

2002년 고려대학교 아세아문제연구소 East Rock Institute 공동주최 국제학술회의

코리안 디아스포라와 한민족네트워크 국제학술대회

The International Conference on
the Korean Diaspora and Strategies of Global Network

일시	2002년 10월 11일 (금) 09:20~18:30
DATE	OCTOBER 11, 2002
장소	고려대학교 인촌기념관
PLACE	INCHON MEMORIAL HALL, KOREA UNIVERSITY
주최	고려대학교 아세아문제연구소, East Rock Institute
Co-HOSTS	ASIATIC RESEARCH CENTER AND EAST ROCK INSTITUTE
후원	재외동포재단
SPONSOR	OVERSEAS KOREANS FOUNDATION

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프로그램

제1분과 10:00~12:30

사회자

김형찬 (Western Washington University, USA)

발표자

- 민병갑 (Queens College of CUNY, USA)
"재미동포의 민족응집력과 연대의 세대간 변화"
- 김 게르만 (Kazakhstan State University)
"소련체제 해체 이후 중앙아시아의 고려인 디아스포라: 대 북한, 남한 관계 및 입장"
- 치카코 카시와자키 (Keio University)
"재일한인의 디아스포라 경험"
- 실병수 (경북대학교)
"한국계 호주인들의 사회적 동화와 민족적 집착"

중식 12:30~13:30

제2분과 13:30~15:30

사회자

이광규 (서울대학교 명예교수)

발표자

- 허명철 (연변대학교)
"조선족 공동체에 대한 이론적 탐구"
- 윤인진 (고려대학교)
"남북한 재외동포 정책 비교"
- 변중수 (Memphis University)
"한민족 경제 공동체와 미국 동포사회"

휴식 15:30~15:50

제3분과 15:50~18:30

한민족분산의 이론화를 위한 종합토론

주제발표

전혜성 (East Rock Institute / Yale University)
"Korean Diaspora : A Comparative View"

지정토론자

- 이종훈 (국회도서관)
- 정성호 (강원대학교)
- 이진영 (경희대학교)
- 진희관 (동국대학교)

발표자들이 토론자로 참여

폐회식 18:30

석식 18:30~20:00

PROGRAM

Session 1 10:00~12:30

Presider

Hyung-Chan Kim (Western Washington University)

Presenter

- Pyong-Gap Min (Queens College of CUNY, USA)
"From Strong Ethnic Attachment and Solidarity to Moderate Ethnic Assimilation: Intergenerational Transition among Korean Americans"
- German Kim (Kazakhstan State University)
"Korean Diaspora in post-Soviet Central Asia: Relations with and Attitudes toward North and South Korea"
- Chikako Kashiwazaki (Keio University, Japan)
"The Diasporic Experience of 'Zainichi' (chaeil): Changes and Challenges in Comparative Perspective."
- Byung-Soo Seol (Kyongpook National University)
"The Social Assimilation and Ethnic Attachment of Korean Australians"

Lunch 12:30~13:30

Session 2 13:30~15:30

Presider

Kwang-Gyu Lee
(Professor Emeritus of the Seoul National University)

Presenter

- Myong-Chul Hurh (Yenbin University, China)
"An Theoretical Inquiry of the Korean Ethnic Community in China"
- In-Jin Yoon (Korea University)
"A Comparison of the South and North Korean Policy of Overseas Koreans"
- Chong-Soo Pyun (Memphis University)
"The Global Korean Economic Community and the Korean American"

Coffee Break 15:30~15:50

Session 3 15:50~18:30

Roundtable Discussion for Theorizing the Korean Diaspora

Keynote Speech

Hesung Chun Koh (East Rock Institute/Yale University)
"Korean Diaspora: A Comparative View"

Designated Discussant

- Jong-Hoon Lee (National Assembly Library)
- Song-Ho Jung (Kangwon National University)
- Jin-Yong Lee (Kyonghee University)
- Hee-Kwan Chin (Dongkook University)

Closing Ceremony 18:30

Dinner 18:30~20:00

제 1 회 (12월 10일)

제 1 회 (12월 10일)

1. 12월 10일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

1. 12월 10일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

제 2 회 (12월 17일)

제 2 회 (12월 17일)

2. 12월 17일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

2. 12월 17일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

제 3 회 (12월 24일)

제 3 회 (12월 24일)

3. 12월 24일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

3. 12월 24일 (토) 14:00 - 17:00

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코리안 디아스포라와 한민족 네트워크 국제학술대회

주최 | 후원 | 주최 | 후원 | 주최 | 후원

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먼저 아세아문제연구소장으로서 이 중요하고 의미 깊은 학술대회를 공동주최하게 된 데 대해 대단히 기쁘다는 말씀을 드리고 싶습니다. 미국, 중국, 카자흐스탄, 일본 등지에서 발표와 토론을 위해 와주신 참여자들, 그리고 그 규모와 내용에 있어서 실로 국제적인 이 대회를 기획하고 준비하는 과정에서 노고를 아끼지 않은 여러분께 이 기회를 빌어 감사의 뜻을 전하고자 합니다. 또한 바쁘신 와중에도 이 학술대회에 격려의 말씀을 주시기 위해 자리하신 한승주 총장과 권병현 재외동포재단 이사장께도 감사의 말씀을 드립니다.

디아스포라, 즉 민족이산의 문제는 인류의 역사가 기록된 이래로 전쟁, 기근, 경기침체, 사회적 차별, 정치적 억압 등의 조건에서 계속되어온 현상이라고 하겠습니다. 그러나 민족이산이, 한 종족집단이 삶의 터전을 박탈당하고 이질적인 환경에서 힘겹게 적응해야만 하는 험난한 집단적 경험의 차원을 넘어서, 관련된 공동체 및 국가들뿐만 아니라 세계사회에 큰 영향을 미치는 현상이 된 것은 19세기 말 이후, 더욱 본격적으로는 20세기에 들어와서라고 할 수 있습니다. 그것은 무엇보다도 운송과 통신기술의 발달, 그리고 그를 통한 자본주의 시장경제의 세계적 확산, 마지막으로 국내적 억압과 두 차례에 걸친 세계대전에서 크게 기인했다고 이해됩니다. 1890년대 공황으로 인해 미국으로 옮겨가야 했던 아일랜드, 이탈리아 같이 낙후된 유럽 나라들의 농민, 짜리즘과 파시즘의 인종주의 정책을 피해 대규모 이산을 해야 했던 러시아와 독일 유대인의 경험은 잘 알려져 있고, 공식적인 역사로서 그리고

학술적인 연구의 대상으로 그 자리가 확립되어 있습니다. 이러한 역사적 경험에 대한 인정(acknowledgment)은 과거의 이산이 어떻게 현재의 종족사회로 변화, 발전해왔는가, 그리고 그들이 전체 사회 내에서 어떤 역할을 수행하는지에 대한 다각적인 연구를 가능케 하는 조건이라고 하겠습니다.

한국의 경우 디아스포라는 식민통치, 전쟁, 분단, 군부권위주의 통치, 지역주의에 기반한 사회적 차별과 같이 역사적으로 대단히 불행한 조건하에서 이루어졌습니다. 개인이든 집단이든 많은 재외동포들에게 이주는 자발적 선택이기보다는 강제된 경험이었습니다. 한민족 공동체의 오늘을 정확히 이해하기 위해서는 이러한 비극적 역사에 대한 깊은 성찰이 필수적이지 않을 수 없습니다. 그러나 이주의 기원과는 좀 다른 차원에서 우리가 생각해보아야 할 문제는 세계화가 넓고 깊게 진행되고 있는 지금 한반도와 이주사회들을 함께 묶는 한민족 네트워크가 어떻게 형성될 수 있고 그 내용은 무엇이어야 하는가일 것입니다. 미국의 예를 본다면, 많은 한인 3세대, 즉 모든 면에서 진정한 코리안-아메리칸이라고 부를 수 있는 개인들이 코리아 타운이라는 상대적으로 전체사회와 떨어져 존재하는 종족공동체를 넘어서 미국사회의 핵심으로 진입하고 있음을 볼 수 있습니다. 비단 미국뿐만 아니라 중국, 일본, 러시아와 구소련권 국가들은 한국의 지정학적·경제적 이익에 긴밀히 연결된 나라들이며, 그러한 이주사회들에서 새로운 한인세대들이 종족적 정체성과 시민적 역할을 결합하는 것이야말로 아마도 한민족 공동체의 형성과 발전이 이루어질 수 있는 토대라고 봅니다.

이 학술대회가 그러한 현재의 실제변화를 충분히 반영하고 앞으로의 발전방향을 제시할 수 있는 포럼이 되기를 기대하며, 다시 한번 참여자 여러분과 대회준비 실무자들에게 감사하다는 말씀을 드립니다.

| 목 차 |

Contents

제1분과 SESSION 1	10:00~12:30
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 재미동포의 민족응집력과 연대의 세대간 변화 민병갑 1 From Strong Ethnic Attachment and Solidarity to Moderate Ethnic Assimilation : Intergenerational Transition among Korean Americans (Pyong-Gap Min) ● 소련체제 해체 이후 중앙아시아의 고려인 디아스포라 : 대 북한, 남한 관계 및 입장 김계르만 Korean Diaspora in Post-Soviet Central Asia : Relations with and Attitudes toward North and South Korea (German Kim) 29 ● 재일한인의 디아스포라 경험 치카코 카시와자키 44 The Diasporic Experience of 'Zainichi'(chaeil) : Changes and Challenges in Comparative Perspective (Chikako Kashiwazaki) ● 한국계 호주인들의 사회적 동화와 민족적 집착 설병수 65 The Social Assimilation and Ethnic Attachment of Korean Australians (Byung-Soo Seol) 	
제2분과 SESSION 2	13:30~15:30
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● 조선족 공동체에 대한 이론적 탐구 허명철 100 An Theoretical Inquiry of the Korean Ethnic Community in China (Myong-Chul Hurh) ● 남북한 재외동포정책 비교 윤인진 119 A Comparison of the South and North Korean Policy of Overseas Koreans (In-Jin Yoon) ● 한민족 경제공동체와 미국 동포사회 변종수 141 The Global Korean Economic Community and the Korean American (Chong-Soo Pyun) 	
제3분과 SESSION 3	15:50~18:30
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Korean Diaspora : A Comparative View (전혜성, Hesung Chun Koh) 168 	



오전 10:00~12:30

- 재미동포의 민족응집력과 연대의 세대간 변화 | 민병갑

From Strong Ethnic Attachment and Solidarity to Moderate Ethnic Assimilation :
Intergenerational Transition among Korean Americans (Pyong-Gap Min)

- 소련체제 해체 이후 중앙아시아의 고려인 디아스포라 : 대 북한, 남한 관계 및 입장 | 김계르만
Korean Diaspora in Post-Soviet Central Asia : Relations with and Attitudes toward
North and South Korea (German Kim)

- 재일한인의 디아스포라 경험 | 치카코 카시와자키

The Diasporic Experience of 'Zainichi'(chaeil) : Changes and Challenges in Comparative
Perspective (Chikako Kashiwazaki)

- 한국계 호주인들의 사회적 동화와 민족적 집착 | 설병수

The Social Assimilation and Ethnic Attachment of Korean Australians (Byung-Soo Seol)

From Strong to Moderate Ethnic Attachment and Solidarity :
Intergenerational Transition among Korean Americans

Pyong Gap Min

Department of Sociology
Queens College and the Graduate Center
The City University of New York

It is more than 35 years since the liberalized 1965 Immigration Act was fully enforced. As an increasing number of children of the post-1965 immigrants have completed formal education and entered the labor market, research on the “new second generation” has been gradually expanded since the late 1980s. Several books and dozens of articles focusing on the new second generation have already been published (Gibson 1988; Hirschman et al 2000; Lee 1996; Min 2002; Min and Kim 1999; Portes 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Cornelius 1995; Rumbaut and Portes 2001; Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 1995; Waters 1999; Zhou and Bankston 1998).

Many studies of the new second generation have taken a theoretical orientation to speculate about labor market outcomes of the children of post-1965 immigrants (Gans 1992; Hirschman et al. 2000; Portes and Zhou 1993). The other empirical studies of the new second generation have generally focused on three themes: ethnic identity, school performance, and/or the positive effects of ethnic retention on school performance. Methodologically, many of these empirical studies have compared different second-generation groups using survey data (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Cornelius 1995; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). The other empirical studies have examined a single second-generation group or several Asian groups, generally using ethnographic research (Gibson 1988; Lee 1996; Min 2002; Min and Kim 1999; Waters 1999; Zhou and Bankston 1998).

Another way to study the adaptation of the second generation would be to examine the overall generation transition by comparing the immigrant generation with the second generation for a particular group using an underlying concept. Examining the level of intergenerational transition for a particular group with regard to a particular issue is meaningful because various immigrant groups experience different kinds of and differential levels of intergenerational transition, determined by significant differences in cultural traditions, the context of immigration, class resources, and economic adjustment. This paper intends to examine intergenerational reduction among Korean Americans in ethnic attachment and ethnic solidarity by reviewing the literature on Korean Americans.

Since second-generation Korean adults still compose a small number of the Korean American population,¹ it is difficult to conduct independent survey studies focusing on second-generation Koreans. Thus, data on ethnic attachment and solidarity among second-generation Koreans are limited (Korean Cultural Research Center 1997; Min 1993; Min and Hong 2002; Park 1998). Due to lack of data, this study is largely deductive rather than inductive. That is, it will speculate on the intergenerational reduction in ethnic attachment and solidarity largely based on examination of changes in structural conditions that have contributed to strong ethnic attachment and solidarity among Korean immigrants.

