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PART THREE.

PEACE AND REUNIFICATION IN KOREAN PENINSULA

Chapter 11. North Korea's Nuclear Issue Stands on the Edge Again.

1) Successful Negotiation, but Failed Result.

The north Korean nuclear issue was passed over to the UN Security Council, and tension mounted again. The U.S. was planning in every aspect several countermeasures against north Korea, and the ROK government decided to resume Team Spirit exercise and import Patriot missiles to south Korea. Meanwhile, north Korea warned it would withdraw from NPT if the US and south Korea would continue threatening against north Korea and the IAEA . shows unfairness in dealing with North Korean Nuclear issue.

North Korea accepted IAEA's inspection on February 16, and the IAEA started its inspection work on March 1. The Working-level meeting for exchange of south and north's special emissaries resumed on March 3, which had been suspended for a while after the third working-level contact in October 25, 1993. Thus, the political deadlock seemed to reach a solution. However, the IAEA finished its inspection with dissatisfaction in March 15, and US-north dialogue was canceled, which was supposed to be held in March 21. Thus, tension soared again. In addition, the working-level talk for inter-Korean exchange of special emissaries was not rewarded with good results, and the 8th working-level contact broke down to a critical situation in which north Korean delegates dared to show a will to evoke war. Thus the inter-Korea relation reached an impasse again.

North Korea's acceptance of the nuclear inspection on February 16 was fruited by the negotiation with the US. In the negotiation, the US promised to suspend the Team Spirit exercise and confirmed the schedule of the third US-north talk, while north Korea accepted the IAEA's general inspection and agreed to resume the dialogue with south Korea on the exchange of special envoys. US and north Korea issued a statement saying US would suspend the Team Spirit concurrently with IAEA's inspection, and both agreed on the third dialogue schedule. This agreement was carried out in early March.

After US-north talks, the IAEA began working-level contacts with north Korea to engage in the nuclear inspection, and the north's nuclear problem was expected to be settled in a smoothly

2) South and North Korea Working-Level Contact Ruptured.

First of all, an ill omen appeared in the working-level negotiation between both Korea. In the fourth working-level talks of March 3, which had been closed for about 4 months, no agreement was reached at all. The north proposed 4 preconditions demanding giving up the international consortium, suspension of nuclear war exercise, which it had first asked before, and withdrawal of President Kim Young-sam's tough statement against north Korea and cancellation of decision to import Patriot missiles. These preconditions were construed to set back Kim Young-sam government's hard line stance towards north Korea and make a cleavage in ROK-US cooperation system by making ROK to repeal its decision of importing Patriot missiles.

However, as the US reaffirmed that the exchange of special emissaries is the condition of the third US-DPRK dialogue, north Korea changed at the 6th working-level contact in March 12, the focus of the discussion and proposed a joint statement on the exchange of special envoys, holding back 4 preconditions. In this situation, north Korea was considered to handle both the impending US-north talks and the inter-Korea working-level contact simultaneously. As the negotiation for special emissaries exchange came to a deadlock and the US-north dialogue was not confirmed, the IAEA's inspection was not smoothly performed, and north Korea took back a hard line attitude.

The possible link between special emissaries and the third US-DPRK dialogue was ominous the working-level contact between the two. The ROK government proposed the exchange of special emissaries as a precondition when the time table of the third US-DPRK negotiation was issued. For this, the US first assumed an ambiguous attitude, but eventually it agreed to declare the exchange of special emissaries as the first condition, seeing no fruits in the ROK-DPRK talks. North Korea fiercely opposed that there was not any precondition of the exchange of special emissaries in the US-north negotiation in February. As known, the basic scheme of US-North Korea talks is the idea of "simultaneous handling", which deals concurrently with suspension of Team Spirit, IAEA's inspection, resumption of south and north dialogue, and the third US-North talks. After all, the U.S. seemed to take on a stiff stance after March watching south Korea's firm attitude and under the blow of hard-line swings within the country. This changed posture was also influenced by the unsatisfactory result of the IAEA's inspection.

The south Korean government is also to some extent responsible for the breakdown of south and north dialogue. With inconsistent government-directed unification policy, the hard-line wing in the government was gaining power after the reshuffle happened in the end of 1993. It seemed unnecessary for hard-liners who support the deployment of Patriot missiles to demand the inter-Korean talk. It was too strongly blurred through the media that north Korean delegates' remarked "we are willing to have a war" and "Seoul will become a sea of fire" at the 8th dialogue, and government provided the video tape to the press in a bid to imply what hard standers in the government really want. Too hastily the south Korean government decided to recommence the Team Spirit exercise and deploy the Patriot missile system.

3) North Korea's Nuclear Issue at the UN Security Council

What became an issue in the IAEA's inspection was the extraction of test fuel from a radioactive chemical laboratory. This fuel is usually used to test whether plutonium was extracted, and the IAEA failed to acquire this fuel before passing over north's nuclear problem to the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, north Korea insisted that other ways can be applied to extract plutonium and rejected the IAEA saying it was unfair to deal with its nuclear problem.

These points have been faced with a serious controversy. When the north and US originally agreed, it was for limited inspection excluding sample survey and inspection of two unidentified nuclear facilities. However the ambiguous agreement on the scale and methods of inspection invoked a severe wrangle. Convincingly, the north insisted that the IAEA trumped up the charge of its failure to north Korea though the north carried out the agreed terms. The Democratic Party also concurred.

The future focus of north's nuclear issue is expected to be aimed at an additional inspection. The UN Security Council will consider dialogue and negotiation prior to sanctions because the PRC has still strongly supported north Korea and the US will be loaded with much burden if it scales up the north's nuclear issue into political and military spheres.

Chapter 12. Progress on Nuclear Inspection of North Korea and Prospect for 3-Stage Talk of North-U.S.

1) Restart of Nuclear Inspection and Points of Dispute

The tension caused by the insufficient conclusion of the previous nuclear inspection in March has developed in May into another trial of the IAEA to inspect north Korean nuclear facilities and a speculation of 3-stage talk between the north and the U.S.

On April 15, the south Korean government proclaimed a policy change that it actually dropped the condition of the exchange of special envoys between the north and south governments. During that period around April 15, which was his birthday, Kim il-sung of the north urged repeatedly, in an appeasing manner through the U.S. media, that the U.S. should come to negotiation and the signing of the amity relations with the north. Later on 20th, the north demanded that the IAEA attend the exchange of the fuel rods for the 5-megawatt atomic reactor in Young-byun. The U.S. showed a positive attitude towards this proposal by persuading the IAEA to attend, the result of which was the IAEA's additional inspection and attendance for the exchange of fuel bars in May.

North Korea, who once maintained its refusal policy against any additional inspections since March, began to show some signs of change after the proposal for IAEA's attendance, as it further announced its position to accept an additional inspection on the 5-megawatt reactor and the nuclear-chemical experiment room through negotiations with the IAEA. However, there still remained points of dispute - a random selection and storage of the used fuel bars of the reactor and an accurate measurement and analysis of them by the IAEA.

The IAEA maintained that an inspection with the two specific procedures were the core of the judgement as to whether or not the north was using the nuclear substance for other purposes and that it would refuse to send its inspectors to the north if these conditions were not met. North Korea said however, it could not accept such an inspection since the regular rules of the NPT were not

applicable to the north, now in the status of suspended secession from the NPT. While north Korea was not in the position to give up the utility of the nuclear card before achieving the 3-stage talk with the U.S., the Clinton administration also set a plan to solve this issue through 3-stage talk negotiation with the north.

Subsequently, the U.S. sought consensus from south Korea and the IAEA on dispatching inspection team under the conditions set by the north. But, the request of the U.S. to north Korea to suspend the time of exchange of the fuel bars until the inspection was refused by the north with the reasons of "safety and technical urgency". When the north proceeded to change the bars one week before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors, the U.S. had to withdraw the previous demands and let the inspectors go to Pyung-yang as scheduled. In sum, all of north Korea's positions were fulfilled in the end.

2) Concession of the Exchange of Envoys and Policy Conflict in the South Korean Government

When Lee Young-duck, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification Board, said "there is no need to think whether now the north-south talk is a prerequisite to the north-U.S. talk or not", he was actually expressing not only the decision to give up the prerequisite but also the confusion of unification (north Korea) policy in the government. Though this step opened a way towards progress of the IAEA inspection and the north-U.S. talk, it also raised doubts as to what capacity the south government has in making policies.

Since last September when the south accepted the proposal of the north, the exchange of envoys between the two governments has become the core of the north policy of south Korea. Through exchange of special envoys would south Korea make a breakthrough to solving the north Korean nuclear issue, and through agreement on the north-south mutual nuclear inspection would it advance to the implementing stage of the previously signed north-south basic agreement, according to the original strategy of the south. It is not correct that the reason for the concession of the envoy prerequisite was 'the lack of will on the part of north Korean government' as the south says. An objective analyst will view that the south government was pushed back in the process of adjusting its policy with the U.S. government. This conclusion becomes clearer if one reads the purpose of Caluchi's visit to south Korea on April 16 and the process of change in the U.S. policies towards north Korea.

Besides, Concerns and confusion were further raised in two incidents concerning the north policy of the south Korean government. One was the problem of dealing with north Korean log(wood-cutter) workers who had escaped to Russia, and the other was the suggestion by Kim Dae-jung to invite Kim Il-sung to the U.S.A.

