under which the Truman Doctrine was introduced, calling for "the complete containment of Communism."

It can be said that modern history is a record of the anti-imperialist movements of the colonies and the subordinated nations, frantic efforts of the U.S. to contain those countries and to obstruct their movement toward non-alignment, and the failure of such efforts. Containment was adopted through the following three measures.

First, was the formation of a U.S.-centered anti-Communist bloc throughout the world - namely, NATO in Western Europe, O.A.S. (Organization of American States) in America, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) in the Middle East, SEATO in the Southeast Asia, ANZUS Alliance in the Oceania, and the U.S.-Japanese, R.O.K.-U.S. Defense Pacts in the Far East.

However, due to the growing movement toward non-alignment and independence, CENTO, SEATO, and ANZUS Alliance were dismantled. On the other hand, the alliances were strengthened in the Far East so that the formation of a Korea-U.S.-Japanese tri-military alliance is being pursued.

Second, nuclear weapons became an essential device for Containment. During the Truman Administration, nuclear weapons were thought to be used just for the U.S.-Soviet conflict. However, the Eisenhower Administration considered the use of nuclear bombs for regional, local wars. And in actuality, the U.S. did use nuclear threats to achieve its ends in the Korean War, the Dien Bien Phu

of Vietnam, the Taiwan Strait Crisis and other instances.

The disgraceful defeat in the Vietnam War, despite the unprecedented mass bombings, showed the realness of the possibility of a nuclear war. The ultra-conservatives in the U.S. claimed that not using the nuclear bomb was one of the deciding factors for the defeat in Vietnam; they insisted on its use in the future regional wars. In 1974, such view was incorporated into General Schlesinger's official Defense Report and concretized as the Team Spirit Exercises. Team Spirit uses our Korean peninsula as the battle ground on which to practice actual war scenarios using nuclear weapons.

The Reagan era has advanced from planning on the level of tactical nuclear war to the level of strategic nuclear war, from hypothesis to the development of concrete strategic plans and military systems through the promotion of such projects as the Strategic Defense Initiative (so called Star Wars). Through such measures, the U.S. is working to prevail in what can only be a Mutually Assured Destruction with the U.S.S.R.

Third, the U.S. has installed military bases in various places on the globe, to use as centers for its military activities. At present, the U.S. has approximately 520,000 troops stationed at over forty military bases. Major bases include West Germany (250,000 troops), Japan (47,000), Korea (43,000), and England (29,000). For a brief period, there was a partial withdrawal of the U.S. troops abroad, due to the anti-war movement spurred by the Vietnam War, and because of the mounting deficit caused by the exorbitant military spending. The short-lived troop withdrawal was not a sign of abandoning the military bases nor of ceasing armed intervention; rather, it merely signified the weakened position of the U.S. Since then, the countless episodes in Iran, Lybia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Panama, clearly testify to the U.S. willingness for armed interventions.

The Upgrading of the Korean Peninsula to a "Vital Interest Area" for the U.S.:

Traditionally, the U.S. military strategy has centered around Europe. As the strongest ally of the U.S., Europe has the most outstanding capacity in industrial production as well as in war capability. Thus, to cope with its own limitations, the basis for the

U.S. military strategy has been to distribute military strength, with Europe as the top priority region. For instance, the so-called Swing Strategy states that in case of a U.S.-Soviet war, the U.S. military in the Pacific region will be transported to Europe.

Of course it is not to say that the present U.S. military strategy is no longer Europe-centered. However, what is evident is that what the U.S. defines as its "vital interest area" has expanded outside of Europe into the Middle East and the Far East. This expansion of the region defined to be vital to the U.S. interest is a result of the insecurity that the U.S. is experiencing from the disintegration of the "containment boundaries." In other words, since the defeat in Vietnam, the ultra-conservatives of the U.S. have insisted outright on the armed intervention. In turn, their views began to be implemented as policies, as the anti-war public sentiment attenuated and the nation as a whole became immersed in the rising wave of conservatism, toward the latter half of the seventies. Since the collapsing of the Indochina containment line, south Korea has emerged as the most crucial strategic stronghold in Asia.

With the above background, the 1982 U.S. Military Report designates Europe, Middle East, and Korea as inseparable ensemble forming a single strategic region, and states that the U.S. strategy in any of the three regions supports and should complement its strategy in the others. Also, the 1983 R.O.K.-U.S. Security Council upgraded Korea from "a significant interest area" to "a vital interest area" for the US. Even now, persistent efforts are actively aimed at the formation of a R.O.K.-U.S.-Japanesetri-partitemilitary formation structure, commensurate to the NATO military alliance.

In the 1980s, the new "horizontal escalation" strategy shows why south Korea became an area of vital importance to the U.S. interests. According to horizontal escalation, if a conflict breaks out at a particular region (especially the Middle East), the U.S. attacks from elsewhere to enlarge the conflict to be of world-wide scale aimed to disperse and weaken the Soviet military strength.

On 16 January 1983, CBS in the U.S. was able to disclose to the public "The U.S. Defense Guidelines for the Fiscal Years 1984-1988," based on a UPI dispatch. The program alarmed and perturbed the viewers by demonstrating a step by step process of how a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Persia would spread to Europe and then to the Far East to become a world-wide war. To prepare for such an event the

U.S. has strengthened its military at the various overseas bases and also demanded that the allies take on a greater responsibility for security.

In building up the nuclear arsenal, the U.S. military expenditure has reached a staggering \$30 billion. Also, accompanying the arms build-up are numerous large scale military exercises and other military activities all over the globe. Nevertheless, the U.S. cannot help but feel its own limitations in containing the growing movements toward non-alignment and independence. Another restricting force on the military expansion is the economic burden of its own budget deficit of \$20 billion, ironically caused, in part, by the enormous military spending. The U.S. has dealt with these unfavorable conditions by demanding the allies to increase the security responsibility on their part, as well as by more fully developing such strategies as the horizontal escalation.

In the Far East, the history of military relations include the creation of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces, the promotion of the modernization plan of the ROK-U.S. Army, the 1970 Guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation, resulting in the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese Military ties. The culmination of the above developments is none other than the annual RIMPAC (U.S.-Japan), and the Team Spirit (U.S.-R.O.K.) military exercises.