To make its main objective clearer to the readers, I may need to make conceptual clarifications of ethnic attachment and ethnic solidarity. Researchers have used ethnicity, ethnic attachment, ethnic identity, ethnic cohesion, and ethnic mobilization interchangeably. But they have used one or another concept to indicate two interrelated, but basically different ethnic phenomena. One phenomenon indicates the extent to which members of an immigrant/ethnic group are culturally, socially, and psychologically integrated to the group. The term "ethnic attachment" seems to best capture this meaning of ethnicity (Hurh and Kim 1984; Miller and Coughlan 1993; Yinger 1985). The other phenomenon is the degree to which members use

¹ According to 2000 U.S. Census data, the U.S. born compose 35% of the Korean American population. However, the vast majority of U.S.- born Koreans have not reached adulthood.

ethnic collective actions to protect their common interests such as boycotting and political lobbies. I consider ethnic solidarity the most appropriate term to denote this meaning of ethnicity. It is important to make this conceptual distinction because members of a group can maintain a high level of ethnic attachment but a low level of ethnic solidarity.

Korean immigrants in the United States as a group have maintained a high level of ethnic attachment (Hurh and Kim 1985; Min 1991, 1998; Min and Bozorgmehr 2000). Moreover, they have shown strong solidarity by frequently using ethnic collective actions to protect common interests (Min 1996; 2001). Korean immigrants may maintain slightly stronger ethnic attachment than some other Asian immigrant groups such as Filipino immigrants. But it is not a social phenomenon unique to Korean immigrants. Immigrants are usually strongly attached to their own culture and social networks. However, strong solidarity post-1965 Korean immigrants have shown over the last twenty years or so is a unique aspect of their experiences that separates them from other Asian immigrant groups. Thus, it can safely be said that strong ethnic attachment and solidarity are the defining characteristics of Korean immigrants' adjustment in the United States that distinguish them from other Asian immigrant groups (Min 1991, 1996). Given this, it is meaningful to examine how much ethnic attachment and solidarity have been reduced over generations to understand the overall intergenerational transition in their experiences in the United States. The following three sections examine intergenerational changes respectively in (1) group homogeneity, (2) religious practices, and (3) economic adjustment as three major structural factors that have contributed to the intergenerational reduction in ethnic attachment and solidarity.

Group Homogeneity

As indicated elsewhere (Min 1990, 2000), Korean immigrants are very homogeneous in their cultural background and homeland, more homogeneous than any other Asian immigrant group. This homogeneity provides the main basis for Korean immigrants' strong ethnic attachment

and solidarity. The monolingual background, Confucian customs and values, and a single homeland are three major elements of Korean immigrants' homogeneity. This section compares Korean immigrants and the second generation in connection with each of the three elements of group homogeneity.

Language is the most important component of culture, and Korean immigrants have only one language. This monolingual background gives them a big advantage over other multilingual groups such as Asian Indians, Filipinos, and Chinese in maintaining ethnic attachment and solidarity. By virtue of their monolingual background, all Korean immigrants can speak, read, and write the Korean language perfectly. As a result, they depend mainly upon Korean language ethnic dailies, and Korean-language TV and radio programs for news, information, and leisure activities (Hurh and Kim 1988). For example, according to the results of my 1997- 1998 survey of Korean immigrants in Queens, New York City, 68% of the respondents reported that they subscribed to at least one ethnic newspaper. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents reported they watched Korean TV programs almost always or more often than American TV programs, with only 18% watching American programs more often. Their heavy dependence upon ethnic media has strengthened their attachment to the Korean community and the home country, although it has hindered their assimilation to American society.

The Korean ethnic media that have been highly developed and very effective by virtue of their monolingual background, have contributed not only to ethnic attachment among Korean immigrants, but also to their solidarity. For example, Korean community leaders in New York have effectively used ethnic media to educate Koreans about the importance of participating in school board elections and the 2000 U.S. census (Min 2001). Korean-language media have been able to widely publicize community political issues because all Koreans speak the same language. In February 2000, I conducted a survey of Korean Americans in New York to examine the effects of publicizing 2000 Census by the NY/NJ Korean American Census Task Force. The results of the survey showed that the vast of the respondents heard about 2000 Census and that Korean TV/radio programs

were the most effective channels of publicity about the census. Interestingly, Korean elderly respondents were found to be more familiar with the census than younger respondents many of whom were second- and 1.5-generation Koreans (NY/NJ Korean American Census Task Force 2001). This is due to the fact that Korean elderly people watch and listen to Korean TV/radio programs far more frequently than younger respondents.

We have above noted that their monolingual background has helped Korean immigrants to maintain strong ethnic attachment and solidarity. But it does not give second-generation Koreans much advantage over other second-generation Asian groups for maintaining their ethnic attachment because U.S.-born children of immigrants, with the exception of Latinos, usually lose much of their mother tongue. In fact, data reveal that second-generation Koreans are less successful than other Asian groups in retaining their mother tongue. For example, an analysis of 1990 census data by David Lopez shows that only 22% of U.S.-born Koreans 25-44 years old in Greater Los Angeles reported that they spoke other language than English (most likely their mother tongue) (Lopez 1996: 158). This figure compares to 32% of Chinese, 35% of Filipino, 36% of Indian, and 64% of Vietnamese counterparts. In a 1989-1996 survey of second-generation (U.S.-born and those who immigrated to the United States at the age of five or before) Korean high school students in New York, only 9% of the respondents reported that they spoke English fluently (Min and Hong 2002: 116). In the same survey, 85% of the respondents said they spoke English with their Korean friends outside of school always, most of the time or more often (Min and Hong 2002: 117).

As noted above, monolingual Korean immigrants have home-language newspaper and TV/radio programs while multilingual Indian and Filipino immigrants have English-language programs. Home-language media materials give Korean immigrants advantage over Indian or Filipino immigrants for maintaining their authentic culture. However, the intergenerational language shift from home language to English has caused second-generation Korean adults severely handicapped--far more handicapped than their Indian or Filipino counterparts--for learning about the Korean community and the homeland through Korean-language media.

Few second-generation Koreans can understand Korean-language ethnic newspapers and TV/radio programs, while all second-generation Indians and Filipinos can understand English-language ethnic media almost perfectly. Second-generation Koreans in New York, for example, have no access to English-language ethnic daily or weekly that provides them with information about the Korean community and Korea. By contrast, second-generation Indians in the city have access to three major Indian dailies in English: *India Abroad*, *India Weekly-USA*, and *The Indian Express*. This suggests that second-generation Koreans have disadvantage compared to second-generation Indians for retaining their cultural traditions and ethnic networks through ethnic media.

In addition to their monolingual background, another important factor that unifies all Korean immigrants culturally is the legacy of Confucianism. Confucianism entered Korea from China in the fourth century (during the Three-Kingdom period). Since the Chosun Dynasty adopted Confucianism as the official ideology at the end of the fourteenth century (1392), it has had a powerful influence on Korean customs and values, especially on those pertaining to family life (Peterson 1998). As will be shown in the next section, the vast majority of Korean immigrants are Protestants or Catholics with a small proportion being Buddhists. However, regardless of their religious or socioeconomic background all Korean immigrants stick to Confucian principles that emphasize family and kin ties, formality in social relations, age-based authority, patriarchal customs, and children's education (Hurh and Kim 1985: 96; Kim and Kim 2001; Min 1998a, Chapters 3 and 4, 1998b).

We noted above that Confucian customs and values regulating family life and social relations, tie all Korean immigrants together regardless of their religious or social backgrounds. But Confucian elements of Korean culture emphasizing age- and gender-based social hierarchy, group ties, and formality are least acceptable to second-generation Koreans in the United States because they are almost antithetical to individualism, the core of American values (Chung 1999; Pai et al. 1987). Korean Americans significantly differ from other overseas Korean groups, especially those settled in China and Japan, in that they have lost their

Confucian customs and values. Koreans in China and Japan in particular have been able to maintain their Confucian cultural traditions fairly successfully mainly because the customs and values do not conflict with the culture of the host society.

Essays by and interviews with second-generation Koreans reveal that they are critical of elements of Korean culture related to Confucian traditions such as age-based authority, patriarchal customs, and overemphasis on academic achievement (Chai 1998; Chung 1999; Jeong 1999; A. Kim 1996; R. Kim 1999; Min 1998a). Second-generation Korean women are usually critical of patriarchal customs practiced in Korean immigrant families. Rose Kim, a second-generation Korean journalist, contributed an essay to an anthology of personal narratives on ethnic and pan-ethnic identities by Asian American professionals she and I co-edited (Min and Kim 1999). The following paragraph from her essay aptly captures the negative reaction by second-generation Korean women to patriarchal customs they consider the core of Korean culture (R. Kim 1999: 50).

Some of my earliest memories are of suffering the degradation of being female, and for a long time I could not help but associate Korean culture with the oppression of women. I believe that my reaction was inevitable in a culture where women primarily held domestic, nonpublic roles as housekeepers, mothers, wives, and prostitutes.

Ruth Chung, the other second-generation Korean woman contributor to the book, never failed to discuss her critical view of Korean patriarchal customs and gender inequality she witnessed at home in her early years. She confessed that she was more attracted to white men than to Korean men "in part due to my resentment of what I deemed to be oppressive patriarchy within Korean culture" (Chung 1999: 63). She further commented: "As I observed the inequality between men and women in Korean culture, I was determined not to perpetuate the pattern" (Chung 1999: 63). Many second-generation Korean women have difficulty understanding their mothers' submissive attitudes toward their fathers. They often show their anger to their mothers, saying "I don't want to live like you."

Second-generation Koreans are equally critical of Korean immigrant parents' authoritarian attitudes embedded in Korean Confucian cultural traditions. Alex Jeong, a second-generation Korean working as an assistant district attorney, was the third Korean contributor to the book that collected fifteen personal narratives (Min and Kim 1999). His essay reflects his critical views about Korean immigrant parents' authoritarian attitudes toward their children. He gave a credit to his parents for his work ethic he considered an asset to working as an attorney. But he blamed his parents' authoritarian child socialization techniques for his lack of communication and social skills, which he said made him disadvantaged in his career as an attorney. As he puts it:

My lack of communication and social skills is the result, I think, of the Korean Cultural patterns that prevailed within my family. We rarely talked to one another. Dinners often lasted less than fifteen minutes since we never uttered an unnecessary word.... In traditional Korean society, a child was considered virtuous if he or she was silent and obedient to his or her parents. Because of my parents' own experiences in traditional, authoritarian families, they lacked the knowledge of how to create a warm, familial atmosphere where open verbal exchanges flourished (Jeong 1999: 73-74).

In a survey of Korean adolescents and their mothers in New York, "my parents never admit it when they are wrong," "my parents restrict my freedom too much," "my parents put too much pressure on me to do well in school, and "my parents are overprotective of me" were found to be some of the most common complaints by Korean children about their parents (Min 1995). These complaints generally reflect Korean immigrant parents' child socialization practices influenced by their Confucian cultural traditions.

While Chinese and Indian immigrants have originated from several different countries, almost all Korean immigrants have come from South Korea, a small (smaller than Georgia State) and culturally homogeneous country. Korean immigrants' single homeland is another important element of their group homogeneity that ties them together. In a survey of Chinese, Indian, and Korean immigrants in Queens, New York City, the

respondents were asked which team they would cheer for in case there is a soccer game between the United States and their home country (China, India, or Korea). Ninety-six percent of the Korean respondents (N=187) chose the category of *definitely the home country* or *probably the home country*, compared to only 57% of the Chinese respondents and 56% of the Indian respondents. The result of the comparative survey reveals that Korean immigrants are far more loyal to their home country than either Chinese or Indian immigrants. Given this, it is not surprising at all that about 2,000 Korean Americans in New York City gathered at a Korean hotel in Flushing for several nights to cheer for the Korean team in the World Soccer this summer.

The existence of a single home country and a great improvement in the international image of South Korea as a major economic power and a major democratic country in Asia during recent years seem to have contributed to positive ethnic identity and ethnic pride among second-generation Koreans. In a survey of second-generation high school students in New York, the respondents were asked to choose their ethnic identity label out of four categories: Korean, Korean American, Asian American, and American. Seventy-two percent chose the Korean American label and another 21% chose the Korean label (Min and Hong 2002). Thus, only 7% of the respondents chose the Asian American or American label. The results of a survey of other Asian groups reveal that higher proportions (13%-15%) chose the Asian American or American label (Rumbaut 1994: 764). In a question of whether to support Korean or U.S. competitors in the 1996 Atlanta Olympic games, 62% of second- or higher-generation Korean American respondents reported that they would support Korean competitors entirely or more than U.S. competitors (The Korean Cultural Research Center 1997: 71). This figure is higher than the Chinese or Indian immigrants who would cheer for the Chinese or Indian team over the U.S. team in a soccer game. The Korean soccer team's splendid performance in the 2002 World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, is likely to have further enhanced second-generation Koreans' ethnic pride and positive attitudes toward their mother country. Thus, if a similar question testing second-generation Koreans' loyalty to their mother country is asked in a

survey, the vast majority of the respondents are likely to report that they would cheer for the Korean team.