In the beginning, the issue of runaway north Korean log workers has been raised by conservative press and right-wing politicians, with an aim of indirectly criticizing Kim's reform policy. The pressure on north policy from the forces using this issue so yielded its effect on removing reformist ministers like Han Wan-sang(then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification Board) and Lee In-je(then Minister of Labour) last year. But in April, 1994 the government took the issue in order to replace the envoy prerequisite.

Until now, it was difficult to assess the actual situation of log workers in eastern Russia since the related facts were not easily gathered in the south while the south Korean government did not expose any information on them. Kim Young-sam first took the position of not accepting the north Korean workers' defection to the south. His recent U-turn in this policy, to accept them was not unrelated to the conservative swing in his whole policy after the deadlock of the north-south relations this year. In early May this year, the Agency for National Security Planning(ANSP, the former KCIA) brought 5 runaway n.korean log workers from Russia to Seoul.

Various signs of the present situation indicate that the south government will pursue and expand this policy line for some time. But, there are concerns that the so-called 'human rights issues of north Korea' must be dealt with great care, and measures like bringing defectors to the south must not be used for the 'security of the regime' as in the past. There are factors in this policy shift that do not fit the purpose of enhancing the north-south relations, but rather aim to denunciate them. Doubts were also raised whether or not this shift was a sign of reviving the past anti-north, anti-communist fervor.

The lack of policy coherence was also revealed when the south government stumbled upon Kim Dae-jung's suggestion of inviting Kim Il-sung to the U.S. On April 15 in an interview with an American broadcast, Kim Il-sung stated frankly his wish to visit the U.S. to urge the peaceful improvement of the north-U.S. relations. On May 12 in a response to this, Kim Dae-jung proposed to the U.S. government to invite the north Korean leader, in his speech at the

National Press Center in Washington, D.C. This proposal ignited a big reaction. On May 16, Gilbert Klein, president of NPC, officially expressed his willingness to invite Kim Il-sung to the U.S.

Disappointingly, the first reaction of the south Korean government was silence and then a sudden protest. The government and media later turned their point of attack to Kim Dae-jung. Even though their over-sensitive reaction on this matter has something to do with Korean politics concerning Kim Dae-jung, its root can be traced to the negative attitude of the south government towards unification-oriented policy and the resulting defensive psychology for the government's incapability. One should hope and urge the south government to keep its words that it should aid in the progress of the north-U.S. relations through its north policy.

3) 3-Stage Talk Lost in Sight and a Critical Situation Imminent

The issue of additional nuclear inspections, once in an easy step towards agreement, had suddenly arrived to a state of critical tension by the end of May 1994. as the removal of fuel rods by north Korea became a focal point of dispute.

Since last year when north Korea resigned from the NPT, it pursued policies on the issue of nuclear inspection in relation to the goal of improving north-US relation. When it proposed on April 28 for the transformation of the Cease-Fire Truce into a Peace Agreement and provision of peace thereafter, it was speaking to the U.S. with the high-level 3-stage talk specifically in mind. Its background was that north Korea can commit itself to economic problems when peace in the peninsular is structured to exist. In other words, it was pursuing its basic strategy of making cooperative economic relations with U.S. and Japan to help its economy grow.

These intentions of north Korea, however, were shattered by the hard-line policies of the IAEA and the U.S. on the issue of fuel rods removal. On June 2, the IAEA announced its final judgment on accounting of weapons-grade of fuel rods in a letter sent to the Security Council of the U.N. by its director general Hans Blix, saying "the opportunity to prove how much nuclear stuff the DPRK has produced in the past had been all lost". On the same day, the U.S. government also declared in a statement that "the 3-stage talk with the DPRK

is canceled and now all relevant issues are to be submitted to the U.N. Security Council".

At this, the deputy chief of the DPRK's diplomatic department proclaimed in a statement that the beginning of sanctions on north Korea would mean announcement of a war, and maintained that any kind of pressure or sanctions would result in north Korea's full secession from the NPT. He emphasized, in addition, a political solution to the nuclear issue and urged the U.S. government for dialogue.

It is not easy to draw an easy judgement from the two completely different accounts of north Korea and the IAEA on this issue. Nevertheless, solution through dialogue still remains a necessary and feasible approach.

Above all, there is some exaggeration in the IAEA's hasty conclusion that further verification of the DPRK's nuclear stuff was impossible. Though there were questions on the way the fuel rods are stored, it is not altogether impossible to analyze the nuclear materials since the IAEA's monitor cameras have been recording the procedure uninterrupted. In an interview with a weekly military news source, the Defense News, John Wolfsteal, a senior researcher in a non-governmental institute in Washington, called the Society for Disarmament, said "it is possible to do accounting of weapons-grade fuel of the past by only knowing the way the DPRK has removed fuel rods". He claimed that since the removal had been proceeded under the monitoring of the IAEA-installed cameras and attendance of the IAEA's inspectors, and since the removed fuel rods were stored in the sequential order of removal, there were no problems in identifying later the former locations of the removed rods.

From another view-point, the DPRK seems to have continuously yielded to the demands of the U.S. and the IAEA if one looks closely at the progress of the dispute. While the talk of inspection in March was under the understanding of a limited inspection, the U.S. and the IAEA later demanded full inspection. In April, north Korea actually accepted an additional inspection as demanded by them. The present point of dispute, the verification of fuel rods, was the last step of the full inspection, which is also the last point the DPRK was placed in negotiating with the U.S. Therefore, on the part of north Korea, it had no room to step backward.

In sum, the fundamental concern in this dispute was the real intention that the hard-liners in the U.S. government have. This situation was being led by these hard-liners, who would push north Korea to the end. South Korean government, accepting their position without reservation and reviving the anachronistic sentiment of anti-communism and hatred towards north Korea, is doing nothing other than paving a way towards war. The best pragmatic solution is possible if south Korea can, instead, help strengthen soft-liners and support their positions in the U.S. government in order to enlarge the possibility of a package solution for all north-U.S. issues.

Chapter 13. Death of KIM IL-SUNG of North Korea and New Changes in North-South Relations.

1) North Korea after the Death of the Chairman Kim Il-sung

The death of Kim Il-sung on 8 July brought several changes to the reunification of Korea. The US-North talk on the progress then was postponed to August, and the north-south summit scheduled for the end of July was postponed indefinitely.

The sudden death of Chairman Kim, who ruled north Korea since 1945, during the liberation year of Korea from Japan's rule, attracted deep interest in the peninsula as well as from the international community. The first question was how north Korea will change in the coming 'post-Kim'days. Though there are diverse rumors on 'post-Kim' north Korea, it seems that north Korea will maintain its traditional foreign policy, focussing on improving the US-north relations, as well. Politically, it will continue to hold on to the principle of the singular instruction of the leader. This expectation comes from the fact that the succession process has been conducted since 20 years ago by emphasizing the importance of succession to Kim Jong-il in an unprecedented manner in history and that the successor Kim Jong-il has been actually summarizing all internal and foreign policies.

The economic target policies of north-Korea are to achieve the three major tasks of improving agriculture light industry and foreign trade, at it announced as the beginning of this year. This was a new policy line after the previous failure of 'the third 7-year plan', to overcome the economic difficulty it faces today, and will be maintained unaltered during the buffer period it had set until 1996. In particular, this focus will be incorporated into its negotiation with the U.S.A in improving economic cooperation between the two countries, because north Korea needs the capital and technology of the advanced capitalist nations in order to improve its economy. In short, the future of north Korea can be said to depend on its relation to the U.S., and this compels north Korea to focus on the solution of the nuclear issue as the most important progress.

2) Three-Level US-North Talk and Prospect of Solving the Nuclear Issue

The three-level talk between the U.S. and north Korea resumed on 5 August after a postponement caused by the sudden death of Kim Il-sung. In contradiction to south Korea where new 'security state' emerged since Kim's death, Clinton's administration took active steps such as expressing his sorrow for the death, opening the road to the three-level talk.

The top agenda of the talk were the clear identification of the past nuclear activities and freezing nuclear development of north Korea at present and in the future. The U.S. demanded of north Korea the freeze, the return to the NPT, and the duty to cooperation nuclear inspection of the IAEA. North Korea demanded in return a US support to north Korea to have light-water reactors and political measures to end hostilities of the two countries. The joint statement of agreement of the U.S. and north Korea on 13 August shows that the issues of the touchy agenda had been smoothly agreed.

By the agreement, the U.S. will supply light-water nuclear reactors in return for north Korea's termination of building carbon-reduction type reactors. Moreover, the two countries agreed to set up a liaison office and lower trade barriers in order to normalize their economic and political relations. On the nuclear issue, they reconfirmed the previous agreement that north Korea follow the north-south joint communique on non-proliferation of the Korean peninsula and the U.S. not exert a nuclear threat to north Korea. The last point of agreement was that north Korea remain in the NPT system and follow its duty according the nuclear safety agreements of the NPT. The world equivocally welcomed this settlement and the south Korean government, too, viewed it as an important step forward in solving the north Korean nuclear issue.

It may be a little dangerous to jump to conclusions of the future since the US-north relations are still in the process of developing. It seems it will improve steadily, however, through some twists and turns as it has done so far. This is because both countries have something to gain in normalizing their relations. North Korea has a basic strategy of normalizing its relations with advanced nations including Japan on the basis the normalized relation with the U.S., since it will help a peace structure settle in the peninsula, reduce its defense budget, and bring in foreign capital and technology.