At present, aside from Western Europe, the Korean peninsula is the sole region which the U.S. is preparing as an actual site for a nuclear war. If it is for the benefit of the U.S., a nuclear demolition of Korea remains a viable and feasible option.

U.S. Armed Forces in Korea and Their History:

The U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is a peculiar phenomenon even compared with the other U.S. military units abroad. The reasons are, that 1) The nuclear-armed U.S. troops are stationed in south Korea indefinitely, 2) The U.S. holds the operational command of the south Korean forces, and 3) The U.S. uses the UN Command as a cover.

Ever since World War II, the U.S. troops in south Korea have been symbols of the East-West polarization, U.S. intervention and domination.

In August of 1945, when Japan surrendered, Korea was liberated from the colonial rule. However, in order to facilitate the removal of the Japanese troops and the repatriation of the Japanese, U.S. troops moved into the south of the 38th parallel, and the Soviets into the north.

Shortly after, the Soviets withdrew from the north, but the U.S. remained to prepare for a future military base. The U.S. forces had only partially withdrew, leaving many others as the "Military Advisory Group," to control and foster the Korean Army in its own fashion. Furthermore, the Korea-U.S. Provisional Agreement (August, 1948) granted the U.S. the right of ownership of the railroad, the communication channels, airports, as well as the authority to "organize, train and arm the Korean Army."

June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. The U.S. commitment of its troops and the entrance of the Chinese Voluntary Corps set off a complicated series of developments. At the time, the UN was heavily dominated by the U.S. and the UN's decision to intervene was made under other crucial abnormal conditions. At the time of the voting, USSR was not present and Taiwan was recognized as the legitimate representative of China. In this way, the U.S. was able to bring in and command the UN Army.

The Armistice was signed in July, 1953. It stated that there should be a political conference to "settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question etc.," but the talks came to a halt when the U.S. walked out several months later. Soon after the Armistice, the Chinese pulled out their forces, whereas the U.S. troops still remain to this day. Since then, the south Korean government has continuously affirmed the indefinite stay of the UN Army and the U.S. control of the south Korean military, through the signing of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Statement.

Due to the anti-war sentiments inside the U.S. and the national budget deficit, there was a partial withdrawal of the U.S. troops. However, towards the late seventies, as the strategic importance of Korea escalated in the Pacific region, so did the troops, now numbering 43,886. Constituting 8% of the total U.S. military abroad, it is the third largest in the world after West Germany and Japan.

The majority of the U.S. Forces in Korea are members of the 8th U.S. Army, headquartered in Seoul. The major element of the 8th Army is the Second Infantry Division. South Korea is the only place in the world where U.S. forces are permanently placed at Defense Readiness Condition Four (DEFCON 4), which is one level above normal. The 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and the 19th Support Command are also under the 8th Army.

Within the 8th Army are the Second Infantry Division, the 52nd Air Force, the 502nd Military intelligence, whose total number of personnel add up to 31,206. The main U.S. Air Force unit in Korea is the 314th Air Division, headquartered at Osan, which is under the command of the 5th Air Force with its headquarter in Tokyo, Japan. The number of personnel in the Air Force totals 11,566. The Navy has no fighting unit; however, the number of cabinet officers at the Seoul Combined Forces Command and the Jinhae Support Command, and the Pusan Marine Transport Command adds up to 394 Navy personnel and 720 Marine personnel.

In addition, according to the Defense Monitor (1985, No.2), the U.S. Army's Special Forces are stationed in Korea as well.

The U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is Composed Primarily of the 8th Army:

The U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is composed primarily of the 8th Army, the sole ground force in the Asia-Pacific region. The Commander is given three different positions to work from: the Commander of the UN Command, the U.S. Forces in Korea, and the U.S. 8th Army. Furthermore, he possesses the operational control of the south Korean forces.

The R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Field Army, under the command of the 8th Army, has expanded and re-organized the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined 1st Army since March, 1987. The Euijungbu Combined Forces Command is composed of R.O.K. and U.S. Forces; the U.S. Army 2nd Infantry Division and the three corps divisions within the R.O.K. 3rd Army, the two armed divisions, and one Marine Brigade all serve as the main bodies of operation.

The 2nd Infantry Division, with its headquarters at Dongdu-

chun is notorious for its 24 hours-a-day operation for war preparation. The 2nd Infantry is composed of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades. Stationing 100 M60A1 tanks, the operation placed in its artillery division 103 mm and 155 mm artillery shells and nuclear-armed weapons. The 2nd Infantry Division also possess the latest model of 150 mm artillery shells and anti-tank helicopters that can shoot from any where in the air with ground surveillance radar. Also installed are a multiple rocket launch system, M60A3 tank, and 180 other new war weapons. The 4th Missile Command, located in Choonchun, has one Honest John surface-to-surface missile and one Sergeant. Starting from the demarcation line, the Sergeant covers the areas from the west to the east coast.

The 19th Support Command (Taegu) serves as the distribution base for the other locations dealing with ammunition, transportation, missiles, fuel, airplane parts, and electronic communication equipments.

In addition, there exist such teams as the 24th Psychological Operations Force (a pro-U.N. Command team promoting anti-spy campaigns), the medical alert team (Seoul), and the Intelligence Brigade.

The main force of the U.S. Air Force in the R.O.K. is the 314th Air Division which is under the 5th Air Force. It has the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing the 51st Tactical Fighter Wing, and some 120 other fighter machines and planes. The main air bases include Kunsan, Osan, Kimpo, Suwon, Kwangju, Taegu, and Kangrueng.

The 2146th Intelligence Force (Osan) is an Air Force Intelligence Unit supporting the command, control, operation, and propagation of the U.S. Air Force. There is also the 7602nd Secret Service Unit in Seoul.

By 1983, the 48 F4D Phantom Fighters in Kunsan and Taegu were replaced with the F16 fighter-bombers and the technology of the bases has made remarkable progress.