Religious Practices

The vast majority of Korean immigrants are affiliated with Korean immigrant churches, and they are active in participation in Korean churches. The literature on the earlier white immigrant groups indicates that immigrant/ethnic congregations contribute to ethnic attachment by increasing ethnic fellowship and networks and by preserving ethnic cultural traditions and ethnic identity (Greeley 1971; Smith 1978; Tomasi and Engel 1971). Two of the major social functions of Korean immigrant churches are provision of fellowship and ethnic networks and maintenance of Korean cultural traditions (Min 1992). Thus, Korean churches help Korean immigrants to maintain social and cultural ethnic attachment. However, Korean Christian immigrants cannot transmit their cultural traditions to the second generation through religion because Korean folk culture has not been incorporated into Korean Protestantism or Catholicism (Min 2000). Many second-generation Koreans have inherited Christian religions from their parents, but they generally practice only religion without inheriting Korean cultural traditions.

American missionaries—mostly Protestant—brought Protestantism to Korea at the end of the nineteenth century while French missionaries had introduced Roman Catholicism to Korea about a century earlier (K. Min 1988). However, both Christian religions were not popular in Korea until the 1960s. In 1962, only 2.8% of the population in South Korea was Protestant and 2.2% Catholic (Park and Cho 1995: 119). The proportion of Christians has gradually increased in conjunction with economic growth in South Korea. It increased to 25% in 1991, with 19% being Protestants and 6% being Catholics (Park and Cho 1995). In 1997, Protestants and Catholics respectively accounted for 23% and 9% while Buddhists composed 30% (Choe 2001).

Christians have been especially numerous among those Koreans migrating to the United States. Several surveys reveal that 55%-60% of Korean immigrants were Christians prior to migration (Hurh and Kim 1990; Min and Kim 2000; Park et al. 1990).

Christians are heavily concentrated in the middle-class segment of the population in large cities in Korea, and Korean immigrants have largely been drawn from the urban middle-class population (Park and Cho 1995). This is one major reason why Christians are overrepresented among Korean immigrants in the United States. Korean Christians have selectively migrated to the United States, regardless of their class or urban-rural background, which is the other important reason for the overrepresentation of Christians among Korean immigrants. The abundance of numerous Korean Protestant churches caused by an oversupply of Korean pastors and the need of Korean immigrants for communal bonds have led many Buddhists and other non-Christian Koreans to participate in Korean immigrant churches (Hurh and Kim 1990; Kim 1981; Min 1992, forthcoming). Thus, survey studies reveal that more than 75% of Korean immigrants are affiliated with Korean Christian churches, 55% with Protestant churches and 20% with Catholic churches, compared to only 3-5% with Buddhist temples (Hurh and Kim 1990; Min forthcoming; Min and Kim 2000). As of September 2002, there are approximately 3,500 Korean churches in the United States with a Korean population of about 1,200,000, which means one Korean church for about 350 Korean Americans.

Korean Christian immigrants are interesting to researchers not only because almost all of them participate in Korean churches but also because they participate very frequently, far more frequently than other Christian groups in the United States. Survey data cited above reveal that about 80% of Korean Christian immigrants participate in church at least once a week, usually on Sunday, and that about 20% participate twice or more often. Korean Christian immigrants' exceptionally frequent participation in congregations becomes clearer when compared with those of non-Korean Christian groups in the United States. According to 1997-1999 Racial and Ethnic Presbyterian Panel Studies (Kim and Kim 2001: 82), 78% of Korean Presbyterian respondents participated in Sunday worship services every

week, compared to 28% of white Americans, 34% of African Americans, and 49% of Hispanics. My 1997-1998 survey of Asian immigrants in Queens indicates that 44% of Indian Christian immigrants and 39% of Chinese Christian immigrants, compared to 83% of Korean Christian immigrants, attend church at least once a week. Only Haitian Catholic immigrants seem to attend congregations as frequently as Korean Protestant immigrants.²

Korean immigrant churches have enhanced Korean immigrants' ethnic attachment by providing them with fellowship and ethnic networks on the one hand and by helping them to preserve Korean cultural traditions on the other (Hurh and Kim 1990; Kim 1981, Chapter 6; Min 1991, 1992, 2000, forthcoming). Korean immigrants participate in a Korean church partly to meet their need for communal ties derived from their sense of alienation in an alien environment. A small Korean church is similar to "a pseudo extended family" (Kim 1981: 199) in that church members maintain intimate, primary social interaction in a family-like atmosphere. During the fellowship hour following the Sunday service, church members enjoy greetings with their relatives and co-ethnic friends and discussing personal matters with refreshments or lunch served. In addition, the Korean church provides them with many other opportunities such as regular committee meetings, summer retreats, picnics, the year-end party, and filial tours to maintain friendship and co-ethnic networks. Large Korean immigrant churches are less effective for meeting the need of Korean immigrants for an intimate social environment. But they, too, provide their members with the opportunity for face-to-face, small-group social interactions mainly through the *gooyuk yebae* (district services) (Kim 1981; Kwon 1997; Min 1992, forthcoming). They have divided members into a number of districts based on locations of members' homes, each district consisting of about a dozen members. Members of each district usually hold a two-hour district meeting once a month under the guidance of the head of the district at a member's home on rotation. After having a short service, participants

²Alex Stepick (1998: 85) said: "Nearly 75% of recent Haitian immigrants in South Florida reported in 1985 that they attended church at least weekly."

enjoy fellowship, talking about children's education, businesses, politics in Korea, and other matters of mutual interest. The *gooyuk yebae* enhances friendship networks among members of the same district because it is a small-group meeting held at a private home usually with dinner. In fact, members of the same district often become close friends to the extent that they exchange informal dinner invitations and help each other.

Korean churches also help Korean immigrants to maintain their cultural traditions. As noted above, Christian religions were transplanted to Korea by Western missionaries and popularized in Korea only over the last forty years. Thus, neither Korean Protestantism nor Korean Catholicism has incorporated Korean folk culture in the forms of Korean language, food, holidays, music, and dance. Thus, compared to Indian Hindu immigrants Korean Christian immigrants have disadvantage for preserving their cultural traditions through religion (Min 2000). However, Korean Christian immigrants do retain their cultural traditions by actively participating in Korean congregations and by practicing Korean culture there rather than Christian culture (A. Kim 1996; Min 1992, forthcoming). Korean churches celebrate two traditional Korean holidays, the Lunar New Year Day and *Chuseok* (Korean Thanksgiving day), with traditional Korean foods served and many women wearing traditional Korean dresses. They also observe two major Korean national holidays, the March First Movement day and the independence day. Korean Protestant immigrants usually do not practice ancestor worship, the core of Korean Confucian customs. But many Korean Catholic immigrants do practice ancestor worship because since the early 1960s Roman Catholicism has allowed different nationality and ethnic groups to practice the religion consistent with their cultural traditions. Large Korean Christian churches have established Korean schools to teach Korean children the Korean language, culture, history, and etiquette (Min 1992). Korean children also learn Korean etiquette and Korean customs in Korean immigrant churches simply through their social interactions with other Korean children. Korean immigrants with school-attending children usually participate in a Korean immigrant church, especially for the benefit of ethnic education to their children.

We have above noted that Korean immigrants' active participation in Korean churches enhances their ethnic attachment by increasing their fellowship and social networks and by helping them to retain their cultural traditions. Korean immigrant congregations also facilitate their ethnic mobilization, e.g., their use of ethnic collective actions. African American churches played a significant role in Civil Rights Movement partly by providing an organizational mass base and a financial base (Morris 1984: 4). In a similar way, Korean churches have facilitated Korean immigrants' ethnic mobilization by mobilizing church members and money for ethnic collective actions.

I can illustrate my point using examples in the context of the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area. In summer 1990, the Korean Association of New York was organizing a mass demonstration in front of City Hall to condemn Mayor Dinkins for not taking action to terminate boycotts of two Korean produce stores in Brooklyn (Min 1996). The major concern of the organizers was how to mobilize a large number of Korean Americans to the planned demonstration. They partly depended upon nearly 300 Korean churches in the New York-New Jersey area (at that time) for mobilization of Koreans to the demonstration. The information about the demonstration was delivered to all churches through the Council of Korean Churches of Greater New York. As a result, many churches brought their members and other Koreans in their neighborhoods using their vans, helping to mobilize about 7,000 Korean Americans to the demonstration held in September 1990 in front of City Hall (Min 1996: 151). Before the demonstration, Korean community and business leaders asked for donations for the two boycotted Korean produce stores and for visits to them for shopping so that the stores could stay open. Again, Korean churches played an important role in helping the two stores to stay open with donations of money and group visits for shopping (Min 1996: 149). In addition, Korean churches in New York played an important role in getting Korean candidates for school board members elected by disseminating information about the importance and procedures for local school board elections, introducing Korean candidates in churches, and mobilizing their members to the ballot boxes (Min 2001).

The intergenerational continuity in the congregational basis for ethnic attachment and solidarity depends upon both the level of second-generation Koreans' participation in Korean churches and the levels of their ethnic fellowship and cultural retention through Korean churches. Available data indicate that a small proportion of second-generation Koreans--a much smaller proportion than Korean immigrants--participate in Korean churches regularly. More significantly, second-generation Korean congregations are much less important than Korean immigrant congregations for ethnic networks and retention of ethnic culture.

There is only one survey study of a second- and 1.5-generation adult sample (25-34 years old) that tapped into their church affiliation and participation (Min and Kim 2000). In the survey, 77% of second-generation and 1.5-generation (those who were born in Korea and immigrated at the age of 12 or before) respondents in New York (N=202) indicated Protestantism (58%) or Catholicism (19%) as their religion during childhood. But only 41% of them reported that they were affiliated with a church at the time of the interview. Data suggest that many second-generation Koreans who attended church accompanied by their parents, stopped going to church when they left their parental home. The reduction of church affiliation from childhood to adulthood is greater for Korean Catholics (from 19% to 5%) than for Protestants (from 58% to 36%). Among those younger-generation respondents affiliated with a church, 61% were affiliated with a Korean church while the rest affiliated with a white American (28%) or a pan-Asian church (11%). Altogether, only 25% of the second- and 1.5-generation young Korean adults (41% x 61%) were affiliated with a Korean church at the time of the interview. This figure compares to about 75% of Korean immigrants in New York who are affiliated with a Korean church. The affiliation with a Korean ethnic church is reduced to one-third from Korean immigrants to the second- and 1.5-generations. In addition, the frequency of participation in a Korean church has been reduced from Korean immigrants to the younger generations, slightly for Protestants but significantly for Catholics (Min and Kim 2000).

Second-generation Korean Christians who participate in a white American or a pan-Asian church cannot use their church participation for their ethnic attachment. But even those who participate in a Korean congregation cannot expect to do much for Korean ethnic attachment because neither Protestantism nor Catholicism has incorporated much of Korean cultural traditions. As previously noted, both Protestantism and Catholicism are Western religions imported to Korea one or two centuries ago and popularized there only over the past forty years. As such, Korean folk culture--language, food, holidays, music, and dance--has not been incorporated into Korean Protestantism or Catholicism (Min 2000). This suggests that compared to Indian Hindus or Jews in the United States Korean American Christians have difficulty in preserving their cultural traditions through religion.

Most second-generation Korean Christians in New York who participate in a Korean congregation participate in English ministry established within large Korean immigrant churches. Because second-generation English congregations are not physically separate from Korean immigrant congregations, they can be very ethnic in worship style and socio-cultural activities. However, a few studies of second-generation congregations (Alumkal 1999, 2001; Chai 1998, 2001) and my own study of a second-generation congregation in New York (Min and Kim 2000) indicate that second-generation Korean congregations have eliminated much of Korean cultural traditions and that therefore they radically differ from Korean immigrant congregation in terms of Korean cultural resources. As Jeung has documented (Jeung 2002), evangelical Asian American churches have heavily borrowed from the contemporary white American evangelical movement, while mainline Asian American churches have developed their distinctive worship style consistent by incorporating Asian cultural traditions. Most second-generation Korean churches, whether independent or attached to Korean immigrant congregations, are evangelical churches strongly influenced by the white American evangelical movement. Thus, unlike Korean immigrant churches they do not celebrate either Korean traditional holidays or Korean national holidays.

The second-generation Korean pastor in a second-generation Korean congregation in Queens told me that in his sermon or prayer he never mentioned "Korea" even one time over the past one year. He expressed his conviction that "We Christians should pray for the world, not for Korea or Korean people." According to him, the only thing "Korean" in his congregation is Korean food that church members often eat after the Sunday service. He was very critical of Korean immigrant congregations for being too "ethnic," too "cliquish," "not reaching out to the neighborhood." Second-generation Korean Protestants may feel good about co-ethnic fellowship. But they accept Christian as their primary identity and Korean American as their secondary identity (Alumkal 1999; Chai 1998; Park 2001). Thus, they interact with church members primarily, not as co-ethnic members, but as fellow Christians. They feel Korean churches should be open to members of other groups, and almost all second-generation Korean congregations in New York have some non-Korean members, mostly Chinese. They believe that for Korean churches to be open to non-Korean members, they should not put too much emphasis on Korean fellowship and Korean cultural traditions. Their Christian, especially evangelical background, seems to partly explain the highest intermarriage rate among native-born Korean Americans (70% in 1990) among all Asian ethnic groups (40% for native-born Asian Americans) (Lee and Fernandez 1998).

Economic Adjustment

A unique aspect of Korean immigrants' adjustment to the United States is that they are heavily concentrated in small businesses. While ethnic ties help Korean immigrants to establish and operate small businesses, their concentration in small businesses further contributes to ethnic attachment and solidarity. Due to their heavy involvement in middleman businesses, Korean merchants have encountered a high level of inter-group conflicts with black customers, white suppliers and Latino employees. As a result of their business-related inter-group conflicts,

Korean immigrants have used ethnic collective actions far more than other Asian groups. By contrast, U.S. educated second- and 1.5-generation Koreans find employment in the general labor market, many in professional and managerial occupations. As a result, they do not have job-related ethnic attachment. More significantly, they do not have to use ethnic collective actions to protect their economic interests.