The U.S. also aims for gains in the same direction. If it can not induce a sudden collapse of north Korea, it has only other options of realizing security in North-East Asia by multilateral politics of the post-Cold-War period. The U.S. can not act as 'the world police' anymore and Japan, China and Russia are no longer 'rubber stamps' for the vs. Moreover, the U.S. is in need of quickly restoring the NPT system vis-a-vis the immediate conclusion of its effect coming March. The U.S. could agree with north Korea since the agreement helped its own national interest, too, in the long run.

Even though the recent development of the US-north relations will surely serve for a peaceful reunification, the most fundamental relation to be improved is that between north and south Korea and also among the people of the two divided regions. Reunification is essentially a matter of the 70 million Korean people. Therefore, the north-south relation is the key factor in understanding changes in the peninsula. Without reformation of this relation, there is a destined limit in development of the US-north relation as well as a danger of 'divide and rule' motive. Governments of north and south Korea should acknowledge this reality. The position and policy line of south Korean government, for example, should be oriented towards supporting the north's efforts to improve its relations with Japan and the U.S.. The North-South summit will be the unique and key momentum in the reunification and nuclear safety issues.

3) Kim Young-sam's Speech on 15 August and Prospect of the North-South Relations

Since the death of Kim Il-sung, the north-south relations froze as the so-called 'security state' prevailed in the south at the question of sending diplomatic condolence to the north. In addition, the President Kim's speech on August 15, the memorial day of liberation from Japan, showed that the Kim's government is taking a definitely conservative turn in its reunification policy.

In the speech, Kim declared 'liberal democracy' as the ideology and system of the future unified Korea. He stated "we hope for a steady and step-by step reunification, but reunification may also come suddenly at a very unexpected moment", and, "we should check all possibilities and be prepared

fully for any situation". These words are generally interpreted as an indication of the possibility of German type unification - absorption - and as meaning Kim's abandonment of his first policy line - the Three-Step and Three-Precept Reunification Plan. The speech is also seen as a complete reunification of the previous north-south basic accord. The north policy of Kim Young-san's government is turning quickly to the right.

Since the July 4 the Communique in 1972, south Korea has never mentioned officially the social system of the unified Korea, though it undoubtedly preferred capitalism. It was too sensitive a problem. Kim's government, benefiting from its civilian image and, brazenly broke this interdiction, but towards a more conservative direction.

North Korea firecly criticized the August-15 speech, as expected. Enjoying political ease from the unyielding McCarthy-styls sensation ignited by the issue of sending diplomatic condolence to the north, Kim's government turned its back to the north's attitude. The north-south situation seemed to need another mediation of the U.S. seen by Mr. Carter's visit to the north. In this regard, Kim Daejung's proposal of 'a north-south summit in Washington by the President Clinton's invitation was significantly suggestive.

North Korea will some day propose the dates for a north-south summit after throwing some measures to improve its relation with Japan and the U.S. However, there is a limit in normalizing the US-north relations without normalizing the north-south relations and in Kim Young-sam's effort to delay north-south talk by allotting preconditions. South Korea has already intervned in the US-north relation through the issue of supporting the north with a light-water reactor. Kim Young-sam is also facing the reality that the 'security state' politics did not help his popularity much as proven in the August-2 elections. The demands for north-south economic cooperation that the business groups raise also forms furture pressure for Kim to change its present position.

A successful summit between north and south Korea will be a key factor in the present situation. The tradition confrontation and conflict of the two Koreas during the past half century can only be altered by a determined agreement between the leading rulers of the two Koreas. Since the two Koreas have reached to an agreement of having a summit, they should work better to achieve it in near future in order to creat a historical turning point towards reconciliation and peace.

4) The Fifth Pan-Korean Meeting and Reunification Movement

The fifth Pan-Korean meeting was held on 14 and 15 of August on the campus of the Seoul National University, despite the most unfavorable conditions of 'the security state'. The meeting was outlawed, and key organizers were either arrested or sought after for arrest. The police dispatched hundreds of riot police to stop and disperse the meeting, but was unable to do so.

This year's Pan-Korean meeting convened on the themes of the need to sign a peace accord and the need of a pan-national unity. In a meeting of Pan-Korean representatives on August 15, the 100 or so participants accepted a resolution demanding an early summit, the abolishment of the national security law, the release of prisoners of conscience, the package agreement between the U.S. and north Korea, and the signing of a peace accord.

The Civilians' role in the process of reunification was quite significant. Unification brought only by governmental negotiations were proven to accompany great side-effects in the cases of Germany and Yemen. Therefore, the governments in Korea should support to activate non-governmental reunification movements, and the civil forces should work to expand its basis of reunification movement through various programs of participation.

Chapter 14. Agreement on Nuclear Issues between North Korea and the United States, and the Prospect of South and North Dialogue.

1) Agreement on Nuclear Issues Between North Korea and the United States

Nuclear negotiation between north Korea and the U.S. was concluded on October 16 after the 18 months of long dispute. north and the U.S. are going together towards a new cooperation, liquidating the past distrust and confrontation. The improvement of north and the U.S. relation broke down an axis of the Cold War structure in the Korean peninsula.

The mutual agreement outlines that: north accept IAEA's special inspection, the north should stop all the nuclear operations, north transfer waste fuel rods to the third country, North fully return to NPT; the U.S. provide north with crude petroleum as a substitute until it provides light water reactor; the north carry out the declaration of denuclearization in the Korean peninsula and resume south-north talk; the U.S. provides north with 2,000 Mega Watt grade light water reactor; and the both install liaison offices. what draw attentions are; first, that light water reactor which was in a serious dispute, special inspection, and south-north talk. On the light water reactor, North finally accepted Korean-style reactor after much opposition. Both north and the U.S. did not specify the Korean-style in the agreement paper, however expressed a word which implies Uljin(name of a south Korean locality) No. 3 and 4 plants to actually accept the Korean-style. This means the north granted south Korea's significant role in construction of light water reactor. On the special inspection issue, north agreed to perform the duty of IAEA's safety recommendation which the latter thinks it needed including special inspection before the north is provided with the core part of light water reactor. As of south and north dialogue which was in a dispute to the end in the second session of the third north and the U.S. talk, the north agree to declare a promise to resume the south-north talk and carry out the Declaration of denuclearization in the Korean peninsula.

It became a matter of time to install liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington and establish a diplomatic relation which was agreed in the final talk. The liaison offices are expected to deal with general consul matters and government businesses, economic cooperation and so on. They have already

agreed to install liaison offices, in obedience to "the Wien accord on diplomatic relation" in a specialists meeting which was held in September 10. These offices are expected to play a role of comprehensive diplomatic establishments for broad contacts in politics, economical, and cultural areas. Besides, this is the first step for an official diplomatic relation.

The improvement of north-U.S. relation is expected to have an influence on the tensions surrounding the Korean peninsula. The north side proved the ceasefire agreement a dead letter and neglected ceasefire organization while it proposed a conversation for "a new system to secure peace" including conclusion a peace treaty with the U.S. in April 28. It also installed a detachment of DPRK forces in Panmunjom in May, and pulled Chinese representatives out of the military armistice committee in September. The south and the U.S. showed a negative stance on North's movement and asked north Korea to observe the existing ceasefire agreement and perform faithfully the original basic agreements between south and north to secure peace. The south Korean government, in particular, considers merely both Koreas as the countries directly concerned with the peace accord. In a situation that the north does not sincerely observe the truce accord, the armistice system is somewhat expected to change in a way. With the agreement between the north and the U.S., there is a very strong possibility that the military structure surrounding the Korean peninsula will be reorganized in an argument of multilateral security system in the Northeast Asia.

The improvement of north-U.S. relationship will in the end create a stir in Northeast Asia which remains in somewhat the old Cold War conflict. U.S., Russia, China, and Japan will approve each other with this as a momentum.

The south-north relation will be changed from the political and military confrontation structure caused by ideological difference to a competition based on economic interests with cross approval between south and north. If the south and north agree to approve each other, the neighboring countries seek to expand their influence and profits, making the best use of the south-north relationship. We have to actively respond to this movement on a nationalistic foundation facing up the vortex in Northeast Asia's situation.

2) Prospect of South and North Relation

As the north and the U.S. agreed, there is a great expectation that the south and north can lead the era of reconciliation and cooperation. The government

declared that it would accept the consequence of the north-U.S. agreement and resume the south and north dialogue and economic cooperation. Government announced that it would allow private enterprises to install a liaison office in north Korea from November which is earlier than expected, since it withdrew the policy of connecting nuclear issues with economic cooperation. south Korea is supposed to take a great share(50 to 70%) of the expense for light water reactor supply, joining the U.S.-lead international consortium. The government is mapping out a scheme to improve the south and north relationship businessmen's visit to north Korea, then a resumption third by of economic cooperation, contacts of separated families, and finally through reopening a joint committee for nuclear control which mainly focuses on non-political fields.

the government decided also in the political area to promote a prime minister level talk. However, the south and north relation cooled again as a funeral ceremony and "Joosa(Jooche ideology) family" problems were raised in south Korea after the death of Kim Il-sung. We can not be optimistic about the reopening of south-north dialogue though north and the U.S. stated plainly in an agreement the resumption of south and north talk. It is absolutely prohibited to criticize Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in the north Korean political environment. Thus, the south Korean government has to show confidence to north Korea for the south and north dialogue. It is expected that north Korea formalize Kim Jong-il succession system at the 100th day memorial ceremony for the late Kim Il-sung as a turning point. Kim Jong-il is expected to be placed as the central figure through the reshuffle of power structure within a matter of time. There was no change seen in the political hierarchy at the mourning ceremony. Kim Jong-il is soon to be named as both the general secretary and president of North Korea in the plenum of party's central committee and the supreme people's committee.