The U.S. Navy does not have a Fighter Unit but only the Command personnel. However, its role is critical. The U.S. Air Force Commander, as the commander of the naval department of the U.N., is in charge of the Major Submarine Warfare in the nearby seas, while wielding operational control of the R.O.K Navy and

Marines. Since the U.S. Pacific Fleet (Headquarter in Hawaii) and the 7th Fleet (Headquarter in Yokosueka) are always conducting military exercises in the sea area near Korea and Japan, there is no need for the stationing of U.S. Fleet Fighter Unit in Korea.

In Pusan, the U.S. Naval Transport Command Office was established, and in Jinhae, a Naval support facility was established. The naval bases are used by nuclear air fighter squadrons and atomic submarines of the 7th Fleet of Midway, Enterprise, and New Jersey. Thus, the bases function, in a sense, as an outpost for the fleet.

The State of Nuclear Bases in the Korean Peninsula:

The whole world is aware of the fact that the U.S. Forces in south Korea maintain nuclear weapons. More specifically, there are nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells, nuclear-tipped missiles, and nuclear bombs. Also, the majority of surface-to-surface missiles are located near the demarcation line. The nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) training facilities are placed in Dongduchun, close to the demarcation line.

The nuclear bomb exists in the form of 3 phantom fighter-bombs at Kunsan and Osan. It was exposed through internal records of the U.S. Air Force on 'The Plan of Action for the Pacific Air Force Weapon Safety' that nuclear weapons were placed at Osan and Kunsan and more explosive compounds are being kept at Osan, Kunsan, and Kwangju.

According to the Brookings Institute, the U.S. military has placed at least 650 to 1000 nuclear weapons. The destructive capacity of the nuclear weapons in south Korea is 1000 times stronger than the bomb dropped in Hiroshima. According to a news column (May, 1983), the U.S. has placed 133 nuclear fighter-bombs, 63 two inch howitzers, 31 155mm howitzers, 21 nuclear mines. In addition, the U.S. introduced the neutron bomb, which only destroys people and not buildings.

The New Military Exercises, Operation Team Spirit:

Operation Team Spirit, the R.O.K.-U.S. Joint Military Exercises that started in 1976, is different from other previous military

exercises in several aspects. 1) It is a **first-strike offensive**, as part of the "horizontal escalation" strategy. 2) It is a tactical nuclear offensive based on the notion of a limited nuclear war. 3) The strategy has changed from a quantity-oriented offensive dependent on massive fire power, to a manoeuver-oriented, open space strategy. 4) It is a large scale **total and comprehensive offensive**, much more advanced than the comprehensive strategy of the 70's.

Team Spirit is the result of the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. The U.S. military explained that the fundamental cause for the defeat was to have yielded to the anti-war public sentiments, have refrained from the use of the nuclear weapons and have limited the military activities to the south of the 17th parallel.

In that context, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger, declared "(in case of a Korean emergency), to attack the heart of the enemy forces," at the same time "not to preclude any options, including the use of the tactical nuclear weapons."

Team Spirit was started within this process of rebuilding the Far East Policy in the post-Vietnam setting. The first Team Spirit was carried out in secret in 1976. Since then, it has been described as a strategy that "centered on the Army Reserve reinforcement and its prompt offense and defense strategy in case of a Korean emergency" (Chun-Nam Daily, 2/21/79). It is much like the "Focus Retina" and "Freedom Bolt" of the late 60's and the early 70's.

However, Team Spirit '78 was altered drastically when the number of troops soared (from 87,000 in 1977, to 104,000), and the US nuclear fighter plane, F111 and Guam's B52 Bombers were brought in for the first time. Furthermore, what shocked the world was that the tactical nuclear missile called Satan's Missile, and the neutron bomb carrying Lance Missile (range 120 km) were mobilized from the U.S. to the demarcation line where simulation exercises were performed under actual battle conditions.

One U.S. officer explained to the reporters that the target of the attack was "Gae-Sung, the biggest supply base (in north Korea)" and that in case of a Korean emergency, the Lance Missile would be ready to be launched toward Gae-Sung.

Other operations in the Team Spirit include combined landing operation, river-crossing operation II, combined mobilization, and emergency landing using highways.

Such unprecedented aggressive belligerence is in accordance with what the Commander of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces stated in his "9-Day War Plan," that "B52 Bombers and other aircrafts will shoot down 301 enemy planes per hour, for 24 hours, to totally dominate, destroy, and defeat the enemy forces."

The Constantly Expanding Team Spirit Exercises:

Since 1980, Team Spirit grew and expanded even more actively. First, what used to be a 10-15 days of exercises, drastically increased to 51 days in 1980, 69 days in 1981, 72 days in 1982, 75 in 1983, over 70 days in 1984, 89 days in 1985, and 73 days in 1986. The scale of the exercises burgeoned as well, so that by 1984, Team Spirit was by far the largest operation of its kind, involving over 200,000 troops.

As part of the Team Spirit Exercises, an operation called the Final Offense Operation against north Korea was rehearsed. This new strategy was adopted since September of 1982 as the strategy for Korea, a plan heavily dependent on the tactical nuclear missiles to attack the heart of north Korea, Pyongyang.

The newly revised war plans (OPLAN-5027) of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Command, reveal the details for the front line formation and the itinerary for the occupation and attack of north Korea, using the south Korean military. This plan absolutely requires air fire power, artillery fire power, and mobilization unit -each using nuclear power as the core. The plan also includes the penetration of north Korea by a specialized nuclear crew unit to set up and later to set off the nuclear bomb by remote control.

The nuclear war plans were made more real with the appearance of the E4B, the nuclear war command plane. The command plane carries the Supreme Commander of the U.S. to instruct and coordinate nuclear attacks. The E4B that was first placed in Yokota military base on 3 March 1987, was transported to Okinawa on the 5th.

Recently, the Team Spirit exercises have included even chemical warfare, specifically, the three-dimensional NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) warfare. Chemical warfare has been in progress under the pretext of "U.S. base defense" or "city defense." The Sankai

Newspaper (29 January 1987) confirms that the chemical warfare was indeed part of the 1987 exercises.