Both census data and results of independent surveys show that Korean immigrants have an exceptionally high self-employment rate. For example, an analysis of the 1990 census data by Light and Roach (1996: 199) reveal that 35% of Korean immigrants in the Los Angeles region were self-employed in 1989, compared to 13% of the native-born white populations. Korean immigrants in Los Angeles ranked the number one in the self-employment rate, followed by Iranian (28%) and Armenian immigrants (27%). Census surveys, based on respondents' self-reports, underestimate the self-employment rate of the population (Light and Bonacich 1988: 159; Light and Rosenstein 1995: 33-55; Min 1996: 47). My own Independent surveys conducted in Los Angeles and New York reveal that the majority of Korean immigrant men have their own businesses (Min 1996: 48). My survey study conducted in 1988 revealed that 61% of Korean immigrant married men in New York City were self-employed and that another 25% were employed in Korean-owned businesses (Min 1996: 48). Thus, less than 15% of Korean immigrant married men in New York City worked in the general economy.

Korean immigrants heavily concentrate in labor-intensive small businesses such as grocery and produce retail, retail and wholesale of Asian-imported manufactured goods, dry cleaning and nailing services, and garment subcontracting. Korean immigrants' disadvantages for employment in the general labor market largely explain why they specialize in these labor-intensive small businesses (Kim et al. 1989; Min 1984, 1988; Yoon 1997). A large proportion of Korean male immigrants completed their college education in Korea, but they cannot find in the United States professional or managerial occupations commensurate with their educational level. They choose self-employment in a small business as an alternative to a blue-collar occupation.

A number of studies have shown that concentrating in small business facilitates ethnic attachment (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Fugita and Obrien 1991; Reitz 1980). For example, Bonacich and Modell (1980) showed that Japanese Americans in the ethnic economy maintained stronger ethnic attachment than Japanese Americans in the corporate economy in terms of maintaining Japanese cultural traditions and of interacting socially with co-ethnic members. Reitz (1980) demonstrated that Chinese, Eastern European, and Southern European ethnic groups in Canada maintained higher levels of ethnicity than other ethnic groups in terms of retaining mother tongue and ethnic endogamy, because they were more involved in small businesses. Results of my survey of Korean immigrants in Los Angeles have also supported the hypothesis regarding the effects of ethnic business on ethnic attachment. Korean immigrants in the ethnic economy were found to use the Korean language and interact with Koreans more frequently than those in the general labor market did (Min 1991).

Social scientists have developed the concept "middleman minority" to refer to a minority group that plays an economically intermediary role bridging minority customers and suppliers of the ruling group (Blalock 1967; Eitzen 1971; Zenner 1991). All immigrant and minority groups concentrated in small businesses preserve high levels of ethnic attachment. But only those groups that play the middleman minority role are likely to use ethnic collective action to protect group interests because they frequently have conflict with both minority customers and suppliers (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Min 1996; Min and Bozorgmehr 2000).

Many Korean grocery, liquor, produce, and fish retailers play the middleman minority role in that they distribute merchandise supplied by white corporations to low-income Black and Latino customers (Kim 1999; Min 1996; Min and Kolodney 1994). Due to their middleman role, they have had conflicts with black customers in the forms of boycotts, arson, and victimization of the 1992 Los Angeles riots (Kim 1999; Min 1996; Yoon 1997). They have also had conflicts with white suppliers (Min 1996). Korean merchants, regardless of the location of their businesses, also heavily depend upon Latino employees, which is another source of Korean immigrants' business-related inter-group conflicts (Kim 1999; Min 1996).

Korean merchants' business-related inter-group conflicts with all three non-Korean interest groups, in turn, have enhanced ethnic solidarity. As I have examined it in detail elsewhere (Min 1996), long-term black boycotts of Korean produce and grocery stores in New York up to 1990 and the destruction of 2,300 Korean businesses in the 1992 riots have strengthened solidarity not only among Korean merchants, but also among all Koreans. The demonstration in September 1990 in which 7,000 Koreans participated to help to terminate blacks' boycotts of two Korean stores in Brooklyn is the largest demonstration ever taken by Korean Americans in New York City. The peace rally immediately following the 1992 riots in which about 30,000 Korean Americans participated is the largest Korean demonstration ever taken in Los Angeles. Moreover, Korean produce, grocery, and fish retailers' conflicts with white suppliers in New York have forced them to use ethnic collective actions such as demonstrations and boycotts to protect their ethnic-class interests. In addition, the administrative and political lobbies Korean community and business leaders have taken to moderate laws and measures regulating small business activities have led them to improve their political skill (Light and Bonacich 1988, Chapter 12; Min 1996, Chapter 9).

The victimization of many Korean merchants in the 1992 Los Angeles riots not only solidified Korean immigrants, but also awakened second-generation Koreans' ethnic and political consciousness (Min 1996: 159-168). Many young Koreans quickly responded to the riots by writing articles in major English dailies in California; they attacked the media bias and the police failure to protect Koreatown and the position of the Korean community. A large number of second- and 1.5-generation Koreans participated in a solidarity rally held in Koreatown immediately after the riots. About a thousand Korean American students rallied in front of the local ABC-TV station to protest the station's unfair coverage of Korean Americans. Collective memory of major historical events, such as the Holocaust and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, has played an important role in the persistency of ethnicity (Goren 1982: 108-110; Nakanishi 1993). The victimization of innocent Korean

merchants during the riots is another such historical event that can have an impact on the ethnic identity of Korean Americans for many years to come.

In the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area, Chinese Americans outnumber Korean Americans by three times while Asian Indians outnumber Koreans by 2.5 times. However, there are eight Korean school board members, in comparison to seven Chinese and two Indian members (Min 2001). This is a rather surprising finding, given that Indians speak English far better than Koreans, and that Chinese Americans, including more U.S.-born Chinese, are more fluent in English than Koreans. Koreans' group homogeneity and their affiliation with Korean Christian churches have partly contributed to their political development. However, I like to argue Korean immigrants' business-related conflicts with other groups and government agencies are the most significant factor to their political consciousness and development. Despite their group homogeneity, Korean immigrants have had a lot of internal conflicts. But, when Korean immigrants have encountered threats to their economic survival from the outside world, they have had to set aside internal conflicts and get united. Neither Chinese nor Indian immigrants in New York have encountered serious business-related inter-group conflicts that may have solidified their communities.

Korean immigrants have made occupational adjustment to self-employment in small business mainly because of their language barrier and other disadvantages for employment in the general labor market. Second- and 1.5-generation Koreans who have completed their college education in the United States and thus are fluent in English are not disadvantaged for employment in the general labor market. Also, Korean immigrant parents never encourage their children to run businesses; they want their children to succeed in high-status professional occupations (Kim 2000; Min 1988: 68). In addition, second-generation Korean adults cannot work 70 or 80 hours per week in small businesses. Thus, the vast majority of second- and 1.5-generation Koreans find occupations in the general economy, with many of them holding professional and managerial occupations and very few engaging in businesses. An analysis of 1990 census data reveal that only 11% of U.S.-born Koreans in the Los Angeles region were self-employed

(Min 1996: 52). This is lower than the self-employment rate (13%) of the native-born white. A survey study of second- and 1.5-generation adults (25-34 years old) conducted in New York also show that the vast majority of the respondents (N=202) were in the general economy with less than 15% self-employed (Kim 2000). Unlike Jews who transmit their businesses over generations,³ Korean immigrants do not transmit their businesses to the second generation.

Because second-generation Koreans largely work in the general economy, they neither interact mainly with Korean people nor mainly speak the Korean language at the workplace. As a result, they lose the high level of ethnic attachment associated with Korean immigrants' concentration in small businesses. Moreover, by virtue of their non-involvement in small businesses and occupational assimilation, second-generation Koreans do not encounter job-related inter-group conflicts. Consequently, they do not have to use ethnic collective actions for their economic survival. My content analysis of demonstrations and boycotts Korean immigrants in New York used against other groups or government agencies between 1970 and 1994 revealed that nine of thirteen demonstrations and all seven boycotts were taken to protect their business interests (Min 1996: 195-196). Since second-generation Koreans in New York are not involved in small businesses, they are unlikely to use these types of collective actions in the future. To moderate regulations of small business activities, Korean immigrants in New York have extensively lobbied city, state and federal government agencies, and politicians, which has helped them to improve their political skills. Second-generation Korean Americans who are in the general economy do not need to lobby government agencies and politicians to protect their economic interests. I have previously indicated that the victimization of many Korean merchants during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, as a major historical event for Korean Americans, will have a positive impact not only on second- but also on later-generation Koreans' ethnic

³ 1990 census data show that 25% of U.S.- born whites of Russian ancestry in the Los Angeles region were self-employed. Since the vast majority of whites of Russian ancestry are Jewish Americans, the figure reflects the high self-employment rate of third- and fourth-generation Jewish Americans.

identity. Second-generation Koreans and their descendants, who will work in the mainstream economy, are unlikely to encounter a similar historical event in the future that can linger on Korean Americans' collective memory over generations.

Summary and Conclusion

Korean immigrants' monolingual background and sharing of Confucian customs and values have given them huge advantages over other Asian immigrant groups for strong ethnic attachment and even ethnic solidarity. But these advantages deriving from Koreans' cultural homogeneity disappear for second-generation Koreans who have become very much English-monolingual and adopted individualism as the core value.

In fact, the absence of English-language ethnic media in the Korean community gives second-generation disadvantages, compared to their Indian or Filipino counterparts, for ethnic attachment and ethnic solidarity. The existence of a single mother country and the emergence of South Korea as a major economic and political power among Asian countries are more important elements of Korean Americans' group homogeneity for second-generation Koreans' ethnicity than the monolingual background or sharing of Confucian customs and values.

Korean Protestant and Catholic immigrants' active participation in Korean congregation has helped them to maintain strong ethnic attachment through congregation-related ethnic networks and cultural activities. However, many second-generation Koreans who went to church during their childhood have stopped going to church in their adulthood. Moreover, a significant proportion of second-generation Korean Christians (about one-third) participate in white American or pan-Asian congregations. In addition, even second-generation Korean Christians who regularly participate in Korean English ministry are not exposed to a strong ethnic environment because both second-generation Korean Christian themselves and English congregations have been far more strongly influenced by the

white American evangelical movement than by Korean immigrant churches. In both worship style and socio-cultural activities, second-generation congregations are radically different from Korean immigrant congregations. In a nutshell, second-generation Korean Christians have difficulty maintaining Korean ethnicity through religion mainly because neither Protestantism nor Catholicism is a religion indigenous to Korea. This makes a sharp contrast with Jewish Americans and Indian Hindus who have brought their indigenous religions.

Due to their language barrier and other disadvantages for employment in the general labor market, Korean immigrants are heavily concentrated in small businesses. Their heavy involvement in several lines of small businesses has strengthened their ethnic attachment. More significantly, their business-related conflicts with black customers, white suppliers, Latino employees, and government agencies have contributed to strong ethnic solidarity. However, second-generation Koreans who are fluent in English and who have completed their education find jobs in the mainstream economy. This occupational assimilation is a positive element of the second-generation Koreans' adaptation to American society. Yet it has reduced their ethnic attachment significantly and has given them little opportunity to use ethnic collective action.

Despite unpopularity of classical assimilation theory, immigrant groups' progressive assimilation and reduction of ethnicity over generations seem to be inevitable. All Asian groups have experienced some level of intergenerational reduction of ethnic attachment and solidarity. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, Korean Americans seem to have experienced the highest level of intergeneration reduction of ethnic attachment and solidarity among all Asian groups. This suggests that they have had or will have more intergenerational conflicts than any other Asian group.

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Korean Diaspora in post-Soviet Central Asia: Relations with and Attitudes toward North and South Korea

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There are roughly 450,000 Koreans living in the former Soviet Union, about 2/3 of them in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the remaining third mostly in Russia, with a small number of Koreans also live in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Belarus and elsewhere.¹ This wide spread dispersal of the population resulted from the repression of the Stalin era, and subsequent migration of the population.

In the past, both in the academic literature and the vernacular, the term "Soviet Koreans" was used to refer to all Koreans living in the "unified and everlasting Union". During the Soviet time, the population referred to themselves as either "Koryo Saram" or "Choson Saram" interchangeably, but in the last ten years, both at home and abroad, the term "Koryo Saram" has become preferred.

The Soviet Koreans are not homogeneous in composition, but should rather be divided into three distinct groups. The most numerous group are the descendants of the Korean settlers in the Russian Far East – largely from Hamgyungbukdo in the northern part of Korea. This group is now in the second to fifth generation abroad. The term "Koryo Saram" refers to this group in particular.² The second largest group are the "Sakhalin Koreans", who are descendants of the roughly 60,000 Koreans who were sent from the southern part of the Korean peninsula to the southern part of Sakhalin Island by the Japanese colonial administration as forced laborers.

¹ In 1999, the first national census of Kazakhstan was held, and in the other CIS countries, this will happen in the near future.

² Kim Syn Khwa. *Ocherk po istorii sovetskikh koreitsev*. Alma-Ata, 1965; Pak B.D. *Koreitsy v rossiskoi imperii*. Moscow, 1993;

Today, the Sakhalin Koreans number about 35,000 people, and they are in the first to third generation.³ The third group of Soviet Koreans consists from the former citizens of the DPRK who came to the Soviet Union for university studies or contract work, and did not return home. This group is remarkable because although small in number they are easily distinguished because they speak Korean as their mother tongue. Thus, the term "Soviet Koreans" is much more general than the term "Koryo Saram", despite that they are often incorrectly used as synonyms.