The U.S. gave a promise to north Korea to improve the relationship and lift economic sanctions against north through north-U.S. agreement. The north's diplomatic achievement will provide the country which suffers from isolation and energy problems with the justification for Kim Jong-il system. The north has an experience of a failure in economic policy as Kim Jong-il took the lead of light industry revolution and joint ventures law since 1984. The north has surely failed to improve the relation with the U.S. at the moment. Thus, the betterment of north-U.S. relationship is the key point of economic reconstruction and advancement into the international society. north Korea, which has advocated the 3 big policies(trade-centered, lightindustry-centered, agriculture-centered) and a limited opening policy, will gain the economic fruit as U.S. partly abolished investment restriction. North Korea currently established free trade zones in Najin,

Sonbong, and Tooman river development zone as a part of stronghold development strategy to attract Western capital. Thus economic collaboration between south and north is also expected to grow.

The north and the U.S. agreement on nuclear issues provided a significant and potential momentum for the future of our nation. We hope Both Koreas take the most advantage of this opportunity, and use it in a positive and independent way to settle a peaceful situation in the Korean peninsula and open the era of peace and cooperation.

Chapter 15. Breakthrough in the North Korea-U.S. Relationship and South Korea's Leftout

1) Fruitless Measure on the North and South Economic Cooperation

It does not seem that a thaw will come soon in the frozen relationship of north and south Korea since the summer of 1994. The Seoul government's announcement on the North and South Economic Cooperation on November 9 was immediately rejected by the Pyongyang government the next day. North Korea has been raising its voice in criticising the south Korean government, and the south, too, seems not to have any alternative in improving the existing relationship.

The main contents of the North and South Economic Cooperation are as following:

Main contents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *allowance of businessmen's visit to North Korea for the purpose of venture business and the market examination *the government will permit the visit considering the scale of the visit *permission to invite North Korean businessmen for investment presentation and field trip
Processing of brought-in materials and trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *principles should be set up in case of case of long stay for technical guide and quality examination *venture business - daily necessities and manufacturing industry *permission to setup liaison office in private level for business contact, market analysis and research
Technicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *for the management of facilities, technical guide and quality examination *the government will decide considering the content of the business and the scale
facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *large scale facilities need the permit from the Minister of Reunification Board *small facilities need the permit from president of a foreign exchange bank
venture business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *small manufacturing - textiles, toys, socks, bags, shoes, leather, electronic parts, etc *daily necessities - ramyun, noodles, soy bean paste, hot pepper paste, flavorings, sugar, cooking oil, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, etc *business facilitating unification-employment of the North Korean workers in a third country
institutional backup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *preparation and ratification of the regulations needed for North and South joint venture *principles needed to guarantee safe investment and to avoid dual taxation
financial support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *limiting support before the start of joint

However, the above content does not show any difference or include anything new from "5-Year Plan for New Economy" announced by the Kim government before. It is significant oventurely in the sense that the government decided to allow contacts with the north which it had strongly prohibited before. However, because the decision was announced without any prior consultation with north Korea, it provoked North's backlash and resulted in antagonizing the north. The only positive outcome since the announcement was the visit of SSang-yong Group's investment study team to the Najin-Sunbong Area in north Korea in December. The north side seems to pursue economic cooperation through individual enterprises not through governmental channel.

Analysts see that the government's decision on economic cooperation with the north came out in hurry after the Geneva Agreement on nuclear issues between north Korea and the US. In contrast to the gradual and pragmatic improvement in the north and US relationship, there has been almost no change in the relation between the two Koreas, for which the south seems to hold moct responsibility. Since the death of north Korean President Kim Il-sung in July 1994, the Seoul government has been vigorous in anti-North propaganda and has not changed its extremely conservative policy toward the Pyongyang government. Without drastic shift in the policy of the south Korean government, it will be very difficult to expect any meaningful improvement in the relationship between the two Koreas.

2) Improvement of the North and US Relationship and the Helicopter Incident

In contrast to the frozen relationship between the north and south, north Korea and the US are going under negotiations based on the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. Negotiations on used fuel rods held in Pyongyang in November 12 to 19, and conference on light water reactor held in Beijing on the 30th of the same month. In addition, negotiations in the liaison office held in Washington on December 6 to 10, and other talks also scheduled in 1995, signify the continuation of dialogue between north Korea and the US.

On the other hand, on December 17, a US helicopter was downed after inadvertently flying over north Korean territory. The incident was settled as

the north sent back the dead pilot on the 22nd and the other survivor on the 30th. However, the incident marked another turning point in the north-US relationship because the existing armistice was ignored and the incident was settled by a direct political dialogue between the two parties. The south Korean government was totally left out from the negotiations and even raised complaint to Washington about the process.

During the negotiations, north Korea's argument that the Military Armistice Commission should be abolished and the armistice should be replaced by peace a agreement came out from the closet. At first, south Korea and the US wanted to solve the helicopter issue through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, not as a diplomatic matter but as a military issue. But, this intention met strong opposition from the North. In the negotiation on sending back the dead body, the US sent a senior member to the Military Armistice Commission and the North regarded the contact as a high level military talk. Furthermore, Washington sent Thomas Hubbard, assistant secretary of State Department, to Pyongyang in December 28 to 30 to negotiate the release of chief warrant officer Bobby Hall. The visit was interpreted as a mark of improvement in the political relation of Pyongyang and Washington.

After the direct contact, north Korea and the US announced the following: first, the US apologies for invading North Korea's territorial sky and promises such an incident not to happen again; second, the two parties will continue military contacts at Panmunjom; and third, they will discuss the issue of prisoners of the Korean War and long-term non-converted prisoners imprisoned in south Korea. The announcement immediately provoked unpleasant response from the Seoul government.

Most of all, the north and US high-level military contact will make the Military Armistice Commission meaningless and will leave out south Korea from the dialogue. Since April of 1994, the Pyongyang government has continuously demanded the Armistice to be replaced by a peace agreement, and the US to conclude a peace agreement with north Korea at the same time. As liaison office is scheduled to set up in April 1995, the conclusion of peace agreement between north Korea and the US has now emerged as a matter of fact. However, south Korea, fearing to be left out both politically and militarily, has expressed strong opposition to this issue. In addition, the Pyongyang government has demanded the repatriation of the prisoners of the

Korean War and also long-term non-converted prisoners imprisoned by the south Korean government through various channels, taking as an example the case of Lee In-mo's repatriation. This issue also embarrassed Seoul as it was raised in the north Korea US negotiations without any prior consultation with the south.

Currently, the only card left to the Seoul government in order to improve its relation with the north is to pay the cost of light water reactor and provide the south Korean model of the reactor. Unfortunately, however, south Korea has little leverage in the Korean Energy Development Organization(KEDO). The KEDO was scheduled for establishment in February 1995, and south Korea is expected to take a vice secretary-general and to provide \$ 4 billion, 50% of the total cost for constructing the light water reactors. But, the US will play the major role in the KEDO and will be the actual supplier of the reactor. Moreover, north Korea claims that it will lead the construction of the reactors and the KEDO will only provide the financial cost. If this claim is accepted, the leverage of Seoul will be much less significant.

The influence of the south Korean government over the politics surrounding the Korean Peninsula has lessened over the past few years. In the early pace of the post Cold War era in the beginning of the 1990s, the Nordpolitik of the Roh Tae-woo government was effective in isolating north Korea. However, since the agreement between Pyongyang and Washington, the south seems to be isolated from the North East Asian politics, and the coming negotiations on diplomatic normalization between north Korea and Japan will precipitate this reality. It is true that south Korea has played much more important role in the regional politics, but in order to maintain the position in reunification process as well, it will be inevitable for the Seoul government to bring changes in its North Korean policies. President Kim should realize that detente in the north Korean-US and north Korean-Japan relationship is a positive signal toward peaceful resolution of the Korean issue, and should approach the coming peace agreement between the north and the US and normalization talks between the north and Japan, not from narrow-sight of south Korean interest, but from broader sight of national interest.

PART FOUR.

ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT

Chapter 16. CBS Case and Ecumenics.

The boarding committee of CBS had special meeting in February 1 before accepting President Lee Jae-eun's resignation and nominating Rev. Kwon Ho Kyong(the then general-secretary of the Church Council) to bring about an upturn in Ecumenics and Church Council. The Jesuit and Presbyterian Association immediately opposed the decision, and the Ecumenical groups viewed the situation with apprehension.

The 43rd general meeting of the Church Council in February 21 was crippled by the absence of representatives from the Jesuit and Presbyterian Association. The process of nominating the new general secretary was passed over to the executive committee, and most of the agenda was reserved. The joint conference between the president of the committee and representatives of the Jesuit and Presbyterian Association was held in February 18 before the general council decided to hold back keeping a relation with the Church Council and oppose any collaboration with it against undemocratic features which appeared in the process of selecting CBS president. The Jesuit and Presbyterian Association announced a statement saying Korean churches do not exist for the Church Council and the Council itself is not a ladder for the upward social nobility of an individual, and it insisted that those who gave bad influences to the joint movement of churches by hovering in several groups at his own desire should resign on charge of shame on their attitude.