Despite the contrary evidence, the R.O.K. and the U.S. claim that the above measures are in response to the north Korea's plans for a chemical missile attack. "Okinawa Marine" (a U.S. Navy Bulletin, 29 February 1987) reports that numerous cases of a kind of hemorrhage, known to be caused by chemical weapons use, were discovered. The article reports that two soldiers died of it and eight still hospitalized from the Bear Hunt '87 Exercises.

It is frighteningly clear that Operation Team Spirit is on the road to expansion at the cost of driving the Korean situation into a hair-trigger crisis. Team Spirit exists as the most telling example that expresses the nature of the relationship between our Korean people and the U.S. troops in Korea.



Table 1. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea

Service	System	# of Nuclear-Capable System	Load & Reload (#per system)	Total Nuclear Weapons	Explosive Power per Weapon (maximum Kilotonnage)
US Air Force	F-4 Phantom	48	4	192	10Kt
US Army	Artillery				
	8mm(M-110)	28	2	56	1Kt
	155mm(M-109)	76	2	152	1Kt
	Surface to Air Missiles				
	Nike-Hercules	144	1	144	5Kt
	Surface to Surface Missiles				
	Honest John	4	20	80	100Kt
	Sergeant	2	6	12	100Kt
	Atomic Mines	25-30	1	25-30	5Kt
TOTALS		327-352		661-686	Nuclear Weapons

(Source: "Korea & U.S. Policy in Asia", The Defense Monitor, The Center for Defense Information: Washington, D.C., Vol. V, No.1)

6. Nuclear Peril in the Korean Peninsula

by

Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, Walden Bello

Brinkmanship in Korea

In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened China and north Korea with the use of atomic weapons to force an armistice in Korea. In his memoirs, Eisenhower revealed that "One possibility (to bring about an agreement) was to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean peninsula."

This was not idle talk. Advised by the U.S. Joint Strategic Planning Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already considered numerous proposals to attack Korea and China with nuclear weapons during the early 1950s. The Committee had proposed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended, and President Truman had approved the establishment of U.S. nuclear delivery capability.

In March 1951, a Johns Hopkins University research group, under contract to the Far East Command in Tokyo, submitted an immense report to General MacArthur entitled Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons. The newly declassified study noted that:

"The Korean War has offered an excellent opportunity for the study of the tactical employment of atomic bombs in support of ground forces. It has been possible to consider the war a kind of laboratory within which everything was at hand in the most realistic proportions, except the bomb itself and the means to deliver it."

A covering memorandum from the Far East Command in July 1951 reveals that the study, while not yet adopted as Army policy, was far from academic. "This headquarters," stated General Doyle Hickey, "is continuing study of (the) report with a view to taking any actions that may be indicated to prepare the Far East Command offensively and defensively for possible employment of nuclear weapons."

The report revealed, however, that Far East Command faced major obstacles to conducting nuclear war in Korea. Applying the "Hiroshima Death Function" to a variety of actual battle situations in the Korean War, the study demonstrated that there were many "lucrative" military targets for nuclear attack. One such attack would have employed ten 40 kiloton nuclear bombs dropped just 6.5 km apart to "neutralize" the "Pyongyang-Chorwon-Kumhwa Triangle" - that is, to destroy the north Korean capital city and surrounds. The authors noted that such nuclear attacks would kill many civilians, which they termed a "distorting consideration." They suggested that destroying 10,000 enemy troops with a nuclear attack was worth killing 500 "friendly civilians," although they were "reluctant" to recommend killing 50,000 civilians for the same gain.

The report also found that U.S. forces in Korea were ill equipped for nuclear warfare. Few American soldiers and practically no allied forces had received "atomic indoctrination" in safety and radiological protection, and by January 1951, only two radiological defense officers had been trained.

Deterred by these obstacles from actually using nuclear weapons in the ground war in Korea, the report recommended staff training to "perform all the real staff work required to plan and execute simulated atomic attacks on targets as they develop." The staff training was to be matched with combat training for B-29 delivery of nuclear bombs, "to fly simulated atomic sorties against real enemy targets... as a part of an actual bomber or fighter strike with conventional weapons or immediately after such a strike." The report recommended: "These test sorties should be made as realistic as possible in all details except that conventional rather than atomic explosions would be used."

Accordingly, from late September to October 15, 1951, several simulated nuclear strikes were conducted as Exercise Hudson Harbor in Korea. These exercises laid the groundwork for the May 15, 1953 National Security Council meeting where Eisenhower argued that nuclear weapons were cheaper in Korea than conventional weapons.

Just how close Eisenhower came to using his nuclear option is revealed in the record of a National Security Council meeting on May 20, 1953. Eisenhower's "only real worry" about the Joint Chiefs' view that "more positive action" would entail nuclear attack on

China was the possibility of Soviet intervention.

The "New Look" Strategy

Limited war, nonetheless, had its place in the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy. Learning from Korea, a meatgrinder for conventional forces, the administration felt that limited war required the liberal use of tactical nuclear weapons. Atomic weapons, insisted Dulles, were "becoming more and more conventional." Eisenhower himself argued: "Where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." The "bullets" Eisenhower had in mind were about as powerful as the bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In limited war conditions, ground forces could not be totally dispensed with. But in the view of Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. ground commitment would be restricted to Marine units and "small Atomic task forces" from the Army. The bulk of the ground fighting would be done by U.S. equipped and trained "indigenous troops." Conceived as a way to avoid the massive defense spending of Korea in future conflicts, the "New Look" strategy was "intervention on the cheap." As American strategist Townsend Hoopes wrote, it was essentially "an approach to warfare based on an acceptance of greater destructiveness in war in return for a lower cost in the preparation for war."

Nuclear Tripwire in Korea

In addition to scenarios for an all-out nuclear war, American strategists also prepare for lesser nuclear contingencies. They view all-out nuclear war as the top rung of a ladder which starts with limited (non-nuclear) war, moves to limited and then theater nuclear war. These rungs, in their eyes, are clearly defined and one can choose to climb up or descend the escalation ladder.

Nuclear weapons for "limited" war are part of the daily practice of every service in Pacific Command and could be used in at least two contexts - Korea and a naval war.