Because of intensive research by scholars, both domestic and foreign, the history and contemporary lifestyle of the Koryoe Saram is no longer a "tabula rasa"⁴, however many aspects of the relationship of the Soviet Koreans and Koryo Saram of the post-Soviet period with the North and South Korea have not been studied thoroughly yet. Better studied are mainly the official economic and cultural ties between the modern Central Asian countries and the Korea states.⁵

It is believed that Koreans in the Soviet Union were on friendly terms with the Northern Koreans. However, in fact it was not like that. Certainly, on the official level the Soviet government rendered political, military and economic support to Pyongyang. The Soviet Koreans had little to do with it.

However, after Second World War the Soviet Koreans found themselves drawn into political ambitions and games of the Stalin regime. In 1946 Moscow sent instructions to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to register all Korean communists, candidates to the Communist Party and Comsomol members, educated and speaking Korean or Chinese. On the whole in Kazakhstan 1, 000 people were on the list. A special commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan was dealing with those

³ Bik Zi Kou. Sakhalinskiye koreitsy: problemy i perspektivy. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 1989; Kuzin A.T. Dalnevostochnye koreitsy: zhizn' i tragediya sud'by. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 1993.

⁴ Kim G.N. Koryo saram. Bibliografya i istoriografya. Almaty. Kazakh University Press, 2000.

⁵ Myon D.V. Kazakhstansko-Yuzhnokoreiskiyeh odnoscheniya na sovremennoy etape...- Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol.4, 1998, p. 30-43; Kim G.H., Хан В.С.

chosen to be sent to the North Korea. Then they were trained and sent to Moscow. Going to Korea was considered to be a special business trip on the mission of the Central committee of the All-Russia Communist Party.⁶

It will be possible to exactly determine how many Soviet Koreans were sent to work in the PDRK only after all the corresponding documents have been made available. Professor Suh Dae Sook believes that 427 Soviet Koreans were in the North Korea between August 1945 and January 1949.⁷ Lee Chang Sik and Oh Ki-Wan give approximately the same number.⁸ Hur Un Be in his research on the history of the PDRK writes that in January 1949 in the North Korea there were 428 Soviet Koreans. Thus, the figure of 427-428 seems to be real. It can be supported by simple calculations. It is enough to add four figures: 1). 140-150 Soviet military men – Koreans who came in 1945, 2). 100 civil specialists sent in 1946-1948, 3). 110 family members of the latter and 4). Unknown number of the family members of the military, supposedly 100-150. If we also take into consideration the fact that some of the Soviet Koreans left the country together with the Soviet troops in 1948 or were called back to Moscow, we will get approximately the same number – 400-450 people. It is true that this figure includes members of the families. The number of politically active Soviet Koreans was smaller – 140-200 people.⁹

The national cadres in Korea itself were very weak at that time and because of it the Soviet Koreans who had great party, governmental, managerial and cultural experience occupied important positions in Korea. Besides, the Soviet military administration tried to place their people

⁶ Lankov A.N. Severnaya Koreya: vchera i segodnya. M., 1995, c. 155-187; Myon D.V. Sovetskie koreitsy v Severnoi Koreye. - Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol.8, 2001, p. 108-123; German Kim. Stereotypes of Soviet Historiography and Topical Problems in the Study of the History of the Korean War, 1950-1953. - Korea between Tradition and Modernity. Selected Papers from the fourth Pacific and Asian Conference on Korean Studies, UBS, Vancouver, Canada, 200, 215-227

⁷ Suh, Dae-Sook. Soviet Koreans and North Korea // Suh Dae-Sook (ed.) Koreans in the Soviet Union. Honolulu, 1987, pp.101-128.

⁸ Lee, Chong-Sik and Oh Ki-Wan. The Russian Faction in North Korea // Asian Survey, 1968, April, No. 4, pp.270-280.

⁹ Lankov A.N. Ho Ga Yi. Ocherk zhizni i deyatelnosti. - Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol.7, 1999, p. 109-127

everywhere. For such reasons the Soviet Koreans from the first days started to play a very important role in the political and military administration of the North Korea.

The Soviet Koreans participated in the Korean War of 1950-1953. Some of them were awarded the highest military award "Hero of the PDRK", some became generals of the North Korean Army. Soon after the war the majority of the Soviet Koreans were deported by Kim Il Sung Regime. Only several dozens remained and many of them suffered from repressions. Only very few, those really loyal to the Leader, remained in the North Korea and died there when their time came.

It should be noted that among the Soviet Koreans there was a small group of former citizens of the PDRK who had stayed in the Soviet Union upon graduating universities or after post graduate courses or contract work or those who had crossed the border. Most of the northern Koreans remained in Moscow after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, at which Khrushchev officially criticized the personality cult of Stalin. The relations between Moscow and Pyongyang aggravated. This group of non-returnees was composed of intellectuals. Later they began to play a considerable role in the Korean diaspora and national culture. Suffice is to name such as Hur Un Be, Han Din, Myon Dong Uk, Yan Von Sik etc.

After the personality cult of the "father of peoples" was exposed and because of the worsened Soviet-Chinese relations Moscow and Pyongyang kept at some distance from each other. In 60-70ies in Kazakhstan there were only several occasions on which some jubilee dates were observed, i.e. liberation of Korea, formation of the PDRK and even they did not involve the Korean diaspora.¹⁰

In 1985 in the USSR perestroika started and in May for the first time a group of Soviet Koreans could go to the North Korea and during 12 days visited Pyongyang, Wonsan, Nampo, Gumgansan.

Still we should not maintain that during the Soviet period the relations of the Soviet Koreans with the North Korea were limited by the

¹⁰ A Collection of official documents about events dedicated to the 15th anniversary of Liberation of Korea in the book: Kim G.N., Myon D.V. *Istoriya i kultura koreitsev Kazakhstana*. Almaty. 1995, c. 254-260

official interstate relations. We should point to several factors. Firstly, for the elder generation deported from the Far East to the Central Asia, it was the North Korea that remained to be the "historical motherland". They called Korea "Choson" and not "Hanguk". Secondly, a considerable group of the Soviet Koreans were sent to the North Korea on a "special mission" and those people were in direct contact with the North Koreans. Thirdly, Koryo Saram were under direct influence of the Soviet mass media. Newspapers, magazines, TV and radio news carried exclusively positive information about the PDRK based on the feeling of proletarian internationalism and the necessity to protect the brotherly people from the foreign aggression. The newspapers of the Soviet Koreans "Lenin Kichi", "Lenin Killo" (Sakhalin), the propaganda magazines "Soviet Union" and "Soviet Woman" published in Korean and the North Korean magazine "Korea" published in Russian also provided the information channel between the Soviet Koreans and the North Korea. Fifthly, the information about the South Korea was very limited and only negative which led the formation of the image of the "good North" and "bad South" in the heads of the Soviet Koreans.

In 1988 a considerable group of the Soviet people went first time to the South Korea to take part in the Seoul Summer Olympics. Among athletes and coaches there were some Soviet Koreans. The Seoul Olympics opened the eyes of the Soviet people including Koreans and they realized that the South Korea was a dynamically developing country which had already achieved considerable economic success.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the independent Central Asian countries established diplomatic relations with both Korean states. Besides official governmental bodies the Association of Korean Cultural Centers set up in 1990 began to play a very important role in the first contacts of Kazakhstani Koreans with the South and North.

At first the North Korea tried to compete with the South in establishing and developing ties with Central Asian Koreans. For example, in 1989 three thousand textbooks and ABC books in Korean were sent from

Pyongyang.¹¹ A professor came from the North Korea who taught the Korean language at Almaty State University. Taekwondo instructor from the North Korea gave lessons in the national martial art to the young people of Kazakhstan including Koreans.

In 1989 Kazakhstan branch of the All-union Association for Promotion of Unification of Korea was set up, its activity was financed by the North Korea. During the first years of its activity the APUK made possible for Kazakhstani Koreans especially of the older generation to visit the North Korea. About 1000 people could visit the North Korea.

In September 1994 the APUK in Kazakhstan was re-registered and renamed – Kazakhstan Korean Association «Yedinstvo» (“Unity”) and three years later renamed again – “Kotonryon”. This organization numbering several activist is led by Radmir Kang and stuck to its pro-North Korean policy and got from Pyongyang textbooks and propaganda materials, Korean musical instruments, national dresses. Once every year a small group of Kazakhstani Koreans went to Pyongyang to take part in the celebrations of Kim Il Sung birthday called “April Spring”. “Kotonryon” cooperates with the North Korean Committee on support to the Koreans living abroad. The Committee was founded by Kim Il Sung for the sake of close ties with the “Chochonryon” - the pro North Korean organization in Japan. As Khan R. maintains “the life of compatriots abroad interested Kim Il Sung and the Committee maintained very active relations with all the Korean diasporas abroad. However, between Moscow and Pyongyang there was a secret agreement the the North Korea will not get involved in the problems of the Soviet Koreans.¹²

The main aims of the Committee were: firstly, revival of the Korean language, secondly, to acquaint compatriots with the North Korea; thirdly, to invite them to Pyongyang, fourthly, to spread the ideas of «juche». As

¹¹ Khan G.B. Proschloye i nastoyatscheye koreitsev Kazakhstana. Almaty, 1997, c. 16.

¹² Natsuko Oka. The Korean Diaspora in Nationalizing Kazakhstan: Strategies for Survival as an Ethnic Minority.- German Nikolaevich Kim and Ross King (Eds.) The Koryo Saram: Koreans in the Former USSR. Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin. Vol. 2&3. 2001. p. 105-106.

Khan R. puts it, he refused to realize the fourth and the most important aim.¹³

In early 1990-s in Pyongyang at the University named after Kim Il Sung there were 15 young Koreans from the CIS, three of them were from Kazakhstan. Several groups of Korean singers and artists from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan went to Pyongyang, they covered their travel expenses and the expenses in Pyongyang were covered by the North Korea. On August, 28, 2000 «Kotonryon» held an exhibition of culture of the PDRK in Almaty, the Korean delegation was headed by Ким Ын Нам, head of the department of the Korean society of publications exchange. Such exhibitions were held in Almaty and Tashkent several times in the past but it was for the first time that the South Korean ambassador – Che Sung Ho, and a number of other South Korean officials and citizens visited the exhibition, talked to the members of the North Korean delegation and bought pictures, books and souvenirs.¹⁴

The deep crisis of the North Korean regime of mid-nineties made Pyongyang close its embassy in Almaty and call back the diplomats. Thus the North Korea left no noticeable trace in Kazakhstan and did not influence the Korean diaspora.

The North Korean crisis brought about an avalanche of publications in the Russian press exposing personality cult and authoritarian regime of the two North Korean leaders and describing unbearable living conditions in the North Korea. Such materials quite often exaggerated the negative side. As a result we got a picture which did not correspond to the reality.¹⁵ Some articles were reprinted in the newspaper Kore Ilbo causing discontent among representatives of the older generation of the Korean diaspora who believed that it was a shame for the Korean people on the whole. At present in the Russian newspapers there are fewer of such exposing publications

¹³ Natsuko Oka. Koretsy v sovremennom Kazakhstane: strategiya vyhivaniya v roli etnicheskogo menshinstva. – Diaspory (Moscow), No.2-3, c. 214.

¹⁴ Koryo Ilbo, 2000, September 1

¹⁵ See for example: Olga Narzissova. Zakrytaya Strana. Putevyye zametki o Severnoi Koreye. Kiyev, 1997, 39 c.

and in all probability it is connected with the attempts of Moscow to restore relations with Pyongyang.

As regards the South, from the very beginning of establishing diplomatic relations between Seoul and Almaty their relations were developing very fast, widening every year. Thousands of Kazakhstani Koreans were able to visit the South Korea and in turn thousands of South Koreans came to Kazakhstan.

The biggest South Korean companies such as "LG" and "Samsung" have invested millions of dollars in the economy of Kazakhstan. Dozens of joint and Korean companies are acting in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where many local Koreans work. Many trading companies import from the South Korea all kinds of products from cars and computers to foodstuff and consumer goods. The Association of Koreans in Kazakhstan contributed to signing a number of mutually beneficial contracts between Kazakhstani and South Korean companies. In September 1999 the AKK contributed to signing an agreement on cooperation between the Karatal region, the head of which - Roman Kim was appointed at the recommendation of the AKK, and the company "LG- Almatyelectronics" The agreement envisages a number of interesting investment projects.¹⁶

Teachers from the South Korea are teaching the Korean language at the Universities in Almaty, Tashkent and other cities of Central Asia, several Dozens of South Korean students are getting education here. All the Students who learn Korean use South Korean textbooks and other learning materials from Seoul.