This crisis was chiefly caused by the eruption of chronic problems being structurally reprocessed in the Ecumenical circles, though it was triggered by the government's intervention in the management realm of CBS. Thus, Ecumenics should consider this case as a turning point for the future development.

After the CBS crisis broke out, Ecumenical circles announced a statement expressing worry over the situation. The National Pastors Council for Justice and Peace(Chairman, Paek Nam-un) and the Korean YMCA council(Chairman, Kwak Kyongjon) worried in a statement of the government's unlawful intervention in the case. Both organizations asserted that the government infringed upon the freedom of mission of CBS if it

called for the resignation of CBS president on the pretext of approving issuance of bonds, and stressed that the autonomy of CBS should be absolutely secured.

Much things were discussed for the renewal and development of Ecumenics in "the forum for the renovation of Ecumenics in Korean churches." In this forum sponsored by the Practical Council of Jesuit and Presbyterian for Sound Mission, Doctor Kim Yong-bok(the Dean of Jonjoo Hanil divinity school), Oh Jae-sik, president of the Social Education Institute, Rev. Kim Yo'ng-woon(President of the bible research institute for a community, Christian Academy), Doctor Lee Sam-yol(Professor of Sung-sil University), Rev. Park Sang-jung(president of CISJD) discussed about the reformation tasks of Korean Ecumenics.

In this forum, it was proved that the Ecumenical movement of Korean churches was crippled by "Order Politics" based on the ecclesiastical authority, and another crisis like this case would not be prevented without a remedy of this practice. And they also suggested that they should study a way of democratic decision-making process within the members of the Church Council, in cooperation with non-members known as Lay Believers Association of Ecumenics before evaluating the existing structure of Church Association is not fit for Ecumenics.

This was not an accidental crisis - rather it was brought from chronic problems within Ecumenics. Thus, to settle this problem, we should find a fundamental solution by attempting far-sighted, not considering a short-term efficiency or a temporary remedy.

Chapter 17. Continuing Tensions within the Church

1) NCKK Appoints Rev. Kim Dong-wan as its General Secretary

Rev. Kim Dong-wan of Hyungje church of the Methodist Church was appointed to the post of the 6th General Secretary of NCKK on April 20 by the consensus of 5 congregations represented in the NCKK executive committee, while the Unified Church of Jesuits and Presbyterians(UCJP) was absent. The official response of the UCJP came on April 22, when the meeting of officers convened, who in turn decided 'there is no meaning in selecting a representative for dialogue since the new general secretary was unilaterally appointed'. On this, Rev. Kim expressed his feeling by saying, "it is truly a heart-breaking situation that I was appointed while the largest member of NCKK, the UCJP could not be present", and vowed to, "especially try to push a unity movement based on genuine ecumenism, and I as a servant and learning from this incident."

Graduating from Inha University and later the Methodist Theology College, Rev. Kim worked in the fields of rural and urban industrial missions during the 70s and the 80s. Then, he successively held the posts of the general secretary of NCKK Human Rights Committee, the chair of the Urban, Rural, Fishery Missions Committee of NCKK, the chair of the National Association of Ministers to Practice Justice and Peace, etc. Holding the present post by a Methodist minister is the first in history since the liberation in 1945.

UCJP, on the other hand, convened on May 6 with all representatives it had sent to NCKK to discuss about Church unification works in the assembly room of the Centennial Building. The participants stated that they identified what UCJP had consistently urged so far - that the ecumenical movement of the Korean Churches should be reformed - and "if we come to realize that there is no more possibility to reflect our opinions, we propose that UCJP's all officer's meeting then study and pursue ways to achieve unity and ecumenism within the Korean Churches in a larger context."

2) '94 Asia Mission Congress

The Council of Churches of Asia(CCA) held '94 Asia Mission Congress from April 26 to May 1 at Hangang Hotel in Seoul, in order to share different religious, social and economic situations of each country and to prepare joint plans for Asian Christians to deal with the raised problems. This meeting was gathered under the theme of "Common Witness of Evangelism in Multipolar Asian Societies," and some 230 persons from 16 countries participated.

The participants had various discussions on evangelic and theological topics raised from The Asian situation but from different religious, political, and cultural backgrounds. In addition, about 10 persons representing Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and other religions also participated and sought plans for solidarity and cooperation in The Asian community guided by the spirit of justice and peace. Having the common experience of colonial rule, the participants succeeded in agreeing to pursue joint studies on 1) the gap between the rich north and the poor south and conflict between social strata, 2) ethnic and religious minorities, 3) inter-religious dialogue and solidarity, and 4) topics such as preaching, serving, human and social development, and international issues.

3) Problems Related to the Christian Cable TV(CATV)

A debate is going on about who will take the Christian Cable TV that will start operating next year. A heated last-hour competition is being launched between the CBS(Christian Broadcasting Company president, Rev. Kwon Ho-kyung) which emphasizes its representation from the Korean Protestant Churches and Comprehensive CATV Business Groups(chief director, Choi Soon-young) which emphasizes its financial capabilities. Both sides held public briefings and emergency meetings during the last week of May.

The CBS held a meeting of representatives of 12 congregations and other institutions that are members of the CBS on May 12, and a wider meeting of representatives of 46 congregations and 11 united institutions on May 13. In the meetings, the CBS announced that Comprehensive CATV will be run as a joint-stock company where 70% of the stock will be open to all congregations and other united institution, but no one stock-holder can possess more than 29%. Individual stock holders would not be allowed, it added.

Comprehensive CATV Business Groups, on the other hand, convened an emergency meeting on May 12 where 111 congregations gathered that were

participants to the Comprehensive CATV Business Groups's business consortium. The meeting asserted that the CATV channel should be given to the business body which had been evaluated highly by objective standards, the Comprehensive CATV Business Groups.

CATV Business Groups, having lost the initiatives in the heated dispute, began to criticize the government body in charge, the Ministry of Information, and demanded it to choose one from the four options they presented: 1) to permit Comprehensive CATV Business Groups to take the CATV, 2) for CBS and Comprehensive CATV Business Groups jointly to form a business consortium by 50-50 ratio under the guidance of the Ministry, 3) also under the guidance of the Ministry, to form a business consortium where CBS and Comprehensive CATV Business Groupstakes 40% each and the 20% remaining will be shared by congregations that wish to participate, 4) to induce a competition for good by allowing multiple enterprises for CATV.

Rev. Kwon, the president of CBS, said the Christian Churches should be able to stop such shameful behavior as shown in the dispute and manifest their potential strength by uniting and consolidating. He added that even though the congregational composition of CBS already represented more than 80% of the whole Protestant, CBS would be open to any further participation in order to achieve a genuine unity of the Church.

Chapter 18. Police Burst-in to the NCKK Office and National Rally for Peace and Reunification

1) Police Burst-in to the NCKK Office

On Sunday of 26 June, the police forcefully burst into the office of the National Council of Churches to take away some 400 sit-in workers belonging to the national council of locomotive drivers. The workers had been on a sit-in with the NCKK's permission on their union activities and in demand of the NCKK's mediation to the NCKK. The police subdued the Church by force as it actively began its role as moderator. This is a direct denunciation of the Church's role as shelter for those in need of protection.

After the burst-in, protest statements and sit-in's followed by the Chairman and the Human Rights Committee of the NCKK, the Seoul Presbytery of the Presbyterian church in the R.O.K., and other priests. Embarrassed by the strong tone of the protest, the Minister of Internal Affairs Choi Hyung-woo and the Head of the National Police Agency Kim Hwa-nam visited the office and apologized to the NCKK. The NCKK decided to accept the apology and set its position as to observe punishment of those responsible for the burst-in and follow-up measures for the 5 workers arrested after the take-away. The apology of the Minister was carried out by the invitation of the Advisers' Committee of the NCKK. The priests who were on the sit-in protest in the office were somewhat disappointed by this result because the fate of the arrested workers was ambiguously termed in the apology and continued their fast-prayer for more days.

On 12 July, "the prayer meeting for a peaceful solution to the railway and subway problems and in protest of the police burst-in to the NCKK" was held in the Christian building, organized by the Korea Association of the Christian Social Movement... and invited by the Human Rights Committee of the NCKK. In the meeting, the participants denounced the burst-in as a clear violation of the freedom of missionary work and a challenge to the Church, and demanded an apology from the President, immediate release of the arrested workers, and a transformation of the government's attitude towards workers from anti-labour position to negotiation-oriented one. They also attempted to launch a candle-lit demonstration on the street.

Though the police burst-in was somewhat concluded by the Minister's apology, it suggests many aspects to us. First one is the government's attitude towards a social conflict. The new government did not avert itself from the long tradition of solving a social problem consistently by sheer force rather than solving it by dialogue and negotiation or by structural reforms. The fact the police chose a Sunday to do the operation in a christian institution is a direct violation of the freedom of missionary work. The second one is the Church's responsibility. The Church should take a more active role in protecting and aiding those in difficulty and need, as well as in reforming structural cause of evil such as the third-party intervention law, singular trade union structure, political participation of industrial workers, etc.