The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of the Korean Peninsula is the most militarized place on earth. On each side of the DMZ are nearly a million heavily armed troops. Since only a truce was negotiated in 1953, north and south Korea are still technically at war and tensions remain high. Korea is the volatile powderkeg of the Pacific, the place where war may break out with only minutes notice - and the most likely site for the use of nuclear weapons.

The Army keeps nuclear weapons on hand in Korea to stun or stop an attack from the north. Under heavy attack, states the U.S. Army Field Manual, "nuclear weapons provide the urgently needed tactical edge in combat power that is required for a successful defense." In a nuclear war, U.S. forces could use Atomic Demolition Mines and nuclear artillery in approved "packages" over a specified area and period. A hypothetical nuclear "package" in south Korea might include two atomic demolition mines, thirty artillery, and five or ten aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons.

Atomic Demolition Mines (ADMs) are the centerpiece of the "limited" nuclear arsenal in south Korea. Up to twenty-one ADMs are reportedly stored in south Korea, ready to be placed in underground tunnels near or under the Demilitarized Zone. These small nuclear weapons are intended, according to the Army, to "block avenues of approach by cratering defiles (narrow valleys) or creating rubble; sever routes of communication by destroying tunnels, bridges, roads, and canal locks; create areas of tree blowdown and forest fires; crater areas including frozen bodies of water subject to landings by hostile airmobile units, (and) create water barriers by the destruction of dams and reservoirs."

Specially trained Marines or Army Special Forces can explode ADMs with timer or by remote control to halt advancing tanks with impassable craters. Along the way, notes an Army writer, considerable damage will be inflicted on villages in valleys where ADMs are used. U.S. F-4 and F-16 fighter jets in south Korea are also nuclear-capable, and their gravity bombs are stored at Osan and Kunsan airfields.

The U.S. Army is prepared for nuclear war in the Pacific. All Army units - including those in south Korea - have set up a "NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) Control Party," which aims to achieve "a high degree of NBC readiness" and during combat, to "coordinate the NBC Defense Team," "for detection, monitoring, and

decontamination." NBC training exercises are held under "realistic battlefield conditions," including "simulated friendly employment of nuclear/chemical weapons and enemy employment of NBC weapons." Since north Korea does not have nuclear weapons, the Army evidently anticipates Soviet or Chinese entry into a war in north Korea, or a spillover into Korea of a battle in the North Pacific.

In addition to its general forces, the Army's units responsible for delivering nuclear warheads also train constantly for nuclear war in south Korea. The nuclear-capable artillery battalion at Uijongbu, for example, conducts quarterly exercises and training "to emphasize tactical realism to the maximum extent possible." "Nuclear training," states the Army's Western Command, "must be integrated into the total training program without detracting from either the (unit's) nuclear or conventional capabilities" and should cover tactical movement, nuclear assembly, and control.

The Army can refer openly to the idea of waging a limited nuclear war in Korea because it faces far fewer political constraints than in Europe. In January 1983, U.S. Army Chief of Staff in Korea General Edward Mayer discussed the use of nuclear weapons. The general blurted out, "It's far simpler here than in Europe where consultations have to be made with fifteen different sovereign nations."

For the U.S. military, nuclear weapons on the DMZ deter the north Koreans from "invading" the south. As former U.S. Commander in Korea, General Richard Stilwell, wrote in 1977: "Encamped between the demilitarized zone and any logical military objectives, he (the U.S. ground soldier) constitutes the real earnest of U.S. investment in deterrence." The military believe that if a north-south war erupts, nuclear weapons would be used immediately on the "use them or lose them" imperative. In this logic, the question of escalation simply does not arise since the nuclear weapons should deter war from breaking out. If, in fact, a war does embroil Korea again - and it well might - nuclear weapons would pose a dilemma for the U.S., since their use would run a high risk of escalation. As strategic analyst William Overholt notes: The choice would be between (politically) unacceptable use of the weapons and the unacceptability of withdrawal under fire. This dilemma would be greatly enhanced if the weapons were stationed relatively far forward and therefore the decision became necessary almost immediately after the initiation of what would likely be a

surprise attack.

While U.S. military leaders believe that limited nuclear war can be controlled by using "small", short-range nuclear weapons that do not threaten the Soviet Union directly, experienced commanders are less sanguine. Former CINCPAC Admiral Noel Gayler warned:

"It is very difficult to think of using nuclear weapons (in Korea) in a way which doesn't contain the seeds of escalation. There will be backers (the superpowers) again in a war on the Korean Peninsula and a strong political temptation to raise the ante when either side are involved. The step from a nuclear war involving our proteges, as it were, and nuclear war between ourselves (the superpowers) is a very narrow one, a very dangerous one."

Northwest Pacific Nuclear-free Zone

The nuclear peril in the Far East is concentrated on Northeast Asia, the powderkeg of the Pacific. The outbreak of war between north and south Korea would be likely to prompt immediate U.S. nuclear attack. Nuclear war in Korea could spill over into nuclear exchanges in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, triggering an all-out nuclear war.

Defusing the nuclear time-bomb in Korea requires reducing tensions in the Peninsula and eliminating the risk of U.S. nuclear attack on north Korea. Regional powers such as China and Japan have a direct interest in lessening hostilities and removing forces from the Korean Peninsula; north Korea has also called for a Korea Nuclear-free Zone. Pressed collectively by their allies and friends throughout the region, the superpowers might find a Korean Nuclear-free Zone in their interest, provided that the necessary reductions of nuclear and conventional forces occur on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone.

The pre-conditions of progress are American, Soviet and Chinese guarantees that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in Korea or to transfer nuclear weapons to the governments of either north or south Korea. It is equally important to initiate rapprochement between north and south Korea. China could prod the U.S. to sponsor three-way talks between the two Koreas and the U.S. Such talks could aim to achieve a north-south non-aggression pact, prompting great power cross-recognition of the two Koreas and

setting the scene for U.S. disengagement. After these steps were taken, the U.S. could then shift its nuclear-capable artillery south, beyond the range of the DMZ. This minimal adjustment to the U.S. posture could indicate good faith to all parties.