In 1991 the Center of Education of the Republic of Korea was opened in Almaty and later in Tashkent and now they play a very important role in the life of the Korean diaspora. Thousands of students, hundreds of teachers have taken language courses in the Center. Alongside with the educational activity the Center promotes the Korean national art, gives knowledge about history and culture of the Republic of Korea, holds various cultural events. The Centers of Education has branches in many

¹⁶ Kim G.N., Kvon L.A., Men D.V., Yu E.S. Social and economic situation in the Republic Kazakhstan and Korean Diaspora in transitional Period. Almaty, 1998.

regional centers, big cities and other places with compact Korean population.¹⁷

From 1991 Korean Christian churches began to appear in post-soviet Central Asia, now their number is more than three dozens. The bulk of parishioners are Koreans but the doors are open for everybody. Many started going to the church not for the sake of religion but to be able to learn the Korean language and to communicate with people in an informal manner. If originally they were mostly people of the older generation who went to the church, now younger people also are interested in it.¹⁸

During the past years in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan there were many concerts, exhibitions, theatre performances, fashion shows and other cultural events organized by the South Korean side together with the Associations of Koreans in Kazakhstan (AKK) and Uzbekistan. Lots of people from the Korean diaspora took part in those events. The AKK organized and held a number of important socio-political, cultural and sport events, which were highly appreciated at the top level. At the celebratory meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the stay of Koreans in Kazakhstan the president of the country Nursultan Nazarbaev emphasized the contribution of Koreans to the development of their motherland – Kazakhstan and very warmly spoke about his close comrades in arms from the Korean diaspora. The AKK held a number of republican festivals of the Korean culture and art, thousands of people taking part including those from the South Korea. The Embassy of the Republic of Korea has always supported such important and useful events.

¹⁷ See: Assotsiatsiya koreitsev Kazakstana – 10 let. Almaty, 2000, 345 c.; Kim G.N., Shim Yeong Seob. Istoriya prosvescheniya koreitsev Rossii i Kazakhstana. Vtoraya polovina XIX veka – 2000. Almaty, Kazak universitety, 2000, c. 259-357.

¹⁸ Kim G.M. On the Question of Religioness among Koreans, attending the Protestant Churches (Kazakhstan).- Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol. 1, 1996, p. 76-80; Kim G.M. The State of the Religioness on the Korean Charismatic Churches.(Comparative Study). – 18th AKSE Conference, Stockholm, April, 17-21, 1997, Conference Paper, Religion, pp.1-10; Kim G.M. Glossolaliya kak element kultovoi praktiki v koreiskoi presvetarianskoi harismaticheskoi tserkvi.. - Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol. 3, 1998, p. 28-35

In the middle of 1990 the number of South Koreans in Kazakhstan was several hundreds, which led to the formation of the public organization called "Hanin hwe" uniting above all businessmen, pastors and students. Unfortunately from the very beginning the Association of the South Korean citizens and the AKK failed to establish close cooperation, each of them being busy with its own activities. At present there is a tendency of bringing those two organizations closer to each other which will lead to better understanding and contacts between the South Koreans and the Korean diaspora in Kazakhstan.

During the past ten years to Kazakhshstan several times came teams from the biggest South Korean TV- and radio companies to shoot documentary films and series of programs on the history, life and prospects for future of the Koreans in Kazakhstan. In Almaty one can watch "Arirang" TV program in Korean and English.

Scientists and journalists have already written a lot of articles, published books about Central Asian Koreans. Several international scientific conferences on Korean Studies were held in Almaty and Tashkent scientists – Koreans from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan participated in scientific conferences in the Republic of Korea.¹⁹

The South Korea rendered all kind of humanitarian help and a lot of Korean people of the Central Asia could benefit from it. First of all, they were refugees from Tajikistan who suffered most from the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet state.²⁰ The Koreans ousted from Tajikistan by the

¹⁹ German Kim. Korean Studies in Kazakhstan and Central Asia: the Past, the Present and the Future.- China, Central Asia and Korea: Cultural Ties and Korean Studies. Papers of International Seminar, HUFS, Seoul, 17.April, 2002, pp. 33-42.

²⁰ The Koreans deported to the Central Asia, got to Tadjikistan in 1941. they were first Korean families of white collar workers who were sent there by the Soviet government. Later from late 50-s – early 60-s due to the liquidation of the restriction for settlement Koreans from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan started to come there. Thus the number of Koreans in Tajikistan before 1959 was 2.400, in 1979 - 11 thousands, and in 1989 - 13 thousands. In Tajikistan the Koreans lived mainly in the capital – Dushanbe and in the suburbs of Leninabad (now Khodjent) in the north , and in Kurgan Tyube in the south.. Because of the Civil war which started in 1990-s many Koreans left Tadjikistan. In 1996 r. there remained 1800 families, about 6300 people, who found themselves in a very complicated socio-economic situation and needed all-round support. See: Lee Aelia.

war, migrated to the neighboring Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and later the geography of their exodus was broadened to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Volga. The return of Koreans to Primoriye (Maritime region of russian Far East) became important due to the following factors: firstly, the Russian debts to the South Korea and the ways to cover them; secondly, conversion in the Far East ; thirdly, excess of vacant accommodation in the Army towns; fourthly, the demand in the agricultural products in the area and lastly, the tendency to migrate of the certain part of the Korean population of the Central Asia. At that moment one could also witness the activity of some informal leaders – heads of big families, clans of relatives who were influential among the villagers. A significant role was played by Telmir Kim, the son of Afanasiyi Kim, a former secretary of the Pos'et Party Committee who was then accused of treachery and executed by the Stalin's regime. Thys the mid 90-s were marked by the migration of several thousands of Koreans to Primoriye (it is very difficult to get an exact figure).

Originally on the territory of the Volgograd oblast 500 Korean refugees got settled and during the last two years 623 more Koreans moved there.²¹ The living conditions were hard: in summer they lived in dug outs and in winter in the rented flats in Volgograd. The assistance came from the World Korean Charity Foundation, regional Korean public organization "First of March" (Pastor Lee Hyeon Kyn), the movement "Uri minjok sero dobki undong», which gathered money to buy and build houses, to buy foodstuff , medicine, clothes. The representative of the Ministry of Federation, professor Bugai N.F., leaders of the administration of Volgograd oblast, pastor Lee Hyeon Kyn examined the regions of potential

Koreans in the Civil War Tajikistan. Proceedings of the International Conference on the Problems of National Reunification, Chonnam University, Institute of Sociological al Studies, p.90: Tae Hyeon Back. The Social Reality faced by Ethnic Koreans in Central Asia. German Nikolaevich Kim and Ross King (Eds.) The Koryo Saram: Koreans in the Former USSR. Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin. Vol. 2&3, 2001, p. 155.
²¹ Rossiyskiye koreitsy. 2001, No.15.

settlement by the Korean refugees and migrants from the Central Asia to create a "Korean village".²²

The relations between Central Asian and South Koreans have turned from official into direct, human and everyday contacts. It is well known that people remain the most conservative in food preferences and stick to the food they got used to in their childhood. Ten years ago in Almaty, Tashkent and Bishkek Korean restaurants started to appear specializing in such dishes as *yukkejang*, *bulgogi*, *kimpab*, *jeyuk bokkeum* and others unfamiliar for Kore Saram. On the other hand, in the same South Korean restaurants and cafes the *panchan* menu (i.e. starters) includes the so called *morkov chya* (c carrot salad), and all the guests from the South Korea ask "What is it?". There are quite a few examples when Kore Saram due to every day contacts with the South Korean people start to return to the traditional Korean culture and the language. During family and calendar holidays some elderly and young women wear hanbok, sing Korean songs and play Korean national games. There are cases when children are given Korean traditional names.

There is a number of cases when such contacts led to marriage and family ties. If ten years ago a marriage of a South Korean and a Korean from Kazakhstan was kind of a sensation as they were so different regarding mentality, language and way of life, now no one is any longer surprised. One can say that Koreans from Kazakhstan and South Koreans have become very close. The interethnic marriages are typical for South Korean men and the girls from the Central Asia. It happens not only in Korea but also in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Kyrgyzstan. In the first case we usually speak about the girls who are students studying at some Korean universities and in the second one – the South Korean businessmen in Almaty, Tashkent, Vladivostok or Bishkek. Widely known collective international weddings held by Mun Samyong, attracted some young Korean girls from the Central Asia. The South Korean men are considered to be good grooms as marriage to them is associated with

22 Bugay N.F. Rossiyskiye koreitsy i politika "solnechnogo tepla". M.: Gotika, 2002, c. 194-196

material well being, solution of economic and financial problems, a possibility to get settled well in life and to guarantee a bright future for the children. That is why it is very rare when a South Korean girl marries a Koryo Saram man. At the same time in the inter ethnic marriages to the representatives of other nationalities of Kazakhstan, Russia or Uzbekistan both Koryo Saram men and women are active.²³ The image of the Republic of Korea as an economically developed country to a certain extent contributed to the high status of the Korean Diaspora in post-soviet Central Asian countries.

Another channel in the relationship of the Koreans from the post Soviet Central Asia and South Korea is connected to the fact that in the mid-90s the South Korean small and medium size business companies got a permission to attract foreign workers mostly from developing countries of the third world. Citizens from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also got a chance "to work on probation" at the plants and factories of the South Korea, however among those willing to earn their living in Korea representatives of the Korean diaspora compose less than one fourth or fifth. The reasons for such unwillingness are different.²⁴ However, on the whole Koreans from the Central Asia visit Seoul much more frequently than representatives of other nationalities. Such trips are made to attend language courses, to study, to participate in various conferences and to make business.

Thus, the relations between the Republic of Korea on the one hand and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where about one third of all the former Soviet Koreans live, on the other hand, have been rapidly developing. These

23 Yem Natalya. K probleme natsionalno-smeschanykh brakov (po rezultatam aktovykh zapisei gorarchiva ZAGS g. Almaty. - Newsletter of Korean Studies in Kazakhstan. Vol. 2. 1997. p. 40-51; German Kim. Binationale Ehen der koreanischen Bevoelkerung in der Stadt Almaty. Kazahstan.- Korea Forum, 1999. No.3, S. 39-41; On inter-ethnic Marriage among the Korean Population in the city Almaty.- International Journal of Central Asian Studies. 2000. Vol.5, p. 14-26.

24 One of the reasons is, undoubtedly, difference in the mentality, culture, way of life. The Sakhalin Koreans repatriated to Korea, despite the support and concern rendered to them, feel uncomfortable in their Motherland, the feeling which have led to several suicides and the desire to return to Sakhalin. See: Ten Yu.M., Kim Yen Un. Koreitsy Rossii – sovremennoye polozheniye I problemy.- Sotrudnichestvo. Materialy 6 0oi mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii. Moscow, 29-30 noyabrya 2000, Moscow, 2001. c. 42

relations covered all the aspects of political, socio-economic, cultural and scientific life. In this regard I fully agree with the opinion of professor Kim Jee Yong (Yonsey university), who rightly notes that in order to achieve more efficient and rapid development of such relations it is necessary to create "a system of centralized management"²⁵ He himself agrees that the words "centralized management" grate the ear but actually he raises the right issue because, I think there is no long-term, well thought out, expedient program of cooperation with Korean diasporas abroad. Various aspects of support and development of the relations with the compatriots abroad are regulated by different laws, ministries, foundations and departments. For instance, the issues of the Korean language teaching can be considered in the Ministry of Education, Korea Research Foundation, Korea Foundation, Overseas Korean Foundation, KOICA, embassies of the Republic of Korea etc., which quite often leads to the situation when some events are duplicated, money is inefficiently spent and there is general muddle in the activity.

The Law on Foreign Koreans adopted in the Republic of Korea gives equal civil and political rights to all the immigrants who left the country after it had been officially proclaimed. Thus it does not include the Koreans of the former Soviet Union and China. However, one must admit that such limitation of rights was practically ignored by the Korean diaspora of Post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. The leadership of OOK (The All-Russia organization of Koreans, President Vasilij Suh) sent a letter to the President of the Republic of Korea expressing their regret about exclusion of the Russian Koreans from the jurisdiction of the Law on Foreign Koreans.²⁶ The question – " Do the Koreans in Kazakhstan want the rights equal to those of the South Koreans?" remains open. The answer to it is not simple as it is connected not only with the desire of Koreans themselves but also with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, international law and terms of inter-governmental agreements.

²⁵ Kim Jee Yeon. Puti rasschireniya obmenov mezhdru RK i RF v oblasti nauki, tekhnologii i kultury. – Tretiy rossiysko-koreiskiy forum. M.: Nauchnaya kniga, 2002, c. 178.

²⁶ Protokol No.6 Vneocherednogo zasedaniya OOK. 3 sentyabrya 1999. - Bugay N.F. Rossiyskiye koreitsy i politika "solnechnogo tepla", c. 222-223.

It should also be noted that there are certain problems in the relations between Koreans in Central Asia and the South Koreans. The thing is that some South Korean businessmen, professors and pastors using the dominating position in their surrounding are trying to impose their models of behavior and mentality to the Koryo saram.²⁷ Korean companies introduce the order and rules which are typically Korean and which may sooner or later lead to a negative reaction on the side of the local personnel. Tense relations and mutual hostility on the personal level can pass on to a higher level.

We should not forget that we - Koryo saram are blood brothers to the Koreans from the South and North but due to the historical destiny we are different from each other in mentality, psychology, habits and interests.²⁸ We should know our common features and our differences, we should respect each other, we should support and assist each other, we should strengthen and develop our relations for the sake of the future.

²⁷ Khan V.S. Koreiskoye mezhdunarodnoye soobshchestvo: utopiya ili perspektiva.- International Journal of Central Asian Studies». Vol. 6. Seoul: IASD. 2001, p. 94.