2) National Rally For Peace and Reunification and Christian Conference for the Jubilee Year '1995

On 15 August, The National Rally for Peace and Reunification was held with the participation of non-government and religious organizations from Seoul, Taejun and 9 other localities. This event was a reduced form of the "'94 Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification" originally planned to take place all over the country. As the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification was held very successfully in 1993, it became a new model of non-governmental reunification campaigns and drew popular support from almost all sectors of society. With such popularity, 1994 year's plan included organizing one million people with arm in arm from Panmunjom to Cheju Island via Kwangju, Mogpo, Taejun and Pusan. The plan also aimed to be a national event with the participation of the 6 congregations and 5 nation non-governmental organizations.

However, the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification was reduced to National Rally for Peace and Reunification at the request of restraint from the government on 20 July. The authority requested to reduce the social impact of the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification because it considered "the north-south relation and political situation of the south are quite different from last year, and the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification would not help the reunification process".

In short, the government could not allow a civil action for reunification which is not under its control since the situation in the north was unstable

after Kim Il-sung's death. But, this is another way of expressing the government's lack of willingness or intention to acknowledge spontaneous, popular and peace-oriented civil actions participated by ordinary people, including the religious. The government seems to be burdened by the possibility that the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification may become a regular annual event of civil participation. If the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification 1994 were supported as 1993s, the regular organization of civil movement towards reunification would have lost its legitimacy in controlling such civil actions. In summery, the government showed again its determination for sole and official leadership in the north-south relationship.

On the other hand, the south headquarter for the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification was criticized for its prompt decision to reduce the event just by one request from the government, acknowledging the government superiority even in civilian cause for reunification. The national federation of the YMCA criticized the headquarter for its abuse of confidence in making the decision of reducing the event, and expressed regret that in the decision making progress the participating organizations were not fully asked for an opinion and the reduction was a violation of the original objectives of the Human Chain Rally for Peace and Reunification.

The reduced National Rally for Peace and Reunification left an important attainment in inter-congregation cooperation by holding 6 congregations in one place for one cause, but it also hurt the civilian reunification movement by light-heartedly accepting the government regulation and failing to achieve a consensus between the Church groups and secular organizations on the matter. The NCKK, in particular, cannot escape from criticism since it was the central body to organize the event despite the participation of the 6 congregations. The attitude of the NCKK, succumbing to the government pressure without any persuasive logic, lowered its authority by disappointing the public and the Church, which had an expectation for the NCKK to lead civilian participation for the reunification process.

Another event for reunification was held in Seoul on 16 August by the title "Christian Conference for the Jubilee Year 1995" and under the theme of "How We Will Receive the Jubilee Year 1995". In the discussion, Reverend Carino (general secretary of the NCC of the Philippines) gave a comprehensive interpretation for the Jubilee in that it is not just for the

peace and reunification of Korea but a new focus of cumenism. He praised highly the Korean Church's effort to connect the Jubilee to the peace and reunification issue, adding that we would have to discuss how the unity in Christ could be used as a basis for the future efforts to heal division and splitting of nations and states. He emphasized, too, that we must take the Jubilee as a new focus of ecumenical movement as it is the confession of all creatures and life forms before God in accepting following all their duty for Him.

In a thematic presentation of "New Start Towards the Jubilee Year", Reverend Lee Jae-jung noted the Jubilee was a new-history making movement with the participation of the whole nation and a concrete starting point for a peaceful and unified Korea. He urged that the Church present concrete alternative ideas for a unified Korea and work for a meeting of the churches in the north and south, inheriting the Zion spirit. The forum demonstrated, in a sense, the general enthusiasm of the Church towards bringing about some concrete fruits of the Jubilee discussions at a time of only one year before the Jubilee.

Chapter 19. Women's Ordination Proposal Passed at General Assembly of P.C.K. and Discussion on Reforming Ecumenical Movement in Korea

1) Women's Ordination Proposal Passed at General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea(PCK)

A proposal which allows women to give ordination was carried after 110 years since the PCK has been integrated. At the 79th joint general assembly held from September 8 to 14, the proposal passed with 701 votes in agreement, 612 votes in protest, and 8 in abstention, with a total of 1,321 representatives. Those representatives balloted after a prayer without a discussion. For this outcome, the women's council of PCK, Women Minister's Association of P.C.K., Women missionary council of PCK, Woman theological student's association of PCK exerted their efforts together. 63 years have passed since the same prproposal submitted by 102 female members and the chairperson of Hamnam presbytery of PCK was rejected in 1933.

The proposal inched one step forward to approval at the general assembly. The constitutional amendment committee revised the provision of a ministry from 'male over 30 years old' to 'male and female over 30 years old'. For presbyter, 'male and female, 30 and over who has considerable knowledge and leadership, and has joined the church for 7 years without a defect'. The revision on women's ordiantion, amended by the constitutional amendment committee will be effective if it goes through two thirds approval in the general assembly of 51 presbyteries. As a matter of fact, we have to wait for another year, before having woman ministers.

Even the Presbyterian Church and the Korean Methodist churches allowed women's ordination already, but more attention was drawn on the decision whether PCK allows it because the decision will have a considerable influence on all Korean churches. Many people assume that the PCK took an orthodox stance in the past and takes a moderate course in various roads of Korean churches. Thus, with this decision of the P.C.K. as a turning point, female's ordination should be allowed in all orders of Korean churches.

Furthermore, to make the proposal much more practical, every condition

should be arranged to promote active participation of women in the general church life. Even an order which already allows female's ordination has not so taken care of the policy to have the system firmly rooted. It's still very uncommon to name a woman as a minister in charge or presbyter. Thus, there is a need for the change in the way of thinking. Women's ordination should be regarded not as a mere consideration for women, but as a participating companion for the Gospel.

2) Discussion on Reforming Ecumenical Movement in Korea

NCKK greeted the 70th anniversary on September 30 since its establishment. The organization has contributed to the church renewal and unity of churches, democratization and unification movement of Korea, expansion of human rights as a leader of Ecumenical movement.

NCKK is however involved in the discussion on the reform of Ecumenical movement. There was shown a dispute on the Korean Bible Institute, and discordance in the choice of CATV. A trouble was in particular raised from the orders which belong to NCKK regarding the reshuffle of CBS.

There are many problems in the Korean Ecumenical movement. The first problem in the current Ecumenical movement is disunion and incapacity of associated organization of churches. That is, the highest organization which is separated into various missionary works is disunited and fails in its duty. The division of the organization seems to be related to the idea that the Ecumenical movement is merely separated in terms of progressivism and conservatism. Korean Ecumenical movement first started in 1924 with the establishment of the Korean National Christian Council which is the antecedents of NCKK and covered the whole Korean churches. NCKK, however has lost its influences as the country has been flooded with various orders due to the difference of view between theological schools and the Ecumenical movement line since the 1945 liberation. Thus, the movement was finally separated into two lines. First is the NCKK which represents the Ecumenical movement of progressive camp, and the second is the Christian Council of Korea which represent the conservative wing. Various devices are currently being designed to overcome the splited situation. Several plans came out such as the NCKK-led great association, the great association led by the christian Council of Korea, and the 3rd association. However more of them is fully supported yet.

The second problem is that the churches or representatives of each order which belong to the association seldom practice and promote accords as their own projects. For example, lay believers are not educated well on Jubilee, even though the Korean church association has set 1995 as Jubilee and prepared for it.

Third, there is a problem in the standpoint which views the quantitative development of Korean churches and the Ecumenical movement in a separate way. It is blamed that Korean churches have somewhat followed the malady of domestic society due to the bureaucratism within the association and absence of proper policies, though Korean churches have grown up in quantity. The Ecumenical movement and each church should point out and remedy social maladies, and exclaim the self-renovation together to overcome the criticism on the mere expansion of churches.

PCK brought up a proposal for the reform of the Ecumenical movement. The proposal is in substance as follows. First, NCKK should be born again with the Korean Presbyterian Church(Reformed), Presbyterian Church in Korea, Presbyterian Church of Korea(Daeshin), Jesus Korea Songkyol(Holiness) Churches attended. Second is to expand the scope of NCKK projects to meet with the emotion of each church. For instance, divinity training, restoration movement of morals and ethics, programs to search again the identity of Christian schools. Third is to secure the fairness, responsibility, and transparency together with democratic participation in the discussion.

The fourth is to open the system to allow other associations such as Christian Literature Society, YMCA join in the NCKK. The fifth is to guarantee women, the youth, laymen to participate in an institutional way. The P.C.K. hopes the NCKK could lead the reformation of Ecumenical movement.

The ecumenical movement should be future-oriented and play a pivotal role in the renewal of church and society, with the reviewing and learning of the 70 years' consequence of the NCKK.

Chapter 20. Approaching the Year of Reunification

As we approaching the year of Jubilee, the ecumenical movement is required to play more active role. On December 15, 1994, around 120 denominations of the Protestant church formed the Committee for Peaceful Unification(CPU), which is an expanded organization of the Preparatory Committee for Unification formed by 49 denominations.

The KNCC held the New Year's service according to the north and south joint liturgy agreed by the north and south churches in November 1994. It also prepares a second declaration on August 15, 1995, as a sequence of the 1988 declaration.