Little further progress could be made until south and north Korea replaced their offensive with truly defensive forces. The U.S. could match a phased, mutual reduction by the two Koreas with a step-by-step withdrawal of its own nuclear and conventional forces. The U.S. would have to push south Korea into accepting the settlement by committing itself publicly to removing all nuclear weapons from Korea, thereby forcing political adjustments inside south Korea.

Whether prompted by external or internal pressures, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Korea would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war in Northeast Asia. But the threat of nuclear attack in Korea stems not only from U.S. forces on the Peninsula but also from U.S. and Soviet warships and warplanes which surround the area. The U.S. could rapidly reintroduce its medium-range nuclear forces in the Northwest Pacific into Korea. Both Soviet and U.S. theatre forces project nuclear threats from offshore which would undermine the credibility of a Korean Nuclear-Free Zone. Furthermore, Soviet and American forces directly confront each other, heightening the risk of accidental nuclear war.

To retreat from the nuclear brink in Northeast Asia, it will be necessary to withdraw from the region all U.S. and Soviet nuclear-capable forces which can hit targets in the region. As a first step, Soviet and U.S. naval-nuclear forces would need to disengage from the area adjacent to the Korean and Soviet coastlines. Since it depends on substantial progress in Korea, a naval-nuclear disengagement zone would have to be negotiated after or at the same time as a Korean Nuclear-free Zone.

People's Diplomacy

Since the early 1970's, the nuclear-free Pacific movement has generated a powerful "people's diplomacy," bringing together activists throughout the region. At the root of the regional movement are broad-based domestic movements typically composed of popular peace forces, churches, trade-unionists, and anti-nuclear,

independence, or social democratic political parties. They have pursued not only nuclear disarmament but also political and economic independence from the superpowers.

The growing transnational network of the nuclear-free Pacific movement is the cutting edge of regional disarmament. These non-governmental people's forces are crucial elements in changing the status quo. Without doubt, popular movements and pro-disarmament governments will chart new routes to peace and security in the Pacific. They will suffer setbacks, as well as make advances. But demands for a new order will certainly persist. To match the superpowers will require perseverance and carefully constructed, long-term strategy.

The alternatives are stark. One future is a Pacific of heightened tension and risk, ending with visions of scorched, radiating islands and poisoned waters. Or a new Pacific may be forged as people reach across the ocean, from Manila to Suva, from Sydney to Seoul, to form a regional community founded on cooperation, free of the threat of nuclear war.

(Excerpts from *American Lake*, Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello, Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, England, 1986.)



7. Threat of Invasion Posed by North Korea?: A Comparison of Military Powers of North and South Korea

It is generally assumed that the Korean War ended in July, 1953. However, north and south Korea are still at war, because only an unstable truce is still in effect since 1953. The suffering of 60 million Koreans has continuously been heightened by the cruel 40-year division, the unstable truce, and ever increasing military tension in the Korean peninsula.

Who is responsible for causing such insecurity and military tension in Korea? Which side is posing the threat - north or south? This essay will compare military powers of the two Koreas in order to answer these questions.

The South Korean and the U.S. governments have been concerned with the military build-up in north Korea. The Assistant Secretary of State Paul Holifowicz has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "for the past decade, north Korea ... has carried out a major force buildup which has seriously affected the military balance on the (Korean) peninsula." However, Table 1 indicates quite the contrary.

Table 1
Military Spending in north and south Korea
(in million dollars)

Source	ACDA 1970-83	ISS 1974-84	SIPRI 1974-86
s.Korea	304	340	420
n.Korea	244	152	240

Thus, the sources of military data in the above table show that south Korea outspent north Korea by almost 50 percent. Even the ACDA which tends to overestimate north Korean military spending puts south Korean military spending far above that of north Korea. In other words, south Korea outspent north Korea by a considerable

margin during the period of outcry against "extensive north Korean buildup or threat."

South Korean government argues that "north Korean military spending is far more than officially announced." However, even south Korean sources do not negate the facts. For example, the Ministry of National Reunification published in 1987 "Economic Situation in North and South Korea: 1986", which indicates south Korean military spending to be at 4.8 billion dollars and north Korea's at 3.9 billion dollars. The embarrassed south Korean ruling sector attributed the lower military spending of north Korea to self-sufficiency in military food cost and low maintenance costs in north Korean armed forces. But this rationalization is not convincing, if we take a look at Table 2.

Table 2.
Spending on Military Weapons
(in million dollars)

	1970-79	1981-86
south Korea	285	196
north Korea	132	99

Table 2 shows spendings in the procurement of military weapons which may be a more reliable indicator of the actual military power. South Korea reinforced its military power by far outspending north Korea in purchase of weaponry.

Considering all these facts, the myth popularized by the south Korean and U.S. governments that military spending accounts for 20 percent of the GNP in north Korea is very deceptive. It tells little about the military capability of north Korea in relation to that of south Korea and also obscures the fact that the south outspends the north in military expenses.

The Korean peninsula is the most heavily militarized region in the world. It is one of the most likely places for an outbreak of war. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in Korea where already more than 1,200,000 military troops along the 155 mile Demilitarized Zone are aiming to fire at each other. The Korean Armistice Agreement of July 1953 has never ended the war and never rooted peace in the peninsula. Foreign forces, namely the U.S., stationed

its military troops in south Korea, and weapons were overtly imported into the land, violating the Armistice Agreement.