²⁸ Differences in the philosophy of life, mentality, habits and behavior were accurately noted by a well known Soviet (Russian) writer Anatolyi Kim in his essay "The Train of Memory". where he describes his long trip from Vladivostok through Siberia and the Central Asia to Moscow. In the train which was going the same way as in 1937, when deported Koreans were heading for their unknown destination, there were about 200 people – Koreans from the South Korea, USA, China, Canada and Kore Saram. Being different in age, sex, social status, and the country of living. Being different people but being Koreans. -

The Diasporic Experience of 'Zainichi' (*chaeil*):
Changes and challenges in comparative perspective

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1. Introduction

In June 2002, South Korea and Japan jointly sponsored the FIFA World Cup soccer games. Overall, the event was quite successful. A great number of Japanese people cheered the Korean team. The image of South Korea among the Japanese populace had changed over time for the better, and this positive image seems to have had an impact on *zainichi* Koreans [Korean residents in Japan], too. The Japanese media extensively covered, in an approving if somewhat condescending manner, how the *zainichi* Korean community welcomed and enjoyed the occasion.

On September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a historic day trip to Pyongyang and held a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. While the meeting yielded some progress toward opening diplomatic relations between the two countries, the occasion generated much popular resentment in Japan against the North Korean state concerning Japanese abductees. Just like in the aftermath of the launching of the *tepodon* rocket by North Korea in 1998, there has been harassment against *zainichi* Korean individuals and institutions.

The two episodes above suggest that ethnic Koreans in Japan are inextricably linked with their 'homeland(s)', or at least so it is believed, even when many of the young generation *zainichi* may feel that their daily life has little to do with the Korean peninsula. The theme of this conference,

'diaspora', implies that the people in question live in a country which is in one way or another not considered as *their own* land. In this respect, *zainichi* Koreans share similarities with other overseas Korean groups as well as with many other ethnic or national groups around the world. However, comparative research is still underdeveloped in the field of *zainichi* studies. The purpose of the present work is to consider research potential in that direction.

Specifically, this paper takes up a few areas in which an introduction of comparative perspective should help better understand the diasporic experience of *zainichi* Koreans, and offers preliminary discussions in those areas.¹ They include the history of migration, ethnic associations and social movements, and the patterns of assimilation and their relations to ethnic identity formation. I will pay particular attention to the *interpretive* aspects and consider the ways in which the prevailing understanding of the *zainichi* Korean experience has shaped the frameworks of academic research in Japan. By doing so, I shall demonstrate both potential and difficulty in employing comparative frameworks.

2. Potential and Pitfalls in Comparative Investigation

(1) Demographic trend

It would be useful to begin by reviewing some of the major characteristics and changes in the demography of Koreans in Japan. However, anything that has to do with 'counting' poses a major problem. We inevitably face the difficult question of the definition and boundaries of

¹ This paper almost exclusively focuses on 'old-comer' Koreans, or ethnic Koreans who have resided in Japan since before the early 1950s and their descendants. I use the term "zainichi Koreans" interchangeably with "old-comer Koreans." The settlement of 'old-comer' Koreans is more directly linked with Japanese colonialism than that of 'newcomers', many of whom came to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s as migrant workers or students. The dichotomous categorization has its problems, however, as there has in practice been a continuous flow of people.

zainichi Koreans. For instance, although it is problematic to include only those who are Korean nationals (without Japanese nationality) as zainichi, virtually all the statistical records are based on nationality status.² It is therefore important to keep in mind that the available set of numbers gives only a partial, or sometimes even a misleading, picture.

The total number of Korean nationals is gradually decreasing due to the accelerating fall in the old-comer population (Figure 1). Contributing to this trend is the increase in both naturalizations and inter-marriages (Figures 2 and 3). The impact of the latter has been felt strongly since 1985, when Japan amended the Nationality Law by which a child acquires Japanese nationality if at least one parent is a Japanese national. While children of mixed marriage may hold dual nationality, they are not included in the statistics of foreign nationals. In short, Japanese nationality holders of Korean descent are on the increase.

Another dramatic change over time has to do with the relative size of the Korean population among immigrant groups in Japan. Whereas Koreans comprised over 80% of all foreign residents in Japan as late as in 1984, they now account for no more than 30% due to the sharp rise in the number of other foreign residents in Japan during the 1990s (Figure 4).

The majority of zainichi Koreans reside in the western parts of Japan, with the highest concentration in the Ikuno district of Osaka City.³ In and around Tokyo, there are a couple of areas where Koreans have historically been settled in large numbers, such as Arakawa and Kawasaki. Meanwhile, the Shinjuku-Okubo section of downtown Tokyo has seen the development of what might be called a new 'Korea town', where Korean restaurants, grocery stores, and other shops have concentrated with the rapid growth in newcomer Korean population.

² In April 1952, the Japanese government unilaterally declared that all former colonial subjects, namely Koreans and Taiwanese, had lost Japanese nationality even if they had continued to live in Japan. After that, practically the only method for a Korean national to obtain Japanese nationality was to go through the administrative process of naturalization.

³ See Ryang (2000) for the ethnographic sketch of both old-comer and newcomer Koreans in this area.

Over 90% of old-comer zainichi Koreans originally came from the southern provinces of Korea (Table 1). The relatively high proportion of people from Cheju Island is another characteristic of the zainichi Korean community. As shown in Table 2, two-thirds of zainichi Koreans were Japan-born as of 1969. Today, zainichi Koreans consist mainly of second and third generations, with smaller proportions for the first generation and the young but growing fourth generation onwards.

(2) Academic research in Koreans in Japan

Writings on zainichi Koreans are abundant today in both academic and non-academic circles. However, this was not always the case. Despite their settlement in Japan since the prewar period, only in the 1990s did we see a marked development of zainichi Korean studies in social sciences. Together with the growth of the overall volume of publications related to zainichi Koreans, diversification in terms of disciplines and approaches is notable. In addition to law and history where research used to be concentrated, there are now many studies in sociology, anthropology, education and literature, and areas such as linguistics, religion and music are also catching up.⁴

This diversification in academic research appears to parallel the situations for other overseas Korean communities, or for that matter, studies of immigrant groups in general: understanding of history and basic social status, followed by a closer look at various aspects of life and greater attention to internal differences. However, it is not that zainichi studies have merely followed some general evolutionary pattern. Rather, the course of development in research itself reveals the prevailing understanding of Japanese society as well as the position of ethnic Koreans in that society.

⁴ One can get the glimpse of the breadth and diversity of zainichi-related studies in the Korean history reference database (in Professor Mizuno Naoki's homepage, compiled by Chosenshi Kenkyukai), which is a valuable electronic resource on Japanese publications <<http://www.zinbun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~mizna/index.html>>.

For one thing, the shortage of research in the past reflected the belief, or ideology, that Japanese society is ethnically homogeneous. This notion thoroughly permeated postwar Japan, and the assumptions held by researchers were no exception. Race and ethnic differences as variables were hardly ever brought into the analysis of Japanese society. Under this condition, Koreans remained largely invisible and marginal, and researchers were indifferent (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 2).

Second, even if the existence of Korean communities was recognized, they were not considered part of Japanese society but understood as belonging to the (one or the other) Korean state. As John Lie's article demonstrates, *zainichi* intellectuals along with political leaders in *zainichi* communities maintained strong homeland orientations (Lie 2000a). In the context of the Cold War rivalry, issues concerning Koreans in Japan were subsumed under geopolitics. For researchers, the topic was too ideologically charged. Seeking contacts through one or the other ethnic organization, for instance, could have been taken as a political statement.⁵

The recent surge in publications on *zainichi* Koreans reflects an overall rise in the interest in ethnic diversity and minority culture in Japanese society. The existence of *zainichi* Koreans as an ethnic minority group gradually came to be recognized, while the growing presence of 'newcomer' foreigners since the 1980s challenged the assumption of ethnically homogeneous Japan.⁶ In the field of policy and administration, a new perspective has emerged that situates *zainichi* Koreans under the theme of resident foreigners as a whole.

⁵ Fukuoka and Kim (1997: 1-3) also mention the difficulty in sampling as a special problem in conducting quantitative analysis.

⁶ Oguma's influential study (1995) showed that the 'myth' of ethnic homogeneity was firmly established only after 1945. See Lie (2000b, 2001) on how the assumption of ethnic homogeneity has been entrenched in the mind of Japanese people.

(3) Potential and pitfalls in the act of comparison

Korean communities in other countries have also received growing attention in recent years in Japan, though comparative research in overseas Koreans is still scanty. This may be partly because of the assumption of idiosyncratic development. There are certainly a number of conditions that underscore the uniqueness of the case of Koreans in Japan, among other things the fact that they live in the country that once ruled their homeland. Nevertheless, comparative analysis has the potential in generating new insights, allowing us to better understand the case of Koreans in Japan. The *zainichi* experience can in turn give feedback to other cases and to theoretical discussions. However, the course of development of *zainichi* studies as outlined above suggests possible pitfalls in comparative work as well.

Many of the previous writings in Japan on other overseas Korean communities are found in essays, reportage and other journalistic forms, or else publications by ethnic organizations. They provide some hints concerning possible pitfalls in making comparisons. For instance, one typical approach is to emphasize the 'power' or 'energy' of Korean people, supposedly stemming from their ethnicity (or "national character"), that helped them to endure hardships.⁷ Another way in which comparative perspective is introduced is to highlight the uniqueness of Koreans in Japan. It may be their special plight of living in a repressive and assimilationist society, or the respectable determination to maintain their ethnic/national identity not least by holding on to Korean citizenship.⁸

What is needed more, in my view, is an analytical perspective to comparative investigation.⁹ This is quite a challenge, however. To begin

⁷ For example, Pak (2002: 27-28) identifies "the exceptional ability of adaptation, indomitable strength, and unique ethnic consciousness" as well as "an astoundingly high level of concern for education" as characteristics of overseas Koreans.

⁸ The author of a Mindan publication finds it insulting that the South Korean official statistics does not distinguish between other overseas Koreans and *zainichi*, who show exceptional loyalty to the South Korean state by holding on to their legal nationality (Mindan 1997: 120-122).

⁹ Harajiri's comparative study (2000) exemplifies this orientation.

with, researchers in zainichi studies may find it uneasy to discuss zainichi in relative terms. Comparative perspective might 'dilute' the violent nature of Japanese colonialism. A reference to the 1937 deportation of *koryo saram* from Russian Far East, for instance, could easily lead to an unfruitful discussion of which ruler was more evil. Some researchers may also find comparisons of the contemporary life of overseas Koreans rather risky, for they would obscure the hardships and suffering of zainichi Koreans, many of whom look relatively well-off and having a comfortable life in a rich country.

Another challenge is the application of theoretical models developed elsewhere. Dominant ethnic organizations and leading intellectuals among zainichi Koreans have emphasized that Koreans in Japan are *not* an ethnic minority group (*sosu minjok*) but belong to Korean states. While this idea is today not as influential as before, its implication is to reject the framework of majority-minority relations *within* Japanese society. Moreover, 'assimilation' has been evaluated extremely negative, as discussed below. Overall, then, the race and ethnic relation paradigm that is dominant in the United States is not applicable in a straightforward way. Theories of immigration and nationalism are surely useful, but again, contextual differences have to be carefully examined when making comparisons with other cases. Comparative researchers would therefore need to come to terms with these difficulties in one way or another. In the next section, I will discuss selective issues to reconsider the prevailing understanding of zainichi experience in comparative light.

3. Interpreting and Analyzing Zainichi Experience

(1) History of Migration

In general, zainichi Koreans can be characterized as those who arrived and settled in Japan as a result of Japan's colonial policy. History of migration thus occupies an important place in the understanding the

diasporic experience of zainichi. In particular, the role of Japanese colonial policy and the 'involuntary' aspect of Korean migration have been central themes. The established framework for portraying history, however, also hindered the development of new perspectives.

Figure 5 shows the trend in migration flows and Korean population in Japan during the colonial period. Whereas there were a small number of Korean migrants arriving in Japan already in the late 19th century, it was after Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910 that the volume of population flow between the Korean peninsula and mainland Japan increased rapidly. The land and economic policy of imperial Japan effectively drove Korean farmers out of their villages. Furthermore, the forced labor recruitment program that began in the late 1930s brought more than 600,000 laborers to Japan to work in mining and construction sites (Weiner 1994: ch. 4).

Indeed, this forced labor recruitment symbolizes Japanese colonialism and the 'involuntary' nature of Korean migration to Japan (Ryang 2000: 3). In practice, the majority of zainichi Koreans did not originally come as conscript laborers but had settled in Japan since before the late 1930s. Nevertheless, the notion that Korean migrants were "forced to come" has had political and ideological significance. It gave support to the homeland orientations of Koreans in Japan. Moreover, it has been a powerful basis for addressing the historical responsibility of the Japanese government to protect their legal rights.

Yet it is unfortunate that the distinction between 'forced/involuntary' and 'voluntary' migrations has been drawn in a rather simplistic manner. Understanding the Korean migration only as involuntary, and therefore a passive phenomenon for Koreans, would stop us from probing into the diverse motivations and decision-making on the part of individual migrants.

In recent years, a small but significant body of research has examined migratory processes, including family networks, the role of regular ferry services in the flow of people, and the formation of zainichi communities (Sugihara 1998; Ko 1996). Life history interviews have also revealed typical patterns among migrants: a young male initially came alone and eventually married or reunited with his family, and built their family life in Japan (Fukuoka 2000: 4-5).

While recognizing colonial migration as the salient characteristic of the collective experience of zainichi Koreans, we would benefit by introducing a broader framework. First, theoretical models of migration processes should be useful as a reference point in analyzing the history of Korean migration to Japan. They include stages in labor migration and the development of migration networks. Individual and family decision-making processes are worth exploring, while Japanese colonial policies and administrative regulations undoubtedly comprise important structural factors in those processes. The explicit application of theoretical models should help us identify what is special about colonial migration as well.