In order to carry out the scheduled projects of churches and to make them fruitful, it will be necessary to evaluate the current situation of ecumenical movement. In 1994, major argument in the movement was the issue of conflict among different denominations and of expanding the membership of the KNCC. This argument seems to be continued also in 1995, and only when these issues are settled in a desirable way, the Korean ecumenical movement will produce excellent results.

The CPU superficially seems to include almost all denominations of the Protestant church, but to make this real it needs more organized structure and practical projects. First of all, because the CPU was set up in a hurry, the process lacked sufficient discussions on the meaning and the objective of the organization. It succeeded in including denominations which were outside of the KNCC, But the internal atmosphere was so conservative that even the term "the Year of Jubilee" could not be used during the discussions. This was also true in the conference on expanding the membership of the KNCC.

The KNCC presented three prerequisite conditions for its membership in the Church Unity Commission (representative: Rev. Park Choon-hwa) held in November 1994. They are: to share the spirit of ecumenism, to be willing to participate in international solidarity, and to have national roots in Korea. Though these seem to be nothing more than general principles, they are significant in the meaning that they will activate the membership discussions among other denominations.

The membership argument has been continuously raised in the process of changing political atmosphere of the 1990s. The KNCC was including only 6 denominations among more than 100 denominations, and 28.9% churches among the whole Korean Protestant churches. In addition, experience from solidarity movement with other denominations outside of the KNCC, such as the Human Chain Movement added the possibility of expanding the membership.

The fact that subjects of the ecumenical movement are expanded is a welcome sign, but it should neither harm the spirit of the united movement nor be overwhelmed by quantitative problems. The spirit of ecumenism should not be dominated by a specific denomination or person, but the legacy and the process should be respected. First, satisfactory understanding and cooperation among the existing members of the KNCC should be prior to anything else, and from that point, discussions on reorganization should begin with critical examination and analysis on the structure of the KNCC.

Conclusion

The 1994 publication of The Korea Situation coincides with Kim Young-sam's second year in office and covers Kim Young-sam's attempts at reform and reform-related issues in terms of economics, politics, and unification policies and their implementation. The Korea Situation evaluates the two years of the Kim Young-sam administration since his inauguration.

1994 started off with election laws and politics-related laws. With the taking of office in 1993, the Kim Young-sam administration began its human purges by declaring election law reform, government organizational reform, and regarding the side effects of the structural reforms. The fact is, these reforms did not follow public accord or citizen support, but it was as if done through backstage politics. Needless to say, this resulted in many problems and dissent.

With the National Assembly Ratification of the UR, National Security Law enactment, and problems with inflation, the tensions between the controlling political party and the opposition have been mounting. The nationwide tax irregularity continues, and the everyday major disasters and accidents that occur cause the citizens to lose confidence in the government. Especially with the collapse of the Songso Bridge in the middle of Seoul, much doubt was cast on the entire national societal system and mistrust mounted in the Kim Young-sam administration.

Namely, the problem seems to lie in the fact that the reform objective was undertaken by one person, Kim Young-sam, who assumed the role as enlightened ruler and commanded the reforms with an unformed objective and without collective counsel. Moreover, the Kim Young-sam administration reform did not project a long-term outlook, and as a result, has been criticized for its myopia.

During the early stages of the Kim Young-sam administration, it effectively targeted military reform, real name financial transaction system, and favoritism to military personelle, and therefore won the support of the Korean citizen. However, from a non-government perspective of the average Korean citizen, the administration fell short in many aspects. There is a need to reorganize the oppressive rule of the late Korea's military administration

system and to instal and institutionalize a societal sense of value, but no such attempts have been seen. Subsequently the questions regarding independent reunification, the rural and urban poor who were alienated by the military dicatorship, the welfare of the entire nation, and the environment, have been ignored. The examination and rectification of certain past events such as the Kwang-ju situation and the December 12 problem, as well as many other events in history have fallen well below expectation.

On August 15, 1995, fifty years after liberation from the Japanese occupation, the 1994 administration's reunification policy unexpectedly adopted McCarthyism. Having resorted to conservative politics, this new government betrayed the expectations of all those concerned. Although north and south Korea were again plagued by complications that were in part the result of the north Korean nuclear weapons crisis, the issue turned out to be in regards to the north Korean and US theatrical compromise. But with the death of Kim Il-sung, the head of north Korea, the debates over a funeral address flared into McCarthyism, with an excuse to criticize and purge moderate reunification policy directors.

The 1994 Korean economy in one view has been praised for its economic stability and growth. Under this favorable view, the export and equipment investment index rocketed the entire GNP by 8%. But beyond the positive short-term phenomena are the continuing trend of failed and bankrupt businesses and the resulting instability, as well as the Chaebol-centered financial and business structure which in turn resulted in the public disdain over the government's lack of action.

The Kim Young-sam government, which was obsessed with the Korean recession during its early administration, failed to mature out of the past dictatorship policies toward growth and could not noticeably change the economic foundation. The truth is that there is no impartiality in the implementation of the Fair Transaction Law, that the privitization of public companies are exempt from this law, and that ultimately there is not a noticeable outcome from its application. The Financial Transaction Act could not uproot black marketeering, and with the impartial trade business, big corporation's sanction policy has transformed into a policy of gigantic Chaebol support. Especially in the privitization of public enterprises, the Chaebols expanded their diverse expansion into new business areas, and with their petty arguments have rubbed against public sympathy.

Moreover, administration regulation relief and process of domestic market opening, national economic strengthening, etc., are associated with business system adjustment process and should be resolved from a social prespective. However, this adjustment process has been working with no regards to the socially disadvantaged, medium and small producers, and others who were alienated from the structural adjustment process.

These processes have become the reason for critiquing the Kim Young-sam administration, with its "fading reforms" and "faux globalization efforts" since the second year in adminstration. Reform regarding Chaebols have been abandoned, and the reform of social welfare and standard of living has been ignored, with an excuse that the blueprint for the reform was lost.

The development of Korean society demands a new paradigm that contrasts from the late dictatorship's previous focus on quantity rather than quality and excessive emphasis on growth. Environmentally friendly economic development, consideration for the disadvantaged in society, proof of citizen support through counsel, human oriented policies, quality focus on social development, and other such ideas are important to Korean social development in the future.

The NCKK went through a difficult period where on June 26, 1994, with the police intrusion on the NCKK center, the problems with human chain rally, and finally the church group's assertion to dismantle the NCC. But on the other hand, the NCC reached its 70th anniversary on September 30, 1994. The NCC lead to the coalition movement, and church renovation, democratization and reunification, and human rights priorities. Within the quantitative growth of the Korean church and political and social change, the NCC is attempting to grasp a new position and function, as seen from the activities and efforts of this past year.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1 : Joint Statement of Korea NGOs on the 1994 APEC Summit

Appendix 2 : Statement of the Korea NGO Forum for Social Development

**Joint Statement of Korea NGOs
on the 1994 APEC Summit**

Position of the Korea NGOs on '94 APEC

**- *Towards People-Centered Development
and Transborder Participatory Democracy***

Today the second APEC Summit held in Bogor, Indonesia was attended by the presidents or representatives of 18 member states. Since the first APEC Summit in Seattle in November 1993, we have been observing closely the potential impacts of APEC on people in the Asia-Pacific region including Korea. In support of the statement released in Jakarta on November 12 by the NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region, we express our common position based on our reflections and discussions as follows:

Assesment of the APEC process

1.0. APEC, aiming at "Open Regionalism", has organized discussions at various levels in order to 'establish the world's largest free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific region by the year 2020.' We welcome that the governments in the Asia-Pacific region have made concerted efforts to promote cooperation in solving regional problems such as widespread poverty and unemployment. Reviewing the discussions and proposals at '94 APEC, however, we cannot but doubt that APEC can solve the basic socio-economic problems facing the majority of people in the Asia-Pacific region.

1.1. First of all, we note the undemocratic process leading to the '94 APEC Summit.

The proposals set forth by the so-called Eminent Persons Group (EPG) reflect only narrow business interests, rather than the broader interests of the larger sector of society including workers, peasants,

urban poor, women, and children, all of whom may suffer adverse effects of APEC. Furthermore, NGOs and labor unions representing civil society were excluded from the proposal-making and decision-making processes from the beginning.

1.2. We worry that APEC neglects social dimensions of economic problems.

APEC has not seriously considered the effects of economic and trade issues on the political and social lives of the people in the region. Due to market expansion and deregulation, transnational corporations (TNCs) have moved into the region with little regard to their ethical and social responsibilities. APEC has not taken the appropriate measures necessary to protect the human rights of socio-economic minorities who may suffer under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).

1.3. We note that APEC follows quantity-oriented economic development strategy necessarily accompanied by serious degradation of the environment and violations of human rights.

The World Summit for Social Development (WSSD) will take place in Copenhagen in March 1995. Many governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have directed serious efforts to seek global alternatives to the borderless environmental degradation, widespread structural poverty, unemployment, and other factors contributing to our present global situation in which 30,000 people starve to death every day. APEC, however, is not concerned with these alternative paradigms of "Sustainable Human Development" and "People-Centered Development" which will be discussed at WSSD.

1.4. We worry that the so-called "Development Dictatorship" justified by national security ideology and facilitated by limitless economic competition tends to be reinforced in the APEC process.

State-initiated economic development strategies which exclude voluntary participation of civil society may seem efficient and visibly successful, but in the long run, they will impede social integration as they widen the gap between rich and poor, uproot community values, and reinforce governmental corruption and inefficiency. Many APEC member states still justify their authoritarian rule by putting national security before the people's security.