Based on the facts, how seriously should one be shaken by the "threat posed by north Korea"? Table 3 is a 1987-1988 balance sheet on military capabilities of north and south Korea in "The Military Balance" published by a prestigious British International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Table 3
Comparison of south and north Korea's military

		south Korea	north Korea
Population		42.12 million	21.15 million
Gross Domestic Product	1986	\$ 98.1 billion	n/a
	1985	\$ 86.7 billion	\$ 42.4 billion
	1984	n/a	\$ 39.9 billion
Armed Forces		620,000	830,000
Military Budget	1987	\$ 6.0 billion	\$ 4.45 billion
	1986	\$ 5.1 billion	\$ 3.87 billion
	1985	\$ 4.55 billion	\$ 4.19 billion
Army		540,000	750,000
Tanks		1,300	2,900
Armored Personnel Carriers		850	1,690
Field Artillery		3,300	6,000
Navy		29,000	35,000
Destroyer		9	0
Frigate		6	2
Corvettes		11	0
Patrol Boat		127	65
Submarine		1	27
Small Patrol		9	0
Fast attack craft		11	337
Amphibious Boat		46	135
Air Force		33,000	53,000
Combat aircraft		476	840

Reserves	484,000	155,000
Para-military Forces	410,000	370,000

According to the table, north Korea's armed forces outnumbers that of south Korea by 200,000 proving its overwhelming superiority in manpower. However, the table fails to take into account south Korea's 200,000 "defense soldiers" and 70,000 combat police. In reserve, south Korea has 4,840,000 soldiers compared to 1,440,000 in north Korea, an advantage of more than 3 million people. In para-military forces, including reserved military which can be mobilized in an emergency, south Korea again maintains a clear edge over north Korea. In addition, south Korea has a total of 464,000 males reaching the age for military services each year, compared to 260,000 for the north. In a long war, south Korea's population, twice that of the north would prove a decisive factor. Thus, "south Korea's inferiority in manpower," a view advocated by south Korea and the U.S., is groundless.

South Korea and the U.S. also emphasize their inferiority in weaponry. In terms of quantity, north Korea has an edge over the south, but here lies a trap as follows. South Korea was not able to produce even a rifle, ten years ago. But owing to the rapid development of its military industry that started in the early 1970's, south Korea can now produce most of the weapons used by its military. South Korea began to explore foreign markets as soon as its domestic military market was saturated. South Korea, therefore, was ranked as the fifth largest arms exporters in the Third World for the period between 1975 and 1982, with \$ 1.2 billion in military export. South Korea's military industry which has enjoyed various financial privileges including taxbreaks provided by the south Korean government is now in crisis, because of the small size of its domestic market. The attempt to expand foreign markets has met strong opposition by the U.S. which has monopolized international market for military weapons. South Korea's plea for export of its weapons to the U.S. has also been ignored by the U.S. government. Only 50 percent of south Korea's military industry is presently in operation.

If south Korea is far behind the north in terms of the procurement of military weapons, then why does it not seek to deploy more weapons which can immediately be produced by south Korea's military industry?

Comparison in terms of quality

General Menetrey, the Commander-in-Chief of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces, testified at a Senate hearing that "north Korea will be heavily dependent on 6,000 artillery, 1,800 multiple long-range artillery, and 3,000 tanks if it wants to reunite the country by military means." The north Korean quantitative edge is still far short of the current Soviet operational doctrine of success of offensive versus defensive forces: three to one in man-power, five to one in tanks, and six to one in artillery. Furthermore, north Korean tanks would be very vulnerable to attacks by south Korea's anti-tank weaponry, 24 A-10 "tank busters," and helicopters equipped with two anti-missiles.

In naval forces, north Korea's quantitative edge and south Korea's qualitative superiority is also notable. North Korea has 520 naval vessels compared to 160 for the south, another north Korean quantitative edge. However, the south has about thirty percent more tonnage (93,000 vs. 71,000). This can be explained by south Korea's naval concentration in large surface ships and north Korea's emphasis on patrol boats and small fast attack crafts. South Korea's naval force is known to be a decade ahead of north Korea in terms of its modernity. Another handicap of north Korea is the geographic division of east and west sea which restricts flexible concentration and mobility of its fleet, whereas south Korea is surrounded by sea naval so that fleet's flexible movements are unobstructed.

There is no question of south Korea's superiority in air forces. About three quarters of north Korea's combat aircraft are 1950's vintage. The most advanced combat aircraft owned by north Korea is the MIG-23 but even this aircraft is not nearly as modern as the F-16 owned by the south Korean air force. U.S. Air Forces Commander Lt. Charles Donnelly notes that "the north Korean aircraft are fairly old and have limited range. We think we can negate them pretty quickly." Colonel Thomas Olson, another commander, presents a similar view: "We expect to be operating initially in a semi-permissive environment, and soon after in a

permissive environment."

Twenty out of 36 F-16's which south Korea contracted to purchase in 1981 have already been deployed in south Korea. South Korea's air force has 325 F-4's and F-5's, which are far more advanced than most north Korean combat aircraft, except for the 40 MiG-23's. To counter such a decisive edge enjoyed by south Korean air force, north Korea is hurriedly importing land-to-surface missiles and new combat aircraft which may improve its anti-air defense capability.

A couple of issues should draw special attention here to demystify the "north Korean threat." First, there is concern with north Korea's deployment further south, closer to the DMZ. However, the movement was not sudden but gradual in nature, occurring over the course of three years starting in 1982. U.S. officials have admitted that it represented no increase in the overall north Korean military strength, only the shifting of rear echelon forces into more forward positions to make a more efficient use of their resources. Admiral Crowe did not seem overly concerned when asked about this movement in 1983: "I think we probably have put more attention and emphasis on our communications and warning systems in Korea than we have in any other single piece of real estate in the world..... We've got a good capability... these steps (DPRK movements south) ... made us work a little harder to compensate in other ways." It would be quite odd if military troops are deployed in the rear area, not along a borderline. Does south Korea empty the DMZ area to stay in the rear area?


Second, there has been claims that the north has many underground military facilities. However, this assumption has no sound base. As John Keegan, a distinguished military analyst, has noted, north Korea's forces may be best suited for a long, defensive war fought on its own territory, not for a quick offensive victory.

One of the threats posed by north Korea seems to be the existence of 80,000 commandos and rangers as well as the Hugh helicopters supposedly smuggled into north Korea, which can best be used for infiltration into the south because of their similar appearance to south Korean helicopters. However, south Korea also has commandos-rangers that include 25,000 marines and paratroopers, and a special military unit which gained its "fame" for the brutal massacre in the 1980 Kwangju People's Uprising. The

appearance of the Hugh helicopters is not a significant factor, since the confusion can also occur for north Korean forces themselves and mistake the south Korean helicopters for their own.