Second, greater attention should be paid to a variety of migration experiences. For instance, a section of today's zainichi community consists of post-1945 immigrants who entered Japan 'illegally'¹⁰. Strictly speaking, these people do not fall into the category of colonial migrants, and their presence has often been de-emphasized presumably because of their manner of entry. The prevailing understanding of zainichi as having originated under Japan's colonial rule likely gives greater legitimacy to some types of immigrants over others.

The explicit reference to theoretical frameworks and attention to the diversity of migratory experience should then open up wide potential for comparative investigation. Korean migration to China and Russia are both comparable to the zainichi case in that Japan's colonial venture had a direct and indirect impact on migration flows. One major difference is that these other Korean communities were settled in the 'third party' country, not the former colonial power that ruled their homeland. Accordingly, the interpretation of the original migration and its significance would be different from the case of zainichi.

The case of Koreans in the United States is generally regarded as *voluntary* migration and therefore may not appear comparable with zainichi experience. However, war brides and adoptees do not fit neatly into the

¹⁰ They include people from Cheju Island who fled after the 1948 incident. Many of the illegal entrants eventually obtained special permission for residence, though often many years later.

voluntary category. It seems that the prevailing understanding of immigration as voluntary phenomena in the United States serves to downplay the involuntary elements involved in the process. In fact, many cases of cross-border migration include both voluntary and involuntary elements even within each case, so it would be useful to examine the complex interrelations between the two.

The above discussion of the history of migration suggests that the interpretation or framing of the past can have a significant impact on the scope and orientation of research. Just as the 1937 deportation defines who *koryo saram* are, 'involuntary' migration as the origin of their community continues to inform zainichi Koreans as well as researchers working in the field. The understanding of the history of migration and settlement is also relevant to the activities of ethnic organizations and social movements, to which I will now turn.

(2) Ethnic organizations and social movements

Most first-generation zainichi Koreans originally came to Japan as colonial migrants. They were defined at that time as Japanese emperor's subjects. After Japan's defeat, the Japanese government declared that Koreans had uniformly lost their Japanese nationality and excluded them from a range of entitlements accessible only to citizens. Since this early postwar period, the core approach in zainichi Korean political activities has been to advance their status *as foreigners* in Japan.

It is generally expected that the orientation of immigrant associations shifts from homeland to the place of residence. This shift is most directly associated with generational change: unlike first-generation immigrants, the second and third generations likely acquire strong interests in the affairs of the society they live in and that the ties to their homeland weaken over time. To be sure, the process is not always unidirectional and irreversible. The recent discussion on 'transnationalism' suggests that transborder activities may generate among immigrants renewed commitment to their country of origin. Nevertheless, the basic concept of generational shift is still useful at least as a reference point for theoretical discussion.

The prolonged homeland orientation characterizes the dominant ethnic Korean organizations in Japan: Chongryun, affiliated with North Korea, and Mindan, affiliated with South Korea.¹¹ One factor that reinforced the strength of their homeland orientation was the retention of Korean nationality, or perhaps more accurately, the rejection of Japanese nationality. Both organizations have repeatedly emphasized that Koreans in Japan are *overseas nationals* of respective states. This does not necessarily mean that Korean residence in Japan is temporary; the *zainichi* community largely abandoned the idea of collective repatriation for permanent settlement as unrealistic particularly after the actual repatriation to North Korea tapered off by the mid-1960s.¹² However, their nationality status has played an important role in sustaining material links to the homeland. Chongryun has practically been the diplomatic representative for North Korea in Japan, while Mindan used to play an intermediary role in issuing South Korean passports to *zainichi* Koreans.

The homeland orientation and nationalism accompanying it were closely related to the strong anti-assimilation thrust among *zainichi* leadership. *Zainichi* organizations in early periods tended to evaluate any sign of 'becoming closer to Japanese' as negative. Thus, in the 1970s, when an activist group began a campaign to denounce an employment discrimination case, established Korean organizations criticized it as trying to enter the mainstream of Japanese society and 'assimilate' (Yamawaki 2001: 301).

However, the gap between the reality of settlement in Japan and the homeland orientation of these ethnic associations widened. Newer, younger groups began to tackle problems that more directly concerned the life of *zainichi*, or what John Lie calls "diasporic issues and concern" (Lie 2000a).

¹¹ Chongryun (established in 1955) was initially far more influential than Mindan, but the latter gained strength as *zainichi* Koreans sought South Korean passports in greater numbers after the conclusion of the 1965 ROK-Japan treaty (Kashiwazaki 2000a).

¹² As a result of the campaign to 'return' to North Korea, over 80,000 *zainichi* Koreans and their Japanese family members left for the country beginning in December 1959. However, the number of repatriating people rapidly diminished after the first few years (Ryang 1997: 113-115).

In the early 1980s, protest against fingerprinting on the Alien Registration Card gathered momentum, and it was successful in addressing the human rights problem to the Japanese public.

Although the homeland orientation has gradually weakened even in the activities of Chongryun and Mindan, Korean nationality has remained significant and shaped the orientations of social movements among younger generation as well. Legal status and social rights are always among major items in the political demand made by ethnic Korean associations or citizens' groups acting on behalf of *zainichi* Koreans. They include elimination of the nationality-based restrictions in the access to jobs and eligibility for social programs such as the National Pension plan. More recently, the demand for local electoral rights for permanent resident foreigners gained enough support among Japanese political parties so that the bills to give them voting rights were submitted to the Diet.

In short, the primary goal of Korean social movements has been to achieve equality without having to obtain Japanese nationality. The status of *zainichi* Koreans as foreign nationals has been taken for granted. This orientation in Korean social movements is closely related to the understanding of 'assimilation' discussed in the next sub-section. Because naturalization is considered 'assimilation', structural assimilation, or equalization in legal and socioeconomic positions, has to be sought without acquiring Japanese nationality. Naturally, many *zainichi* Korean activists condemned the recent move among a section of conservative politicians to submit a bill that would allow Korean special permanent residents to obtain Japanese nationality by registration only.

The lack of legal citizenship has ironically opened up new opportunities for *zainichi* Koreans in recent years. Due to the sharp growth in the number of foreign residents, many Japanese local communities are faced with a new and urgent set of problems, such as how to accommodate immigrant children who barely speak Japanese in the public school system. Even though there are some differences between old-comer and newcomer foreigners in major concerns, *zainichi* Korean individuals and groups have been instrumental in developing programs to support foreign residents and

to secure their legal and social rights.¹³ In this way, there is a chance that zainichi Koreans could advance their own interests by assuming a leadership role in the category of people called 'foreign residents' in Japan.

The prevailing assumption of zainichi as foreigners, or non-Japanese, has at the same time limited the scope and direction of their social movements. Japanese nationality holders of Korean origin are not fully recognized as important actors in Korean social movements (Kashiwazaki 2000b). Consequently, there has scarcely been a vision within the Korean community to actively seek Japanese nationality and develop as an ethnic minority group with full citizenship rights.¹⁴ Likewise, the growing body of research in "foreign residents in Japan" continues to focus primarily on foreign nationals rather than immigrants and minority population as a whole.

In comparative perspective, the case of zainichi Koreans urges us to reconsider the role of ethnic associations and the nature of social movements. While the overall shift in focus from homeland to the country of residence is probably generalizable, there is much to be explained concerning variations. For example, the prolonged homeland orientation in the case of zainichi Korean organizations is related to a number of factors, including complex geopolitical relations with two Korean states, the hostile attitude of the Japanese government and society, and the dominance of first-generation leaders who maintained powerful positions within the zainichi community for a long time. It would thus be particularly useful to ask which types of political demand are weak or absent, and why.

¹³ Several local governments have launched the foreign citizens' council as a consultative organ. Chairperson is often elected from among zainichi Korean members, reflecting their established status as permanent residents and the command of Japanese (which is usually their first language).

¹⁴ There are a few exceptions: some leaders in Mintoren, a federation of zainichi Korean groups, have proposed to acquire Japanese nationality as-of-right. In contrast, other commentators have argued that zainichi Koreans should be able to obtain full citizenship rights, including electoral rights on the national level, *without* becoming Japanese nationals (Suh 1995).

(3) Assimilation, Differentiation, and Identity

In the political discourse of zainichi Koreans, the denunciation of Japan's assimilationist policies and struggle against assimilation has been a major theme. 'Doka' or assimilation is an emotionally and ideologically charged word in Japan. The word corresponds with 'assimilation' in English, but it has a stronger emphasis on cultural assimilation and implies not just erosion but the elimination of one's previous ethnic/national identity.

There are good reasons why 'doka' has become such a loaded word. It is closely associated with Japan's colonial policy. The policy of *kominka* that began in the late 1930s aimed at thoroughly eliminating Korean social and cultural heritage to make all Koreans loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor. Among other things, the program of *soshikaimei* in which Korean people were ordered to adopt Japanese-style names epitomizes the concept of assimilation in the Japanese context. In postwar Japan, too, most Koreans have continued to use Japanese-style names in social life instead of their ethnic Korean names. The difficulty of openly expressing one's Korean background has been understood as a continuation of Japanese assimilation policy since the colonial period.

Just as in the case of migration process, however, the dominant interpretation of 'assimilation' has had the effect of narrowing the space for analytically oriented research. Specifically, there is a lack of attention to (i) the multi-faceted nature of 'assimilation', and (ii) the mechanism of 'passing'.

Following the classic work by Milton Gordon, we can at least differentiate between cultural and structural assimilation (Gordon 1964). The debate about the assimilation of zainichi Koreans has heavily concentrated on the erosion of Korean cultural identity, on the one hand, and disadvantages they face due to their legal status, on the other. Less often addressed in theoretical terms are aspects of structural assimilation such as socioeconomic status and its relations to cultural assimilation.

One of the major indicators of cultural assimilation is the language. As Kim and King (2001:14) rightly point out in their article, linguistic shift was relatively fast in the case of zainichi Koreans. Here, we should take historical factors into account, however. Under Japanese colonial rule,

Koreans were forced to learn Japanese and punished for using Korean. Such collective experience is likely to have accelerated language transition. At the same time, this historical factor contributed to the prevailing interpretation that zainichi Koreans were deprived of their language, rather than having acquired the language of the majority population as part of the process of immigrant adaptation.

School education has been a powerful agency for both cultural and structural assimilation. Zainichi Korean children who go to Japanese school make friends with ethnic Japanese. An important exception is the ethnic Korean school. While there are only a few South Korean schools, the North Korean school network extends all over Japan. In these schools, classes are conducted in the Korean language, and the students there are generally more segregated from the larger society compared with other zainichi Korean children.

Because of data limitations, it is not easy to discuss socioeconomic status of zainichi Koreans.¹⁵ In the past, poverty and unemployment characterized the life of ordinary zainichi Koreans. Certain occupations have stereotypically been associated with zainichi Koreans such as *pachinko* parlors and *yakiniku* (*pul kogi*) restaurants. It is also known that zainichi Koreans have been overrepresented in the entertainment industry such as pop singers and actors, though most of them assume Japanese names and do not usually reveal their Korean ancestry. Various pieces of evidence suggest upward social mobility over time.¹⁶ However, zainichi Koreans continue to face difficulty in entering the mainstream corporate world and the legal barrier to holding jobs in the public sector. Middle-class zainichi Koreans therefore tend to seek professional career. In any case, the growing internal diversity and class differentiation makes it increasingly difficult to make generalizations.

¹⁵ Quantitative data sources include occupational categories compiled by the Ministry of Justice (*Zairyu Gaikokujin Tokei*), Fukuoka and Kim (1997), and a variety of surveys conducted by local governments (e.g. Kinbara et al. 1986; Kanagawa Jichitai 2001).

¹⁶ For instance, Fukuoka and Kim (1997) found no significant differences between young generation Koreans and Japanese in educational attainment and occupational status. Their sample is limited to South Korean nationality holders.

Another indicator of structural assimilation is inter-group marriages, through which members of different groups join together at the primary group level. Although Figure 3 only gives one's nationality rather than one's ethnicity, it can be inferred that most zainichi Koreans today marry ethnic Japanese¹⁷. Rarely are such couples accepted easily by the family and relatives on both sides, however.

Finally, the fact that the majority of zainichi Koreans do not hold Japanese citizenship has important implications when theoretical models of assimilation are applied. Structural assimilation is literally 'structurally' limited for foreign nationals, such as in electoral rights and the right to hold positions in governments. As mentioned above, greater structural assimilation in the legal status, though not the acquisition of Japanese citizenship, has been a primary goal for zainichi Korean associations.

Based on this brief sketch of the trend in assimilation, one could say that, at the risk of over-generalizing the complex picture, both cultural and structural assimilation has advanced over time. In fact, a number of young zainichi Koreans would say they are little different from ethnic Japanese around them. However, concerned zainichi Koreans are not at all sanguine about the diminishing gap between the majority group and the minority group, for it does not necessarily accompany the recognition of their distinct ethnic identity and respect for basic human rights.

In comparative perspective, the zainichi case draws our attention to variations in normative ideas associated with 'assimilation', namely which kind of assimilation is approved or disapproved. The contrast between the United States and Japan is a case in point. In the American discourse, structural assimilation is often the implicit goal. Cultural assimilation appears to be tolerated to the extent that it serves the goal of integration into the mainstream society. These assumptions are reflected in the ways in which research questions are typically framed. For example, questions may be asked whether non-European immigrants could assimilate into the mainstream society despite their racial minority status; whether immigrant

¹⁷ Based on the early 1990s figures, Fukuoka (2000: 36) estimates that Japanese-zainichi marriages outnumber Korean-Korean marriages by the ratio of 7:2.