Our demands of APEC member governments

2.0. Therefore, we strongly urge APEC member states to undertake the following:

2.1. First of all, APEC should try to solve by all possible means urgent human rights problems in the region, such as those in East Timor and Burma (Myanmar). APEC member states should urge the government of Indonesia to respect UN resolutions and to guarantee East Timor's right to self-determination. At the same time, APEC member states should urge the Burmese government to improve their human rights situation, starting with the unconditional lifting of the house arrest of Aung San Su Kyi.

2.2. APEC's economic development strategy should prioritize the full protection of the basic right to survive, the elimination of structural poverty, the reduction of the gap between each nation's rich and poor, as well as the gap between rich and poor countries within the region.

2.3. All APEC member states should ratify and observe major UN human rights treaties, in particular, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC).

2.4. All APEC member states should guarantee basic workers' rights, such as the right to organize and the right of collective action in accordance with the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO). They should also effect efforts to remove all forms of discrimination against women, including in employment and wages, in accordance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

2.5. All APEC member states should focus their efforts on protecting the environment in the Asia-Pacific region by means of instituting prohibitions on massive deforestation due to logging, bans on transborder movement of toxic waste and other environmentally destructive materials, bans on nuclear testing, development of alternative forms of energy friendly to the environment, and the reduction or prohibition of arms trade within the region.

2.6. All APEC member states should enact practical measures to protect the human rights of migrant workers which has worsened in recent years due to the increasing import and export of labor without appropriate social policies.

2.7. All APEC member states should establish and strengthen a cooperative network to solve various transborder social problems, such as the issues of refugees, child labor, human trafficking, sex tourism, and drug trade.

2.8. APEC should frame a "Social Charter" containing the aforementioned provisions and establish a "Regional Human Rights or Social Commission" to monitor and evaluate the APEC's implementation of these provision. In both institutions, NGO participation should be fully guaranteed.

Our demands of the Korean government

3.0. We demand the following of the Korean government.

3.1. The Korean government policy of globalization has been based on an ideology of "International competitiveness". The Structural Adjustment Program(SAP) which started with an open-market trend since the early 80s and signing of Uruguay Round should consider its effects on the socio-economically marginalized including workers and peasants. Furthermore, it should give special and much needed priority to medium-size industry over large industry.

3.2. Women workers in Korea have suffered most heavily under the SAP. Therefore, more equitable job training and priority employment in the public sector should be implemented. Also, corporate policies protective of maternity should be encouraged by an increase in the governmental budget for such policies as well as by a decrease in corporate taxes for companies instituting such policies.

3.3. Overseas capital investment and construction projects of Korean companies should not be accompanied by violations of the human rights of oversea workers and destruction of the environments. In particular, the Korean government should make special efforts to

protect the human rights of workers employed in Korean companies abroad. Machinery such as that used in the Wonjin Rayon Factory which was responsible for the deaths of numerous workers should not be allowed to be exported to other nations such as China. Also, the overseas construction project of unsafe nuclear power plants should be stopped.

3.4. The death of Aida, a female migrant worker from the Philippines, in the collapse of the Songsoo Bridege symbolizes the tragic situation of the approximately 80,000 migrant workers in Korea. The Korean government should draft legal and institutional policy for the fundamental improvement in the treatemnt of migrant workers and the protection of their human rights.

3.5. Economic development can be sustained only when accompanied by a consistent expansion of reform and democracy. We call for the immediate repeal of the National Security Law(NSL) and current labor laws which prohibit third party intervention, organization of parallel labor unions and political activities condemned by international representatives such as the UN and ILO. Recommendations by the committee on CEDAW should be ratified and implemented.

3.6. The Korean government should not manipulate the diplomatic activities in APEC Summit to divert the people's attention from domestic issues such as the indictment of those instrumental in the military coup of December 12 1979 (commonly referred to as the "12.12 Issue") and to create a political atmosphere favorable to the ratification of Uruguay Round Treaty.

The Resolutions of the Korean NGOs:

4.0. We believe that true globalization should promote progressive and universal values, such as human rights and democracy, among all states and peoples and should seek a common prosperity based on the interests and demands of the people. APEC should serve to realize such worthy goals in the Asia-Pacific Region.

4.1. We, in solidarity with other NGOs in our region sharing a similar vision, resolve to set forth our best efforts for realizing "People's

Regionalism," a true form of "Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation," and "People-Centered Development and Transborder Participatory Democracy" transcending national boundaries, peoples, and race.

End.

November 15, 1994, Seoul

Signed by:

National Alliance of Democracy and Unification in Korea (NADUK)

Korean Council of Trade Unions (KCTU)

Yongdengpo Urban Industrial Mission

Solidarity for Participation and Human Rights

National Congress for Unification and Democracy in Korea

Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD)

Korea Women's Associations United (KWAU)

Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM)

- In alphabetical order

Statement of the Korea NGO Forum for Social Development

11 March, 1995

1. Viewing the Conclusion of the Summit

As a joint forum formed in July 1994, the twelve Korean NGOs that participated the Social Summit and the NGO Forum '95 in Copenhagen have been working together with other NGOs of the globe in pursuit of a global humane society. Though the Social Summit has brought the issue of human and social development into the core of the governmental discussion, the government delegations of developed countries seem to have rather chosen symbolic statements, rather than concrete policies to alleviate poverty in the South and to lay foundations for sustainable social development. We of the KNFSD are reaffirmed that, as in Rio Conference on Environment(UNCED), the global issues of the present time cannot be effectively dealt with by governmental negotiations alone.

2. Towards a Human Livelihood

The KNFSD has repeatedly demanded the Korean government for renewed local and international policies for social development. The economic growth of the past three decades in South Korea has brought some positive effects such as elimination of the absolute poverty. However, the rapid economic development has also resulted in numerous social problems such as environmental disasters, disparities between the rich and the poor, serious human rights violations on the part of workers, peasants, women and other vulnerable groups. We are especially worried that this tradition is outreaching to the serious human rights violations against foreign workers both in Korea and in the Korean companies abroad. In this regard, we urge the Korean government to move away from the quantitative-expansive economic policies towards human-oriented qualitative development in accordance with the ideas set forth in the Copenhagen Declaration and the recommendations of the NGO Forum '95. In particular, we believe the government should:

A. guarantee all the political, social, and economic rights stipulated in the international human rights treaties. Especially, the government should ratify the ILO conventions and work to set 'national minimum standards for livelihood' to protect socially vulnerable groups.

B. prioritize environmental protection policies to heal the enormous harm done to the environment by the rapid economic growth, by earnestly implementing the Agenda 21 of the UNCED.

C. increase significantly the social welfare budget: the government should increase the present welfare budget of 1.18% of the GNP to the 20% of the national budget in accordance with the 20:20 pact.

3. Seeking Common Future for the Humankind

From the positive and negative teachings of the past economic growth, we believe South Korea should contribute much more and better to the sustainable development of the South. Especially, we would like to expect the government to deviate from traditional pursuit of national-interest to taking an active mediatory role to attack the disparity problems between the North and the South. In particular, the Korean government should;

A. energetically work with the developed countries to reduce or cancel the foreign debt of the poorest countries, with the condition that the recipient nations allocate more money to basic social development,

B. should work to provision financial resources for the social development of the South with the developed countries and urge the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to contribute to the social development of the South with new human development oriented policies,

C. should significantly increase its ODA which is now only 0.4% of GNP. We also recognize that 85% of the present ODA (US \$17.6 billion) is offered as loans as of 1995. We, therefore, urge the government to reduce this ratio to 20% as in most of the donor countries and condition the aid so that 20% of it be spent for social development of the recipient countries. The government should also set the policy-consultation structure for aid policies with NGOs in relevant fields.

4. From Copenhagen to Seoul

Till now, the South Korean government has not sincerely listened to the voices of Korean NGOs demanding renewed policies for social and human development. We note with a special concern that for reasons of political interest, the Korean government continued to withdraw itself from the disputes between the G77 and the developed nations in the Summit, rather than playing an active mediatory role.

However, we believe both the government and the NGOs in Korea can and should work better from now on to bring forward a sustainable human-oriented future for all the peoples of the world. For this, we of the KNFSD will continue to promote international solidarity and exert our best efforts in Korea by monitoring the follow-up measures and the duties of the state agreed in the Declaration and Program of Action signed here in Copenhagen.

KNFSD (KOREA NGO FORUM FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT)

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CISJD was founded in 1979 to make contribution, with christian perspective, towards the building a just and democratic society. The ecumenical movement in Korea perceived the diverse social issues which the Korean churches confronted in terms of missiological tasks and engaged in the process of bringing the solutions through such activities as democratization movement, human rights actions, Urban-Rural Mission. Through these and other involvements it became clear to us that besides these actions we must have the capacity for scientific analysis and critical reflection as well as presenting alternatives in order to solve the social problems. Therefore, CISJD was founded as a concrete expression of our common commitment for the ecumenical joint action.

CISJD, for the last ten years, has creatively pioneered and opened the way for the process of systematic research and publication on Reunification, Democratization and the Renewal of the Church. More than that, it furthermore served the ecumenical movement with its academic and intellectual competence.

This work will continue and it hopes to render much more effective service towards the unity and renewal of the churches everywhere.