Thus, there is no legitimate basis for claiming the "threat of invasion posed by north Korea." If we take into account more than 43,000 U.S. troops and their modernized weapons, including some 600 nuclear missiles, it is absurd to insist further about a "north Korean military threat." On the contrary, a threat posed by south Korean and the U.S. military would make more sense.

In conclusion, the claim that north Korea is capable of invading the south successfully or that it is posing a serious military threat is nothing more than a ploy to legitimize the division of Korea and the presence of U.S. troops and its nuclear weapons in south Korea.



8. Are You Aware of the Following Malicious Law?: the National Security Law to Reinforce the Military Dictatorship and the Division of Korea

"You, commie, confess your crime!" As the investigator orders confession from the dark, one can only be utterly panic-stricken under a glaring light. Brutal torture-investigation starts as soon as one is caught in the trap of the National Security Law (the NS Law for short). The ruthless implementation of torture may mean a chance for promotion and reward to security and intelligence personnel.

Long, illegal detention is a rule rather than an exception in south Korea. The attorney-general tends to cursorily dismiss allegations about torture. It has become an accepted norm to copy the verdict statement verbatim from the prosecution statement. Those imprisoned due to the violation of the NS Law are subject to close surveillance and labelled as "commies." Their family members are also stigmatized as commies. Moreover they have to live through the cold alienation from the neighbors. Even after they are released, it is virtually impossible for these political prisoners to get a job. In other words, those trapped by the NS Law are doomed to a complete alienation from society.

The NS Law was first promulgated on 1 December 1948. The law was integrated with the Anti-Communist Law into a new National Security Law in December 1980, immediately after General Chun Doo-Hwan's coup d'etat and the 1980 Kwangju Massacre, to suppress the Korean people's struggle for democracy and reunification. The new NS Law prohibits south Koreans to visit, to come from, to mention unless willing to criticize, to trade or communicate with the "anti-state" areas or organizations. It also obligates all citizens to report to the authorities anyone violating the prohibitions. The law consists of 25 articles on such "crimes" as:

- Forming anti-state organizations (Article 3)
- Leaking secrets related to national security (Article 4)
- Engaging in monetary transactions (Article 5)
- Defecting or infiltrating from "anti-state" areas (Article 6)
- Encouraging praise of anti-state organizations, forming enemy-benefiting groups, or possessing pro-enemy

publications (Article 7)

-Conferring or communicating with members of anti-state organizations (Article 8)

-Providing convenience for anti-state organizations (Article 9)

-Failing to report to the authorities any of the above crimes (Article 10)

The NS Law is couched in vague and obscure language. Article 7, for instance, has been frequently cited to persecute democratic activists. Article 7 can penalize those without anti-state intentions if the authorities decide there is even a slightest possibility of benefiting anti-state organizations (north Korea, or any organization sympathetic to north Korea). According to Article 7, terms such as "praise, encourage and sympathize" are so vague that they are subject to arbitrary definitions.

The same can be said of anti-state organizations (or overseas communist-related activities). If the north Korean Workers Party says, "let's kill flies in the summer" and some one in south Korea says, "it's good to kill flies in the summer time", then it is defined as praising the activity of an anti-state organization. This may sound ridiculous. But the Korean courts have contributed to extending the applicability of the NS Law to encompass diverse and odd cases. The following actual cases show the absurdity of the law.

"The price of rice is changing all the time in south Korea. You can buy anything even in the rural area if you have money. What matters is money." -- prosecuted for leaking top state secrets, Aug. 29, 1967.

"If an essay includes any sentence or clause that praises or encourages the activities of anti-state organizations, the author can be prosecuted despite his or her critical conclusion on grounds that the particular clause may influence the reader." -- excerpts from the final verdict on the case of Professor Lee Young-Hee's book, Idol and Reason.

"Since the defendants bought or obtained north Korean stamps, it must mean that they wished to benefit north Korea by aiding in its sale and distribution process." -- excerpts from a verdict delivered on Dec. 13, 1978.

"The Korean War was caused by conspiracy of Yankees and Russkies." -- prosecuted for violating the NSL.

These examples still serve as precedents to prosecute and decimate movements for democracy and reunification. From July 1984 to June 1987 alone, 726 activists were imprisoned for the violation of the NS Law.

In this way, the NS Law perpetuates the division of Korea and the anti-communist, fascist dictatorship in south Korea. The law is a convenient legal device for the U.S., critical to its grip on south Korea and to the continued implementation of the two-Korea policy. Ultimately it is the 6 million Korean people who suffer from such legal and political absurdities. However, in the midst of their sufferings, the Koreans' yearning for reunification and true democracy grows daily. The comprehensive repeal of the NS Law, as demanded by many concerned Koreans, is long overdue.

UPDATE: KOREA

National Security Law Revisions Railroaded in 35 Seconds

Abuses of the Law Unchanged

While hundreds of thousands of south Koreans were protesting the fatal beating of a college student (Kang Kyung Dae) by the riot police, the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) passed the Revised National Security Law (NSL) unilaterally on June 10, in 35 seconds.

The DLP bypassed all proper procedures of explaining the proposal, deliberations, debate and voting and simply announced the passage of the NSL revision proposal. The Chair of the National Assembly, Park Joon Gyu, entered the meeting room, made his announcement from the corridor at the back of the room and exited promptly as opposition parties shouted, "It's illegal, it's illegal!" Park also announced that

the National Assembly would go on recess the following day, to prevent further debate.

The so-called revisions are mere cosmetic changes to the original version. For instance, the idea of "benefiting the enemy" was modified from simply "an act that benefits the enemy organization (meaning north Korea)" to "an act committed knowing that it would disturb the security of the nation." The Court can arbitrarily define what constitutes an act that threatens the security of the nation and whether the defendant knew it or not, just as it defined what benefits the enemy.

The revision will not affect the vast majority of political prisoners or those on trial for violating the NSL. So far, only a few prominent personalities including Kim Dae Jung and three other legislators are expected to benefit from the revisions. As symbolic tokens, a few may receive decreased prison sentences or be released early.

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